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Abstract 
This thesis investigates how successive postwar British Governments formulated a civil 
defence policy aimed at ameliorating the effects of an enemy attack in the cold war. It 
shows that civil defence was a nuanced response to the prospect of nuclear attack 
framed in the changing political, economic and strategic contexts of cold war Britain. 
Beginning as a genuine life-saving measure, thermonuclear-era civil defence became an 
integral part of Britain's wider deterrence strategy. By locating civil defence within 
Britain's wider defence strategy, this thesis demonstrates the importance of civil 
defence as a key policy of the cold war state. It examines how civil defence policy was 
formulated, with studies of the effects of nuclear weapons and estimates of the 
consequences of an attack on British cities, and of the individual policies which were 
developed - especially evacuation, shelter, the voluntary Civil Defence Corps, and 
public information. It charts the changes in how civil defence was conceptualised and 
justified from the early cold war era to the period of detente after the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, details the responses to key cold war crises, and explains how economic 
retrenchment and developments in nuclear weapon technology, as well as detente, 
undermined civil defence policy and led to it being placed on a care-and-maintenance 
basis in 1968. 
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Introduction: Civil Defence Policy in Cold War Britain, 1945-68 
If an all-out global war had broken out between the NATO powers and the Soviet bloc 
over Korea in 1950, Berlin between 1958 and 1961, or Cuba 1962, what would have 
happened to Britain? How could the catastrophic effects of atomic and thermonuclear 
weapons be mitigated? How could Britain recover as a nation? These were the key 
questions asked by successive postwar British governments during the cold war, and the 
answers produced between 1945 and 1968 are the focus of this thesis. Between these 
two dates a large apparatus was constructed to plan for the eventuality of nuclear war, 
for saving lives during it, and for the survival of the nation afterwards. This policy of 
civil defence amounted to a major state response to the threats posed by the cold war, 
and as much as understanding the policies themselves, it is vital to evaluate how they 
were shaped by contextual factors such as the economic position of Britain and the 
nation's wider strategy. As well as its enormous strategic significance, civil defence 
policy was also important domestically, and another aim of this thesis is to integrate 
civil defence policy into the mainstream of postwar domestic British history. 
The importance of the cold war in the British national context has yet to be fully 
investigated. In the study of British foreign policy, work on the cold war gets short 
shrift compared to the welter of studies on the `special relationship', European 
integration and the end of Empire. ' In the domestic field, there has been scant work on 
the influence of the cold war, aside from the peace movement, 2 although this is 
gradually changing. 3 More work been completed in the diplomatic or military spheres, 
' An illustrative example: the only scholarly article to investigate the Eden Government's 1956 Policy 
Review - which had massive ramifications both for civil defence and for Britain's deterrent policy - 
deals 
with it from the perspective of Anglo-American relations: See K. Ruane and J. Ellison, `Managing the 
Americans: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and the Pursuit of "Power-by-Proxy" in the 1950s', 
Contemporary British History, 18: 3 (2004), 147-67 
2 The literature on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is large. The most useful material is 
Christopher Driver, The Disarmers: A Study in Protest, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964); Paul 
Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, (London: Croom Helm, 1988); Richard Taylor, Against 
the Bomb: The British Peace Movement, 1958-65, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); see also Holger 
Nehring, `The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Cultures of the Cold 
War', Contemporary British History, 19: 2 (2005), 223-41. 
3 H. Jones, `The Impact of the Cold War', in P. Addison and H. Jones, Blackwell Companion to 
Contemporary Britain, (Oxford: Blackwell's, 2005); T. Shaw, British Cinema and the Cold War: The 
State, Propaganda and Consensus, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000); and Diane Kirby's work on the religious 
response, D. Kirby, `The Church of England and the Cold War Nuclear Debate', Twentieth Century 
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with excellent and comprehensive accounts of the British nuclear deterrent. 4 Recently, 
sustained by archival releases, there has been an increasing interest in other aspects of 
British policy in the cold war - especially in the field of intelligence. 
5 But whereas the 
historiography of postwar Britain in general has served to shove the cold war off the 
centre stage, the reality is the cold war had an enormous impact. If one examines the 
preoccupations of British Prime Ministers up until 1964 one sees that the cold war was a 
constant, ominous concern. 
The reason for such preoccupations was relatively simple: the threat of nuclear war. 
The cold war was so frightening because of the potential destruction it would cause. 
Although this fear of destruction became a worldwide phenomena in the late 1950s and 
1960s, it was felt very early in Britain. For such a small, densely populated island, the 
consequences of nuclear war, even in its atomic phase, were markedly greater than they 
would have been for the larger, less intensively populated powers. Given this and the 
proximity of Britain to its potential enemy - the Soviet Union and its Eastern European 
satellites - it was clear from the advent of the atomic age that Britain would be 
peculiarly vulnerable to atomic attack. But whereas American scholars have produced 
rich studies of the political, social and cultural implications of the nuclear threat, British 
historians are only just beginning to do so. 6 
This fear was acutely felt at the highest levels. As an old man, Harold Macmillan had 
nightmares about two things - the Battle of the Somme (in which Macmillan was 
wounded) and what would have happened had the Cuban Missile Crisis escalated into 
all-out war. 7 James Chuter Ede, Home Secretary, 1945-51, admitted in 1954 that the 
British History, 4: 3, (1993), 250-83; D. Kirby (ed. ), Religion and the Cold War, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2003). 
4 See the two official histories of British nuclear weapons: M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: 
Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-52 (two volumes) (London: Macmillan, 1974); L. Arnold, Britain and 
the Hydrogen Bomb, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). See also, L. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear 
Weapons, (London: Macmillan, 1980); J. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence: British nuclear strategy, 
1945-64 (Oxford: OUP, 1995); S. Twigge and L. Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States 
and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000). 
5 See R. J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and cold war secret intelligence (London: John 
Murray, 2001); P. Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee saw the World, 
(London: John Murray, 2002). 
6 G. Oakes, The Imaginary War, (Oxford UP, 1994); L. McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 
(Princeton UP, 2000); P. S. Boyer, By The Bomb's Early Light, (New York: Pantheon, 1985). 
7 P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945, (London: Penguin, 2001), 
pp. 102-3. 
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thought of atomic war `oppressed me for every moment I was in office'. 8 For Churchill, 
in his last years of office, `saving the world from destruction in a reciprocal holocaust of 
H-Bombs' `increasingly dominated his mind' 9 . Perhaps most poignant was Clement 
Attlee's reaction to the atomic bomb. A Major in the Great War, and Deputy Prime 
Minister in the war against Hitler, Attlee told his colleagues three weeks after 
Hiroshima that `It is difficult for people to adjust their minds to an entirely new 
situation.... It is infinitely harder for people to realise that even the modern conception 
of war to which in my lifetime we have become accustomed is now completely out of 
date". 10 Adjusting to this shock, he questioned whether any defence could be mounted 
against such a weapon: 
Nothing can alter the fact that the geographical situation of Britain 
offers to a Continental Power such targets as London and the other great 
cities. Dispersal of munitions works and airfields cannot alter the facts 
of geography.... It would appear that the provision of bomb proof 
basements in factories and offices and the retention of A. R. P and Fire 
Services is futile waste. " 
Whether or not an attack with such weapons could be defended against was a significant 
subject in the first years after 1945, and Attlee's comments about the `futile waste' of 
Fire Services, Air Raid Precautions and the dispersal of industry raised the question 
which cold war civil defence was designed to answer. 
This thesis is an attempt to understand the political response to the threat of atomic or 
thermonuclear war, at least in the field of defending the civilian population from attack. 
It seeks to explain how and why civil defence policies were adopted, the reasoning 
behind their adoption, and how they changed and developed over the early cold war 
period. Overall, it seeks to explain how civil defence went from being a key aspect of 
the cold war British state in the late 1940s to a discardable and almost an embarrassing 
policy, by the late 1960s. By evaluating the changing context in which civil defence 
policy was formulated - economic, political and strategic - this transition from utility to 
expendability can be anatomised and explained. Britain's economic problems, the 
8 House of Commons, Official Report, 5.7.1954, col. 1823. 
9 R. Jenkins, Churchill, (London: Pan, 2002), p. 846. 
10 The National Archives, Kew [Hereafter NA], CAB 130/3. Atomic Energy Committee, GEN 75/1, `The 
Atomic Bomb', memorandum by the Prime Minister, 28.8.1945. 
11 Ibid. 
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changing and unpredictable tensions of the cold war, the technical developments of 
nuclear weapons, and the changing public perception of civil defence all help explain 
why civil defence policies were adopted as they were. The issues it raises and seeks to 
elucidate include: how the opposing strategic and economic needs of Britain were 
reconciled within civil defence policy; how civil defence policy kept pace with the 
development of new nuclear weapons; how civil defence policy was integrated within a 
wider theory of nuclear deterrence; and how the government handled the wasting asset 
that was civil defence. 
This analysis is possible solely due to the recent and continuing opening of the archives 
- the closure of which goes a long way to explaining the historical neglect civil defence 
has suffered. Before now, a chapter in Peter Hennessy's The Secret State was the only 
archive-based look at the issue. 12 Before Hennessy, books on civil defence came from 
investigative journalists, writing to reveal secret government preparations for war. 
Writers in the 1970s and 1980s had to go to great lengths to make the revelations they 
did, and their work speaks of a deep interest tempered by indignation that such things 
remained hidden for so long. 13 They were driven by anger that the government had, as 
they saw it, secret plans to fight a nuclear war, and were using the facade of civil 
defence to create an impression that nuclear war could be survived - and were thus 
duping the population into supporting the government's secret military machine. 
Although there is a degree of truth in this, the vast array of documents now available - 
and the figure grows almost monthly - tell a different story. Successive governments' 
civil defence policies cannot simply be dismissed and attacked as a shameful facade. 
They must be evaluated and understood. As will become clear, the government's public 
position on civil defence was often deliberately created to give an illusory impression of 
preparedness. The reasoning behind government policy - the aims, justifications, 
discussions, achievements and setbacks - are detailed here for the first time, and 
understanding of why civil defence policy developed the way it did is even more 
important than detailing exactly how it developed. 
12 P. Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War, (London: Penguin, 2003). 
13 P. Laurie, Beneath the City Street: a private enquiry into the nuclear preoccupations of Government, 
(London: Allen Lane, 1970); D. Campbell, War Plan UK: the truth about civil defence in Britain, 
(London: Burnett, 1982). 
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So in order to understand the how and why of cold war civil defence, a brief look at the 
main issues will provide an introduction to the themes which emerge throughout the 
period between 1945 and 1968. First is a very brief outline of the history of civil 
defence. Next is a discussion of the four big themes which shaped - and pulled apart - 
civil defence policy. After this comes an outline of four key civil defence policies 
which should highlight the importance of the four `constraining' themes and illuminate 
some of the difficulties inherent in civil defence policy-making throughout the twenty- 
three years after 1945. 
A Brief History 
In the Second World War civil defence was comprised of five elements: the air-raid 
warning system; the notorious and unpopular blackout; shelter provision; the evacuation 
of certain sections of society, essentially children and some mothers; and finally the 
ARP Wardens, who attempted to rescue those in bombed areas. 14 Some 300,000 people 
worked full-time, 1.6 million part-time, in the civil defence apparatus which divided 
Britain into twelve regions each controlled by a Commissioner. The organisation was 
designed to save lives but also to protect industry and property, ensuring the 
continuation of war production. After the war, as we have seen, a clearly worried Attlee 
believed that Britain's Second World War civil defence apparatus could not cope with 
atomic bombardment. When, after the shock of the Berlin blockade of 1948, Britain 
seemed likely to be under heavy attack again, the civil defence apparatus of the Second 
World War was to a large degree reconstructed from the existing model rather than 
created anew (although it would have been extended in size). The regional basis of 
command, including the actual boundaries of the regions remained similar. The core 
preoccupations of warning, evacuation, shelter and post-attack `ARP' (or post-1949, the 
volunteer Civil Defence Corps) all returned as the Cold War threatened to turn hot. 
Even the blackout was to be reintroduced. 
As the cold war developed, the various strands of civil defence grew or declined in 
importance. The blackout did not last long; shelters were believed to be vital to the 
survival of the nation but were never built; evacuation remained central to policy- 
makers, as did the Civil Defence Corps, until 1968. In the atomic age, as in 1939-45, 
14 For the official and full history of Civil Defence in the Second World War see T. O'Brien, Civil 
Defence, (London: HMSO, 1955); R. M. Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, (London: HMSO, 1950). 
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policy focused on both saving lives and on continuing production. It was hoped that 
even after atomic attack the country would still function and attempt to supply its armies 
overseas. This was `broken-backed-warfare', and a great deal of effort was expended in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s to plan for the continuation of industry. This was the 
principle which was meant to underpin all other planning and meant enormous sums 
were spent on stockpiling essential resources. 
The understanding of the new power of the hydrogen bomb which came after the Bikini 
Atoll explosion of March 1954 was to make these plans obsolete. In the years after 
1954, inspired by the Strath Report -a fundamental review of all civil defence plans in 
the face of the threat of fallout15 - civil defence plans tried to keep pace with the 
hydrogen bomb. The concept of `broken backed warfare' became untenable, the Strath 
Report believing that all the nation's resources would be needed to ensure Britain's 
post-attack survival and recovery. All civil defence plans were revised to secure this 
end. The first priority was reducing casualties through evacuation and shelter policy, as 
well as sufficient fire and medical services and the rescue work of the Civil Defence 
Corps. There would have to be a new government machinery to replace the one 
obliterated by the H-Bomb. To aid recovery there would have to be enormous stocks of 
food, oil and other equipment to allow the economic life of Britain to restart as soon as 
possible. '6 
In the years after Strath, from about 1956 onwards, it became clear that planning for 
recovery was beyond the limits of financial possibility (see Chapter 5). `Survival' alone 
became the dominant thought, with recovery measures such as stockpiling jettisoned. 
By 1960 the survival of Britain as a political entity was the only civil defence priority, 
to be secured by the government control system and little else - there was scant official 
faith in what was left of the life-saving capacities of the state (Chapter 6). But `public' 
measures such as the Civil Defence Corps continued until 1968 to help maintain public 
support for the deterrent, and it is the story of the changing priorities and evolving 
strategies of civil defence between 1945 and 1968 which is told in this thesis. 
15 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)3, `The Defence Implications of Fallout from a Hydrogen Bomb', Report 
by a Group of Officials, 8.3.1955. 
16 Ibid. 
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Constraints on civil defence policy 
Beyond this quick run through of the development of civil defence policy, it is 
important to understand the factors which determined how it developed in cold war 
Britain. There were four big, and interconnecting, themes; these were, firstly, the 
changing nature of nuclear attack; secondly, the events and changing nature of the cold 
war; thirdly, the precarious state of the British economy; and finally the need to present 
an image of a `survivable' nuclear war. The first of these was the dominant factor in 
shaping civil defence policies and priorities. Reviews of civil defence policy were 
largely instigated by developments in nuclear warfare. As the power of the weapons 
grew, and as the stockpiles of bombs did likewise, civil defence policies had to be 
amended, recast or discarded to meet the consequences of the likely scale of attack. A 
quick run through of the estimates of destruction illustrates how the scale of the task 
confronting the civil defence planners grew after 1945. 
In 1946 it was estimated that one atomic bomb on a British city would kill 50,000 and 
make homeless around 400,000.17 This estimate (along with the details of the effects of 
radiation on human beings) was used as the basis for all civil defence planning until the 
mid-1950s, and the power of the atomic bomb necessitated the concentration in civil 
defence policy-making on providing stockpiles of food and medicine, and the dispersal 
of industry and vital services away from the target areas. In 1953 it was estimated that 
the Soviet Union could deliver some 132 atomic bombs on Britain in a future war. '8 A 
report aiming to map out (literally - although no map is extant), what this scale of attack 
would mean believed it would leave 1,378,000 people dead and 785,000 seriously 
injured, with 10 million homeless. 19 Life, for the ordinary person, would be `a case of 
sheer survival or not'. 20 Even though the sea-change in nuclear warfare was still to 
come, by 1953 it was clear that the old notion of `broken backed warfare' was 
imperilled: an attack on this scale would have undoubtedly caused such destruction as to 
close down industrial production. 
17 Home Office and Air Ministry, The Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Report of 
the British Mission to Japan, (HMSO, 1946), pp. 18-19. 
18 NA, CAB 134/938. HDC(53)4, `Distribution of Air Attack on the United Kingdom', Note by the Joint 
Secretaries, 1.4.1953. 
19 Ibid. HDC(53)7, `The Initial Phase of a War', Report by the Home Defence Committee Working 
Party, 24.7.1953. 
20 Ibid. 
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The importance of this report was being absorbed when the hydrogen bomb was seared 
onto the world's imagination in March 1954 (Chapter 4). A year of frantic calculations, 
reports and meetings was capped by a fundamental review of civil defence policy 
completed by William Strath, a Treasury civil servant. 21 Strath attempted to get across 
the power of the hydrogen bomb which today, just as much as in 1955, is hard to 
conceptualise. We might think of it in the following way. If such a bomb was exploded 
over the British Museum in Bloomsbury, the area of total devastation would reach 
Maida Vale, Hampstead, Holloway, Whitechapel, Battersea and Lambeth. The Cities of 
London and Westminster, London Zoo and both Lord's and the Oval cricket grounds 
would be completely destroyed. Houses and buildings would collapse in Acton, Wood 
Green, Poplar, Tooting and Camberwell. Fires would be started as far west as 
Heathrow and as far east as Romford. It was estimated that an attack on Britain with ten 
such weapons would kill 12 million, seriously injure 4 million and the radioactive 
fallout would ensure that around 13 million survivors would be pinned down in their 
houses. The difficulties in providing medical or rescue aid would mean many of these 
people would also die. 22 One understands the focus on survival and recovery - but it 
was Strath's key belief that with adequate resources, civil defence could substantially 
23 reduce the effects of the hydrogen bomb. 
By 1960, however, stocks of the hydrogen bomb had developed enormously. It was 
then estimated that the Soviet Union could drop some 159 three megaton hydrogen 
bombs on 87 targets, leaving an estimated 8 million dead and 3 million injured from the 
instant, direct effects of the bombs. 24 Deaths from radiation in `average' fallout 
conditions would take the total to 21.5 million dead and 4 million injured. 
25 25.5 
million dead and injured would represent half of the country. What price recovery from 
such an attack? It was at this point that the belief that civil defence measures could save 
lives on any meaningful scale disappeared (Chapter 6). It also gave an additional spur 
to the preparations for a wartime machinery of government. 
21 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)3, `The Defence Implications of Fallout from a Hydrogen Bomb'. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. See also HDC(55)4, `Minutes of an informal meeting held on 16 March 1955', 17.3.1955. 
24 NA, CAB 134/2039. HDR(60)8, `Assessment of the Effects of Attack on the United Kingdom', Note 
by the Home Office, 5.4.1960. 
2 Ibid. 
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The second main theme is linked to this growth of nuclear weapons: the developing cold 
war. Although the advances in the power and method of delivering large numbers of 
weapons prompted wide-ranging or even fundamental rethinks of policy, it was the 
changing levels of cold war tension which usually acted as the main spur for actual 
preparations. To take an example, Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed the way Whitehall 
conceptualised civil defence (Chapter 1), but it took the Berlin crisis for the apparatus of 
cold war planning to be put in place in the form of the Civil Defence Act, 1948 and the 
formation of the Civil Defence Corps in 1949 (Chapter 2). Furthermore, it took the 
massive rise in tension following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 for work to 
begin on many of the physical preparations believed to be essential for survival 
(Chapter 3). It is this sequence of events which explains the steep rise of the civil 
defence estimates between 1949 and 1952/3 (Appendix A. 1). 
As well as providing spurs for future policy development, cold war crises caused 
immediate `crash' civil defence plans to be formulated. Over Berlin in 1948, and again 
in 1958-9 and 1961 (Chapters 5 and 6), paper plans on how some kind of workable civil 
defence apparatus could be implemented within a few months were pieced together. 
For the historian, they provide enormous insight into what was possible in the field of 
civil defence at any given time, and into just how under-prepared Britain was for any 
possible nuclear war. In general, however, the development of civil defence followed 
the pattern of technological developments causing fundamental rethinks of long-term 
policy, but the jolts of successive cold war crises ensuring actual physical preparations 
being completed. Hence paper plans were compiled or revised after 1945, by the Hall 
Working Party in 1953, by Strath in 1955 and by the Home Defence Review of 1960. 
But it took Berlin in 1948, Korea in 1950 and Berlin, 1959 and 1961 and Cuba in 1962 
to speed along the process of physical preparations. 
This factor also explains why the expenditure dropped so quickly after 1955: although 
the economic imperative was huge, as will be examined next, the strategic imperative 
for keeping spending high was absent. The relative lack of tension in the mid-1950s 
was a main factor in keeping civil defence expenditure low. If Berlin (both versions), 
Korea and Cuba could all bring about increased civil defence activity, then detente was 
equally important in diminishing it. Between 1955 and 1959 but more importantly, 
after 1964, the reduced tension felt in the cold war enabled those in favour of cost- 
14 
cutting to convincingly argue that the short-term risk of war did not justify large levels 
of expenditure on civil defence. Finally, in 1968 it was felt that the risk of war in the 
short-term was sufficiently small to justify ending civil defence preparations, although 
financial considerations were the main factor. 
The third major theme affecting civil defence policy, then, was the seemingly 
perpetually precarious state of the British economy and the ill-matched demands of the 
civil defence planners and the finances made available by the Treasury. For example, in 
1950 it was estimated that to provide an adequate civil defence policy would cost 
£936,093,000 over four years; it received £136 million. 26 Even in the post-Strath 
appraisal of the reduced potential of civil defence, Ministers agreed in principle to spend 
some £628 million over seven years, but not even the first instalment was met in full. 27 
Economic considerations always provided an upper limit to what civil defence 
preparations could be implemented, and when an economic crisis loomed, it was always 
an attractive policy to cut. For example, there were steep declines between 1955/56 and 
1957/58 (when the budget fell from £69.66 million to £21 million), and in the years 
after the election of the Labour Government in 1964 (from £24.1 million to £7.6 
million). The first of these cuts was initiated by the economic retrenchment ordered by 
the Eden Government in response to the recession of 1955-56.28 In a wide-ranging 
policy review designed to implement cuts, civil defence was identified as being ripe for 
pruning: and when the budget for the next financial year (1957/8) was announced, it had 
been reduced by over fifty per cent, with a catastrophic result on provision. 29 By 
abandoning those costly recovery measures, mainly the continued stockpiling of food 
and medical supplies, the government was able to save over £22 million. This left only 
`those home defence preparations the absence of which would be liable to undermine 
the deterrent'. 30 
After 1964 it was harder for the Labour Government to save money in the civil defence 
field. This was mostly because it had already been pared down to what were considered 
26 NA, CAB 131/8. DO(50)15th Meeting, 24.7.1950. 
27 NA, CAB 134/1245. HD(M)(56)1, `Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments', Memorandum by the 
Chairman of the Home Defence (Ministerial) Committee, 3.1.1956. 
28 NA, CAB 134. /1315. PR(56)3, `Future of the United Kingdom in World Affairs', 1.6.1956. 
29 Ministry of Defence, Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124, (London: HMSO, 1957) 
30 NA, CAB 134/1315. PR(56)8, `Home Defence Policy Review', Memorandum by the Minister of 
Defence, 7.6.1956.. 
15 
the bare essentials - mainly the `control system' and funding the very public Civil 
Defence Corps. Only by trimming, and then abolishing the Corps was the budget 
reduced to under £8 million from 1968. This final decision to abolish the Corps and 
place civil and home defence planning on a `care-and-maintenance' basis was a result of 
the Government's desperate attempt to cut expenditure in the wake of devaluation in 
1967. It is important, however, not to ascribe the reduction of civil defence policy at 
any point solely to economic imperatives - we must also stress the lack of any 
convincing strategic argument as to why cuts in provision should be resisted. If we take 
the care-and-maintenance decision as our example, we can see that although primarily 
motivated by economic factors, it was only possible because of the apparently reduced 
threat of war in the five years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and because the risk of a 
political outcry had also declined. 
The final theme is the government's controversial need to present an image of a 
`survivable' nuclear war. In brief, this was an argument put forward that millions of 
people would survive nuclear war and the Corps and other government preparations 
would save significant numbers of lives. This was the government's public position 
until well into the 1960s, but, as we have seen, it was realised within Whitehall that this 
was untrue from 1956 onwards. Therefore, there was an important divergence between 
the government's secret policy on the one hand, and its avowed policy on the other. As 
developments in nuclear war made life-saving even more problematic, the divergence 
grew. This civil defence gap rapidly became a millstone as it allowed the government's 
opponents to attack the `fallacy' of civil defence. It is this fallacy or facade, readily 
admitted to in secret Whitehall discussions, which has clouded thinking on civil defence 
ever since. Rather than highlighting the difference between the public and the private 
view to castigate civil defence policy as a sham, however, it is vital to understand that 
this `gap' was a vital policy itself, and one which impinged on all others from the mid- 
1950s. 
The Government had an entrenched public `discourse' on civil defence from the atomic 
era - one based on the life-saving capabilities of the state. In the thermonuclear age this 
continued up until 1956 at least, but circumstances precluded an open admission that 
civil defence on the scale provided by the government could not save lives. One was 
Whitehall's belief that admitting this would cause a clamour for measures the country 
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could ill-afford. Another was the nascent campaign to show that measures where 
`worthless' in the face of the hydrogen bomb. After Bikini Atoll in 1954, Coventry City 
Council announced it would not spend money on civil defence, which was `futile' in the 
thermonuclear age (Chapter 4). The Government openly and honestly refuted such a 
suggestion, and when two years later, the possibility of abandoning civil defence was 
raised, one argument against it was that `it would involve admitting Coventry was 
right'. 31 As the 1950s wore on, the government's desire to protect itself from criticism 
can be seen to be a reason for maintaining the image of the survivable nuclear war. The 
reaction to the 1957 Defence White Paper's statement that `it must be frankly 
recognised that there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the 
people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons 1 
32 
demonstrated to the government that the life-saving capacities of the state must always 
be stressed. 
A desire to avoid controversy was by no means the root cause of the decision to carry 
on a facade of civil defence policy. In fact such a policy was self-defeating: the larger 
the gap between image and reality, the easier it was to expose the fallacy and the more 
ridiculous the government was made to look. A classic example of this was the 
publication of the booklet Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear 
Attack, 33 which was published in order to maintain an impression of government 
preparedness (see Chapter 6), but resulted in its manifest limitations being pilloried by 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Rather, the `facade' policy was maintained 
largely on defence grounds - in order to maintain the credibility of the deterrent. From 
the mid-1950s it was felt that scrapping civil defence or admitting it could not save lives 
would endanger the credibility of the deterrent by undermining public confidence in the 
government to successfully resolve a crisis and by encouraging the Soviet Union to 
believe that nuclear attack would not be launched because of the fractured nature of 
public opinion. This seems obtuse, rather tenuous reasoning, but from the mid-1950s 
this became the fundamental justification for continued civil defence measures, and, 
therefore, the `facade' policy. Although at first intuitively felt, this link between civil 
31 NA, CAB 21/3508. `Prime Minister's Brief on PR(56)19, Home Defence', Note by Sir Norman Brook, 
13.7.1956. 
32 Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124, (London: HMSO, 1957), p. 2. 
33 Home Office, Civil Defence Handbook No. 10: Advising the Householder on Protection against 
Nuclear Attack, (HMSO, 1963). 
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defence and the deterrent was comprehensively investigated in 1960 and the role of 
supporting the deterrent by creating an illusion of preparedness became the only civil 
defence rationale in the 1960s (see Chapter 6). 
These four factors defined what civil defence policies were needed and what was 
possible, and explain how civil defence developed as it did. Together they show why 
civil defence preparations could never be undertaken on a scale that would approach 
adequacy. Nuclear weapons were too powerful, and economic resources were too 
scarce for large-scale civil defence measures. Also, the short-term imperative for civil 
defence measures was sometimes present, sometimes absent. In later years, until 1968, 
the impossibility of a successful civil defence policy did not result in its demise - it had 
become an indispensable, if controversial and troublesome, part of the government's 
wider defence policy. 
The development of certain key civil defence policies 
As civil defence policy developed between 1945 and 1968 it became apparent how the 
whole conceptualisation of the policy and its individual elements were affected by these 
four big themes. What of the policies themselves? Focussing on four which illustrate 
how civil defence developed over the course of the period - the Civil Defence Corps, 
Evacuation, Shelter and the wartime Machinery of Government - will allow us to 
connect them with the big themes just outlined and elucidate the complexities of civil 
defence policy as a whole. 
Given its size, it is remarkable that the Corps has not been the subject of any sustained 
historical work. The contrast with the voluminous work on CND is enormous, 34 but the 
Corps had more active participants. The Corps and the allied services numbered 
500,000 in the mid-1950s. Even when the untrained were weeded out after 1961, the 
Corps numbered comfortably over 200,000 volunteers. CND had no national 
membership system in this period, but the highest attendance figure at the annual 
Trafalgar Square march was between 100,000-150,000. At the very least, the story of 
the Corps deserves to share the limelight with CND. 
34 See footnote two, above. For a typical example see D. Sandbrook, Never Had it So Good: A History of 
Britain from Suez to the Beatles, (London: Little, Brown, 2005), which has a lengthy section on CND, but 
does not mention civil defence or the Corps. 
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As mentioned above, the Civil Defence Corps was the public face of the government's 
civil defence policy. Formed in 1949 after the Berlin crisis, the issue of postwar 
voluntary civil defence services had been under review in the Home Office since 1946. 
It consisted of five sections which covered the whole gamut of wartime operations - 
from alerting, rescuing, providing basic medical care and aiding the newly homeless. It 
began recruiting on 15 November 1949 and quickly became an enormous volunteer 
force: with 338,366 members in England and Wales at its 1955 peak (see Appendix 
A. 2). In addition to the Civil Defence Corps, three other organisations of much smaller 
size made up the combined Civil Defence Services: the Auxiliary Fire Service, the 
National Hospital Reserve Service, and the Special Constabulary. All these groups 
undertook training on a limited part-time basis. 
Although the figures for volunteers were impressive, making the Civil Defence Corps 
one of the largest voluntary bodies ever seen in Britain, they never met the high 
expectations of the Home Office. The legacy of the Second World War may explain 
why the Home Office had such high expectations, and why they were disappointed. It 
was clearly hoped that the volunteer spirit that had driven the civil defence services of 
the war could be harnessed for use in the cold war (see Appendix B. 6). To a large 
extent it worked, but when public opinion was analysed in 1952, it was found that the 
public's attitude to the Corps was often based on the `reluctance of a people recovering 
from the strains of a long war to turn their minds to the danger of another war which 
might invade their homes with even more devastating force and to the need once again 
for Civil Defence'. 35 As the 1950s wore on, the Corps' character as a group made up 
largely of Second World War veterans made recruiting younger members of the public 
difficult. Moreover, the image of the Corps as an `anachronistic survival which has 
lingered on from the war' adversely affected the public view of the effectiveness of civil 
defence. 36 This explains why, despite a concentration on images of community, family 
and self improvement from 1954 onwards, recruitment did not increase (see Appendix 
B. 8,10-14). 
35 Home Office, First Report of the Advisory Committee on Publicity and Recruitment for the Civil 
Defence and Allied Services, Cmd. 8708, (HMSO, 1952), p. 3. 
36 NA, CAB 21/4762. `Motivational Factors and Recruitment to the Civil Defence Corps', report by 
Market Research Department, F. C. Pritchard, Wood & Partners Ltd, October 1960. 
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Moreover, the published membership did not translate into operational strength, as not 
all of the volunteers had undertaken the training to be considered `effective' members of 
the Corps. In 1961, for example, it was estimated that of a nominal strength of around 
320,000 less than 150,000 could be called `effective' members. 37 This figure was 
calculated in the context of a review of the Corps which aimed to overhaul the service 
and make it more relevant to the new conceptualisation of nuclear war by improving 
training and weeding out those unwilling or unable to complete it. This reorganization 
after 1961 explains the decline in numbers experienced in the early 1960s (Appendix 
B. 1). As part of the general decline of civil defence, the Rescue and Ambulance 
sections were scrapped in December 1966,38 and the rump was abolished in January 
1968 when Harold Wilson announced the care-and-maintenance policy. 39 
Throughout the Corps' life its `purpose' underwent a dramatic change. In the atomic 
era it was considered an essential life-saving organisation. Although publicly its role 
did not change, within Whitehall it was understood that in the hydrogen bomb era, its 
life-saving role would be limited. It continued because, in the words of a 1965 report: 
`for the general public, the Corps is the only manifestation of an active civil defence 
policy.... Abolition of the Corps might be equated with a policy of complete 
unpreparedness'. 40 The centrality of the Corps in the public conception of civil defence 
meant that its vigorous promotion presented an image of preparedness in the early 
1950s. Equally, the Corps' new efficiency after the 1962 review may have been able to 
salvage the image of a `survivable' nuclear war had the intervening years not destroyed 
such a notion. One of the key consequences of the lethargy prevalent in civil defence 
between Strath and the 1960 Home Defence Review was the collapse of a viable 
alternative to the CND narrative of the apocalyptic nuclear war. Had the reorganisation 
of the Corps occurred five years earlier, the Government might have been able to defend 
its position more credibly. 
When formulating our second policy, evacuation, there were two different factors. The 
first was the necessity of minimising disruption to the economic life of the country, and 
37 NA, CAB 134/1477. CD(62)1, `Civil Defence Corps and Auxiliary Fire Service', Memorandum by the 
Home Secretary, 18.1.1962. 
38 House of Commons, Official Report, 14.12.1966, cols. 458-9. 
39 House of Commons, Official Report, 16.1.1968, col. 1586. 
ao NA, CAB 134/2046. HDR(CD)(65)14, `Home Defence Review Committee: Report of the Sub- 
Committee on the Civil Defence Corps', 16.7.1965. 
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the second was the limits on the numbers of people who could be decanted into the rural 
areas in a short space of time and the space available for evacuees when they got there. 
In 1949 it was hoped that 4.5 million could be evacuated at short notice (it had been 1.5 
million in the war). 41 In 1950, a complicated new scheme was developed which hoped 
to `disperse' an extra 1.5 million key workers from `central key areas' to safer `cushion' 
areas on the outskirts of the key target areas such central London, Birmingham and 
Glasgow. 42 
Like all other policies, evacuation was turned upside down by the hydrogen bomb. The 
key decisions of who was to be evacuated, and how many of them were to go, were 
thrashed out as part of the general post-Strath discussions. Strath argued for evacuating 
the priority classes (after 1954, all mothers with children under 18 were to be evacuated 
with their children), but also argued that workers in essential services should be 
`dispersed' from the central target areas, while `the remainder should be expected to 
stay at work in the high risk areas but should be safeguarded as far as possible by a 
scheme of local dispersal analogous to the sort of dispersal which already takes place 
nightly from the centre of London to the periphery'. 43 This translated into evacuating 
some 14 million people and `dispersing' 2 million more. An alternative scheme 
suggested evacuating, or attempting to, the entire population of the `evacuation areas' - 
some 24 million people - but this scheme was rejected as impracticable. In the end it 
was decided to return to evacuating only the priority classes in a reduced number of 
`evacuation areas' - some 11 million. 
44 It was felt that any scheme significantly larger 
would be unworkable, and that any scheme which breached the `women and children' 
first principle of the priority classes would raise the difficult questions of which workers 
should be evacuated and where from? Evacuating some men, it was felt, would 
encourage others to flee the cities. By keeping to the priority classes, it was hoped 
workers would stay in the cities secure in the knowledge that their families were being 
safeguarded under the aegis of the state. 
'1 NA, CAB 134/80. CD(M)(49)8, `Outline Plan for Evacuation and Care of the Homeless', Report by 
the Official Committee on Civil Defence, 19.7.49. 
42 NA, CAB 134/81. CD(M)(50)7, `Evacuation and Dispersal Policy in Phase III', Memorandum by the 
Chairman of the Official Committee, 3.5.50. 
43 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)3, `The Defence Implications of Fall-out from a Hydrogen Bomb' 
44 NA, CAB 134/1206. CDC(56)2°d Meeting, 6.2.1956. 
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By 1959, however, even this scheme had to be abandoned. The expansion of the Soviet 
nuclear arsenal made it clear that the eastern half of Britain would not be suitable for 
receiving evacuees as the many airfields made these areas highly dangerous - meaning 
much space less for receiving evacuees. A new scheme argued that by evacuating the 
ten largest conurbations only (and again reducing the size of the evacuation areas), 
5,800,000 could be evacuated. But there was a fundamental disagreement over the 
practical worth of evacuation itself and no scheme was approved. Some argued that 
evacuating priority classes before war began would encourage others to flee the cities, 
thus crippling British industry and `lose in advance the war which it was the object of 
the deterrent to prevent'. 45 Others, of course, argued the opposite. 
This episode illustrated the problems within civil defence between 1956 and 1960: once 
the Strath concept of saving lives had been rejected for financial reasons, there was no 
underpinning philosophy guiding civil defence preparations. There was great 
uncertainty over which policies were worthwhile or not, and this uncertainty resulted in 
a loss of confidence about civil defence in general. All this meant that when a rigorous 
response to the rise of CND was needed the government was found wanting - 
vacillating, unsure, and without new policy initiatives because no-one could agree if 
they were worthwhile and because the government was scared of being attacked by 
CND. It all combined to create a paralysis within civil defence policy-making. 
The key civil defence policy of these years is summarised by the following statement by 
the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, in the Cabinet Defence Committee in September 
1958: 
any change in the existing policy, whether directed to expanding or 
curtailing the limited preparations already being made, would be liable to 
attract attention and so to provoke discussion of an issue to which public 
opinion appeared at present to be remarkably indifferent. The wisest 
course, therefore, would be to continue the present policy... and realising 
that its main purpose was to maintain the morale of the population rather 46 than to provide them with any effective protection against nuclear attack. 
as NA, CAB 134/1476. CD(59) 1 S` Meeting, 25.3.1959. 
46 NA, CAB 131/19. D(58)18`h Meeting, 10.9.1958. 
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The years 1960-62, however, saw a renaissance of civil defence policy-making after the 
slumbers of the previous few years - and evacuation was back as a central part of it 
(Chapter 6). It was accepted by Ministers on the grounds that having to admit to not 
having a policy would be extremely embarrassing and would lead to increased support 
for the government's anti-nuclear opponents. Therefore a6 million scheme was 
discussed, although by the time consultations with the local authorities had finished, the 
scheme had been raised to a politically valuable, but frankly unworkable, figure of 9.5 
million. 47 
On our third policy, shelter provision, there was no such agonising - from early on the 
public provision of shelter was fiercely resisted on ground of cost, and only once did a 
major Minister argue for its adoption. After Gwilym Lloyd-George (Home Secretary) 
failed to secure a commitment to shelters in the wake of Strath, the issue was never 
seriously raised again. The appeal of shelter was simple - it would save millions of 
lives. In an atomic attack, adequate shelter on the lines proposed in 1950 would save 
75-80% of the casualties. In the thermonuclear era, millions of lives would be saved if 
fallout shelters were constructed. The drawback, however, was even simpler: it would 
be hugely expensive. When Lloyd-George proposed spending £1,250 million over 
twenty years on shelters, he argued that `alarming as these figures are they would not 
appear so to the man in the street while we are spending some £1,500 million a year on 
defence'. 48 He also believed it would be vital in terms of public morale to build 
shelters. 
The case for shelters was, however, dismissed, just as it had been in 1946 and 1950. 
The benefits of shelters were admitted, but the cost was seen as too high. It was 
suggested that in time the shelter programme would compete with the deterrent for 
funds, and that, in any case the money for shelters would be better spent on bombers. 
Another concern was that shelters would not boost morale. 49 But in the final analysis, 
shelter policy was always decided by money - even to the point of avoiding discussion 
of the issue. As Attlee put it in the Berlin summer of 1948, `it was... essential to avoid 
47 NA, CAB 129/108. C(62)26, `Home Defence: Dispersal Policy', Memorandum by the Home 
Secretary, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister of Housing and Local Government, 
9.2.1962. 
48 NA, CAB 134/1245. HD(M)(55)10, `Shelter Policy', Note by the Home Secretary, 25.10.1955. 
a9 NA, AIR 8/1836. `Brief for Under Secretary of State for Air and the Chief of the Air Staff on Shelter 
Policy', 6.12.1955. 
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a situation in which the Government would be driven to devote resources to civil 
defence on a scale which would cripple the national economy, detract from our power 
of offence and alienate our allies in Western Europe'. 50 If there was an underpinning 
ideology of civil defence in cold war Britain, this is it: that the security of Britain was 
tied to its economic prowess and power of attack - and a `passive' measure such as civil 
defence could not be allowed to detract from either. 
Our final policy, the machinery of government in war, in stark contrast to shelter, 
evacuation and the Civil Defence Corps, was a policy which grew in importance as the 
cold war developed, and by the 1960s became the defining civil defence policy. It is the 
aspect of policy which has intrigued people the most and which was considered most 
sensitive; conversely, it is area in which most material has been released under the 
Freedom of Information Act. In brief, this is how the Britain was to be governed in war, 
although the exact nature of the controls changed as nuclear weapons developed. There 
was to be a central government headquarters from which Britain would be governed 
(see Chapter 4). This exists today in decommissioned form under Box Hill, near 
Corsham in Wiltshire. It went under various names during the cold war: 
SUBTERFUGE, STOCKWELL, BURLINGTON and TURNSTILE. In 1955 it was 
envisaged that there would be a second headquarters, in case Corsham was destroyed 
(this site was called MACADAM, QUADRANGLE, then LINSTOCK). Below this the 
country would be divided into some twelve regions, and each of these would be 
governed from a Regional Seat of Government. Beneath these RSGs there would be 
further sub-Regional controls, and then local war rooms and at street level warden posts 
staffed by the Corps. 51 The aim was decentralisation and flexibility, with the realisation 
that communications would collapse and regions would be cut off. With military help, 
each locality might have to fend for itself in the immediate post-attack phase. The key 
aim of the government after attack would be to restore central control and thus prevent 
the spread of anarchy. 
The wholesale system of control from Corsham to street-level Warden Posts was never 
fully constructed (Chapter 6). The programme, like so much else, meandered along 
under financial constraints until the 1960 Home Defence Review, when it was decided 
50 NA, CAB 130/41. GEN 253/ls` Meeting, 1.10.1948. 
51 NA, CAB 134/2039. HDR(60)9, `Current Home Defence Policy and Preparations', Note by the Home 
Office, 6.4.1960. 
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to speed up construction and complete the system by the mid-1960s. Before all the 
Regional Headquarters were built, however, a pamphlet was published in 1963 which 
announced to the world not only the existence of the RSG system but the locations and 
even the telephone numbers of the buildings. 52 After this, the system was abandoned 
for the eminently sensible reason that given that the details had been published and 
distributed among the protesters on the CND's annual Aldermaston march, it was a fair 
bet that the Soviets would know as well, and place them on their target list. This was in 
spite of a deeply unconvincing argument by the Home Office that the Soviets would not 
attack these installations because they were concerned with post-attack governance 
rather than the nuclear deterrent. 53 In place of RSGs, an ad hoc system was created 
which involved the previous RSG staff moving into their designated region and 
occupying some building left standing after the attack - either the old headquarters or 
one of the new Sub-Regional Headquarters which were to be set up - two or three in 
54 each region (Chapter 7). 
The machinery of government became such an integral part of the plans to deal with 
nuclear war because the boundaries of the possible were continually shrinking. By 1955 
the old policies designed to help Britain fight a war were dead - all the government 
could do was hope for survival. As the thermonuclear age wore on, even life-saving 
plans seemed unworkable and that left maintaining an infrastructure capable of gradual 
and painful recovery the only realistic policy. Like so much of civil defence planning, 
the contrast between the planners' vision and what was actually constructed remained 
huge. 
Definitions, Sources and Limitations 
Before the story of civil defence policy is told in detail, the term itself needs explaining. 
Throughout this period there were two terms for what is discussed here as civil defence, 
but it is important not to impose too great a division between the terms `civil defence' 
and `home defence'. It has been argued that civil defence `was concerned with the 
British people during and after an attack on the UK' and included measures such as 
52 NA, CAB 21/6027. Spies for Peace, `Danger! Official Secret: RSG-6'. 
53 NA, PREM 13/23. Sir Frank Soskice to the Prime Minister, 18.12.1964. 
sa NA, HO 322/354. `Home Defence Committee: Civil Defence Planning-Sub-Committee. The Wartime 
Control System in England and Wales: The Location of Controls', draft note by the Home Office, 
October 1966. 
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`evacuation, shelter, food provision and emergency hospitals', whereas `home defence 
covered a much wider area of both civil and military preparation which aimed to ensure 
national survival during and after air attack', and included policies such as `the 
machinery of government in war, strategic location of the industry, town planning and 
stockpiling' . 
55 
This view, though roughly correct in terms of atomic-age official doctrine, does not take 
account of the essentially fluid nature of the uses of terms throughout Whitehall, let 
alone among the wider public. Harold Wilson conflated the two terms when 
announcing the care-and-maintenance policy, 56 and in 1967 Home Office officials 
argued that civil defence was `the organisation by means of which, if nuclear war 
seemed imminent, all the resources of the nation - central, local, industrial and 
voluntary, could quickly be co-ordinated in pursuit of one single aim - to ensure our 
survival as a nation', 57 embracing all the measures given above as amounting to Home 
Defence. 
Over the course of twenty-three years from 1945 to 1968 civil and home defence were 
largely interchangeable terms. For example, although there were for brief period 
between 1955 and 1957 a Ministerial Civil Defence Committee (CDM) and a 
Ministerial Home Defence (HDM) Committee, the experiment was scrapped and a 
reconstituted Ministerial Civil Defence Committee undertook the work of both. On the 
official level, this conflation was even more marked. Although the Official Committee 
on Civil Defence (CDO) served under the Home Defence Committee (HDC) between 
1953 and 1966, it conducted detailed work on stockpiling and town planning as well as 
on `narrow' civil defence life-saving measures. HDC oversaw this work and other war 
planning work, but usually reported to CDM. The structure charts at Appendix C 
illustrate these divisions. Perhaps most important was the fact that general war planning 
and post-attack life-saving measures were both co-ordinated by Sir Norman Brook 
(Cabinet Secretary, 1947-63), who essentially oversaw civil defence policy and war 
planning from the early 1950s until his retirement. Even after his retirement, in his new 
ss N. Bliss, `The Role of Sir Norman Brook in the Construction of the Cold War State, 1945-51'. 
Unpublished MA in Contemporary British History thesis, Department of History, Queen Mary, 
University of London, 2000. 
56 House of Commons, Official Report, 16.1.1968, col. 1589. 
57 NA, HO 322/44. General Cyril Horton to Air Vice Marshall Sir Walter Merton, 3.1.1967. 
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role of Chairman of the BBC, he had a decisive role in the controversy over The War 
Game (see Chapter 7). Brook's hand, hidden from the public gaze, was palpably on the 
tiller throughout this period. 
In general, however, it is important to identify the shift, outlined above, between the 
traditional, or `narrow' view of civil defence as life-saving operations, and a wider 
policy (sometimes called home defence) which concentrated on both saving lives and 
preparing for national survival. The different terminology, never uniform, was 
undoubtedly due to an official desire to avoid uncomplimentary comparisons between 
cold war provision and the `classic' civil defence policies of the Second World War. 
One example of this was evacuation being renamed `dispersal' in 1962 (Chapter 6). In 
this thesis, civil defence is mostly preferred, but there is no hard and fast rule and `home 
defence' is used when the context demands it. 
The policy which exemplifies the difference between civil defence in its Second World 
War form and its thermonuclear-era incarnation was the construction of an alternative 
wartime machinery of government. The recent release of files on this subject under the 
new Freedom of Information regime which means that the British cold war nuclear state 
can almost be fully reconstructed. It is no exaggeration to state that seven years ago, 
this thesis could not have been written in the same form. Its purpose is to reconstruct 
what happened and why, to examine the origins and outcomes of key policies and to 
understand how civil defence evolved from 1945 to 1968. It is a story which has not 
been told before. A great deal has been discovered, but such a thesis cannot cover 
everything, and there are important gaps. One is the role of the armed services in civil 
defence policy, another is how civil defence policy was implemented on the ground by 
the local authorities. Yet others include how the Civil Defence Corps was recruited, 
trained and operated, the whole interaction between the government and the Women's 
Voluntary Service, and important measures such as the emergency ports scheme. All 
these facets deserve greater attention, and hopefully in time they will receive it. But at 
least now future scholars will have a firm base from which to launch their historical 
enquiries. 
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Conclusion 
Civil defence policy can seen to develop along broad lines, from a genuine attempt to 
save lives and fight a war in the atomic age (1945-54), to planning life-saving and 
recovery measures (1954-56), to an inconsequential drift as the government cut 
spending and lacked the confidence to publicise plans (1956-1960), to another genuine 
attempt to recast civil defence on modern lines (1960-63), and then finally the 
realisation that as nuclear arsenals, detente, and economic pressures increased, the 
utility of civil defence preparations decreased (1963-1968). The following chapters 
follow a chronological structure - old fashioned but vital if the changes and debates 
around civil defence policy are to be sufficiently understood in their inseparable context 
of developments in nuclear technology and the spasmodic crises of the cold war. 
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The Response to the Atomic Bomb, 1945-48 
On the afternoon of 27 March 1945 the last German bomb (a `V2') delivered to the 
United Kingdom in the Second World War exploded in Orpington, Kent. Over three 
years later, during the Berlin blockade, the world appeared to some to be on the verge of 
another war. In civil defence terms, the blockade has been seen as the spur to rapid 
mobilisation of civil defence measures which remained in place. ' While it is true that it 
took the Berlin crisis for these measures to be introduced, the policy had been 
formulated earlier, and the summer of 1948 saw a frantic attempt to implement such a 
policy rather than draw it anew. Cold war civil defence policy had been pieced together 
gradually from the end of the war and was completed just days before the Berlin crisis 
erupted. This chapter will outline this early formulation of civil defence and explain the 
factors which shaped it. Most of all, it will place this investigation of civil defence 
within its context of Britain's broader response to the atomic bombs exploded over 
Japan in August 1945. Only when the significance of the atomic bomb was understood, 
its effects quantified and its implications for future war investigated, were planners able 
to produce a civil defence policy which had real relevance in the new atomic era. 
The Legacy of the War 
Despite expectations that the first sixty days of sustained attack could kill over 600,000 
people, 2 the German bombing offensive against Britain produced little strategic gain. In 
fact, as Basil Collier puts it `the two months offensive against London failed to do 
mortal injury to the British capital', 3 and in the famous subsequent raid on Coventry, 
`no irreparable damage had been done' .4 Civil 
defence preparations did much to ensure 
the estimated deaths did not materialise. As we have seen, the key elements of Second 
World War civil defence remained central to its postwar conceptualisation: the air-raid 
1 Both D. Campbell, War Plan UK and P. Hennessy, The Secret State begin their respective accounts of 
cold war civil defence by stressing its genesis in the shock of Berlin. 
2 T. O'Brien, Civil Defence, pp. 15-16,142-44. 
3 B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, (HMSO, 1957), p. 258. 
4 Ibid., p. 265. 
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warning system; the blackout; shelter provision; the evacuation of certain sections of 
society, essentially children and some mothers; and finally ARP. 5 
There were certain key lessons learned from the experience of the Second World War: 
one was the importance of locality. In the war, civil defence services were run on a 
local level. In the cold war, it was quickly understood that such decentralisation would 
cause disaster - the scale of attack meant that civil defence services would have to be 
co-ordinated nationally, with mobile columns able to reach the worst areas. This did not 
mean the local volunteer was spurned. On the contrary, voluntarism would be the 
defining characteristic of the peace-time Civil Defence Corps and the knowledge of the 
neighbourhood that came with local recruitment people was considered indispensable. 
Other lessons were of similar utility. The success of shelters, especially the domestic 
Anderson or Morrison type ensured that, in the Home Office at least, shelter provision 
would be a high civil defence priority. On evacuation, the mixed results of the war did 
not seem to unduly influence postwar planners. It was considered vital to save lives in 
the face of overwhelming attack. In this sense, thinking had not changed since before 
1939, but the scale of attack to be expected after 1945 corresponded much more with 
the apocalyptic visions of the 1930s than what had materialised in the war against 
Hitler. Allied to evacuation, the postwar planners stressed the need for adequate 
provision for emergency feeding and caring for the homeless (reflecting the criticisms 
of civil defence in the war). 
It is important to stress that although the structure of cold war civil defence matched 
that of the last war, the scale of provision was always intended to dwarf it. In 1946 
Oswald Allen, the civil servant in charge of the Civil Defence Department of the Home 
Office told the Home Secretary, James Chuter Ede, that `we have tried to avoid the 
classical error of planning for the last war'. 
6 By and large they had been successful. 
Much had been learned from the war, but more perhaps from attacks on German cities 
than on British. It was understood that the experience of the two were not comparable, 
and that in a future war Britain was to expect attacks on the scale of Hiroshima, or at 
5 Again, for the official and full history of Civil Defence in the Second World War see O'Brien, Civil 
Defence. 
6 NA, HO 322/99. `Civil Defence Planning: Progress Report for Secretary of State', by Oswald Allen, 
16.1.1946. 
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least Hamburg and Dresden, rather than Coventry. 7 This can be seen from the early 
understanding for the need to disperse vital industries away from the obvious target 
areas. 
One central, if ambiguous `lesson' from the war was the importance of morale. 
Experience in both Britain and Germany demonstrated that a nation's ability to fight 
went only as far as the population's ability to withstand attack. But the lesson was also 
apparently learned that Britain could `take it' - that British morale would stand up to 
attack. This became a basic assumption of the cold war, to the extent that while the 
vital importance of the issue was continually stressed, very little work was undertaken 
to examine if British morale would stand up to attack. For example, a limited study 
from 1946 argued that Britain and the USSR would be `highly resistive' to atomic 
attack, whereas the USA would be much less so. 8 It was assumed that experience of 
bombardment would have inured the population of Britain and Russia, but in America 
the lack of a collective history of a `blitz' experience would mean that proportionately 
less damage could be absorbed before a possible devastating collapse in morale. 9 This 
assumption is borne out by the startling different attitudes to studies on morale. 
Whereas the strength of British morale was assumed, the American authorities 
expended a great deal of time and money on studies gauging the impact of nuclear war 
on the population. 1° Much of this work involved academic psychologists, a group of 
people virtually absent from British civil defence planning in the cold war. 
The Shock of Hiroshima 
The explosion of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945 
respectively, had a profound impact on world opinion. In Britain, the initial reaction 
centred on the moral aspects of the devastation" and what it meant for a future war. On 
Tuesday 7 August, as the news broke in the London press, The Times' diplomatic 
correspondent wrote that the bomb `carries the warning that another world war would 
7 NA, AIR 20/5373. `The Effects of Saturation Air Raids upon the German Civil Defence System'. 
Planners were especially interested in the `fire storm' phenomena. See NA, HO 225/27. `Deaths from fire 
in large scale air attack with special reference to the Hamburg fire storm'; NA, HO 225/2. `Preliminary 
note on the present vulnerability of British cities to fire storms from air attack'. 
8 NA, CAB 121/272. TWC(46)8, `Scale of Attack on Certain Cities', 16/2/1946. 
9 Ibid. 
10 G. Oakes, Imaginary War, pp. 10-33. 
M. Grant, `Clouds of uncertainty', The Tablet, 30.7.2005. 
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mean the destruction of all regulated life' . 
12 The reaction within the new Labour 
Government was no less one of shocked awareness that something monumental had 
taken place. The Labour Party had won a landslide election victory in July and 
immediately had to adjust to a political landscape awed by the bomb and the consequent 
Japanese surrender - `world affairs on a cosmic scale', as Kenneth Harris, Attlee's 
official biographer, put it. 13 
Attlee himself was clearly greatly troubled by the atomic bomb, as can be seen by his 
hastily written memorandum to the members of an about-to-be-convened ministerial 
group on atomic policy. The memorandum is written in short, staccato style, and 
expressed more strongly some of the concerns present in his speech in the debate on the 
King's Address. 14 The memorandum, as a blast from the mind of a man clearly shaken 
by the new atomic problem and as a signpost to how the Government proceeded on the 
issue in the years ahead, is worth quoting at length: 
A decision on major policy with regard to the atomic bomb is 
imperative. Until this is taken civil and military departments are unable 
to plan. It must be recognised that the emergence of this weapon has 
left much of our post-war planning out of date. 
For instance a redistribution of industry planned on account of the 
experience of bombing attacks during the war is quite futile in the face 
of the atomic bomb. 
Nothing can alter the fact that the geographical situation of Britain 
offers to a Continental Power such targets as London and the other great 
cities. Dispersal of munitions works and airfields cannot alter the facts 
of geography. 
Again it would appear that the provision of bomb proof basements in 
factories and offices and the retention of A. R. P and Fire Services is 
futile waste. 
All considerations of strategic bases in the Mediterranean or the East 
Indies are obsolete. The vulnerability of the heart of the Empire is the 
one fact that matters. Unless its safety can be secured, it is no use 
bothering about things on the periphery. 
It is difficult for people to adjust their minds to an entirely new 
situation. I noticed at Potsdam that people still talked of the line of the 
Western Neisse although rivers as strategic frontiers have been absolete 
since the advent of Air Power. It is infinitely harder for people to realise 
that even the modem conception of war to which in my lifetime we have 
become accustomed is now completely out of date. 
12 The Times, 7.8.1945. 
13 K. Harris, Attlee, (Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1995), p. 279. 
14 `We have seen a new force, the result of scientific discovery, the far-reaching consequences of which, I 
think, we find it difficult to grasp', House of Commons, Official Report, 16.8.1945, cols. 95-113. 
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We recognised, or some of us did, before this war that bombing could 
only be answered by counter bombing. We were right. Berlin and 
Magdeburg were the answer to London and Coventry. Both derive from 
Guernica. The answer to an atomic bomb on London is an atomic bomb 
on another great city. 
Duelling with swords and inefficient pistols was bearable. Duelling 
had to go with the advent of weapons of precision. What is to be done 
about the atomic bomb? 
The only course which seems to me to be feasible and to offer a 
reasonable hope of staving off imminent disaster for the world is joint 
action by the USA, UK and Russia based upon stark reality. We should 
declare that this new invention has made it essential to end wars. The 
new world order must start now. '5 
Attlee's memorandum is an example of a man trying to make sense of the new realities 
of the world around him, and his thoughts on the atomic bomb dominated the policy of 
the Government for the subsequent months as he mounted a doomed attempt to 
establish some form of international control of the new weapon. As Brian Cathcart put 
it, `that this most matter-of-fact of British Prime Ministers should have found himself 
committing such thoughts to paper is a measure of the moral and political impact of the 
explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki'. 16 Attlee wrote to President Truman in 
September 1945, rhetorically, `Am I to plan for a peaceful or warlike world? If the 
latter, I ought to direct all our people to live like troglodytes underground as being the 
only hope of survival, and that by no means certain'. 17 Hope for a `peaceful world' 
faded over the next two years, but Attlee sincerely believed that the future of mankind 
rested on international co-operation over atomic energy. ' 8 
Understanding Atomic Energy 
After the initial shock of the atomic bomb, Whitehall set about `understanding' atomic 
energy - undertaking reviews and investigations designed to establish the 
facts 
concerning the power of the bomb, the consequences for the future of warfare, including 
the future of civil defence. The nature and implications of atomic weaponry needed to 
15 NA, CAB 130/3. Atomic Energy Committee, GEN 75/1, `The Atomic Bomb', memorandum by the 
Prime Minister, 28.8.1945. 
16 See B. Cathcart, Test of Greatness: Britain's Struggle for the Atomic Bomb, (London: John Murray, 
1994), p. 9. 
17 Published in M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-52. Volume 
I: Policy Making, (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 78-81. 
18 S. Schrafstetter, "`Loquacious ... and pointless as ever"? Britain, the United 
States and the United 
Nations Negotiations on International Control of Nuclear Energy, 1945-48', Contemporary British 
History, 16: 4 (2002), p. 91; also see R. Smith and J. Zametica, `The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee 
Reconsidered, 1945-1947', International Affairs, 61: 2 (1985), 237-63. 
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be comprehensively understood before any civil defence lessons could be extrapolated. 
This point was made by James Chuter Ede when introducing the Civil Defence Bill to 
end the compulsory civil defence preparations of the Second World War (5 November 
1945). He explained that `what had happened during the war meant that in many 
respects the technique of civil defence was now out of date. What was needed was time 
to bring it up to date' . 
19 
A great deal of time was taken. For example, the military assessment on the impact of 
the atomic bomb on future wars, upon which civil defence policy was later based, was 
not finished until July 1946. This was undertaken by a group called the Joint Technical 
Warfare Committee (JTWC), a sub-committee of the Chief of Staffs organisation. This 
was just one of the numerous groups in the first year of the atomic age, attempting to 
make sense of the new era. Margaret Gowing, the official historian of the British 
atomic energy project, argued that the machinery of government for dealing with the 
issue was not `an interlocking whole. It just grew', and that `the situation was confused, 
to say the least' . 
20 
There was no co-ordinating machinery, just a selection of individuals who seemed to 
have a finger in every atom-flavoured pie. Perhaps the key co-ordinating figure was 
General Sir Hastings `Pug' Ismay, the Military Secretary to the Cabinet and Attlee's key 
link to the atomic world. He played a vital role in keeping the Prime Minister informed 
of key issues and was a central figure in ensuring the Whitehall machine worked. Also 
important were the atomic scientists such as Sir George Thomson and P. M. S. Blackett, 
as well as the industrialist Wallace Akers. All were also present in committees such as 
the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy (ACAE) under the ex-Minister Sir John 
Anderson and the Directorate of Tube Alloys (the wartime codename for atomic 
energy). Therefore, although the organisation seems at first glance untidy, the personnel 
involved enabled a cohesive approach to be taken. 
JTWC first met to discuss their work on 16 October 194521 but were hampered by a lack 
of technical data, despite the best efforts of Akers and Sir James Chadwick, Head of the 
British Mission to the Manhattan Project, discoverer of the neutron, Nobel Laureate and 
9 The Times, 6.11.1945. 
20 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence. Volume I, pp. 19,23. 
21 NA, CAB 81/23. TWC(45)9th meeting, 16.10.1945 
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pre-eminent British physicist. Both stressed the revolutionary nature of the weapon. 
Akers pointed out that `it looks as if the only protection against an atomic weapon is to 
prevent it arriving or to live and carry on all industry in bomb-proof shelters burrowed 
some hundreds (perhaps thousands) of feet in the earth'. 22 Overall, both stressed, in 
Chadwick's words, that `there is no immediate prospect of an adequate defence against 
the atomic bomb'. 23 
The single biggest source of facts on the atomic bomb was the report of the British 
mission to Japan which had been charged with investigating the effects of the atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Requested by the Air Ministry, 24 the mission 
consisted mainly of Home Office scientists. Completed quickly, it was delivered to the 
Prime Minister in January 194625 before being published in the summer. 26 Perhaps 
surprisingly, given the subsequent secrecy which surrounded all atomic and nuclear 
matters, very little from the original report was omitted in the published version. The 
fact that the latter is around half as long is explained by the fact that some detailed 
statistical data and lengthy sections on the methodology of the Mission's modes of 
researching and reaching conclusions was left out, and simply that the public edition 
was more succinctly written. 
Neither version minced its words. President Truman had previously announced that the 
explosive energy of an atomic bomb `was the equivalent to that of 20,000 tons of 
TNT' . 
27 To emphasis the power of the bomb, the report contained a wartime analogy: 
`the scale of destruction expected would be that which would befall a model town built 
to the scale of Gulliver's Lilliput, 1 inch to the foot, if there was exploded above it a 
bomb more than twice as large as the largest British "Blockbuster',. 28 Strikingly the 
report outlines the effects on a British urban area if such a bomb was dropped. Their 
modelling provided an average of `50,000 dead from one atomic bomb in average 
22 NA, CAB 81/26. TWC(45)33, `Information on Atomic Energy', 10.10.1945. 
23 Ibid. TWC(45)35, `Information of Atomic Energy: Replies by Sir James Chadwick to CIGS's 
questions on Atomic Energy', 19.10.1945. 
24 NA, CAB 80/97. COS(45)548(O), `Examination of Effects of the Bombing of Japan', Note by the Air 
Ministry, 22.8.1945. 
25 See NA, PREM 8/194. `Report on the effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki'. 
26 Home Office and Air Ministry, The Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Report of 
the British Mission to Japan, (HMSO, 1946). 
27 Ibid., p. 4. 
28 Ibid., p. 5. 
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British urban conditions' . 
29 Moreover, 30,000 houses would be destroyed and another 
35,000 made uninhabitable. 30 
To put this into perspective, 218,000 houses had been destroyed and a total of 450,000 
had been made uninhabitable during the war, 31 but that had been spread out over six 
years of war. It would take six atomic bombs to cause as much housing damage, but just 
one would come close to equalling the 60,595 deaths caused by enemy air raids over 
Britain. An emphasis on housing is perhaps natural, it was a large concern in the 1945 
General Election with at least one historian arguing that `housing was the most 
important domestic issue' facing the new Government. 32 Attlee's Government built 
50,000 houses in 1946 and averaged 150,000 houses a year in its six years in office. 33 A 
single atomic explosion would require an immense national effort and greatly retard the 
push for postwar reconstruction. 
But the most striking aspect of the report was the descriptions of the casualties caused 
by the bomb. `Flashburn' victims were vividly described, as were those who died due 
to exposure to radiation. It was this section that disillusioned those who had believed 
that the atomic bomb was a sort of conventional super-bomb, equivalent to so many 
tons of TNT. It demonstrated that this was a totally new force: 
Those exposed to gamma rays, if they were protected from flashburn 
and from indirect injury, showed no immediate ill-effect. Even those 
severely irradiated probably did not show the characteristic symptoms, 
nausea, vomiting and fever, for 24 hours, and rarely died in less than one 
week. These first symptoms were followed by bloody diarrhoea, 
occurring most frequently in the second week, at which time loss of 
appetite and general malaise also become marked. Patients began to 
lose their hair after the first week. 
Thereafter, in the severe cases, the clinical picture began to be 
dominated by signs of deficient blood formation.... It was apparent that 
the gamma rays had virtually killed the entire bone marrow.... As red 
blood cell formation ceased, the patient began to suffer from progressive 
anaemia. As platelet formation ceased, the thin blood seeped in small 
and large haemorrhages into the skin and the retina of the eye, and 
sometimes into the intestines and the kidneys. The fall in the number of 
29 Ibid., p. 19. 
30 Ibid, p. 8 
31 Ministry of Reconstruction, Housing, Cmd 6609, (HMSO, 1945). 
32 H. Jones, "`This is Magnificent! " 300,000 Homes a Year and the Tory Revival after 1945', 
Contemporary British History, 14: 1 (2000), p. 99. 
33 See A. E. Holmans, Housing Policy in Britain, (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 178. 
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white blood cells... in severe cases lowered resistance, so the patient 
inevitably fell prey to some infection, usually spreading from the mouth 
and accompanied by gangrene of the lips, the tongue, and sometimes of 
the throat. Death in these cases was the result of a combination of 
anaemia, internal bleeding, and infection. Deaths probably began in 
about the week after the explosion, reached a peak in about three weeks, 
and had for the most part, ceased after six to eight weeks. 34 
Almost as chilling as the actual physical consequences of radiation was the fact it 
permeated reinforced concrete buildings and killed people who were unscathed by blast 
or heat effects. 35 
Elaborating on the overall effects of the bomb, the report showed that `the scale of the 
disaster brought city life and industry virtually to a standstill. Even the most destructive 
conventional attacks, the incendiary raids on Hamburg in the summer of 1943 and on 
Tokyo in the Spring of 1945, had no comparable effect in paralysing communal 
organisation', 36 and `the larger impression which both cities make is of having sunk, in 
an instant and without a struggle, to the most primitive existence'. 37 They recognised 
that `measures of protection, particularly against penetrating gamma ray effects, 
measures of dispersal, and the organisation of medical and rescue services, present a 
formidable problem', 38 but insisted that `it is plain that local services are unequal to 
dealing with such disasters, either immediately or later, and that planned and energetic 
action by central government is essential'. 39 The Effects of the Atomic Bombs at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki is in a way the master document of British understanding of 
the nature of atomic warfare. JTWC based the assumptions of its `Future Developments 
in Weapons and Methods of War' report on it. 40 The Home Office did the same when 
drafting their early proposals on the future structure of the civil defence services. 41 It is 
not going too far to say that Effects of the Atomic Bombs shaped civil defence policy for 
the next eight years, until thermonuclear weapons made its conclusions redundant. 
34 The Effects of the Atomic Bombs, pp. 15-6. 
35 Ibid., p. 16. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p. 4. 
38 Ibid., p. 3. 
39 Ibid., p. 4. 
40 NA, CAB 134/316. HDC(46)2, `Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', 31.7.1946. 
41 See NA, HO 322/99. `Memorandum on the Organisation of Post War Civil Defence', by Sir John 
Hodsoll. 
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Given the implications of the report, it is surprising that it made so little public impact. 
The rapid decline of interest in atomic matters was observed by contemporaries and has 
been noticed by historians. Leonard Woolf argued in 1946 that Hiroshima had been a 
`sensation', and like all sensations forgotten quickly, passing away `in a shiver of 
millions of ordinary persons at the prospect of what, some years hence, it will probably 
mean in misery for themselves or their children'. 42 The historian Margaret Gowing has 
also noted that after the initial burst of interest, the British press and public seemed 
relatively apathetic to atomic issues for the rest of the decade. Gowing blamed the 
paucity of the government information and the poverty of Parliamentary debate. 43 
JTWC's final report emerged only after a lengthy process of revision in the first half of 
1946. Key research which did not feature in the final version included the intelligence 
estimate that the Soviets might have as many as five atomic bombs by 1949,44 a 
remarkable, if tentative, guess given the subsequent inability to predict when Russia 
would achieve atomic parity with the West (the first Soviet bomb was exploded in 
August 1949). 45 Another absent statistic was the estimate that thirty-six atomic bombs 
could eliminate Britain from a future war, 46 though an earlier version of the report gave 
the figure as fifty. 47 The final report stressed to the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence 
Committee what they would have suspected already: that `countries which concentrate a 
high proportion of the population in cities which are not self supporting, or which 
depend on a delicate system of transport and distribution, will be particularly vulnerable 
to this form of attack'. 48 In a future war, therefore, an enemy `might achieve decisive 
results with relatively small effort against the civil population of a nation without a 
clash between major military forces and too rapidly to permit either the building up of 
military forces or the exercise of sea power'. 49 
JTWC was greatly interested by the idea of British collapse, the concept of `breakdown' 
as it later became, and this caused the early interest in morale noted above. It was 
42 L. Woolf, `Britain in the Atomic Age', Political Quarterly, 17: 1 (1946), p. 13. 
43 M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence. Volume I, pp. 52-5. 
as NA, CAB 121/272. JIC(45)320(O), `Strategic Aspects of Atomic Bomb Production', 17.12.1945. 
as Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 31-2. 
46 NA, CAB 121/272. TWC(46)8, `Scale of Attack on Certain Cities', 16.2.1946. 
47 NA, CAB 121/273. TWC(46)13(draft), `Revised Report on Future Developments in Methods of War', 
2.4.1946 
48 NA, CAB 134/316. HDC(46)2, `Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', 31.7.1946. 
49 Ibid. 
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feared that as few as five or ten atomic bombs, `with the prospect of more to follow', 
could cause a panic evacuation of cities on a scale `sufficient seriously to sap the power 
of waging war by conventional means of any country physically and psychologically 
unorganised to meet such action' . 
50 On the other hand, some hundreds of atomic 
weapons might fail to cause the collapse of a country suitably organised physically and 
psychologically. 5' 
In terms of coping with an atomic onslaught, JTWC insisted that `a much greater 
proportion of the defence effort of the country during peace must be devoted to civil 
defence and the dispersal of industry'. 52 Dispersal was central to the new 
conceptualisation of atomic defence. Although they also stressed the need for revisions 
to, and the expansion, of shelter provision, civilian medical services and the ability to 
store and distribute stocks of food, it was only through using the town planning 
apparatus to disperse essential industries and their workforce away from the obvious 
target areas that a nation like Britain could hope to survive an atomic attack. It would 
also lessen the likelihood of a mass flight from the cities in wartime. The extent to 
which industrial dispersal was possible exercised civil defence planners a great deal 
over the following years. 
Concurrently to the work of JTWC, the Home Office was attempting to piece together a 
new structure for the civil defence services. 53 It was quickly understood, as we have 
seen, that the 1939-45 model could not stand up to the increased weight of attack seen 
in Germany in 1944-45, let alone in a future atomic war. Although the Home Office 
was quick to formulate new plans, the Military Secretary to the Cabinet, Pug Ismay was 
equally quick in ensuring that their formal submission was delayed, and that eventually 
discussion on the civil defence organisation took place after the submission of the 
JTWC report and within the context of a co-ordinated investigation into civil defence 
policy. 54 In fact, it was not destined to be submitted to Ministers until October 1947 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See NA, HO 322/99. `Civil Defence Planning: Progress Report' for Secretary of State, by Oswald 
Allen, 16.1.1946. 
54 Ibid. General Ismay to Oswald Allen, 23.1.1946. 
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(see below), 55 but it is worth stressing how early certain important aspects of the 
eventual policy were formulated. These were the necessity of centralised control over 
the organisation and provision of future services, that local forces should be constituted 
in addition to new national `mobile' civil defence columns, and that an ethos of `self- 
help' should be instilled in the civil defence population. 56 As we shall see, these 
became vital principles in the eventual formation of the Civil Defence Corps in 1949. 
Towards a civil defence policy, 1946-48 
The result of the JTWC report was the formation of a cabinet committee, the Home 
Defence Committee, in order to formulate a new civil defence policy based on its 
principles. 57 Although called the Home Defence Committee, its remit was very much 
to investigate the broad range of civil defence measures as they came to be understood 
in the cold war. The Committee was Ismay's creation, informing Attlee in May 1946 
that `the need for such a Committee is already being felt' because the ordinary 
machinery was not suitable for dealing with such inter-departmental long-term 
58 59 planning. Attlee quickly agreed. It was to investigate `all matters of major policy 
relating to Home Defence against air attack (other than active defence measures), 
including strategic aspects of industrial location and town planning, the future 
organisation of civil defence measures and services, and research into problems... 
raised as a result of modern methods of air attack. 60 
The first year of peace was marked by a British foreign policy geared toward 
international co-operation, especially in atomic energy affairs. By mid-1946 such hopes 
had receded in the faces of tension over Germany, Greece and Persia. An intelligence 
assessment from 1946 of Soviet aggression saw, in Peter Hennessy's words, `a 
sustained surge of pessimism on the part of the analysts since the final months of World 
ss NA, CAB 134/316. HDC(47) 10 (revise), `Civil Defence Policy: Report', Memorandum by the Home 
Defence Committee, 7.10.1947. 
56 NA, HO 322/99. `Memorandum on the Organisation of Post War Civil Defence', by Sir John Hodsoll, 
7.2.1946 
57 NA, CAB 134/316. HDC(46)1, `Terms of Reference', Note by the Chairman, 9.7.1946; the report had 
been presented to the Defence Committee the day before; NA, CAB 131/3. DO(46)89, `Future 
Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', 8.7.1946; the conclusions were approved in due course: 
NA, CAB 131/1. DO(46)23`d, 22.7.1946. 
58 NA, PREM 8/75 1. Letter to the Prime Minister by General Ismay, 8.5.1946. 
59 Ibid. 
60 NA, CAB 134/316. HDC(46)1, `Terms of Reference', Note by the Chairman, 9.7.1946. 
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War II1.61 By August 1946 `pessimism' concerning relations with the Soviet Union was 
increasing at the expense of belief in the future of genuine international co-operation. 
Between the summer of 1946 and 1948 the cold war became more entrenched as a 
concept in the official mind of Whitehall. 
The cold war formally arrived at the Cabinet table in the early new year of 1948 when 
the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, submitted four memoranda to his colleagues, 
including `a comprehensive review of the hostile policy Russia had followed towards 
Britain and the West since the end of the war', as Alan Bullock puts it in his masterly 
biography. 62 This is not the place to retread the well worn path of Britain's part in the 
early cold war, 63 but the key theme of the UK's cold war stance was that Soviet inspired 
communism was a direct threat to Britain and that whatever pretence of co-operation 
was put forward by Moscow, the Soviet Union was implacably opposed to British 
democracy and interests. 64 Although Elisabeth Barker criticised the `assumption that 
"world communism" was monolithic and that Moscow could successfully give detailed 
orders to all communists everywhere', 65 the intelligence material Bevin's Cabinet 
papers drew upon were certainly correct to stress the innate enmity of Moscow's 
internationalist communist doctrine. 66 
It was in this atmosphere of mounting tension that HDC worked, although the leisurely 
pace at which the work was undertaken demonstrates that an imminent war was not 
expected. Over the next two years civil defence policy was evaluated in two waves. 
One was the work on shelter, food storage and the future civil defence services, but at 
first work concentrated on the dispersal of industry and mass evacuation - reflecting the 
61 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 12. 
62 A. Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, (Oxford UP, 1984), p. 513; the papers were NA, CAB 
129/23. `Cabinet Memoranda'. CP(48)5, `Policy in Germany', Memorandum by the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, 5.1.1948; CP(48)6, `The First Aim of British Foreign Policy', Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4.1.1948; CP(48)7, `Review of Soviet Policy', Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 5.1.1948; CP(48)8, `Future Foreign Publicity', Memorandum 
by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4.1.1948. 
63 In addition to Bullock's essential study see E. Barker, The British between the Superpowers, 1945-50, 
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priorities of the JTWC report and the Defence Committee. Uniting these two strands 
was the continued effort to understand the consequences of atomic attack on British 
cities. A massive review was undertaken to understand what a future war would mean 
specifically in the British context. Commissioned in October 1946 the study was 
explicitly designed to uncover the `minimum requirement for securing the maintenance 
of this country as a political organism'. 67 The study was divided into two parts: an 
intelligence based assessment by the Vice Chiefs of Staff on the `scale of attack' to be 
expected and an in-depth assessment by a inter-departmental group on `the Effects of 
Aerial Bombardment in the First Three Months of a Future War on the Central 
Resources of the Country'. 68 
Although both reports stressed the `highly speculative assumptions' upon which they 
were based, especially on the period of warning and the imponderable issue of the 
public's psychological reaction to attack, taken together they allowed HDC to identify 
key civil defence priorities and to gauge the enormity of the civil defence task. 69 Two 
scenarios were considered: an attack in 1951 with conventional weapons, and one in 
1956 when it was considered the Soviets would have a stockpile of between forty and 
fifty atomic bombs. On the former, it was considered that Britain could survive a 
conventional attack, albeit with an enormous strain on the resources of the country. 
70 
The story was very different once atomic bombs were added to the conventional attack. 
The damage Britain would sustain in an atomic war depended on the strategy of the 
enemy. If they concentrated on civilian casualties, they would kill around 1.25 million 
people and hospitalise over 1.75 million more. Most startling was the possible `port 
strategy', which would reduce total importing capacity by 78%, meaning the nation's 
`absolute minimum importing requirements could not be met', causing `a collapse of the 
ability of the country to continue the fight must surely occur'. Moreover, this strategy 
would also destroy 12% of power generating capacity and 10% of oil importing 
67 NA, CAB 134/316. HDC(46)2nd Meeting, 24.10.1946. 
68 Ibid. HDC(46)18, `Future Scale of Air Attack on the United Kingdom', Memorandum by the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, 12.12.1946; HDC(47)3, `Appreciation of the Effects of Aerial Bombardment in the First 
Three Months of a Future War on the Central Resources of the Country', Report by Home Defence 
Committee Working Party, 17.02.1947. 
69 Ibid. 
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capacity, as well as killing 1 million people, and destroying 1.25 million homes. 7' This 
destruction would be caused by only seventeen atomic bombs. 
These estimates were underpinned by the first detailed analysis of the consequences of 
an atomic attack on a British city, which showed how 111,000 people would die in 
Liverpool in a future atomic war (if it received three bombs). As HDC were informed, 
`if it is remembered that all enemy action during the recent war caused 60,000 deaths in 
the whole of Great Britain, the scale of the disaster if nearly twice this number were 
killed in one attack on one area may be imagined'. Survival, it was stressed, rested on 
undertaking preparations prior to attack: 
anything which contributes to a sense that the authorities have the 
situation in hand will be of the utmost importance to the maintenance of 
morale and the first obvious requirement is an efficient and well- 
organised system of civil defence... given an adequate system of 
defence, both active and passive, in which the public felt confidence 
there would be less reason to fear that a collapse of morale would occur 
before an economic or military collapse is imminent. 72 
This conceptualisation of civil defence `activity' being key to morale remained valid 
until 1968, and indeed became the main justification for maintaining any semblance of 
civil defence policy from 1960. 
Response to these conclusions was mixed, with some criticising the bleak picture 
painted. Others were more constructive, realising that it gave planners a basis on which 
to begin reducing British vulnerability to atomic attack. 73 This would be no easy task. 
Sir William Dickson, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, pointed out that `the necessary 
measures required to bring about 100% insurance... would involve such vast sums of 
money, materials and manpower that it could not be realised within the period between 
now and 1956 without causing an economic collapse'. A new Working Party was 
instructed to investigate `measures that might be taken to mitigate the effects of the 
scale of attack envisaged for 1956', but was told `not to waste its time... putting 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. HDC(47)1 S` Meeting, 25.2.1947. 
43 
forward a detailed analysis of the cost in money and manpower of major undertakings 
which are clearly out of the question' 74 . 
The conclusions of these estimates of attack amply demonstrated the validity of JTWC's 
decision to prioritise industrial dispersal. But by the time they had been reached in 
February 1947, the policy of industrial dispersal had suffered a mortal wound. It was 
obvious that the demands of the economy and defence would clash over dispersal: any 
policy designed to relocate industry on any scale would have major short-term 
economic consequences. As the chairman of HDC, Sir Findlater Stewart, put it: `the 
first task of this country is to regain its economic strength and we may do more harm 
than good if we press the strategic case too strongly before industry and trade - the very 
sinews of war - are on the road to full recovery'. 75 A plethora of initial studies were 
completed, but little could be achieved given the physical and economic limitations of 
moving industrial capacity into areas poorly served with transport links and labour 
supply. 76 
A test case was the proposal to build a power station in Poplar, East London. In 
strategic terms, Poplar was considered perhaps the worst place in Britain to build a 
power station; the docks, existing electricity generating capacity and a highly 
concentrated population made the area an attractive target - as evidenced by the 
pounding it received from the Luftwaffe - and a sizeable new power plant would only 
make it more so. These were the arguments of the Air Minister Geoffrey de Freitas, 
citing the JTWC report approved by the Defence Committee just the week before, 77 
when the issue reached the full Cabinet in July 1946.78 He wanted the proposed plant 
moved to less strategically vulnerable area, but the Minister of Fuel and Power, 
Emmanuel Shinwell, argued that the economic case for the power plant was pressing, 
and indeed paramount. 79 Attlee was advised that `the economic and political 
consequences of turning down the Poplar site at this stage would seem to be very 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. HDC(46)3, `The approach to business', Note by the Chairman, 25.7.1946. 
76 Ibid. HDC(46)1 1, `Strategic Distribution of Industry', memorandum by the Ministry of Supply, 
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78 NA, CAB 129/12. CP(46)307, `Location of Power Stations', Memorandum by the Under-Secretary of 
State for Air, 29.7.1946. 
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grave'. 80 After it was demonstrated that an alternative site could only be found at 
prohibitive cost and delay, the Defence Committee confirmed the decision to build the 
Poplar power station on 1 November 1946.81 
Poplar demonstrated the inability of defence planners to override economic policy- 
makers. Despite the government's real belief in the need for industrial dispersal and its 
acceptance of the assumptions of JTWC, the enormous importance of generating 
capacity to the contemporary domestic economy meant that the defence planners could 
not overcome the arguments in favour of building the plant. The needs of today were 
always more important than the potentialities of tomorrow. Whatever the accepted 
policy on dispersal, once a genuine problem was raised with real plant contributing to 
the economy in real terms, the apparent importance of strategic considerations lessened 
dramatically. After this decision the strategic advice on the location of industry was 
reaffirmed by the Defence Committee, 82 but when another row broke out in March 1947 
over the proposed Bankside power station - with the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning equally aghast at the effects it would have on their reconstruction plans - the 
result was the same. 83 Meaningful industrial dispersal had been killed off as a viable 
policy. 
Equally dead was the Home Office's first attempt to secure agreement for a policy of 
mass-provision of shelters. The debate on shelter policy was foisted onto the HDC by 
the Home Office, and their memorandum from October 1946 can be seen as an attempt 
to set out its stall on future provision. 84 A massive programme of shelter construction 
was recommended. Under this scheme, some shelter would be provided in areas of 
`low-risk'. In the main target areas, those `useless mouths' not employed in essential 
80 NA, PREM 8/315. Prime Minister's brief for meeting of the Defence Committee, unsigned, undated. 
81 NA, CAB 131/1. DO(46)31S` Meeting, 1.11.1946. 
82 NA, CAB 131/5. DO(47)3rd Meeting, 24.1.1947. 
83 The main issues were summarised for the Cabinet by NA, CAB 129/18. CP(47)1 10, `Power Station at 
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industries would be moved, `by compulsion if need be'. 85 To protect those that 
remained, a variety of measures would be adopted, including building new shelters and 
ensuring that new buildings provided some protection. This would provide shelter for 
some 11 million people costing some £260 million. By limiting provision in target 
areas to key workers, thus splitting families, and forcing workers to reside and work in 
areas likely to suffer sustained attack, the plan involved `the subjection of industry and 
labour to control more drastic than was experienced [in the Second World War] and 
one, moreover, which would have to begin to operate at once'. 86 
The Home Office recommended that such a policy should `be announced at once and 
steps taken overtly to implement it' in order that `sufficient progress may be made 
before another war breaks out'. 87 It was seriously argued in October 1946, therefore, 
that Britain should take active steps to prepare defensively to fight a future war by 
spending some £260 million, a figure £32 million more than the entire National Health 
Service estimates for 1949-1950. It would have been impossible to pursue a policy on 88 
such a basis. The monetary cost alone was prohibitive, let alone the consequences for 
industries already short of steel, or the international repercussions of such an overt `war' 
preparation. Unsurprisingly, a policy on theses lines was swiftly rejected by HDC. 89 
More successful in these years was the planning of the future organisation of the civil 
defence services. There had been initial attempts to design a policy in 1945-46 within 
the Home Office; after this, an inter-departmental working party worked until mid-June 
1947 piecing a policy together, 90 one accepted as a basis for planning by Ministers in 
November 1947.91 If and when war came huge numbers of people would need to be 
fitted into the new services, so it was considered essential that these `should be attached 
to, and developed from', existing services, allowing a large wartime expansion in size 
and role of the police, fire and medical services. 92 In terms of saving-lives, the old-style 
local ARP would be defunct, and an atomic war would require `greater mobility' and `a 
85 NA, CAB 134/316. HDC(46)13, `Shelter Policy'. 
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unified command of all forces engaged in civil defence operations'. 93 Under regional 
control, life-saving would be split in two. There would be a new reserve of Military 
Mobile Columns `to reinforce any areas in which the situation is beyond the capacity of 
the existing local forces'. Civilians would be divided into static and mobile groups, the 
static being part-time volunteers to `put out fires and render elementary first aid and 
rescue'. Local mobile groups would essentially be the Fire Service and special sections 
of the Police. They would `provide well trained and equipped formations to take the 
first shock of attack'. The peace-time Fire Service was to `provide a nucleus for war- 
time expansion', which `although recruited on a local basis, should be operated in war 
as a national force', rather as it had operated in the Second World War. It was also 
stressed that that to avoid casualties a comprehensive evacuation scheme would need to 
be implemented, and the ability to feed, clothe and house those bombed-out would in 
many ways determine whether the new civil defence policy would be a success. 94 
When the policy was announced by Attlee to Parliament on 19 November 1947, the 
Times praised the role given to local volunteers along with the national characteristics of 
the new scheme. 95 Consultations with local authorities began along these lines the next 
month, 96 and formed the basis of the new civil defence services which came into being 
in 1949 - although the dual role never really materialised. Both the Civil Defence 
Corps and the Auxiliary Fire Service were locally recruited and administered and were 
designed to be relatively mobile, well equipped and trained. It was understood that any 
new scheme would require manpower in excess of the 300,000 full-time and 1,600,000 
part-time civil defence workers of the last war, and so from the start it was believed that 
the peace-time services would need to provide a well-trained nucleus of a quickly 
expanded wartime service. The national Mobile reserve never really came to fruition, 
although there was a military Mobile Defence Corps between 1955 and 1957. 
Report to Ministers on Civil Defence Policy 
When HDC informed Ministers of their general progress in October 1947, it seemed as 
if they were determined to ensure the difficulty of their task was understood, and to 
stress that civil defence policy would need to be a delicate balancing of priorities - of 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 `Home Defence', The Times, 20.11.1947. 
96 `Civil Defence on New Basis', The Times, 11.12.1947. 
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identifying the effort required to ensure survival and paying for no more. 97 It was 
immediately stressed that an atomic war would strain Britain's resources to the limit. In 
fact, Ministers were informed, `we should be engaged in a fight for survival. Our whole 
effort might well have to be concentrated on the defence of this island to the virtual 
exclusion of all else'. Certainly it would impossible to wage a war on the 1939-45 scale, 
and the civil defence measures necessary to enable Britain to fight a war on a large scale 
would require a complete dispersal of all major industries and a full shelter programme 
and `were obviously so far reaching and would cause so violent an interruption in the 
process of national recovery' as to be impracticable. 98 After two years study Whitehall 
reached the same conclusion that Attlee had instinctively arrived at in the weeks after 
Hiroshima - that the atomic bomb meant the end of Britain's capacity to fight a major 
war abroad. 
The report concentrated on morale, food supply and industrial production; or, as HDC 
put it, securing Britain's `will to fight', `ability to exist' and `ability to produce the tools 
with which to fight'. 99 Atomic warfare would imperil all these, and how they were 
secured would determine whether Britain could survive as a nation. HDC stressed the 
need for the definition of the `hard core' of Britain's war potential, such as the 
`minimum reserves of food, raw materials and other vital commodities which it will be 
necessary to build up', the `minimum essential industrial potential that must be 
maintained', and `rock-bottom minimum tonnage' Britain would need to import. This 
would `show us what section of our population, industry and public services will be 
absolutely vital in the fight for survival; and so throw into clear relief those features of 
our system to which, in making our civil defence plans, we must devote our principal 
effort'. What was needed, it was argued, was a sensible policy which could be put into 
practice, such as limited industrial dispersal and, for example, attempting to lessen the 
United Kingdom's reliance on the ports of London and Liverpool and ironing out 
transport `choke points' such as the Severn Tunnel. '°° 
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As was noted by one critic, however, the obsession with the `hard core' of British war 
potential skewed the report away from the central importance of morale. 101 The whole 
policy was reliant on a pliant population willing to live and work in areas subject to 
atomic attack. Although Ministers were informed that the public would be `protected', 
the issue of whether people would obey the government and continue to work was never 
really tackled. In fact, the whole issue of death and civilian experience is strikingly 
absent from the report, although an emphasis was placed on offensive actions in 
maintaining morale. 
The absence of adequate work on morale is demonstrated by comparing the assumption 
of benign compliance of the population on one hand and a foolhardy belief that Britain 
could avoid the worst consequences of war through a `carefully planned large-scale 
dispersal of industry and population to the Dominions and Colonies overseas' on the 
other. 102 The proposal for a study on the subject seemed to excite Ministers and Ernest 
Bevin seemed to think that dispersal could invigorate the development of the African 
colonies, '03 and remained on the agenda for a remarkably long time until Winston 
Churchill declared in a speech on 6 December 1947 that 
I am quite sure that socialism will make it impossible for 48,000,000 
people to live in this island, and that at least one quarter of all who are 
alive today will have to disappear in one way or another, after enduring a 
lowering of standards of food and comfort inconceivable in the last fifty 
years'. 14 
Unsurprisingly, the plan for a government study on the mass emigration of people from 
Britain was considered politically inexpedient after this speech, lest it confirm 
Churchill's belief that the Socialists could not support the population, and the project 
was quietly dropped. '°5 Considering the difficulty the planners faced in influencing the 
location of power stations it is deeply ironic to read the lengthy discussions on the 
possibility of relocating industry across the globe. '06 
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As a result of this paper research into secondary port facilities became a priority, and a 
working party was set up merging Ministry of Transport experts with members of Naval 
intelligence who had been engaged in mapping the port facilities and beaches of the 
Western coast. 107 The new working party was to be greatly expanded in order to 
complete work on the whole of the United Kingdom within five years. The estimated 
budget was a princely £25,000 per year. ' 08 This working party, as well as an initial 
investigation into `Strategic Location of Oil Storage Capacity in the United 
Kingdom', ' 09 showed that, at least on the level of research, there was a serious attempt 
to tackle practically some of the problems of civil and home defence. 
A New Machinery 
After these initial debates, the structure for dealing with civil defence was overhauled. 
The Home Defence Committee was replaced by a Civil Defence Committee (CDO) 
under Home Office chairmanship. "° Perhaps more importantly, the Civil Defence Joint 
Planning Staff (CDJPS) was also set up to provide a research capacity and a body to co- 
ordinate detailed plans. ' 1' The consequence of these changes was to give the Home 
Office virtually total control over the formulation of civil defence policy and lessen the 
co-ordinating role of the Cabinet office. This was to have important results. The Home 
Office favoured a policy of massive shelter construction and throughout the rest of the 
1940s and early 1950s advocated this and other policies which were, in effect, 
impossible to implement. Had the Cabinet Office maintained a firmer hold over co- 
ordinating civil defence a more realistic policy may have been developed which 
correlated to a greater extent with the economic realities of the time. As the 
complexities of atomic warfare grew in the early 1950s, however, the Cabinet Secretary 
himself (Sir Norman Brook) took over the key co-ordinating role (see Chapter 3). 
This new machinery was made public in March 1948 by Kenneth Younger, Home 
Office Under-Secretary of State. Younger admitted that up to that point, `the machinery 
107 NA, CAB 21/3789. `Home Defence Committee: Port Facilities of the United Kingdom, Dispersal etc'. 
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has perhaps not been wholly adequate', and explicitly stated that the old HDC was 
being replaced by CDO supported by CDJPS. 112 It was rare indeed for the machinery of 
government to be avowed in this way, and it can be attributed to the need to deflect 
criticism of the Government's tardy handling of civil defence. Sir John Anderson had 
argued that the House had been kept in `benighted ignorance' 113 on the issue since 
Attlee's statement the previous November and the new Committees allowed Younger to 
argue the issue was being vigorously pursued. Later in 1948, Ede even went so far as 
to reveal the existence of the Ministerial Committee appointed in the wake of the Berlin 
crisis and the fact that he chaired it. 114 
Almost parallel to Younger's statement, CDO's new Chairman, Sir Alexander Maxwell 
(Permanent Secretary, Home Office), was enquiring (on 12 March 1948) whether 
CDJPS should undertake a review of short-term planning because the HDC had worked 
on the assumption that a major war was not likely to come about for some time. "s 
Maxwell wondered `whether in the light of the latest developments in the international 
situation, they were right in proceeding on this basis or whether they ought not to 
consider the preparation of an emergency plan in case we were faced with trouble in the 
near future'. 116 Of course the Berlin crisis was to prove Maxwell correct, and his 
suggestion, coming after the Czechoslovakian coup in February, should have appeared 
very sensible. 
Whilst many in the Committee agreed with Maxwell, it was the Army's representative, 
Major-General A. D. Ward, representing the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
who stopped this plan, arguing that the Committee should not be `deflected' from its 
main task of long-term planning, arguing that in a short-term emergency `consideration 
would presumably be devoted to the ways and means of reviving the civil defence 
machinery of the last war'. 117 The decision not to provide a short-term plan courted 
disaster when the Berlin Crisis erupted, and it is hard not to argue that CDO was too 
concerned with its long-term remit and not flexible enough to change its focus. Any 
blame must lie, however, in the lack of co-ordination and political control over civil 
112 House of Commons, Official Report, 22.3.1948, cols. 2696-9. 
113 Ibid, cols. 2648-54. 
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defence planning. In March 1948 it needed someone to argue that rising international 
tension necessitated some short-term planning, to enable the Committee to react to 
events. This decision needed to be a political one, or at least taken by someone with a 
co-ordinating role for defence who was able to see the broad spectrum of government 
business. 
Instead, the first real result of this new structure was another attempt to understand the 
basic principles of civil defence in the atomic age. In many ways it was the most 
successful document as, freed from the constraints of debating importing capacity, it 
managed to set out the basic conceptualisation of how civil defence would operate in a 
future war. Originally drafted and discussed in June 1948, in the weeks before the 
eruption of the Berlin crisis, the report (CDC(48)10) crystallised Whitehall thinking at 
the end of nearly three years of attempting to understand and codify the step-change in 
military strategy. ' 18 
Unlike the report of the previous December, CDC(48)10 understood the importance of 
morale; indeed, it stated that `the primary object of Civil Defence is to maintain in the 
population the will to win' 119 and stressed the difficulty of such a task in face of atomic 
bombardment and an estimated conventional attack some three time greater than that 
experienced by Germany in 1944-45 and forty-five times that suffered in the Blitz. 
Strengthening morale meant reducing casualties, and here the life-saving aspects of civil 
defence were for the first time invested with real importance. Before this, production 
was stressed to the exclusion of almost everything else. CDC(48)10 assumed that there 
would be a shelter policy, an evacuation scheme and programmes to disperse some key 
industries and services, as well as plans for medical services and emergency feeding 
and, of course, a fully functioning life-saving civil defence service. 120 These would be 
the bedrocks of the Home Office's civil defence policy throughout the atomic era and 
all, aside from shelter, were implemented to some degree before 1954. 
CDC(48)10 was explicitly designed to draw a line under three years of work to 
understand the atomic era and to provide pointers of the future. More than this, it was a 
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successful attempt to enunciate a basic `philosophy' of civil defence, one based on the 
twin planks of casualty avoidance and maintenance of production. These two elements 
were essential if Britain was to be able to fight a major war in the atomic age, which 
was the absolute purpose of civil defence in these years - and in general civil defence 
policy did develop along the lines suggested. It was a success only in the longer-term. 
For when the Berlin Blockade began and it seemed as if Britain might be plunged into a 
major war, the background studies of atomic civil defence were worthless. Paper 
planning had been undertaken, but no physical preparations were in place. CDC(48)10 
had envisaged having until 1957 to implement its policy; it was useless in the 
emergency of 1948. As the prospect of war loomed, an improvised civil defence policy 
had to be arranged, and that meant shelving the painstakingly worked out long-term 
policy enshrined in CDC(48) 10.121 
Conclusion 
Considered in these terms, it might be tempting to argue that these first steps towards a 
cold war civil defence policy had been a failure, and the complete lack of any 
preparations in mid-1948 seems to bear this out. Great strides had been made, however, 
and the basic framework of future policy had been produced. The British planners had 
moved from bewilderment at the power of the atomic bomb to having a sound idea of 
how it would affect Britain, how many would die and what could be done to avert such 
a disaster. These were no mean achievements. Mistakes, however, were made in 
understanding the nature of a future war. Too much effort was put into industrial 
dispersal, and not enough into understanding morale. Moreover, as we shall see, the 
lack of a short-term plan could have had disastrous consequences. 
121 Ibid. 
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Two 
The Berlin Crisis and the Re-creation of Civil Defence, 1948-9 
War Scare 
The Berlin blockade of the summer of 1948 was the first major crisis of the cold war, a 
`quite genuine war scare'. ' The Soviet Union cut off the land routes from the western 
zones of Germany and sealed the borders to the British, American and French sectors of 
Berlin on 24 June 1948 as part of their determination not to see the British and the 
Americans succeed in establishing a separate, capitalist German state in their sectors of 
Germany and Berlin. The resulting crisis was the culmination of three years' fraught 
discussion over the future of Germany and the blockade `dramatically exemplified' the 
new cold war confrontation which had grown since 1945.2 For many, war seemed 
imminent: the cliche-prone Conservative MP Cuthbert Hedlam wrote in his diary on 3 
July that `we are living on the edge of a volcano... we are living under the sword of 
Damocles', 3 and the day after `that the Russians mean war is quite probable... they 
could get to the English channel in a very short time'. 4 Instead of war, West Berlin was 
relieved through a massive air-lift operation lasting months, with the Soviet Union 
implicitly admitting defeat in mid-1949 and lifting the blockade. 
Avi Shlaim has argued that `in retrospect it is clear beyond any shadow of a doubt that 
this was the most critical crisis of the cold war'. 5 Although this is debatable, the British 
Government certainly considered it a possible step on the road to war and intensified 
defence planning accordingly. As Alan Bullock put it 
everyone with a claim to expert knowledge agreed that the Russians were 
unlikely to start a war to force the western powers out of Berlin, but the 
fact was that they continued to tighten the blockade and that if a war 
started as a result of miscalculation, there was little chance of stopping 
the Red Army from occupying Western Europe. 6 
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Preparations for war, then, became acute in July 1948, and Peter Hennessy has argued 
that it was the Berlin crisis which led to the creation of the cold war state. ' Berlin 
certainly served to create a concrete apparatus for the civil defence measures planned in 
the previous three years. The passing of the Civil Defence Act of 1948, which required 
local authorities to undertake preparations, and the voluntary Civil Defence Corps 
(1949) were introduced as a direct result of the Berlin war scare. 
This civil defence planning arose from the wider preparations for war. On 9 July Attlee 
and Bevin had told the Chiefs of Staff that, in the words of Elisabeth Barker, `it would 
be prudent to plan on the assumption that there might be a war' "8 The emergency 
military plan produced on 12 July included withdrawing from most of Germany and 
defending the Rhine, 9 and plans for mobilisation followed. 10 The key point of the 
preparations came, however, when the Defence Committee turned down the request of 
the Chiefs of Staff to suspend the releases of 92,000 trained men and women due for 
discharge by the end of September. " Obviously, retaining them would greatly benefit 
Britain's military preparedness. The proposal was rejected because, in Bevin's words, 
although `planning to meet the possibility of a deterioration of the situation should 
proceed as a matter of commonsense precaution', it `was not yet necessary to abandon 
hope of finding a solution to the present difficulties by negotiation'. It was concluded 
that `any form of publicity about the preparation of plans would be undesirable'. Attlee 
agreed that any suggestion of emergency preparations could prove `highly dangerous'. 
12 
The paramount importance given to secrecy extended throughout that summer's debate 
on defence plans, the result of a delicate balance between useful preparations and fear of 
precipitating a crisis through open preparations for war. 
Civil Defence was discussed in July 1948 when Sir Norman Brook produced a report on 
the civil aspects of `the defence position', distributed to the Defence Committee under 
Attlee's name. 13 It sought to give the facts on the nation's `present state of preparedness 
7 P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945, (London: Penguin, 2001), 
p168. 
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'See NA, DEFE 4/14. COS(48)97`h Meeting, 12.7.1948. 
10 NA, CAB 130/38. GEN 241/4`h Meeting, 22.7.1948. 
1' NA, CAB 131/5. DO(48)12`h Meeting, 21.7.1948. 
12 Ibid. 
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for war' and the cost of making good the deficiencies. Brook outlined the position 
starkly: `current civil defence planning is directed to the preparation of a long-term plan 
to meet an emergency in about 1957. No plan to meet an immediate emergency 
exists'. 14 There was no plan at all which had confronted the possibility of an early war, 
and this must rank as spectacular failure of planning (see Chapter One). Brook told 
Ministers that improvisation would be needed to meet an attack which, in the first 
instance, would not exceed that experienced by Britain in 1940-1. 
Any scheme produced at short notice could only be makeshift. Before 
even a start could be made on preparing a scheme it would be necessary 
to consult local authorities and numerous other authorities outside the 
Government; and in order to start enrolling and training the necessary 
volunteers it would be necessary to make it clear to the public that it was 
their duty to prepare themselves for the possibility of an emergency. All 
this, of course, would involve full publicity. 15 
No aspect of the government's defence plans was satisfactory, nor could they be made 
good without weeks or months of effort and full publicity that the Government were 
preparing for war. Since 1945, for example, the RAF Warning System had been 
allowed to atrophy and in 1948 it covered only the Humber, the Solent and the Thames 
- and although the system covering London could be activated at short-notice, a scheme 
for the rest of the country `would take considerable time'. No comprehensive blackout 
scheme could be implemented for `a very long time', and evacuation could take place 
only after `several weeks' of preparations. Most of the shelters `provided in the last 
war, either at people's homes or in public shelters, has been dismantled', and as they 
`could not be replaced on any appreciable scale for many months' demand would soar. '6 
If these measures, all designed to lessen the affect of attack, were unavailable then a 
Russian attack on British cities may have been much more damaging than the German 
onslaught of 1940-1. There was no warning system to alert and no shelters to protect a 
vulnerable population. The lack of a blackout meant that the Soviet air force would be 
able to locate its targets without difficulty and the lack of official evacuation would 
mean children remained in target areas (the possibility of a panic-induced fleeing of the 
cities was not raised by Brook). What is more, the measures to alleviate the 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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consequences of attacks would have also been absent in an immediate war. It would 
take months to supply the ambulance services with enough `suitably equipped' 
vehicles', and although it was assumed volunteers would flock to the wartime Fire and 
Police Services, again it would take months to equip them properly. The shortcomings 
in a wartime fire services would be vital - they would struggle to put out fires as the 
wartime water supply system had been dismantled and to them would fall the task of 
rescuing people, something they were ill-equipped to do. How those made homeless by 
war would be cared for would also cause problems for a nation still piecing its economy 
and services together after the last war, and the authorities would have to rely on the 
charity of the public. The casualties suffered in such a war would have been enormous, 
surely more than in 1940-1, as unlike in the war against Hitler, Britain in 1948 would 
not have had the time to prepare for attack available from at least September 1939. 
In Brook's paper, publicity was key. Every aspect of the plans he outlined needed 
detailed discussion with local authorities and other organisations, and required extensive 
publicity, especially in terms of an appeal for volunteers - and Brook stressed that this 
publicity was vital if any effective steps were to be taken. '7 When Ministers discussed 
it in the context of Britain's entire preparations for a future war, however, caution 
prevailed. Attlee stressed that `it was essential to avoid giving any publicity to Civil 
Defence preparations. Subject to this, however, he thought that all possible steps should 
be taken to prepare plans to improve a situation which was clearly disquieting'. James 
Chuter Ede put forward ideas which would improve the `situation' without attracting 
publicity. These included discussions with the Police Chief Constables and Chief 
Officers of the Fire Brigades to discuss the expansion of the Police and Fire Services 
respectively, asking `the Departments concerned to prepare schemes for the evacuation 
and the handling of casualties', and the selection, with Attlee, of twelve Regional 
Commissioners for the civil defence regions which existed in the last war. '8 
The Emergency Plan 
Once Ede had been authorised by the Defence Committee on 28 July to begin secret 
plans for an early emergency he wasted no time organising a meeting of CDO. 
19 Sir 
Alexander Maxwell informed those present about the proceedings in the Defence 
17 Ibid. 
'8 Ibid. 
19 NA, CAB 134/82. CDC(48)3`d Meeting, 28.7.1948. 
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Committee the day before and stressed that `this sudden change of emphasis to the 
short-term plan should not be taken as an indication that an emergency was imminent', 
but `Ministers felt that it was only common sense to consider discreetly what steps 
would have to be taken' if a peaceful solution was not reached. Although the need for 
secrecy naturally limited the scope for action they were allowed to `bring in such 
Government officials as were necessary and a limited number of persons outside 
Government circles provided they were completely trustworthy and reliable'. 20 (This 
was in the days before any `positive' vetting procedure was in place in Whitehall and 
the definition of `completely trustworthy and reliable' would have been left largely to 
the individual in charge. )21 Maxwell also believed it was vital `to prepare plans 
indicating... what could be done if and when the publicity ban was lifted'. 22 
The subjects to be investigated give a general impression of the scale of the task facing 
CDO. These were the mobilization of the Civil Defence Services, the Control 
Organisation, Evacuation, Shelter, Rest Centres for Homeless, Food, Oil, Casualty 
Services, the Civil Warning System, Communications, Obscuration of Lighting, 
Defence against Gas, Publicity, Anti-Sabotage Measures, Accommodation and finally 
Camouflage and Deception. Departments `should consider first what could be done in 
the various fields', naturally without publicity, and then `proceed... to translate these 
ideas into paper plans and consider what steps would have to be taken to translate these 
into practical effect if the need arose, and the priority in which those steps would have 
to be taken' . 
23 Departments were to report to General Irwin as head of the CDJPS by 10 
August 1948, in order that a report to Ministers could be completed as soon as possible. 
One question raised in the discussion (it is not recorded by whom) was `whether 
24 evacuation was desirable or possible at all in the present circumstances'. In his paper 
to the Defence Committee, Brook had stated that evacuation of certain sections away 
from the areas perceived to be the most liable to attack `would be expected'. 
25 
Evacuation would certainly have been called for by the public, and some evacuation 
20 Ibid. 
21 See P. Hennessy and G. Brownfeld, `Britain's Cold War Security Purge: the Origins of Positive 
Vetting', Historical Journal, 25: 4, (1982), pp. 965-74. 
22 NA, CAB 134/82. CDC(48)3`d Meeting. 
23 Ibid. 
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plan, even if it was limited, would have helped bolster morale had war come. The lack 
of other detailed plans made evacuation more desirable not less so. No shelters and 
limited civil defence services would arouse enormous criticism, but had this been 
coupled with lack of official evacuation, there could have been a severe morale problem 
amongst a public who felt unaided, even abandoned, by the government. The idea of 
abandoning evacuation suggests that at least one planner had either already forgotten the 
lessons of the last war or had spent too long on the paper plans for a long term 
emergency and had neglected the realities of civil defence as it had to be practised. 
Either way, it showed that some at least in CDO were not immediately seized with the 
vital importance of civilian morale in an emergency. 
These reports were forwarded to CDJPS, who pulled them together in a draft report sent 
26 27 to CDO on 14 August 1948, and discussed by them four days later. The final report 
was completed the day after and despatched to the Defence Committee. 28 It was in 
essence the first `emergency plan' for civil defence, and the main body of the report sets 
out sixteen `main problems involved', describing `the steps we have already taken... 
and [giving] an indication of what further steps must be taken to promote progress in 
each field'. 29 Ministers were informed that `in general our proposals aim at a 
progressive re-introduction of the civil defence measures employed with success in 
World War II', in order `to meet a situation that in the initial stages of war in the near 
future is not likely to be materially different'. Its central thrust was that `the 
effectiveness of the paper plans which we can prepare without attracting any public 
attention is very limited', and that outside discussion was `imperative unless we are to 
rely almost entirely on improvisation and impose an unfair burden on those who will 
carry the main responsibility in the event of war'. 30 
To reinforce the point, the report outlined what could be done if consultation was 
allowed: `Given a period of, say, two or three months in which consultation with these 
outside authorities was permitted, it should be possible to create in advance of war the 
framework of an organisation which could be expanded, trained and equipped under the 
26 NA, CAB 134/82. CDC(48)14, `Preparation for Civil Defence', note by General Irwin, 14.8.48. 
27 Ibid., CDC(48)4h Meeting, 18.8.1948. 
28 Ibid., CDC(48)16, `Preparation for Civil Defence', Report to the Defence Committee, 19.8.1948. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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impetus of war itself,. 31 Concentrating on what had already been done, and what could 
be done once the publicity ban was lifted, this `emergency plan' was not a final 
cohesive paper plan, but a document which detailed progress made, and what steps 
would be taken if the government decided that the international crisis warranted the 
final implementation of a crash plan. Of course, it never did. The Berlin crisis 
stabilised as the allied air lift proved successful. 
In terms of the civil defence services, a quick run through of the services provided in the 
Second World War illustrated what was needed: a National Fire Service, emergency 
medical services, `billeting officers and war damage repairs' and the Civil Defence 
General Services organised into units of Report and Control, Wardens, Casualty, Rescue 
and Decontamination. It was not possible to recruit and equip volunteers for all these 
services and the government would have had `to rely on a large measure of 
improvisation'. The basic medical and ambulance services would have to expanded, as 
would the Police and the Fire services, with the former taking over the function of the 
warden service, the latter of rescue. `On outbreak of war it is proposed that volunteers 
should be invited to apply at police stations, fire stations, ambulance stations and local 
authority offices', details were `now being worked out' for the scheme which would `in 
the first instance' require 168,000 whole-time volunteers. To make good the obvious 
deficiencies in organisation, training and equipment would necessitate an `intensive and 
protracted effort in the early days of the war' and simply `it is not to be expected that 
they would be in a position to deal with heavy raids for many months'. 32 
On evacuation proposals, the report stressed the need to learn the lessons of the last war 
and not `make too comprehensive a scheme', as people often preferred to make their 
own arrangements, and not `to announce any organised evacuation plan in advance of 
actual need', largely because `it upsets householders in reception areas'. 33 It was 
proposed, therefore, to limit evacuation to, `in the first instance', expectant mothers and 
school children from key target areas. Help would be needed from the Women's 
Voluntary Service and the British Red Cross, and discussions with these bodies and 
local authorities concerning billeting and feeding, as well as printing evacuation 
timetables and pamphlets would be essential and necessitate publicity. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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Shelter was always going to be the major problem. It was the one area that was deemed 
most essential to the population, the one area where scarce materials and money were 
needed most, and therefore the one area about which it was virtually impossible to 
achieve agreement unless a war seemed imminent. Of the approximately 3.6 million 
Anderson and Morrison shelters provided in the 1939-45 war, 628,000 remained `and 
the rest have been collected and used for scrap'. 34 Only after the publicity ban was 
lifted could the destruction of existing shelters be averted. The London tube system 
sheltered 150,000 people and could be used once the floodgates were reinstalled. It was 
planned to make the best use of existing deep shelters, but `without attracting attention 
and making it clear we are preparing for war there is not much that can be done' . 
35 If 
the publicity ban was lifted local authorities would be advised that `on the outbreak of 
war construction could proceed with the minimum of delay as soon as the material 
becomes available'. 36 Also, the Home Office would distribute pamphlets which would, 
among other things, give `advice to the public generally as to the best means of avoiding 
danger if they have no shelter to go to'. 37 The lack of materials would mean that 
`planning of new construction should proceed on the assumption that, if war breaks out, 
only small quantities of steel, timber and cement will be available', therefore shelters 
could not be built. The level of steel stocks was so perilous that it was suggested that 
existing stocks should be frozen in order to provide shelter in a future war. The ruinous 
impact of this measure on Aneurin Bevin's housing programme was not considered by 
the Home Office. 
The warning system was an equally grave source of concern. London was best served, 
with around a quarter of its sirens capable of operation `within 24 hours'. Others would 
need to be overhauled and it `would take about three months to produce a network of 
sirens in London at all comparable to that of World War 11,. 
38 In the rest of Britain, 
however, few sirens existed and it was impossible to know how long `it would take to 
build up a network to cover the whole country', which `could hardly fail to attract 
widespread attention' . 
39 The only sources for sirens would be new production or 
34 Ibid. 
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`possibly, the British Zone in Germany', and the Foreign Office had been asked to `find 
out discreetly' whether they could obtain suitable sirens. Surely nothing would suggest 
Britain was preparing for war more vividly than the occupying forces roaming around 
Northern Germany looking for air raid sirens to dismantle and ship back to Britain. 
Other areas revealed a similar story. In terms of blackout provision, care of the 
homeless, and disposal of the dead, materials were lacking, organisation non-existent 
and staff needed. Most of all, local authorities needed to be consulted. In terms of oil 
and food, stockpiles were low, and it was recommended that reserves of sugar and flour 
be increased. All in all, ministers were left in no doubt that if an adequate civil defence 
plan was to be produced consultation must be authorised, otherwise the emergency plan 
would `be much less effective' and would have to, in the event of war, `rely very largely 
on improvisation'. However, `if such consultation is authorised it will quickly become 
known that Civil Defence plans are being prepared to meet the possibility of war in the 
near future'. Cost was a factor, too. Ministers were warned that physical preparations 
for civil defence `would place a heavy load on the economy of the country.... Unless 
American help was made available on a vast scale well in advance of the emergency, 
and was subsequently maintained, we see little prospect of being able to meet these 
demands'. 40 In effect, the civil defence planners were asking the Defence Committee 
for a commitment the nation could simply not afford. 
The Defence Committee discussed the emergency plan on 23 August 1948, and 
although the minutes of the discussion have been withheld from the National Archives 
in Kew, we can easily piece the decisions together. A later note to the Prime Minister 
from an official reminding him of the discussion shows that at this point a Ministerial 
Committee on Civil Defence was formed to give `careful consideration' to this issue of 
publicity. 41 We also know that the Defence Committee agreed to purchase flour and 
sugar from the Americans to aid food stocks. 
42 Also, the suspension of military releases 
was agreed `to give the Foreign Secretary backing for his foreign policy over the next 
six to nine months', but it was decided that `an announcement about civil defence plans 
ao Ibid. 
41 NA, PREM 8/1355. Brief for Attlee on GEN 253, by W. S. Murrie, 1.10.48 
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might have a more serious effect on the international situation' and so secrecy was 
maintained. 43 
A Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence (CDM) was appointed on 30 August, and for 
the first time since the Second World War the main committee guiding civil defence 
was placed in the hands of politicians. Its terms of reference were simple: `to review 
what action has been taken, and consider what further action should be taken, in 
preparation for civil defence'. 44 It was chaired by Ede as Home Secretary and included 
the Minister of Defence A. V. Alexander, and six other Ministers. 45 When Ede wrote to 
the rest of CDM on 10 September 1948, the pressure to finalise an emergency plan had 
lessened; he stated that `while we must clearly do the best we can to be ready to meet 
the possibility of an emergency in the near future, our main object must be to perfect 
our plans to meet the longer-term contingency' . 
46 Therefore, `anything that we do to 
meet the possibility of war at an earlier date should be designed as far as possible to fit 
in with the policies we propose to adopt under the long term plan'. Conversely, planning 
would need `to tackle the long-term problem in carefully thought out phases, designed 
to take account of the possibility that war may occur before that date' . 
47 The 
`emergency plan' would merely be the first of these phases. 
On the question of publicity, Ede stressed that `very little more can be done to forward 
this emergency planning without creating the impression that the Government is 
expecting the country to be involved in a war at an early date'. Allied to this was the 
fact that `it would be quite impracticable in present circumstances to make a really 
effective plan as there is no hope of our being allotted the necessary quantities of 
materials and supplies of all kinds'. 48 These were the words of a civil defence 
pragmatist - economic resources for a thoroughgoing implementation of any plan 
simply were not there, so there was no point pushing for widespread publicity which 
might start a public clamour for more resources to be dedicated to civil defence. Ede 
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noted that `a good deal of public interest has recently been displayed' and the public and 
Parliament `expect before too long to see evidence of action as distinct from planning'. 
However, `on the other hand it must be recognised that if there is to be an acceleration 
of the tempo it will give rise to difficult questions in the economic sphere'. 49 
Therefore, Ede believed that `the existing policy of secrecy in respect of this emergency 
plan should be maintained for the present and that we should accept that the outline 
plans that have been prepared are of limited value only and that if war comes we shall 
be forced to rely very largely on improvisation'. Two exceptions to this were the 
immediate cessation of the `demolition of serviceable shelters' and a `census of sirens 
and lists of organisations who would need special warnings'. Although both could 
attract attention `the value of these particular measures would, however, be so great that 
I feel the risk should be accepted and suggest that the Committee should agree that they 
should be put in hand without delay. If any undue alarm results, I should be quite 
prepared to defend them as common-sense measures'. 50 
On long-term planning, it was hoped to `lay a draft Civil Defence Bill before Parliament 
in the next few weeks', which would allow the Government to make a start on `the 
organisation, recruitment, and training of the Civil Defence services'. This `would, of 
course, attract a great deal of attention but as preparations will not be linked with a 
short-term emergency, this would not give rise to any alarm'. Also, CDO were asked to 
determine `the demands which civil defence is likely to make on material and 
equipment' which can then `be related to the requirements in other fields and a decision 
obtained on the proportion of the national resources which is to be made available for 
civil defence '. 51 
CDM met on 16 September 1948, to discuss both the original emergency plan and Ede's 
thoughts on it. Firstly, Bevan, whose responsibilities covered housing and local 
government as well as health, argued that he `doubted the ability' of the enemy to 
deliver the envisaged scale of attack. If they could, however, `then the provision for 
civil defence proposed under this emergency plan was, in his view, quite inadequate'. 
Bevan also doubted whether there was any need for the blackout, as `in the last war it 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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had been a source of serious embarrassment in many fields'. 52 He was reminded by an 
unknown member that strategic advice demanded the blackout and that the scale of 
attack envisaged was the best available estimate. 
The Committee agreed to the plans for evacuation, for civil defence services, and the 
census of sirens. They also stressed the need to stop the destruction of shelters 
immediately. Someone, it is not recorded who, argued that `the idea that only small 
quantities of steel, timber and cement would be available for new construction was quite 
unacceptable. If morale was to be maintained, considerable new construction would be 
essential and the Defence Committee should be apprised of this need'. 53 This argument 
went to the very heart of civil defence. Maintaining morale seemed to necessitate 
shelter construction, but the economy could not bear the strain on resources. 
When the Committee discussed lifting the publicity ban it was stressed that two 
conflicting considerations had to be taken into account. The first was that any 
consultations `specifically relating to the possibility of an early emergency might give 
rise to some alarm, which might be accentuated when it was realised that in practice 
there was very little that could be done in the way of physical preparations such as the 
provision of shelters'. The other was that `the public mind had already been very 
largely prepared for preparations of this character and if the ban were lifted it was quite 
clear that a good deal of really useful work could be done'. It was left to the Defence 
Committee to decide, with Ede stressing that if the `the likelihood of an early 
emergency' was established there was `no doubt that the ban on publicity should be 
lifted and all possible steps taken to make the existing short-term plan more effective'. 
54 
The `public mind' certainly had been prepared for civil defence measures. The press 
had reported the negotiations with local authorities that began in December 1947,55 and 
the debate on it in March 1948,56 and covered Herbert Morrison's speech on 14 
September when he told the Commons that `considerable progress had already been 
made with plans for aiding the population and for the reorganisation of the civil defence 
52 Ibid., CD(M)(48)1S` Meeting, 16.9.1948. 
53 Ibid. . sa Ibid. . ss 'Civil Defence on New Basis', The Times, 11.12.1947. 
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65 
services. The Government expect to be able to introduce legislation at an early date'. 57 
A couple of newspapers had run stories after Morrison's announcement that a Bill was 
imminent. The same day Ede was arguing that the public mind was ready, the Daily 
Telegraph had a front page headline reading `Civil Defence Plan Approved: Committee 
at Work on Shelter Design'. 58 The News Chronicle ran a similar story. 59 The next day, 
the Daily Telegraph leader said that Morrison's statement `is welcome, in so far as it 
betokens a change of tempo, but discouraging as an implicit admission of dilatoriness 
hitherto'. 60 `No doubt', the leader went on, `the Government has been unwilling to 
alarm the public and still more unwilling to direct energy away from our industrial 
effort. But it would be inexcusable to protract the delay further in present conditions'. 61 
With `sensible' press and public opinion primed for further developments, the issue 
returned to CDM in the form of a memorandum by Ede detailing civil defence 
developments to that date, 20 September 1948. Ede asked the Committee to take 
`serious note' that 
whatever preparatory steps may be taken now, we cannot hope to have 
an effective Civil Defence system in the near future.... If we press on 
with the present emergency plan we should be able to build up the civil 
defence services around the available nucleus of men and women of war 
experience, but where the provision of material and equipment is 
concerned (for example, in the provision for protection for industry and 
shelters for the population), it will be a very long time indeed before the 
system can be effective. If the war comes in the near future, therefore, 
whatever we do now there will be serious gaps in the system. 62 
Secondly, Ede reiterated the adverse affects of secrecy on planning, and warned that if 
the ban persisted `it means that if the emergency occurs we should have to rely very 
largely on improvisation and the local and other Authorities concerned will have reason 
to complain that they were not allowed to make preparations beforehand'. He then 
informed the Defence Committee of CDM's belief that if the ban was lifted great strides 
would be made on essential areas such as the warning system, the mobilization of the 
Civil Defence Services, evacuation, shelter, food, care of the homeless and provision of 
57 See `Demob Delayed 3 Months', Daily Express, 15.9.1948. 
58 `Civil Defence Plans Approved', Daily Telegraph, 16.9.1948 
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respirators, and that `the public mind has to some extent already been prepared for 
preparations of this character, and in this country at any rate people are unlikely to be 
alarmed at the fact that steps have been taken to improve the state of preparedness in the 
civil defence as well as the military field'. 63 Ede warned, however, that such 
preparations `will give a clear indication that the Government are contemplating the 
possibility of war in the near future and as the plans unfold the public will very soon be 
aware... of our inability to provide at short notice anything like effective protection 
either for industry or the population in general'. If the ban remained, planning would 
soldier on but `if war breaks out suddenly the Defence committee must appreciate that a 
good deal of useful work that could be done now will not have been done, and we shall 
then have to rely almost entirely on improvisation'. 64 
The decision on publicity was taken by an ad hoc Ministerial Committee, GEN. 253, in 
order to give a decision quickly. Presided over by the Prime Minister on 1 October 
1948, the meeting took place in the context of the failure to reach a settlement of the 
Berlin crisis in the United Nations General Assembly in Paris and an increased British 
and western determination to stand firm. 65 Attlee's brief for the Cabinet Committee 
meeting suggested that given this backdrop, `there seems to be a good case for doing 
more in the way of civil defence planning and it is unlikely that the Home Secretary's 
proposal would lead to any deterioration in the present international situation'. 66 Attlee 
was warned that the lifting of the ban `might lead for a demand for the diversion to civil 
defence of more resources than we can well spare. On balance, however, it seems right 
to face the disadvantage of revealing that only a limited amount of protection can be 
provided for the civilians in any future war'. 67 
The Ministers comprising GEN. 253 (Attlee, Morrison, Ede, Alexander and Bevan) were 
provided with a note by Ede apprising Attlee of developments in the nine days since his 
Defence Committee memorandum had been circulated. Ede argued that `the general 
attitude of the press has been to prepare the public mind for at least the possibility of an 
early emergency, and the discussions at present going on in Paris have not relieved the 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, pp. 604-8. 
66 NA, PREM 8/1355. Brief for Attlee on GEN. 253, by W. S. Murrie, 1.10.1948. 
67 Ibid. 
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public anxiety'. 68 In fact, `nearly every newspaper [a wild exaggeration] has published 
unauthorised but detailed statements as to the action contemplated by the Government'. 
This unofficial speculation could only `create confusion and the fact that no outcry has 
arisen as a result of these articles indicates that the public mind is prepared for early 
action on the part of the Government'. Ede told the Prime Minister that `to maintain the 
present silence about Civil Defence is likely to expose the Government to 
misunderstanding and criticism, and I do not think a decision on the question of 
publicity ought to be deferred any longer'. 69 As well as taking the public into the 
Government's confidence, this would allow the much-desired wider consultation 
essential to civil defence. 
Also sent to the Ministers on GEN. 253 was a Home Office paper outlining how civil 
defence policy was envisaged in both the short and long-term: 
Long-term plans which pre-suppose the establishment of a 
comprehensive training organisation before an appeal is made for 
volunteers. These plans (which require legislation) are not in an 
advanced stage and it is not likely that they would begin to show results 
before the spring of next year. Discussions on them have started with the 
Local Authority Associations 
"Crash" plans which rely on volunteers being forthcoming on the 
outbreak of war including former Civil Defence workers who could be 
used with little or no fresh training and who would be organised by 
existing peace-time services (Police, Fire and Ambulance). As regards 
other Civil Defence measures (for example arrangements for 
accommodating and feeding homeless persons and refugees) it would be 
the duty of the local authorities to base them on the experience of the last 
war and to improvise as best they could. These plans are practically 
complete on paper but of course there is a shortage of equipment and 
supplies. 70 
This memorandum to Ministers was the result of the latest thinking to emerge from 
CDJPS that planning must proceed on a basis which would allow rapid implementation 
if war came before the 1957 planning target. 7' The aim was to link the planning 
assumptions found in CDC(48)10 and the emergency plan, and to allow long-term 
68 NA, CAB 130/41. `Civil Defence'. GEN. 253/1, `Preparations for Civil Defence', Minute from the 
Home Secretary to the Prime Minister, 30.9.1948. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. GEN 253/2, `Preparation for Civil Defence', note by the Home Office, 1.10.48 
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planning to proceed on the basis that it could be used to meet any intermediate 
emergency. CDJPS envisaged an interim civil defence organisation, aimed at 
`providing throughout the country a body of men and women volunteers basically 
trained in appropriate duties to cover the whole front of civil defence. These should be 
organised as a Civil Defence Corps'. In future years, CDJPS hoped, the volunteers 
would be trained to a higher, specialised degree, and be organised for peace and war in 
the mobile and static columns long envisaged by civil defence planners, thus allowing a 
smooth transition from current `emergency' planning whereby the Police and Fires 
Services were expanded, to the final scheme for a fully functioning Civil Defence 
Corps 72 
During the GEN. 253 meeting, Ede argued that publicity would allow local authorities 
`to draw up lists of persons with experience of civil defence who would be willing to 
serve in an emergency, or earmark premises which would be required by the civil 
defence services' in wartime. 73 Ede stressed that he envisaged no financial commitment 
at this stage, and reiterated that `unless an authoritative Government statement were 
made, the public would be misled' over the government's civil defence plans, and yet 
the press attention `had shown that a Government statement about emergency civil 
74 defence preparations would have no adverse effect on morale. 
In the meeting Bevan repeated his belief that the estimated scale of attack was incorrect. 
He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff provide a new one, although he admitted that `the 
fresh appreciation would probably show a scale of attack against which any civil 
defence preparations that were possible at the present time would be ineffective', which 
begs the question why he was so concerned about the estimate in the first place (the 
estimate was not reassessed). Alexander agreed that any measures `were bound to be 
inadequate' . Bevan 
did stress, however, that if civil defence preparations could not 
meet the envisaged scale of attack any announcement of policy might involve `exposing 
themselves to an agitation which would drive them to adopt measures, such as the 
construction of shelters, which would cripple the national economy'. 
75 
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Attlee summed up agreeing that a new appreciation by the Chiefs should be submitted 
and an announcement on civil defence made. He also said that `it was, however, 
essential to avoid a situation in which the Government would be driven to devote 
resources to civil defence on a scale which would cripple the national economy, detract 
from our power of offence and alienate our allies in Western Europe'. 76 The draft 
announcement would also make this clear. What Attlee said held true throughout the 
cold war; the economic realities faced by successive British Governments would never 
allow civil defence policy to develop as the planners would have hoped, and the power 
of offensive was seen as better guarantor of peace. As Hennessy argues, `the bomb was 
always put before shelters' 77 . 
The new appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff added nothing to the estimate of the scale of 
attack. 78 The discussion concerning a public statement on civil defence reached the full 
Cabinet on 18 October, and saw Ede insisting a statement was essential, because it 
would be `extremely embarrassing' for him to delay the consultation with the local 
authorities planned for immediately after the due statement. 79 Attlee, during the debate 
on the King's Speech, announced on 26 October the intention to introduce a Civil 
Defence Bill and hold discussions with local authorities. 80 
The GEN. 253 decision to elide the `crash' and long-term plans and concentrate on the 
latter ensured that discussions with the local authorities could take place without 
controversy, as it meant that the initial approaches could be `related to the first phase of 
our long-term plans', thus also contributing to any future `crash' plan without raising 
suspicions. 81 Although, the organisation of the future civil defence services had been 
settled, outstanding issues included the control organisation, evacuation, shelter, the 
warning system, blackout, food (including school meal facilities), hospital and casualty 
services, care of the homeless, emergency repairs, maintenance of water supply and 
sewerage, and communications. It was even hoped that, if the materials became 
76 Ibid. 
77 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 125. 
78 NA, PREM 8/1355. Brief for Prime Minister on Defence Committee discussion on `civil defence 
eparations (DO(48)65,67 and 68)', by WS Murrie, 7.10.48 
91 NA, CAB 128/13. CM(48)64`h Meeting, 18.10.1948. 
80 House of Commons, Official Report, 26.10.1948, col. 30. 
81 NA, CAB 134/80. CD(M)(48)5. Preparations for Civil Defence, report by the Official Committee, 
2.11.48 
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available, `a modest start on shelter construction... might perhaps become possible'. 82 
None of this was to be settled by the new Act, which provided a framework rather than 
detailed plans. 
This motif of changing tack fully to long-term planning was taken up by Ede when the 
Ministers discussed the proposed discussions on 18 November. 83 Ede argued that 
`earlier Ministerial discussions on this subject had related to short-term plans against the 
possibility of an early emergency. Now it was proposed to create in an orderly fashion 
a more solid foundation for civil defence and progressively to develop long-term plans'. 
This was agreed, although Bevan expressed concern at the suggestion of building 
shelters. He argued that `the public would accept it as reasonable to discontinue 
demolishing shelters; but the most modest start of new shelter construction', as 
`foreshadowed' in Ede's paper `could only cause alarm. Even the collection of 
information about existing shelter would lead to demands from areas or establishments 
revealed as deficient. Nothing must be done to make the public "shelter-conscious"'. 84 
Therefore it was agreed to limit the information local authorities would gather which 
could expose the lack of shelter. To this end the proposed survey of existing shelters 
was postponed until the Ministers could see the report on future shelter provision being 
prepared by CDJPS. The notion of a separate emergency plan was finally killed off in 
this meeting. From this point all civil defence planning was focussed on meeting the 
long-term emergency envisaged in the planning paper CDC(48)10 (see Chapter 1), an 
emergency involving, it was assumed, atomic weapons. If war broke out earlier, 
existing plans would be adapted into action. This meant that the idea of expanding the 
peacetime services was laid to rest, and that the setting up of the stand-alone civil 
defence services would have to proceed apace. 
The Civil Defence Act 
James Chuter Ede introduced the second reading of the Civil Defence Bill ('a flimsy 
Bill of nine pages', as Brigadier Prior-Palmer, MP for Worthing put it) on 23 November 
1948.85 He outlined the basic philosophy of postwar civil defence policy (such as 
shelter and evacuation provision) which had been produced before Berlin, the intended 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., CD(M)(48)2°d Meeting, 18.11.1948 
84 Ibid. 
85 House of Commons, Official Report, 23.11.1948, col. 1119. 
71 
structure of the future civil defence organisation and the planning organisation in the 
Home Office, praising the work of the Chief Scientific Advisor and the Civil Defence 
Joint Planning Staff. Ede stated that `the general purpose of the Bill is to enable us to 
take the first steps towards bringing the planning which I have described to the test of 
action'. 86 The Bill's purpose, then, was not designed to `prescribe the details of the 
preparations to be made, but it provides flexible machinery for progressive 
adjustments' 87 
The Bill had been drafted before Berlin, originally produced in April. As the Home 
Office informed the Parliamentary Counsel on 19 June: 
it is impossible to contemplate a Bill which will lay down in detail, or 
indeed in broad outline what the civil defence structure for the next war 
will be. It is absolutely essential to retain a free hand to make even 
fundamental alterations as knowledge develops.... If I may say so the 
core of the Bill is `the Secretary of State may make regulations'. 8 
Ede stressed in the debate that the Bill's `flexible' nature `affords a starting point for 
further progressive steps which we intend to take with all convenient speed'. 89 
Responsibility `shall be shared, as in the 1939-45 war, by the Ministers whose peace- 
time functions are analogous to those which the organisation would have to discharge in 
time of war'. 90 In practice, in 1948, this would mean the Home Secretary was 
responsible for the lion's share of functions such as shelter policy, expansion of the 
Police and Fire Service, while the Minister of Health would be responsible not only for 
hospital services but also evacuation and care of the homeless. 
Any major capital works, such as shelter-building, would be fully reimbursed and other 
expenditure in peace-time, would be liable to a 75% grant-91 Co-operation with local 
authorities was central to the proposed policy, as `very large and important 
responsibilities will remain for local authorities' in war, despite the intention to 
centralise more of the responsibility. 92 The local authorities would take a leading role in 
86 Ibid., col. 1090 
87 Ibid., cols. 1090-1. 
88 NA, HO 322/1. Draft instructions from Mr Brass to Sir Alan Ellis (Parliamentary Counsel), 19.6.1948 
89 House of Commons, Official Report, 23.11.1948, col. 1090. 
90 Ibid., col. 1092. 
9' Ibid., cols. 1095-6. 
92 Ibid., col. 1089 
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recruiting volunteers, and it was the Government's duty to train the future instructors as 
a first priority before any recruiting could take place. Also, he stressed that `persons 
who volunteer to become part of the organisation shall have brought home to them the 
fact that they are undertaking a serious obligation, and that, if they fail properly to 
attend for training they are hindering and deterring the other members who are more 
keen' . 
93 Some notion of fining those who failed to show up was raised, although the 
issue was dropped before the end of the debate itself. 94 And although Ede outlined the 
need for military support for the civil power in any way, it was stressed that `there is no 
intention of handing over responsibility for Civil Defence to military control'. 95 
Sir John Anderson (Independent, Scottish Universities) replied for the Opposition. An 
expert in civil defence given his wartime role, 96 his speech was too caught up in the 
record and organisation of the Civil Defence Services in the 1939-45 war to be totally 
effective. 97 He did, however, criticise the delay in putting forward concrete plans: 
`there has been talk of Civil Defence under the conditions of the present day for nearly 
two years, it is time that we had more details of the Government have in mind, or what 
they may be expected to have in mind'. Anderson argued that the new policy was the 98 
same as the one in the last war, 99 that the Government need not have bothered with a 
new law, and that it could have resurrected the old system by repealing the Civil 
Defence (Suspension of Powers) Act of 1945. In this he missed the crucial fact that Ede 
was deliberately evoking the civil defence structure of the last war to placate opponents 
and the local authorities and to reassure all that the matter was in hand, whilst 
introducing a flexible Bill that would allow the planners to attempt to meet a scale of 
attack far in excess of that faced by the country in 1939-45. It is interesting, however, 
that the dangers of a future war were barely alluded to by the majority of the speakers. 
Only the Communist member for Mile End, Phil Piratin, raised the issue, arguing that 
the Bill was designed `to prepare the minds of the British public for war' 
loo 
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The Bill was discussed in a Committee of the whole House on 30 November, and the 
third reading was passed on 3 December, with the new Act receiving the Royal Assent 
on 16 December 1948. The key clause of the Bill was clause 2, which stated that `every 
local authority and police authority shall, for civil defence purposes... have and perform 
such functions as may be prescribed in relation to them by regulations to be made by the 
designated Minister'. In 1948 and in the following years, the designated ministers were 
the Home Secretary for general civil defence provision (including the organisation), and 
the Minister of Health, who was responsible for evacuation and the care of the homeless 
in war until the creation of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in 1951. 
The Act was in place, but the policy was not. This was made through the issuing of 
Regulations as Statutory Instruments. The first set of regulations, `The Civil Defence 
(General) Regulations, 1949', 101 and `The Civil Defence Corps Regulations, 1949', 102 
were issued on 27 July 1949, and came into force on 10 August 1949. This date 
represented the real `birthday' of cold war civil defence, some four years after the 
Hiroshima bomb. The General Regulations instructed local authorities to constitute a 
local planning apparatus, but it was the Civil Defence Corps Regulations, which 
required all local authorities to organise and train a division of the Civil Defence Corps 
that really saw the birth of civil defence. 103 From May 1949, local authorities received a 
slew of Home Office circulars which set out policy in detail and led up to a national 
campaign for recruitment which began in the autumn. 104 
Conclusion 
The absence of a civil defence plan during the war scare of 1948 must rank as a major 
policy failure. Some blame must be attached to those planners who had declined to look 
at any short term contingency. More important, though, was the lack of any cohesive 
direction of home and civil defence policy. Civil defence was put away too readily after 
the war, and when the Home Defence Committee was reconstituted in 1946 it was 
101 Statutory Instruments 1949. `No. 1432: Civil Defence: The Civil Defence (General) Regulations, 
1949'. 
102 `No. 1433: Civil Defence: The Civil Defence Corps Regulations, 1949'. 
103 Ibid. 
104 These included Civil Defence Circular 6/1949: `Civil Defence Act, 1948: Functions of Local 
Authorities', 9.6.1949; 16/1949: `First Aid Training for members of the Civil Defence Corps', 31.8.1949; 
21/1949: `Civil Defence Corps: recruitment procedure', 3.10.1949. 
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concerned with the long-term effects of the atomic bomb. This can be seen from the 
work conducted on establishing the `hardcore' of the country's war potential, like some 
sort of atomic Domesday survey, whilst in 1948 the Chief Engineer to the Ministry of 
Works, Sir Alexander Rouse, was left to comment bitterly on the `failure to send to 
postwar Germany anyone connected with shelter policy and the provision', 105 meaning 
Britain had missed the opportunity to gather vital intelligence on shelter provision and 
effectiveness under a weight of attack far exceeding British experience and equal to that 
threatened in the summer of 1948. There was little political direction within the civil 
defence machinery. HDC and CDO reported nominally to the Cabinet's Defence 
Committee, but did so sporadically. Both Committees were dominated, naturally, by 
Home Office officials, yet the Home Secretary was not a member of the Defence 
Committee, and attended only when needed. Had the civil defence planning machinery 
been more integrated within the defence policy-making framework, or had there been a 
Ministerial Committee, perhaps these failures would not have occurred. 
Yet it can be argued that in the long-term the Berlin crisis had served civil defence well. 
Ministers and planners alike had woken up to the fact that civil defence policies had to 
be in place, that shelters were necessary, and that most of all the organisation and 
infrastructure had to be in place before an emergency. This was not the case in the 
summer of 1948, nor was it yet in November, but by the end of 1949 a Civil Defence 
Corps existed that was training to meet any war emergency. Berlin also brought to the 
surface strains and tensions that would not be resolved throughout the cold war. The 
first was the inability to build shelters. Providing shelters for the public was expensive 
and out of the question in 1948. It would remain so; the cost in materials, manpower 
and cash simply outweighed the benefits of contingency planning. Another tension was 
that of publicity. The inability to take the public into their confidence ensured that 
Ministers' deliberations were secret, as were all civil defence plans. The fear that if 
civil defence plans were made public the government would be criticised for not doing 
enough was not peculiar to 1948, but was a factor throughout the cold war. It can be 
argued that resisting all publicity was counter-productive, and that government silence 
instead of forestalling criticism merely increased it, because the public did not know the 
positive aspects of the policy. 
105 NA, HO 197/35. Memorandum to A. S. Hutchinson from Sir Alexander Rouse, 20.7.1948. 
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Three 
The Atomic Age, 1949-53 
After the tension surrounding the Berlin crisis had subsided, civil defence planning 
returned to investigating long-term contingencies and examining the consequences of a 
future war fought with atomic bombs. Work continued on shelter provision, evacuation 
procedures, emergency feeding, and on ensuring the `due functioning' of essential war 
industries. In the period between the end of the Berlin airlift and the development of the 
hydrogen bomb, real civil defence preparations were being made, especially in terms of 
stockpiling resources and training the Civil Defence Corps. An evacuation policy was 
agreed and published. Although some concrete measures came to fruition, other plans 
failed to leave the paper stage. Throughout this time pressure on government finances 
ensured that civil defence expenditure was kept to a minimum, far below that 
considered necessary by civil defence planners; financial provision changed in response 
not just to economic circumstances but also the changing nature of the cold war. For 
while civil defence spending increased in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War in 
June 1950, the cost of the resulting rearmament ensured Ministers were reluctant to 
spend larger sums on a `passive' defence measure. 
The existence of Russian atomic bombs led some defence planners to openly question 
the worth of civil defence in an era when British defence strategy was increasingly 
based on nuclear deterrence. Although civil defence planners in the Home Office 
stressed its life-saving capacities and vital morale role, it was argued that little could be 
done to avoid casualties and that civil defence played no role in deterring a possible 
attack. Certainly, these two arguments were used to great effect by Ministers when 
resisting requests for increased expenditure. Civil defence continued throughout the 
atomic age because it would have been politically difficult to scrap it so soon after 
reintroducing the policy, and because the majority of Whitehall believed that it would 
make a large difference in an atomic war. 
Civil defence in the atomic period became increasingly linked with cold war military 
planning. So-called `civil defence' measures were approved only if they accorded with 
the priorities of the Armed Forces. For example, the key issues of the warning system 
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and communications received funds, but measures to aid civilians were neglected. 
Administratively, this had the effect of causing authority for civil defence planning to 
become blurred as preparations increasingly fell into the orbit of general `war planning'. 
The official machinery for civil defence planning, which after 1945 reported directly to 
the Cabinet's Defence Committee, gradually came within the sphere of Sir Norman 
Brook who conducted the civilian planning for a general war, first from within the 
Defence (Transition) Committee and then from a bespoke Home Defence Committee 
which firmly placed civil defence, in the narrow sense, within the remit of general war 
planning. 
From its formation in 1948 the dominant body in formulating, rather than deciding, 
policy was undoubtedly the CDJPS. With its numerous Working Parties, it drove civil 
defence planning and research, collated the results and sent policy reports to CDO, 
concentrating on issues such as ironing out the organisation of the civil defence 
services, completing paper plans for evacuation, care of the homeless in war and 
emergency feeding arrangements as well as a continual examination of the possibility of 
a shelter policy. ' By far the most important was the Working Party on the Effects of Air 
Attack, which acted as a central clearing house for research and information on the 
effects of atomic bombs and heavy conventional attacks. 2 It was this group which 
calculated the estimated casualties from any given attack. 
Evacuation 
Evacuation was central to civil defence planners. It was perhaps the most important 
issue in atomic-age civil defence because it was effective and cheap. Getting millions 
of people out of danger areas cost little to plan on paper and would cost money only in 
an extreme emergency. The basic `long-term' cold war evacuation policy was pieced 
together gradually in 1949-50, the result of in-depth research and consultations with 
local authorities. The first outline policy, produced by the CDJPS, reached CDM in 
July 1949.3 Like all civil defence plans until December 1950, it was based on the target 
completion date of 1957, as outlined in CDC(48)10 (see Chapter 1). 
1 For the work of the CDJPS and its various working parties, see the various files in NA, HO 357. 
2 NA, HO 357/10. `Working Party on the Effects of Air Attack'. 
3 NA, CAB 134/80. CD(M)(49)8, `Outline Plan for Evacuation and Care of the Homeless', Report by the 
Official Committee on Civil Defence, 19.7.49. 
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The plan consciously followed `the pattern of the organisation developed in the last 
war', 4 with areas `classified respectively as evacuation, neutral or reception' and the 
priority classes including children of school age, expectant mothers and under-fives 
accompanied by their mothers or other guardian. The CDJPS had considered excluding 
the latter category on the grounds that mothers with their children `caused more 
dissatisfaction in reception areas' than the other two classes, but they could not be 
excluded from the plan. Local authorities would bear the brunt of the organisation in 
terms of receiving and billeting evacuees, including `plans for extending their normal 
health, education and similar services'. It was intended that local authorities in 
vulnerable areas would provide accommodation for 8% of their population, earmarked 
for caring for those made homeless after an enemy attack. 5 
The role of central government was limited to issuing Regulations under the Civil 
Defence Act, and preparing the plans for the transport of evacuees out of these areas and 
for assistance in the form of travel vouchers and billeting orders. The travel 
organisation would be a massive undertaking. `Priority classes' in the evacuation areas 
numbered 5.6 million, 6 and it was estimated that 75% of them would participate in any 
evacuation. 7 The plan aimed to ensure that `organised evacuation movement can be 
started at 24 hours notice and evacuees be housed in the reception areas by nightfall on 
the day of departure'. 8 To do this, it would be essential to organise a staggered 
evacuation, beginning in London, in order to avoid clogging the railway system. This 
was a lesson learned from the last war, when the transport infrastructure could not cope 
with the demand placed on it. 
The plan did not offer any solutions to the problems of providing rest centres, 
equipment for emergency feeding or the complexities of transportation, but it did 
provide a basic framework which would allow this planning to be undertaken by local 
authorities and others. Ministers agreed very quickly to issue regulations requiring local 
authorities to plan for evacuation on the above lines, 
9 and the Civil Defence (Evacuation 
and Care of the Homeless) Regulations were issued in 1949. But the circulars giving 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 NA, HO 357/14. CDJPS(E)5, `Population Data for Reception and Evacuation Areas'. 
7 NA, CAB 134/80. CD(M)(49)8, `Outline Plan for Evacuation and Care of the Homeless'. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. CD(M)(49)3`d Meeting, 25.7.49 
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local authorities details on the specific planning required were delayed, first by the need 
to prepare them, and then by the approach of the 1950 General Election. 1° The 
Ministry of Health finally published their Memorandum on Evacuation in 1950,11 the 
first public espousal of the evacuation plans, to the indifference of the press or 
Parliament. Perhaps more interesting than what the plan would do was what it would 
not. It ruled out `the indiscriminate transfer of the general population of large industrial 
towns' due to the `crippling effect on the economic life of the country', and judged that 
it was therefore `essential in the national interest that in war-time all persons with work 
of national importance to do should remain at their posts unless the Government advised 
them to move'. This was an explicit reminder that civil defence preparations would be 
undertaken within the context of a national war effort, that although the role of 
evacuation was humanitarian, it was also `in the national interest that all possible steps 
should be taken to preserve the youth of the country and the future generation'. 12 
National interest also demanded that adult workers remained in the target areas. 
As the Memorandum on Evacuation was being discussed, evacuation policy was already 
being overhauled. As a result of the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb, updating 
the evacuation plan to take into account an atomic bombardment was considered a 
matter of `considerable urgency'. 13 It had previously been assumed that an atomic war 
would not take place for some time, allowing policy to evolve from the `initial' 
conventional phase developed in 1949 to a final atomic phase sometime in the 1950s. 
Instead, no sooner had the `initial' policy been announced than the `final' policy was 
deemed necessary. It even involved jettisoning a planned `intermediary' stage. 14 
The policy put to Ministers on 3 May 1950, and agreed as a basis of planning on 18 
May, 15 was not radically different in terms of evacuation, as accommodation constraints 
meant that any expansion of the scheme `would mean adopting a much higher ratio of 
persons per habitable room than proved acceptable in the last war, and than would 
probably be enforceable even in the dire circumstances of atomic warfare'. Where the 
10 NA, CAB 134/8 1. CD(M)(50) I" Meeting, 19.1.50 
1 Ministry of Health, Civil Defence Act, 1948: Memorandum on Evacuation, (HMSO, 1950). 
12 Ibid., pp. 2-3 
13 NA, CAB 134/8 1. CD(M)(50)7, `Evacuation and Dispersal Policy in Phase III', Memorandum by the 
Chairman of the Official Committee, 3.5.50. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. CD(M)(50)3`d Meeting, 18.5.1950. 
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plan broke new ground was by arguing that some non-priority class `dispersal' (as 
opposed to `evacuation'), could be directed to the neutral rather than reception areas. It 
was estimated 3.5 million could be dispersed in this way. These would come `from the 
most densely populated and strategically most important central key areas', and 500,000 
of these `dispersal' places should be allocated to those over seventy, `the blind and the 
crippled', because, frankly, `we want them out of the way'. The other 3 million would 
be dispersed according to occupation. In these `key central areas', industry would be 
divided along `essential' and `non-essential' lines. Those deemed non-essential to the 
war effort or the essential life of the community would be moved elsewhere; those that 
could not be moved would be shut. Essential undertakings would `be maintained in 
operation to the greatest extent possible'. The population would either be moved out 
with their non-essential firms, moved out to find employment `in less strategically 
significant areas' or would be directed to employment in the now doubtless expanding 
essential industries within the target areas. Those working in the remaining essential 
industries should be found accommodation outside these central areas if possible, and 
then shipped in to work, or they should stay put. In defining `Central Key Areas', it 
was not simply a case of moving `the whole population from one or two key areas as 
extensive as the Thames-side strip from Fulham to Barking', but of a more detailed look 
at achieving a population shift from the `central key areas' to `outer key areas and 
cushion areas'. ' 6 
By concentrating on both reducing casualties and maintaining production, planners had 
produced a hybrid policy of great complexity that may well have proved impossible to 
implement. They recognised that it was by no means certain that any work would be 
able to continue in these central areas, but believed that planning had to be based on the 
assumption of continued production. Success would have rested on minutely planning 
the status of every industry and factory in the target areas. The questions of which 
industries and their workforces stayed or left, and which workers were given `safer' 
accommodation outside the target areas would have been complex and divisive. Once 
the principle of evacuating only uniform classes of population was broken it would 
surely have been difficult for the government to rather arbitrarily disperse certain 
workers and not others without dire consequences for industrial production and social 
harmony. 
16 Ibid. 
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Shelter 
The other key policy for civil defence planners was shelter provision. Ministers 
discussed the issue twice in two years, rejecting the idea in March 1949 and again in 
October 1950. Home Office tactics on both occasions rested on admitting that large 
scale shelter provision was impossible in the short-term, and hoping Ministers would 
approve the general long-term policy of shelters and allow some construction. It was 
clearly believed that once Ministers agreed in principle and the first domestic shelters 
were built, the policy would be irreversible. For example, before the March 1949 
decision, the CDJPS officials drafting their report on shelters were informed that `the 
Ministerial Sub-Committee had proved generally hostile to shelter provision on any 
large scale', thereafter, `as a matter of tactics... endeavour should be made to secure the 
general approval to the scheme by Ministers without mentioning particular quantities of 
steel' .7 
1 
Aside from hiding the full economic consequences of shelter provision from Ministers, 
the other tactic was to stress the disparity of the non-existent cold war provision with 
the ample provision of the Second World War. This served to highlight the belief that 
the public would assume some shelter provision, that morale would be affected if 
shelters did not materialise and that an early start needed to be made, despite the cost. 
The fact, it was argued, `that only a little can be done at present is not in itself an 
argument for inaction. On the contrary, the less we can do, the more important it is that 
we should start early'. 18 CDM rejected the idea of any limited construction but did 
ensure research continued. 19 
The issue returned to CDM in October 1950 when the CDJPS Working Party on Shelter 
completed their third report and CDO forwarded their recommendations to Ministers. 20 
The report discussed various types of shelter protection and linked them to the revised 
estimate of the scale of attack, which included, as well as atomic bombs, a conventional 
bombardment three to four times that of the peak level of German attack (10,000 tons 
17 NA, HO 205/361. `2nd December, shelter policy working party', note of a meeting, 2.12.1948. 
18 NA, CAB 134/80. CD(M)(49)1, `Shelter Policy', Report by the Official Committee on Civil Defence, 
14.3.49. 
19 Ibid., CD(M) 1 S` Meeting, 31.3.1948. 
20 NA, CAB 134/8 1. CD(M)(50)15, `Shelter Policy', Report by the Official Committee, 17.10.1950. 
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delivered in September 1940). This was grim reading for civil defence planners. 
Britain was likely to suffer `area attacks', of the intensity `achieved in our own attacks 
at Hamburg and elsewhere', far exceeding `anything experienced in this country in the 
last war' as well as `precision attacks' on specific targets. This enormous weight of 
conventional attack, coupled with the atomic bomb, made shelter provision all the more 
important as it `would make a valuable contribution towards the reduction of casualties 
and the maintenance of morale'. In a grim pointer to the future, the CDJPS advised that 
this claim `would no longer hold good if and when the problems of producing and 
delivering hydrogen bombs are solved '. 21 
These Hamburg-style conventional attacks would cause enormous casualties. For 
example, an `area attack' on Glasgow could kill 19,000. In the less densely populated 
Nottingham, the dead would number 6,900. If an `average' British city were attacked 
using a `nominal', Nagasaki-type bomb, there would have been 30,000 deaths and the 
same amount injured. All these figures were based on the assumption that there had 
been no evacuation, no shelter, and everyone had been indoors. Shelters would save 
many of these lives, it was argued. Shelters of Second World War standard would save 
four fifths of all `conventional' casualties, and three fifths of atomic. These figures 
precluded the possibility of a `fire storm' of the kind which destroyed Hamburg and 
Dresden breaking out, and although a fire-storm was unlikely in Nottingham, it was 
seen as a `probable' occurrence in Glasgow if incendiary bombs were used, due to the 
high density of population and housing in the city. 22 
Without shelters, it was argued, casualties `in the first few months of a future war may 
be on such a scale as to endanger the national morale'. Moreover, the effect of these 
casualties might be `heightened by a widespread realisation that the nation had allowed 
itself to become involved in a war before reasonable measures had been taken to 
provide shelter against a form of attack which had been clearly foreseen', possibly 
causing `such a break in morale as would even effect our capacity to continue to 
fight'. 23 To avert this potentially devastating collapse, shelter would be required - and 
the Home Office certainly believed the public would expect government-built shelters. 
It was recommended that shelters should be first provided in the so-called `Category I' 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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areas of highest risk: namely Greater London, Merseyside, Glasgow and the other major 
urban centres. 24 
The problem, as it always would be in cold war shelter policy, was the cost. A mixture 
of domestic and communal shelters, of Second World War and atomic design, for the 16 
million people expected to sleep in the areas in war-time, would cost £290 million. 
Including other areas, the report continued, `we are of the opinion that the total cost of 
an adequate programme of shelter construction will be of the order of £500 or £600 
million'. Although the CDJPS clearly understood that `so long as the international 
situation becomes no worse than at present' the question of shelter provision would `be 
determined in relation to grave financial and economic considerations', they believed an 
early start on construction needed to be made because `of the impracticality of 
completing any large part of the work as a rush job under an imminent threat of war'. 25 
The greatest fear of the Home Office planners, however, seemed to be the impact on 
civil defence in general if no shelter was provided. There would be `grave effects on 
morale' in war without them, but the lack of shelters would also damage peacetime 
preparations. It was, CDJPS argued `difficult to see how civil defence can be taken 
seriously - whether by the Civil Defence Corps or by the local authorities - if the 
commencement of shelter construction is long delayed' . 
26 Importantly, CDM agreed 
with CDJPS that shelters would be built when the economy allowed. 27 This policy was 
conveyed by Ede to the House of Commons on 9 November 1950. Ede's speech 
promised that reports would be sought from local authorities establishing what shelter 
was available and what was needed, and he stated that once these reports had been 
received `the Government will consider how soon and on what scale it will be 
practicable, having regard to the international situation and other calls on man-power 
and materials, to embark on a programme of shelter construction' . 
28 Although no firm 
commitment was made, this assumption that some shelters would be built in the future 
was the closest Britain came to a cold war shelter policy. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. CD(M)(50)6`h Meeting, 23.10.1950 
28 House of Commons, Official Report, 9.11.1950, cols. 1124-5. 
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Korea 
The invasion of South Korea by the Communist North on 25 June 1950 had an impact 
in the British context far beyond the events on the Korean peninsula and the deployment 
of British troops under the banner of the UN to repel North Korea. For Britain, the 
Korean War represented a heightening of cold war tension and an enormously increased 
risk of general war. 29 The massive rearmament programme undertaken by the Labour 
Government was implemented at enormous political and economic cost to defend 
Britain and Western Europe against a possible attack by the Soviet Union. Korea 
seemed to indicate that the Communists could strike at any time, and a high state of 
readiness must be achieved by the armed forces of the West. For example, on 6 July 
1950, the Chiefs of Staff told the Defence Committee that, 
our present defence policy was only acceptable on the assumption that 
there would be a period of warning of 18 months or more. It was clear 
from events in Korea that it was more than possible that there would be 
little, if any, warning. In these circumstances the peace-time forces 
maintained by the United Kingdom were hardly more than a bluff. 30 
The same day, Attlee explicitly linked Korea with a possible European war, telling the 
Cabinet that `it was especially important at the present time that preoccupation with 
Korea should not divert attention from other danger-spots in these areas; and also that 
we should not allow the situation in the East generally to blind us to the risks to which 
'3 we were exposed in Europe .1 
Following Korea the defence estimates went from the £780 million agreed in December 
1949, to £3,600 million in August 1950, to £4,700 million in January 1951, splitting the 
Labour Party in the process. 32 This rise in spending, and the economic downturn it 
caused, is seen as a pivotal part of postwar British history. In Peter Hennessy's words, 
there are powerful reasons for supposing our best hope for the kind of 
postwar economic miracle enjoyed by so many western European 
countries was scattered in fragments in the committee rooms of 
Whitehall, on the hills above the Imjin in Korea and along the Rhine in 
29 For example, see `War Cloud over Korea, Daily Telegraph, 26.6.1950. 
30 NA, CAB 131/8. DO(50)12`h Meeting, 6.7.1950. 
31 NA, CAB 128/18. CM(50)43`d Meeting, 6.7.1950. 
32 T. Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 86-124. 
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Germany as British occupation forces were rearmed in readiness for a 
Stalinist assault. 33 
Within this context of rearmament, civil defence was also expanded, rising from around 
£9 million in 1950/1 to over £40 million two years later. Although the atomic bomb 
had caused the re-evaluation of civil defence and Berlin and inspired its institutional 
framework, it was the general war scare caused by the events in Korea which ensured 
civil defence preparations began in earnest in the early 1950s. 
Yet despite the fact that the civil defence budget was increased to some £180 million 
over four years in January 195 134 when the £4,700 million defence figure was agreed, 
civil defence planners were profoundly dissatisfied. Over the course of the Korean 
War/Defence Budget crisis of June 1950-July 1951 civil defence plans costing some 
£936 million were put forward. The size of this request - and its rejection - is 
explained by an essential divergence between the way civil defence was conceived 
within the Home Office civil defence hierarchy and the rest of government. 
One of the first problems was the way in which the increase in civil defence activity was 
instigated in May 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War, when the Defence 
Committee instructed CDO `to prepare and submit proposals designed to enable 
Ministers to determine an order of priority in expenditure on Civil Defence over the 
next three or four years'. 35 This explicitly invited a shopping list approach, and CDO 
recommended a wide range of measures, including `communications; maintaining under 
air attack the due functioning of ports, public utilities and the socialised industries; and 
the storage of oil'. Their report, submitted to CDM on 18 July 1950, was based on the 
then current strategic appreciation which meant relating planning to a possible European 
War in 1957, and therefore, regarded the four year period `as primarily one of 
preparation, in the years subsequent to which there will remain much to be done before 
the country's civil defence measures are in a state of full readiness'. 36 
33 P. Hennessy, Never Again: Britain, 1945-51, (London: Cape, 1992), p. 415. 
34 NA, CAB 131/10. DO(51)1 S` Meeting, 23.1.1951. 
35 NA, CAB 134/81. CD(M)(50)24, `Expenditure over the Next Four Years', Report by the Chairman of 
the Official Committee, 18.7.1950. 
36 Ibid. 
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The plan divided civil defence preparations into three categories, the first of which 
consisted of projects `fundamental to the development of our civil defence measures as 
a whole and to their completion by 1957' which `cannot be improvised at short notice'. 
These included the warning system, communications generally, the training of civil 
defence volunteers, the command and control system, and emergency feeding 
arrangements. The other two categories included vital measures which would need to 
be completed by 1957 and the most expensive elements of the civil defence programme 
which would require `a reorientation of economic and social policy'. 37 Estimates on all 
three Categories over the four years came to £936,093,000, and the `fundamental' 
Category I projects which CDO recommended should be approved, would cost 
£136,998,000 over the 1951-55 period. 
The Defence Committee agreed that the Category I measures should proceed, 38 and the 
Cabinet concurred on 25 July 1950.39 Despite this decision, civil defence planning 
continued on the basis that there would be no major war before 1957 until the Chiefs of 
Staff issued a new `Hypothesis for Defence Preparations'40 in December 1950, after the 
Cabinet had authorised the acceleration of preparations for the armed forces . 
41 The new 
hypothesis called for those civil defence plans `which contribute directly to the 
preparedness of the armed forces' to be completed by the end of 1952 (rather than the 
original 1954). These preparations included those civil defence measures which directly 
aided active air defence and the ability of the Supply Departments to equip the armed 
forces', as well as `certain measures of insurance, such as stockpiling of strategic raw 
materials and food'. 42 Beyond this, `all other plans and preparations should be brought 
as rapidly as possible to the point at which they could be put into execution if physical 
resources were made available' . 
43 
This strategic advice was sent to the Defence (Transition) Committee (DTC) rather than 
CDO, as DTC had the responsibility for conducting aspects of civil departments' war 
planning beyond `narrow' civil defence. Also, although they had no direct link in terms 
37 Ibid. 
38 NA, CAB 131/8. DO(50)15`h Meeting, 24.7.1950. 
39 NA, CAB 128/18. CM(50)50`h Meeting, 25.7.1950 
40 NA, DEFE 5/25. COS(50)534, `Hypothesis for Defence Preparations', Note by the Secretary 
21.12.1950 
41 NA, CAB 128/18. CM(50)87"' Meeting. 
42 NA, DEFE 5/25. COS(50)534, `Hypothesis for Defence Preparations'. 
43 Ibid. 
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of liaison, Sir Frank Newsam (Permanent Secretary, Home Office), Chairman of CDO 
sat on the committee. More importantly, DTC was chaired by Sir Norman Brook, 
meaning that war planning was directed by the Cabinet Secretary. From this point 
onwards, DTC co-ordinated the official submissions to Ministers on the civil defence 
budget. DTC had by early 1951 achieved a de facto advisory capacity over CDO. It 
was not until after the budgetary debates had been completed that the precise 
relationship between the Committees was settled. 44 This essentially meant that the 
CDO dealt with purely `narrow' civil defence issues, whilst DTC had responsibility for 
war planning in the general sense (See Appendix C. 4). 
On New Year's Day 1951, Sir Frank Newsam made a plea for a vigorous expansion of 
civil defence preparations, believing that civil defence should be expanded apace with 
the armed forces: 
Unless this was done the efficiency of the armed forces might be greatly 
impaired by the loss of civilian morale and, moreover the enemy might 
regard our lack of preparations as such a weakness as to nullify the 
deterrent effect of strong active defences. If... war did come, then the 
Government would not have discharged its responsibilities if reasonable 
civil defence measures had not been undertaken.... It was too late to 
wait until war was inevitable before putting into execution plans for, say, 
shelter. 45 
Sir Pierson Dixon of the Foreign Office replied that although he agreed that civil 
defence `might show our determination to resist aggression', he warned that `it was hard 
to assess the effect on the enemy's attitude if civil defence measures were accelerated... 
such action might be considered provocative and as indicating our belief that war was 
inevitable by the time our preparations were complete'. This was an argument familiar 
from the summer of 1948 (and indeed from before 1939). Overall, however, Dixon 
favoured `at least a start on civil defence measures such as shelter provision' . 
46 
44 NA, CAB 134/139. DTC(51)11, `Revised Composition and Terms of Reference', Note by the 
Secretary of the Cabinet, 3.4.1951; DTC(51)20, `Responsibility for War Planning', Memorandum by the 
Secretary of the Cabinet, 22.5.195 1. 
45 Ibid. DTC(51)1 S` Meeting, 1.1.1951. 
46 Ibid. 
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A report on the acceleration of civil defence preparations, initially produced by CDJPS, 
reached the Cabinet on 18 January 1951 via the Chiefs of Staff, and DTC. 47 The report 
also stressed that the military spending `would not provide for any acceleration of civil 
defence preparations, other than those which contribute directly to the preparedness of 
the Armed Forces and certain stockpiling measures). However, those measures which 
were advocated were clearly vital to the defence of Britain, including `full development 
of the Air Raid Warning System' and blackout measures as well as stockpiling raw 
materials, equipment and food. The lack of other civil defence measures was 
`presumably, to be justified by the fact that the Government are aiming to prevent war, 
and are not at this stage putting in hand preparations which would have to be taken if 
war was regarded as inevitable within the next two or three years'. 48 
At the same time as this submission to the Cabinet, Ede also completed a Cabinet paper 
on civil defence, asking for the budget to be increased across all preparations. The 
Home Secretary's Cabinet paper in the first place asked for an increase in the authorised 
spending programme from £137 million to £180 million to meet the recommendations 
of the Chiefs of Staff (and to meet revised estimates on existing projects). 49 It was also 
a neat summary of the fact that civil defence was not benefiting from the increased 
spending and the acceleration of defence planning. The current four-year £136 million 
plan agreed in the summer of 1950 represented preparations which `cover only a very 
limited part of the field of civil defence; as a result of the acceleration of the programme 
for the armed forces, civil defence preparations will lag even further than hitherto 
behind preparations of the armed forces'. He went on, `as the Minister charged with the 
general responsibility for co-ordinating civil defence measures, I feel it my duty to 
report this to the Cabinet and to ask my colleagues whether it is in the national interest 
to limit our civil defence preparations to the projects already approved by the Cabinet 
and to the measures of acceleration recommended [by DTC]'. 
50 
Ede then summarised the `present position': the current civil defence plan due to end in 
March 1955 related to a planning date of 1957 `and it assumed that, in the interval 
47 NA, CAB 129/44. CP(51)18, `Defence Preparations by Civil Departments', Report to the Cabinet, 
18.1.1951. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. CP(51)19, `Civil Defence Preparations', Memorandum by the Home Secretary, 18.1.1951. 
50 Ibid. 
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between 1955 and 1957 there would be a rapid increase in the pace and scale of 
preparations in order that the large gaps which are not covered by the four-year 
programme, and will therefore exist in 1955, may be largely filled by 1957'. 51 What 
was more `even those matters that are covered are only partially covered', as the 1950 
plan was of course only the first part of CDO's wider £936 million scheme. Ede 
stressed that the existing programme plus the `acceleration' would leave the `broad 
position' as follows: there would be `a civil warning system covering the whole country 
(but less efficient than that which existed in the last war)', an `adequate system of 
control and communications for the operation of Civil Defence Services', and some 
`formations of Civil Defence Services reasonably well trained, but with little or none of 
the equipment required to operate in war'. There would be `rudimentary plans' for 
extending `hospital services and... services for evacuees and the homeless, but there 
would be grave shortages of equipment and stores'. Furthermore, `little or no provision 
would have been made for shelter for the public or industry, for emergency water 
supplies or for the maintenance of essential services'. There would be increases in `the 
numbers of volunteers enrolled and trained' in the Civil Defence Services and `on the 
assumption that the measures of stockpiling recommended for 1952 were further 
developed, some of the deficiencies of stores and equipment would have been 
remedied'. However, `the gaps which would remain would be large and serious'. 52 
Ede stressed that `there can be no doubt that there is a great deal more which could be 
done' within the constraints of the economic context, and he firmly believed that `an 
increase in preparedness in the field of civil defence would not only be of value in the 
event of war, but would also supplement the effect of the rearmament programme in 
providing a deterrent against war'. The Cabinet should, Ede argued `decide whether the 
deficiencies in civil defence preparations... can be accepted', and on what hypothesis 
`and permissible degree of interference with the national economy' he could `make 
proposals for meeting these deficiencies' . 
53 
Although the Defence Committee agreed to the acceleration of defence planning 
outlined by the Chiefs of Staff, Ede received short shrift from Attlee concerning civil 
defence spending beyond the newly approved £180 million. In fact, the Home 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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Secretary's proposals were trounced after he hinted that the civil defence budget should, 
if preparations were to keep apace with rearmament, be expanded to the full £936 
million. 54 (In fact, it is difficult to discover what was actually spent on civil and home 
defence, as opposed to `narrow' civil defence measures - see footnote 89 below). 
Attlee replied that 
the wholesale preparations for Civil Defence involving the building of 
shelters could only be undertaken in a period of tension when war was 
assumed to be inevitable. To embark on a Civil Defence programme at 
this stage would create exactly that impression of apprehension which we 
wished to avoid, and would drive the population into a `Maginot' attitude 
of mind at a moment when all their powers should be strained to increase 
the active defence preparations which were designed to deter the enemy 
from attempting war. It was, moreover, quite clear that it would be 
economically impossible to undertake simultaneously an accelerated 
programme for the Armed Forces and for Civil Defence. 55 
The Committee concluded quite simply that `the deficiencies in Civil Defence 
preparations should be accepted'. 56 Ede's attempt to fully integrate civil defence with 
the wider defence preparations had been crushed. The Home Secretary had argued that 
civil defence would both complement rearmament in deterring the Russians and fulfil 
the Government's moral duty to provide civil defence in case war broke out. Attlee, on 
the other hand, conceived full scale civil defence not as an insurance measure but as a 
last ditch policy to be undertaken when desperate. His use of the Maginot Line 
metaphor illustrates Attlee's views perfectly, conjuring an image of the population 
fearful of attack but complacent that civil defence measures would save them. This new 
Maginot Line, civil defence, would cause the population to rest easy, and stop striving 
`to increase the active defence preparations which were designed to deter the enemy 
from attempting war', and actually invite the destruction offensive preparations were 
hoping to avoid . 
57 It was the first time that civil defence measures had been rejected on 
strategic grounds; all previous refusals had been for financial reasons. 
sa NA, CAB 131/10. DO(51)1S` Meeting, 23.1.1951. 
ss Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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Of course, the financial cost of civil defence aided Attlee's decision, but this decision 
was the culmination of a series of statements which demonstrated the Prime Minister's 
embryonic deterrent strategy. In his first thoughts after Hiroshima, in the debates over 
Berlin and now Korea, civil defence was given no role in deterring a possible attack. In 
1948 and 1950 he concentrated on the need for offensive measures, which civil defence 
preparations could only hinder by diverting resources and encouraging a defensive, and 
possibly defeatist `Maginot' attitude. His thoughts had not significantly changed from 
August 1945 when he described civil defence preparations as `futile waste'. 58 This was 
certainly the impression made by Attlee's Commons speech on the new defence 
programme. He argued that rearmament was `designed to deter', and therefore `we do 
not propose any general acceleration of civil defence preparations'. 59 Only those 
`measures which directly support the efficiency of the Armed Forces - in particular 
communications, the control system and the warning system' would be implemented, 
although he did stress that stocks of essential fire-fighting equipment and medical 
supplies would also be built up. 60 
Although Attlee had rejected large scale civil defence preparations on the lines proposed 
by Ede, and although passive measures failed to become a full part of Britain's defence 
policy, the expansion of 1950-51 did ensure that civil defence became part of the cold 
war political and defence landscape. The sums provided for civil defence over the four 
years from 1951 were hardly insubstantial, and they ensured that some civil defence 
measures were completed. Moreover, much of this money was spent on quite visible 
preparations such as training and equipping the Civil Defence Services, especially the 
Civil Defence Corps and the Auxiliary Fire Service. For example, by 1953 2,000 `self- 
propelled water pumps' had been produced - the vehicles later known as `Green 
Goddesses'. 61 
The Civil Defence Services had a firm place in the public mind by early 1951. A large 
scale recruiting campaign had been undertaken between October 1950 and January 1951 
which explicitly linked the Korean War with the threat of an attack on Britain. One 
58 NA, CAB 130/3. Atomic Energy Committee, GEN 75/1, `The Atomic Bomb', memorandum by the 
Prime Minister, 28.8.1945. 
59 House of Commons, Official Report, 29.1.1951, col. 583. 
60 Ibid, 
61 NA, HO 357/7. CDJPS(54)6, `Report on Civil Defence Planning' 20.2.1954. 
91 
press advertisement contained a plea for volunteers from Attlee himself, another had the 
Prime Minister arguing that `the fire that started in distant Korea may burn down your 
house', a third advertisement asked `suppose there is a next time', while one from 
January 1951 focussed on feelings that another war might be inevitable (see Appendix 
B. 2-5). Over 110,000 people volunteered for the Civil Defence Corps between October 
1950 and December 1951. This was a figure well below the hoped-for peace time 
establishment of 500,000 -a discrepancy noticed by many. A Times article from 
February 1951 was especially scathing about the `absurdly low' level of recruitment, 
which was `not merely disappointing' but `intrinsically grave and dangerous'. The 
writer partly blamed public mistrust of regimentation but put most weight on `a 
psychological hostility to any alliance with a subject which by its nature is distasteful to 
the imagination' . 
62 
The Home Office made a sustained effort to recruit: there were regular recruitment 
drives, a short film, and a series of reports on how to improve recruitment. The first, 
undertaken by the Central Office of Information before the Korean War, argued that 
while the main reason for signing up was `sense of duty', the main deterrent seemed to 
be a `longing for peace' and `not wish[ing] to hear about war'. 63 In November 1952 the 
`Advisory Committee on Publicity and Recruitment for the Civil Defence and Allied 
Services' reported that `the initial obstacle to recruiting was undoubtedly the reluctance 
of a people recovering from the strains of a long war to turn their minds to the danger of 
another war which might invade their homes with even more devastating force and to 
the need once again for Civil Defence'. 64 The prevailing attitude of the public needed to 
change. First, Ministers had to dispel the `widespread belief that against the atom bomb 
there is no defence'. Secondly, civil defence needed to be accorded a `proper 
recognised place in national life'. Volunteers were not valued; in fact, `except in times 
of acute crisis the public seems to think the volunteer is wasting their time'. 
65 But 
although the prevailing attitude in the early 1950s was that civil defence was not 
attracting enough volunteers, the numbers involved were enormous. By December 
1952 nearly 240,000 had volunteered for the Corps. Perhaps the Government expected 
62 `Apathy in Civil Defence', The Times, 9.2.1951 
63 J. E. Fothergill and D. L. Lambeth, Recruitment to the Civil Defence Forces, (Central Office of 
Information Social Survey, 1950). 
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too much and compared the volunteer effort of the 1950s too readily with that of the 
Second World War. By looking at the effort in isolation, we can see that recruitment to 
the Corps represent a massive mobilisation of public participation in Britain's cold war 
security. 
The Conservative Years 
Although a great deal of planning had occurred and an increased budget agreed for civil 
defence little had been achieved in concrete terms when the issue was first discussed by 
the new Conservative Government in April 1952. The summary of current preparations 
given by the new Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, demonstrated the 
deficiencies of every area of `primary importance' aside from evacuation planning. 66 
There was no hint of a shelter plan. The numbers in the Civil Defence Services were 
well below the 1,500,000 needed in war-time, and although it was assumed that around 
500,000 should be enrolled by the end of 1954, only 60% could be `regarded as really 
effective for war purposes'. The Air Raid Warning System would be ready by the end 
of 1954, but both the Control and Communications organisation and Blackout provision 
had suffered due to the lack of resources. Hospital beds would need to number 500,000 
in war (there were 200,000 peacetime beds), and although it was believed some 300,000 
could be accommodated in war, it was `unlikely that all the necessary staff and 
equipment will be available' even for these. 67 
Those made homeless by enemy attack would not be cared for. Although all existing 
accommodation which could be used to care for the homeless would have been 
earmarked by 1954 (as a result of the 1949 regulations), it was `unlikely that this would 
be nearly enough to accommodate the several millions of homeless that may be 
expected in a future war'. Huts would have to be erected in war, but the equipment for 
these centres would not exist, and the whole programme `could hardly be expected to do 
more than touch the fringe of the problem'. In addition `little more than half' of the 
emergency feeding equipment was to be ready by the end of 1954, there would be an 
extreme shortage of water for fire fighting purposes, essential industries could not be 
protected from the effects of bombing, and the production of equipment had not even 
66 NA, CAB 131/12. D(52) 10, `Civil Defence Preparations', Note by the Home Secretary, 4.4.1952. 
67 Ibid. 
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kept up with the level approved in 1951. Finally, only `a very small part' of this 
shortfall could have been made good `within a warning period of six months'. 68 
A month later, Maxwell Fyfe requested a decision on whether the Government would 
confirm the four-year civil defence programme put in place by the Labour 
Government. 69 His argument was that the combined expenditure of Departments on 
civil defence and on preparations to aid the military amounted to £280 million until 
March 1955. Moreover, delays meant that nearly £200 million of this would need to be 
spent in the next two years. Could the Government accept such a commitment? When 
the Defence Committee met, Churchill argued that 
He doubted whether it would be justifiable to devote to civil defence 
large sums of money which would be more profitably used in active 
defence measures, which would be a more effective deterrent to war or, 
if the worst came, more valuable in the early stages of war.... Although 
it would be wise to do enough to create an impression of activity in civil 
defence, care must be taken to avoid spending large sums on money on 
measures which would pay no dividend. 70 
Churchill closely followed the reasoning put forward by Sir Norman Brook when the 
Cabinet Secretary had briefed the Prime Minister two days before the meeting on 14 
May 1952. Brook had argued that such a rejection of civil defence was logical, as `as 
we are not preparing for a war which we regard as inevitable', and practical, `for, if we 
proceeded on the basis that all civil defence preparations were to be completed by, say, 
1954, the cost (e. g. in shelter provision) would cripple the national economy' .71 The 
powerful, not to say dominant, influence of Sir Norman Brook allowed continuity 
within defence policy and ensured that the claims of civil defence were rejected in 
favour of increasing the power of offensive measures. Churchill, by arguing that `it 
would be wise to do enough to create an impression of activity in civil defence', was 
building on Attlee's argument that full-scale civil defence was economically impossible 
and strategically unnecessary. This was an early understanding of the place civil 
defence held within the wider strategic context which would later lead to the framing of 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. D(52)18, `Civil Defence Preparedness - Financial Considerations', Memorandum by the Home 
Secretary, 6.5.1952. 
70 Ibid. D(52)5°i Meeting, 14.5.1952. 
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civil defence within the deterrent policy and justifying solely on its ability not to protect 
the public but of creating the impression that the United Kingdom was prepared for war. 
Despite his rejection of full-scale civil defence, Churchill was plainly touched by the 
potential plight of the population in a future war. He intervened personally in late May 
1952 to ascertain `what progress has been made with regard to planning the evacuation 
of children and invalids from London in the event of war appearing imminent'. 72 He 
was told evacuation of the priority classes would occur speedily, 73 but appeared 
unsatisfied, asking Brook `what action do you propose for discussing this? '74 Brook 
replied to this example of Prime Ministerial interference on 9 July 1952 by informing 
Churchill that `with all that you have to do I hope you will not think it necessary to add 
to your labours by taking the lead yourself in the examination of these plans.... I think 
that at this stage you need do no more than satisfy yourself that [Maxwell Fyfe] is 
giving his personal attention to these matters, 75 and there the matter ended. 
Global Strategy and the need for `Survival'. 
Simultaneously with Churchill's intervention, the Chiefs of Staff produced a paper on 
`Global Strategy', in the light of which, Brook informed Churchill, `the whole basis of 
civil defence planning will have to be revised'. 76 The gestation and the nature of the 
`Global Strategy' paper as a key text in British cold war history has been dealt with by 
other historians, 77 but its importance for civil defence rested in its analysis of `the nature 
of a future war', which involved a Soviet attack of the United Kingdom in the initial 
stage of an atomic and conventional bombardment `of unparalleled intensity', in which, 
although `it may only last a few weeks', Britain `will have suffered terrible damage'. 
78 
The scale of this attempted knock-out blow required that `a guiding principle of the 
rearmament programme should be to ensure survival in the short opening phase'. This 
necessitated a thorough review of civil defence preparations, although the new emphasis 
72 Ibid., J. R. Colville to R. B. Marshall, 29.5.1952 
73 NA, CAB 131/12. `Progress of Evacuation Plans', Note by the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, 4.6.1952. 
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on survival did not dramatically alter the basis of civil defence planning, it did ensure 
that there was a new strategic emphasis on having preparations completed before war 
broke out. The Chiefs of Staff believed that important civil defence measures included: 
`training, installation of communications and planning'; `measures to ensure essential 
services during the initial intense phase, particularly in London and the main ports'; 
`continuation of existing schemes not calling for extensive building or scarce materials'; 
`establishment of a supply of gas masks for the civil population'; stockpiling `in order 
to tide over the first few weeks of atomic warfare... during which imports may well be 
brought to a standstill' and the `provision of alternative loading and unloading facilities' 
at ports must be continued. 79 
For planning purposes, it was assumed `that general war breaks out... at some time after 
September 1954, but not later than March 1958' and there would be at least seven days 
warning of attack. 80 After the attack Britain's war production would `be very limited 
although she would probably be able to dispatch her forces abroad as planned and 
would slowly regain the capacity to produce during the subsequent years' . 
81 But were 
the Chiefs of Staff being realistic? They stressed that economic circumstances made 
shelter provision impossible, but assumed civilian morale would stand up to the 
onslaught anyway and allow war production to steadily increase. Another assumption 
was that the ports could begin functioning again after `the first few weeks' of atomic 
attack. Yet, as Maxwell Fyfe's April 1952 paper made clear, along with no shelters, 
there would be no apparatus to either feed or house the homeless, and the civil 
authorities would not be able to fight the thousands of fires which would be caused by 
the initial attack. The under-prepared hospital services would be inundated and would 
surely collapse under the weight of demand. Given the findings of research by civil 
defence planners since 1945 and the lack of preparations either put in place or even 
approved by the summer of 1952, there is little room for doubt that the United Kingdom 
could not operate as the Chiefs of Staff assumed. 
The job of trying to fit war plans around this strategic advice was given to DTC, and 
Brook began the review process by stressing it would impossible to `take all the 
79 Ibid. 
80 NA, CAB 134/812. DTC(52)16, `Background to War Plans and Preparations', Note by the Secretaries, 
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measures necessary to minimise its effects to the extent we should like. The governing 
factor will in fact be our peacetime economic capabilities and not the scale of air 
attack'. 82 Therefore, he argued that the country must `concentrate on those physical 
preparations for the initial phase of war which will pay the best dividends for the 
premium we can afford'. 83 Brook hoped that CDO would produce a revised three-year 
programme along these lines (at a cost of around £65 million per year) but the report 
completed in November 1952 resembled a sustained sulk at the financial constraints 
being placed on civil defence. Their proposals, CDO bemoaned, `do not represent what 
[we] would voluntarily recommend as necessary or adequate'. 84 Moreover, when they 
`were first asked by the last administration to draw up a plan for civil defence 
expenditure, the result was a programme, involving expenditure of the order of £900 
million', but only some of it was approved, and much of that was solely to aid military 
preparedness. 85 Excluding these measures from the current review, CDO worked out 
that the civil defence budget was £132.6 million, to be spread out over three years, 
rather than the two years first planned. 
Taking into consideration the strategic advice, the Committee advocated the following 
adjustments to existing plans: the spreading out over three instead of two years certain 
measures such as war rooms; `provision for the due-functioning of essential industries 
and services... which are vital to the life of the community'; `an increased degree of 
evacuation and dispersal... and provision for larger numbers of homeless than hitherto 
contemplated, with a corresponding reduction of standards of accommodation'. The 
expenditure envisaged, however, `is far from going all the way to providing our 
requirements. In most cases it is no more than an initial useful contribution towards our 
defences' 
. 
86 
Although some basic provision on the air-raid warning system, the functioning of 
essential public services, and the production `on some essential items' could be funded, 
as well as the continued research and training `to provide a framework for the 
operational services... upon which we could expand when larger resources were 
82 Ibid. DTC(52)14, `War Plans ands Preparations', Memorandum by the Chairman, 19.8.52. 
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available', gaping holes would remain in civil defence provision. The most important 
gaps would be the lack of an advanced warning system, public shelter or emergency 
water storage for fire-fighting. There would be `no adequate provision for equipping 
any large number of civil defence personnel, or for reserves of plant or equipment for 
the essential public services, or for expanding the hospital service to meet the needs of 
civilian casualties'. In short, `the programme would not put us within sight of 
preparedness for war'. 87 
Although Brook echoed the concerns of CDO when their recommendations for the 
initial preparations were put to Ministers in December 1952,88 there was little concrete 
result from this first post-'Global Strategy' review. The civil defence budget for the 
following year (1953-54) remained stable at £44 million (although the total defence 
spending by Civil Departments was £77.7 million)89 and in February 1953 a new, more 
fundamental review of civil defence was undertaken. The catalyst for this new review 
was the formation of a new Home Defence Committee (HDC), radically different from 
the Committee of the same name set up in 1946 the linear successor of which, CDO, 
remained as sub-Committee of the new HDC (see Appendix C. 4). The new Committee, 
chaired by Sir Norman Brook, the apex of the civilian planning machinery, with a remit 
`to ensure the consistency in war planning by the military and civil agencies of 
Government which is directed towards the defence of the United Kingdom in a future 
war. 90 The DTC continued in `its original task of dealing with the procedure for 
transition from peace to war'. 91 Essentially, then, HDC was formally assuming the role 
DTC had de facto held during 1952 in co-ordinating civil defence plans. 
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The Hall Report 
The fundamental review of 1953 was a belated reaction to the Global Strategy Paper 
and the implications of atomic attack on Britain. Brook understood, as those planners 
more firmly entrenched with the civil defence planning apparatus seemed unable to, that 
an attack on Britain with between 100 and 200 atomic bombs must alter civil defence 
planning in kind and not just in nature, that it called for `a new approach to the problems 
involved in planning home defence in a future war, which will probably entail even 
closer co-operation between civil and military authorities'. 92 The review was designed 
to understand the conditions that might prevail in Britain during the initial `survival' 
phase discussed in the `Global Strategy' paper, the early stage of war in which the 
nation must grimly hang on to enable later recovery. 
The work on mapping the conditions in the initial phase of war, the stage of war 
dedicated to national survival, fell to the National Economy in War Working Party 
(suitably renamed the Home Defence Committee Working Party for the duration). This 
Working Party was chaired by Robert Hall, Head of the Cabinet Office's Economic 
Section, and also included William Strath from the Treasury's Central Economic 
Planning Staff. The Hall Group worked on the basis of a Soviet stock of 200 atomic 
bombs allocated for Britain: 132 to be delivered on high priority industrial and 
population targets, 40 for air bases and 28 left over as a reserve. 93 
After three months labour the Working Party submitted their report on `The Initial 
Phase of a War' in July 1953,94 a masterly summary of the devastation which would be 
caused by 132 atomic weapons and the effects of a sparse civil defence policy. For, 
unlike the 1947 study on the effects of an attack on `the Central Resources of the 
Country', 95 Hall's Report did take into account what civil defence measures would be 
in place by September 1956 (assuming plans continued and there was no change in 
policy), especially the high degree of evacuation and work protecting communications. 
Despite these measures, the effects of such an attack would have been immense: 
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1,378,000 people dead and 785,000 seriously injured. There would be more British 
casualties in the `first days' of a future atomic war than there were, either in uniform or 
out, in both world wars; there would be over 10 million homeless. Nobody would know 
how many refugees there would be in the target areas; the effects on the morale of the 
population would be obviously enormous but would be largely an `imponderable'; 
nobody would know `whether the first wave of raids will be followed by a further 
series'. For the ordinary person `it is a case of sheer survival or not, and the question is 
whether or not the barest mechanism of life can be maintained in the bombed areas for 
the first few crucial days' , 
96 
The destruction of London, attacked with thirty two atomic bombs, was vividly 
described: 
Take a half-inch map of London; put down a sixpence with its centre 
over each ground zero; draw a circle around it, and let that represent the 
area (three-quarters of a mile in radius) within which everybody is killed 
or seriously injured, and all the houses are completely destroyed or so 
badly damaged as to require demolition. Do the same thing with 
pennies, and you will have the ring (between three-quarters of a mile and 
two-miles from the burst) within which all the houses are uninhabitable, 
at least temporarily. What sort of picture do we get? 97 
There would be `a practically unbroken series of overlapping penny circles' covering a 
massive area from Hounslow in the West to Dartford in the East, and from Enfield in 
the North to Croydon in the South'. Although `there are a few small oases untouched 
by bombs' within the area they were completely cut off from the outside world. 
Although the `sixpenny circles do not as a rule overlap... the ways left between them 
are torturous, and practically every main road into London is blocked at some point by 
the accumulation of debris from shattered buildings'. There would be more than 
400,000 dead and 250,000 seriously injured, with little chance of the majority of the 
latter receiving the required medical care. 98 
The survivors' lot was also graphically imagined: `what about John Smith of Laburnum 
Villa, Stoke Newington, just on the outer edge of a penny circle? ' In a damaged but 
96 NA, CAB 134/938. HDC(53)7, `The Initial Phase of a War'. 
97 Ibid. 
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inhabitable house he `would like to stay put and get on with his job for as long as 
possible', but there would be no power or fuel and `apart from the tins in the store 
cupboard', the family would have to rely on an emergency feeding centre a mile away. 
`Even worse, there is no water until a meagre supply comes through by lorry - if indeed 
these supplies do get through at all and are enough to go round'. He would like to `go 
to his job, but he does not know if the factory is still standing. There are five sixpenny 
rings between his house and it, with not a chance of getting through to it above ground, 
and the tubes have not started running again'. He would not be able to contact the 
factory or even `find out whether his mother in Acton is still alive'. As there would be 
`no newspapers and no current for his all-mains receiver', he would not even be able 
`find out from the wireless what the Government would like him to do. In short, `it is 
difficult to resist the conclusion that London has become unworkable and that, in 
particular, it is no longer possible to carry on the central administration of the country 
from here'. In many provincial cities, little could be done and `it is difficult to see how 
life can be carried on until the fires have burned themselves out and some sort of water 
supply has been arranged'. 99 
The `mechanics of living' would have collapsed in all Britain's cities. It would be 
uncertain how far `Government, in the ordinary sense of the word, has survived.... 
Even more important, in the early stages, is the uncertainty of what has happened to 
many local authorities'. Communications would have collapsed, as `unless John Smith 
in his devastated area is one of the lucky few with a car radio or a portable, his receiver 
has gone dead for lack of current, and the BBC [operating a limited service] will be 
broadcasting to the empty air'. 100 Although some services might operate others will not. 
For example, even if there is petrol the roads would be blocked, so how will fuel and 
water be transported. Some emergency feeding apparatus would exist, but what if the 
bakers have no water supply? 
How could the morale of the people be sustained? Hall argued that `without in any way 
underrating the British capacity for "taking it"', the social effects of the bombs would 
be immense. The attack `must be a test of British staunchness, particularly if the raids 
are spread over several nights'. There would be `the nerve-racking effects of blast, the 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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fires raging everywhere, the sight of the injured whom no help can reach - above all, 
perhaps, the dread of the unknown and the terror of radio-active effects'. It was `a 
shattering prospect, and it is a bold man who would deny the probability of a mass 
flight, set off by the instinct of self-preservation, and the possibility of serious panic, 
especially in congested areas such as the East End of London. Nor is London 
necessarily the only place thus affected - five bombs on Sheffield may well produce the 
result'. lol 
Hall's language and his searing imagery forces the reader to conceptualise the results of 
atomic attack in ways no other official report did: and it is in this exposition that the 
importance of the report lies. It impressed on the reader that there needed to be more 
hospital beds and doctors; larger stocks of food and fuel outside but near the target 
areas; an adequate supply of lorries; building supplies for repairs on a massive scale. It 
was stressed that the port emergency plans `must be brought to readiness'; that 
evacuation would fail unless completed by the time the first bombs fell; and that the 
protection communications system needed to be `pressed forward and intensified'. 
Command and control was vital, and Hall believed it would collapse in war. Not just 
the protection of communications, but `the necessary powers and organisation to direct 
manpower' were vital: first on the local level, where action must take place instantly, 
but then on a regional and then central government level. '02 
Unless central government could maintain control `there will be a grave risk of a 
general collapse of administration and control in a very short time'. Hall recommended 
that `a sufficient number of key people concerned at all levels of government, local, 
regional and central, must be so placed that they survive the disaster and are able to 
exercise immediate and effective control and leadership', and the communications 
between these key people, and between them and the public must survive the initial 
attack. As Hall put, it `unless these conditions can be met, any detailed plans which 
may be made in advance are likely to break down. 103 
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This report was discussed in HDC by a glittering array of civil and military figures on 
29 July 1953.104 Brook was joined by the Committee's usual members and all three 
Chiefs of Staff were present (usually deputies attended). One lesson taken from the 
Report would be inability to supply an army from the United Kingdom, ending the idea 
of `broken backed warfare'. Another lesson seemed to be that `it was clear from the 
report that everything should be done to prevent such an attack ever taking place. This 
emphasised even more than before the importance of the allies building up a powerful 
deterrent'. 105 In civil defence terms, the most important consequence of Hall's report 
was the decision to substantially strengthen the wartime machinery of government. A 
working party under Sir Thomas Padmore, a senior Treasury official, was set up'06 - 
and the Padmore Committee would have an important influence in the formulation of 
plans after the hydrogen bomb in 1955. There was also a second Hall report, focussed 
on the period following the `initial stage', 107 but it reported in March 1954 and its 
findings were lost, not to say made redundant in the maelstrom of activity following the 
American thermonuclear tests in the Pacific beginning on 1 March. 
The Hall Report changed attitudes to what was considered possible in a nuclear war. 
Before July 1953 it was believed that an army could be sustained from Britain even in 
an atomic war. All civil defence plans were geared towards continuing production. As 
we have seen, evacuation schemes were drafted to ensure some sectors of the population 
remained at work - even to the point of insisting workers live near, or be bussed into, 
factories in target areas. After Hall, such plans were unsustainable. Yet the lasting 
impact of Hall on actual civil defence policies was slight. Before any new revision of 
detailed policies took place, the whole strategic basis of the report was swept away. His 
findings, along with every civil defence policy was seemingly made redundant by the 
hydrogen bomb - everything had to be considered anew. 
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Civil defence in the public realm 
Between the first and second reports of the Hall Committee, civil defence came under 
attack from the Parliamentary Select Committee on Estimates which published a 
scathing report on Civil Defence in December 1953.108 Although the Committee 
accepted that both economics and strategy meant that civil defence provision was never 
intended to be extensive, the Government, and especially the Home Office, were 
admonished. The central criticism was that the best results were not being obtained for 
the money spent. Civil defence plans were considered vague in both content and 
delivery dates, and such plans `were destroyed by successive budgetary reductions and 
policy decisions regarding expenditure on equipment and capital works'. The `loose 
organisation' was attacked, and the Estimates Committee considered that there `has not 
been the leadership, direction and guidance from the Official Committee on Civil 
Defence... which those responsible for carrying out the work needed'. 109 
The overall analysis was one critical of the policy of inching towards preparedness - of 
attempting to do a little bit of everything. The Committee argued that a key weakness 
was the Home Office's idea of a `final plan' of civil defence: an end result which could 
be achieved if the Government committed to it. As this money was not forthcoming the 
money which was granted was being spent on a broad front - taking the whole field of 
civil defence slowly towards this final goal. However, as the Committee recognised, it 
would have been a better use of resources to identify a few key projects as priorities for 
what money was available; a more `compact' effort. "° 
The criticisms of CDO and the general planning machinery were well-founded. 
Although officials were to defend themselves against such criticism, 
"' there were major 
problems in the direction of policy and an inability to decide on priorities. As we have 
seen, CDO did indeed have a `final' policy in mind and spent the second half of 1952 
arguing for more money to achieve this and, when rebuffed, put forward a policy which 
most certainly attempted to advance incrementally along a `broad front'. It is also true 
that there had been very little direction in civil defence policy-making. Until Sir 
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Norman Brook took the issue in hand after the `Global Strategy' paper, but on a 
permanent basis from February 1953, civil defence planning had lacked any strategic 
vision, unduly wedded to the `full' policy put forward in January 1951 costing £936 
million. The changes in the machinery of government reflected the fact that the CDO 
were unable to deliver policy advice of a suitable quality, and that the Home Office 
planners were unable to think outside the narrow parameters of traditional civil defence. 
This explains both the creation of HDC and the decision to appoint a figure from 
outside the civil defence planning mainstream to head the fundamental review of 1953, 
an action Brook would repeat when the hydrogen bomb necessitated yet another review 
the following year. 
Some of the Committee's fiercest fire was reserved for the handling of the Civil 
Defence Corps which it argued existed in `name only', and was a `farade'. 112 The 
national aspect of the service was `slightly metaphysical', and there was a serious 
morale problem within the Civil Defence Services in general. There was a large degree 
of wastage and only around 75% of recruits did any training, which was often 
perfunctory and ineffective. Although officials took umbrage at this attack on the Civil 
Defence Services, arguing that the volunteers `so far from deserving criticism, required 
encouragement. Criticism was hardly likely to encourage further recruitment', 113 these 
comments had a great deal of validity. Although over 300,000 people had volunteered 
for the Civil Defence Corps alone by December 1953, there had been some 
disappointment that the numbers had not been higher. This disappointment in part 
reflected the Home Office's obsession with numbers enrolled rather than the number of 
potentially effective volunteers (which remained the case until the 1960s), but also 
revealed fears that people were not engaging with civil defence. There were four 
reviews between 1950 and 1954 on civil defence recruitment: two by the Government's 
own Social Survey, ' 14 and two from the specially set up `Mabane Committee'. 115 These 
revealed a reluctance to give up free time, a belief that civil defence was old fashioned 
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and belonged to the last war and, in the early reports, a startling ignorance of the effects 
of the atomic bomb. 
The report placed the civil defence planners on the defensive. Sir Norman Brook 
explained the basis of civil defence policy to a Prime Minister angered by the criticism 
his Government had received. Brook called the report `misconceived': it had failed to 
understand that `the purpose of the Government's defence policy is, not to prepare for a 
war regarded as inevitable, but to take all practicable measures to prevent 116 
Therefore, Churchill was reminded, `the major part of our defence effort has... been 
directed to strengthening the armed forces; and it is reasonable and logical that civil 
defence should have been allowed to lag behind'. Labour had done the same. Finally, 
Brook argued, `the Select Committee have used the word "facade" as a criticism; but in 
fact neither this Government nor the last have ever intended to build more than a facade 
of civil defence'. 117 
This `facade' argument was central to the understanding of civil defence from 1953 
onwards. Although it was not developed further by Brook in his exchanges with 
Churchill, we can see divergent concepts of civil defence developing at this point in 
time. As we have seen and at times surmised, Sir Norman Brook was the mastermind 
behind cold war civil defence strategy and the decision that great sums could not be 
spent on it, as it was not strategically necessary. The Hall Group, and the Chiefs of 
Staff, had argued that to fully mitigate the effects of the atomic war would be beyond 
the economic capacity of the nation. Brook's analysis of 1951 and before was thus 
supported: that British defence policy must rest on the power to deter an attack through 
offensive action and that a high level of civil defence expenditure would not contribute 
to that. Therefore, although some expenditure was necessary for a variety of reasons - 
military preparations, political necessity and basic `insurance' - the inability of civil 
defence to either fully mitigate the effects of an attack or contribute to Britain's 
`deterrent' power justified keeping expenditure as low as possible. 
But the civil defence planners within the Home Office Civil Defence Department, 
within CDO and within CDJPS did not share Brook's nuanced view of the subservient 
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role of civil defence within British strategy. Instead, they supported civil defence 
preparations on their own merits as a necessary precaution against the risk of war, and 
became increasingly exasperated by Ministerial refusals to increase expenditure. This 
divergence ensured that the `final' plan remained close to the planners' hearts despite 
the impossibility of it ever being agreed. Only when the role of civil defence planning 
within the wider defence strategy, and its implications for the civil defence budget, were 
fully understood by everyone in Whitehall could specific policies be prioritised and 
completed (or jettisoned) and the practice of small piecemeal advances across the `broad 
front' be abandoned. 
Explaining civil defence within this strategic context had proved problematic for the 
Government - as the report of the Estimates Committee had shown. It was hamstrung 
by the prevailing desire to avoid criticism. For example, the initial reaction to the 
Estimates Committees' report within the Home Office was to rush out a White Paper 
outlining in full the rationale behind the Government's civil defence policy. The idea 
was abandoned because it would `focus too much public attention on the question of 
Civil Defence, and might lead to a public demand that that greater sums of money 
should be spent'. 118 Although they managed to avoid criticism, it was perhaps a missed 
opportunity to engage with the public on the rationale behind civil defence. 
Although in May 1950 a CDJPS Working Party argued that high morale in wartime 
could only be secured by a vigorous public information programme in peacetime 
explaining the dangers of atomic war, 119 the idea of a systematic attempt to inform the 
public went completely against the grain of entrenched official practice which 
demanded secrecy. For example, the publication of the civil defence training pamphlet 
on Atomic Warfare was debated at great length despite its rather commonplace 
description of atomic war. 120 The same fear of public debate caused Ministerial 
reluctance to approve the text to a pamphlet designed to be issued only `during, or, if 
possible, immediately before an emergency '. 121 
1 18 NA, CAB 134/792. CD(O)(54) 1 S` Meeting, 13.1.1954. 
119 NA, HO 357/9. CDJPS(M)(50)12, `Public Instruction on Mass Destruction Weapons', 11.5.1950. 
120 See NA, CAB 134/81. CD(M)(50)4, `Civil Defence Training Manual on Atomic Warfare', Note by 
Chairman of the Official Committee, 9.3.50; and CD(M)(50)2"d Meeting, 15.3.50 
121 NA, HO 357/5. CDJPS(52)16, `Issue to Householders of a Pamphlet on Civil Defence', Note by the 
Joint Secretaries, 2.4.1952. 
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The Government's reply to the Estimates Committee was given on 28 January 1954 by 
Fyfe via a written question, in which he defended the Government's record and 
criticised the Select Committee's `misapprehension' of the Government's civil defence 
policy, which he stated was `to build up the nucleus of an organisation with a view to its 
subsequent expansion if necessary'. He also stressed civil defence's `secondary role' in 
the wider defence strategy compared to deterring the enemy. ' 22 The next day the Times 
attacked the Home Secretary with some severity. It argued that `obviously something is 
very wrong with the nation's civil defence', and attacked Fyfe for his statement, 
suggesting he had placed `the bruised feelings of Ministers and civil servants' above the 
issue of whether civil defence was being pursued with adequate vigour. 123 
Conclusion 
In December 1953, a paper was circulated in CDO presaging a revolution in civil 
defence matters: the hydrogen bomb. 124 Due to the increased size of `normal (fission) 
atomic bombs', however, and to the fact that the Russians exploding a hydrogen bomb 
did `not mean that they have exploded a bomb with a power hundreds of times that of 
the Nagasaki bomb' the advice tendered to planners was that `no special studies need at 
present be made for the hydrogen bomb'. Recent planning based on the largest atomic 
bombs might `cover developments in the hydrogen bomb for some years'. 125 Little did 
CDO know that developments would change the whole basis of defence before 
Christmas eve came around again. For by Christmas 1954 a Working Party under 
William Strath was investigating the impact of hydrogen bombs many times more 
powerful than Irwin ever imagined in his paper, and civil defence was to change 
completely. 
The development of atomic weapons since Berlin had bewildered civil defence planners 
unable to meet the pace of change. Although by late 1953 the framework of civil 
defence had existed for only five years it was already redundant. For example, the Civil 
Defence Corps was set up in 1948-49 to meet an overwhelming conventional attack, but 
in 1953 it was considered as part of the `facade' of civil defence. This facade required 
122 House of Commons, Official Report, 28.1.1954, written answer cols. 272-8. 
123 `A Wrong Approach', The Times, 29.1.1954. 
124 NA, CAB 134/791. CD(O)(53)29, `Civil Defence Planning Policy to Take Account of Development 
of Atomic Weapons', Note by General Irwin, 24.12.1953. 
125 Ibid. 
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public preparations such as the Corps to convince those outside Whitehall that some 
basic `insurance' existed against atomic war, but the lack of training and equipment 
made it manifestly clear that the Corps could not fulfil that role. The failure to spend 
large sums on civil defence needed to be explained within the context of wider British 
strategy, but officials and Ministers were deeply reluctant to do so, fearful of engaging 
on any level with atomic destruction. This lack of engagement left them open to attack 
for neglecting an issue which Government policy stressed was an important one; and it 
was to have major consequences in the thermonuclear age. The failure of civil defence 
was not solely down to money; there had been a lack of overall direction which allowed 
planners to remain unduly wedded to their `full' programme which in turn caused a 
piecemeal approach along a broad area of policy rather than prioritising specific 
proposals which would have added real value to Britain's defence. 
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Four 
Understanding the Hydrogen Bomb, 1954-55 
The Hydrogen Bomb Panic 
A hydrogen bomb was first exploded on 1 November 1952, by the United States in the 
Pacific. The Soviet Union fired a thermonuclear weapon on 12 August 1953, with some 
arguing it was a `hybrid' rather than a `true' H-Bomb, with an indisputably `true' 
hydrogen bomb explosion following in November 1955.1 It was the series of American 
tests in the Pacific from February to May 1954, however, which demonstrated to the 
world that the new weapon could destroy entire cities with one explosion and threaten 
the continued existence of the human race. In Britain, it was this series of tests which 
precipitated a political crisis over the hydrogen bomb, as public, press and 
parliamentary opinion reacted to the news of the power of the new weapon. Within the 
Government, it took the 1954 tests for policy-makers and planners to appreciate fully 
the revolutionary consequences of the hydrogen bomb. In a matter of months, 
Whitehall frantically adapted existing defence and civil defence plans to meet the new 
strategic reality. Yet, as 1954 wore on, it became clear that piecemeal changes to plans 
could not hope to meet the new threat, and in December a new Cabinet Office group 
was appointed to radically review defence plans in the light of the completely new 
circumstances presented by the hydrogen bomb. 
The 1954 tests were also the spur both for Churchill's final push to end, or at least ease, 
cold war tensions, and for the decision to build a British hydrogen bomb. For Peter 
Hennessy, 1954 `was the pivotal year for all the nuclear-related aspects of the secret 
state'. 2 Not only was civil defence and the `durability of the post-attack British state 
itself' rethought, but the possession of nuclear weapons and their place in the wider 
defence strategy were fundamentally overhauled. 
3 As Ian Clark and Nicholas J Wheeler 
put it, British reactions to the hydrogen bombs could be divided between the pessimistic 
and the optimistic. `For the pessimists, the H-bomb served only to intensify those acute 
fears of exposure which had been present since 1945: if Britain was already vulnerable 
' See L. Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 27-30. 
2 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 50. 
3 Ibid. 
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to atomic weapons, her cities would be promptly destroyed by the H-bomb'. 4 For the 
optimists, however, the `new order' of destructiveness the H-bomb represented meant 
all countries would be equally vulnerable to it. 5 It is this `optimistic' aspect of the 
hydrogen bomb which Hennessy detects in the decision-making process leading to the 
building of the British thermonuclear weapon. Churchill and others saw `the H-bomb as 
the salvation for a great power seriously on the slide in terms of finances and its armed 
forces relative to the superpowers; go thermonuclear and thereby both save money and 
increase your relative clout in the world'. 6 
But the purpose of this study is, like the mid-Fifties planners, to stare into the abyss of 
nuclear destruction, rather than to look on any `bright side' of the consequences of 
thermonuclear weapons. Whilst the bolstering of British power seemed to be a 
noteworthy silver lining to the mushroom cloud which rose above Bikini on 1 March 
1954, the tests plunged Churchill and others into despair. Harold Macmillan, then still 
Minister of Housing and Local Government, had already noted in his diary of 27 
February: `Churchill broods a great deal about the atomic and hydrogen bomb. The 
destructive power of the latter is frightful. All London in one night'. 7 As the facts 
concerning the Bikini test became apparent, he noted `it is obvious there is tremendous 
interest, almost panic, in many parts of the world, about the hydrogen bomb', 8 and on 
31 March, `the Hydrogen Bomb panic is spreading'. 9 
Indeed, a major consequence of the Bikini explosion was the seizing of the public 
imagination by the hydrogen bomb. Events moved quickly. The Times first reported 
the famous incident of the fisherman on the Japanese boat The Lucky Dragon being 
contaminated by radioactive fallout under the headline `Radioactive Fish Alarm in 
Japan"° on 20 March 1954, and six days later their leader argued that `the explosion at 
Bikini on the first day of this month added no new issues to the moral debate. From the 
beginning they have been painfully clear. Is science to be allowed to go on to produce 
4 I. Clark and N. J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-55, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 
P. 210. 
Ibid. 
6 Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 54-5. 
7 P. Catterall (ed. ), The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950-57, (London: Pan Macmillan, 2003), 
297, entry for 27.2.1954. 
8 Ibid, p. 302, entry for 28.3.1954. 
9 Ibid, p. 303, entry for 31.3.1954 
10 `Radioactive Fish Alarm in Japan', The Times, 20.3.1954; the story of the boat was graphically told in 
Ralph E. Lapp, The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon, (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1958). 
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more and more horrible engines of destruction, even though it now begins to appear that 
they possibly stretch out to infinity? '. " On 1 April 1954 the news broke that Lewis 
Strauss, special adviser to President Eisenhower on atomic weapons, had announced 
that the new weapon could be made `as large as you wish' and could certainly wipe out 
New York City. 12 
The issue became party political in a debate on the issue in the House of Commons on 5 
April 1954, the day before the Budget, when Churchill argued that the Labour 
Government had abandoned the right to veto the use of atomic weapons he had secured 
with President Roosevelt in the Quebec Agreement of 1943.13 Churchill's outburst 
caused outrage on the Labour benches and doubts on his own, provoking more 
questions about his ability to do his job than it answered about the hydrogen bomb. 
Macmillan noted that `Churchill's failure was due to two things. First, the contrast 
between the general "non-partisan" character of the debate and the damaging revelation 
was too horribly made and was inartistically led up to. Second, his power of recovery 
has gone.... He was "knocked off his perch"'. 14 The Times' leader ('insufferably 
pontifical', Macmillan called it)15 argued that `the Prime Minister's sense of occasion is 
one of his greatest strengths in the House of Commons. It deserted him sadly 
yesterday', after a `grave, non-partisan speech' by Attlee, Churchill's speech caused the 
debate to degenerate `into a sterile, angry and pitiful party wrangle'. 16 
Coventry 
But before the dust on this argument could settle, a bigger crisis, at least in terms of 
civil defence policy, occurred. On the evening of the Commons debate the Labour 
controlled Coventry City Council passed a resolution declaring `in view of the recent 
reports in regard to the explosion of the hydrogen bomb and its devastating effects, to 
inform the Home Secretary that it is a waste of public time and money to carry on with 
the Civil Defence Committee: therefore, it is the Council's intention to take steps to 
11 `A Hideous Reality', The Times, 26.3.1954. 
12 `H-Bomb can wipe out any city, Strauss reports after tests', New York Times, 1.4.1954; 
Lorna Arnold, 
Britain and the H-Bomb, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 20. 
13 House of Commons, Official Report, 5.4.1954, cols. 49-60. 
14 Catterall (ed. ), The Macmillan Diaries, pp. 304-5, entry for 6.4.1954 
15 Ibid. 
16 `The Gulf', The Times, 6.4.1954. 
112 
terminate its existence' . 
17 Alderman Stringer, leader of the Council and his `Socialist' 
colleagues, were attacked in scathing terms by the Daily Mail on 8 April 1954, which 
called them `conceited little men who, because they have been elected to a local council, 
think they have a mandate to run the world. The socialist councillors of Coventry have 
no moral right to decide whether a life-or-death matter for the people shall be subject to 
their whims and fancies'. 18 The newspaper also reported a planned protest march by the 
3,000 Civil Defence Corps volunteers in Coventry. 19 
The row rumbled on and was only brought to a conclusion on 24 July 1954 when the 
Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, exercised his right (enshrined in regulations 
made under the 1948 Civil Defence Act) to appoint three commissioners to undertake 
the civil defence functions in Coventry `in the name and at the expense of the said 
Council'. 20 This was the culmination of a bitter dispute, in which both sides evoked the 
memories of 1940 and the destruction of the city to aid their cause. 21 The local Labour 
group even issued a leaflet which explicitly explained that the 1954 decision was taken 
in order to avert a recurrence of the events of November 1940 (see Appendix B. 15). 
The final decision to institute the commissioners was taken by the standing Cabinet 
Committee on Home Affairs, 22 with Churchill himself sending a note to the Home 
Secretary approving the measure, and declaring that the Council should be treated `with 
the utmost censure which the law allows. What a mean and cowardly gesture for a city 
to refuse to give humanitarian aid to neighbouring towns in distress, at the same time 
expecting help themselves'. 23 
The Coventry crisis is a fascinating episode which put civil defence and possible 
protection against the hydrogen bomb high on the political agenda. Although the 
Council's decision was vehemently attacked, it was the result of genuine deep-seated 
fear over the apparent lack of defensive measures against the hydrogen bomb. It 
represented the anxieties of not just one city, but also of individuals in the government 
17 NA, HO 322/136. Letter from the Town Clark, Coventry, to the Home Secretary, 7.4.1954. 
18 `A Bomb and a Town', Daily Mail, 8.4.1954. 
19 Denis Holmes, `3,000 to March Against CD Ban: Blitz hero leads protests to stop Coventry shutdown', 
Daily Mail, 8.4.1954. 
20 NA, HO 322/136. `Civil Defence: City of Coventry', Order by David Maxwell Fyfe, 24 July 1954 
21 See Stefan Goebel, `Commemorative Cosmopolis: Transnational Networks of Remembrance in Post- 
War Coventry'. Unpublished paper, Writing War Seminar, Department of History, Queen Mary, 
University of London, 19.10.2005. 
22 NA, CAB 134/915. HA(54)17`h Meeting, 16.7.1954. 
23 NA, PREM 11/607. Churchill to Maxwell Fyfe, 15.7.1954 
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and countless ordinary people. This fear of the bomb coalesced later in the 1950s and 
saw the founding, and spectacular rise, of CND. If it is possible to give one response to 
the H-bomb as `typical' of many intelligent people's reaction to the H-bomb in 1954, 
perhaps Nesta Pain, a BBC radio producer can provide it. She wrote to her head of 
features, Lawrence Gilliam, and explained that `I think we ought to do a programme on 
the hydrogen bomb and its implications for the human race.... It seems clear that in a 
war in which hydrogen bombs are used, England would quite clearly be finished'. 24 Her 
motive was simple: `like many people, I have simply avoided thinking about these 
bombs and their implications during the last ten years. Now that I have been obliged to 
do so, I feel very strongly indeed that in the face of dangers which might conceivably 
engulf the whole of the human race (even the possibility seems absurdly melodramatic) 
it is the clear right and duty of all of us to know and appreciate the facts, and so have a 
chance to do any small thing we can to prevent such things from happening'. 25 The 
documentary was never made. 
The First Review 
On 12 March 1954, Sir Norman Brook, convened what Peter Hennessy has called `a 
super-sensitive meeting of the permanent, inner guardians of the bomb-touched 
realm'. 26 The meeting was designed to serve as a preliminary to a second meeting on 
19 March which would `acquaint the Chiefs of Staff with the latest information 
concerning the development of the hydrogen bomb by both the Americans and the 
Russians'. 27 On 12 March Sir William Penney (head of weapons development at the 
United Kingdom Atomic Emergency Authority), one of the truly great British 
physicists, 28 outlined to all the graphic consequences of the hydrogen bomb: 
a five megaton "true" hydrogen bomb would have the following effects. 
A bomb dropped on London and bursting on impact would produce a 
crater 3/4 of a mile across and 150 ft deep, and a fire-ball of 2'/a miles 
diameter. The blast from it would crush the Admiralty citadel at a 
distance of 1 mile. Suburban houses would be destroyed at a distance of 
three miles from the explosion, and they would lose their roofs and be 
24 BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham, Berks [WAC], R19/1486, `Hydrogen Bomb', Nesta Pain to 
Lawrence Gilliam, 31.8.1954. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 50. 
27 NA, CAB 130/101. GEN 461/ls` Meeting, 12.3.1954. 
28 See B. Cathcart, `Penney, William George, Baron Penney (1909-199 1)', Oxford Dictionary of 
National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/49920, accessed 
25 
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PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL 
defence organisation centred around the Home Office which compiled plans and reports 
up throughout the rest of the year. 
The work of the Defence Policy Committee was instrumental in the decision to build a 
British hydrogen bomb, but its first piece of work was to discuss a JIC assessment of 
`The Likelihood of War', 38 and a report on the `Russian Capacity to Produce and 
Deliver Thermo-Nuclear Weapons'. 39 The former concluded that there was little risk 
of a `deliberate war', and that `both sides are so anxious to avoid war that even 
"unintentional war" is unlikely'. 40 The latter suggested that there were no real 
impediments to Soviet nuclear production, that their first `true' hydrogen bomb was 
imminent, and that the Russians could deliver nuclear weapons on Britain via ballistic 
rockets between 1957 and 1960 in addition to their existing bomber capacity. 41 
More importantly, by 1 June 1954 the Chiefs had finished their review paper. It was a 
vitally important document linking the almost certain destruction of Britain in a future 
global war with a case for building the hydrogen bomb on the grounds of deterrence and 
cost: having the most up-to-date weaponry would allow cuts in conventional force. 
Thus we can identify the `United Kingdom Defence Policy' paper as a direct precursor 
of the 1957 Defence White Paper which set out explicitly the policy of nuclear 
deterrence allowing a reduction in conventional forces and the ending of National 
Service. 42 In terms of destruction, the Chiefs warned that `if war did break out, we 
should have to expect that the United Kingdom would be devastated in the opening days 
to such an extent that it could no longer function as a main support area. Indeed, the 
. real problem might be one of physical survival' 
43 
This devastation was succinctly explained to the Ministers on DPC: an attack on British 
cities with ten bombs `of 100 times "nominal" [Nagasaki type] power', would kill 
Secretary), R. A. Butler (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Earl Alexander (Ministry of Defence), and 
Duncan Sandys (Minister of Supply). 
38 Ibid. DP(54)2, `The Likelihood of War', Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, 29.4.54. 
39 Ibid. DP(54)3, `Russian Capacity to Produce and Deliver Thermo-Nuclear Weapons', Note by the 
Secretary of the Cabinet, 30.4.1954. 
ao Ibid. DP(54)2, `The Likelihood of War'. 
41 Ibid. DP(54)3, `Russian Capacity to Produce and Deliver Thermo-Nuclear Weapons'. 
42 Ministry of Defence, Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124, (London: HMSO, 1957). 
43 NA, CAB 134/808. DP(54)6, `United Kingdom Defence Policy'. 
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5,000,000 people, `if 1,000 times "nominal" power, 12 millions '. 44 Therefore any 
`country which can equip itself with the means of delivery needs only a comparatively 
small stockpile of such weapons in order to be able to deliver a devastating attack on an 
enemy'. Here was the ambiguous promise of the hydrogen bomb: it made destruction 
of Britain virtually guaranteed in a global war; but it also meant that with limited 
resources, Britain could hope to mount a credible deterrent to war on its own, or at least 
substantially bolster Western deterrence as a whole. Indeed, `our scientific skill and 
technological capacity to produce the hydrogen weapon puts within our grasp the ability 
to be on terms with the United States and Russia'. Therefore the Chiefs stressed the 
need for the bomb: `The nuclear threat is the main deterrent to war. Moreover, an 
immediate and overwhelming counter-offensive with the most powerful nuclear 
weapons offers the only hope of preventing the enemy from completely devastating this 
country. We must contribute to the deterrent by producing a stockpile of nuclear, 
including hydrogen, weapons and the means to deliver them'. 45 This paper was 
instrumental in the final decision to produce hydrogen bombs in Britain, and has been 
described as `one of the most significant to be produced by the Chiefs in the mid- 
. 1950s' 
46 
Ministerial discussion on the paper, as well as furthering the debate on building the new 
bomb, 47 raised important questions concerning civil defence. Maxwell Fyfe lamented 
that the Chiefs ignored `the part which Civil Defence would play in a revised defence 
policy'. 48 Quite simply, `the policy outlined... could not be sustained unless the British 
public were prepared to accept the risks which it involved. If those risks were to be run, 
public opinion must be carefully prepared'. This was a plea which had been repeated 
consistently since 1945, and continued to be reiterated in the years after 1954: that 
public morale would be of central importance in any future war; and if it could not be 
maintained, that war would be lost. Maxwell Fyfe outlined to all the issues at stake: the 
events in Coventry had been caused by `left-wing politicians who believed that it was 
useless to try to protect the civil population against the effects of nuclear attack and that 
as Ibid. 
as Ibid. 
46 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 55. 
47 For the full story of the Hydrogen bomb decision see Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb; Hennessy, The 
Secret State, pp. 49-60; Katherine Pyne, `Art or Article? The Need for and Nature of the British Hydrogen 
Bomb, 1954-58', Contemporary British History, 13: 3 (1999), pp. 562-585. 
48 NA, CAB 134/808. DP(54)3`d Meeting, 16.6.1954. 
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this justified the adoption of a "neutralist" attitude in our international relations'. Such 
thinking `might lead to a demand for the withdrawal of the United States strategic air 
forces from the United Kingdom'. 49 
Fyfe ended by emphasising the continued importance of civil defence provision and the 
centrality of public morale in surviving a future war: the Civil Defence Services would 
have a vital role, and `could certainly give valuable aid on the periphery of a hydrogen 
bomb explosion'. Arrangements could be made for `the evacuation of women and 
children from the... target areas and for emergency feeding and relief in the areas to 
which they went', and powers could be devolved to regional authorities in an 
emergency. But, `if such a policy was to be effective, there must be some public 
understanding and support for it; and a great effort would be needed to create a state of 
public morale which would support such a policy'. 50 Maxwell Fyfe's vigorous stance, 
both on civil defence and on the Chiefs' silence on it, can partly be explained by the fact 
that the civil defence planning organisation had produced dramatically different plans in 
the face of the hydrogen bomb since March. This work had clearly failed to reach or 
influence the Chiefs. 
At this point, when dealing with the machinery of government, the historian of civil 
defence has to be very careful. Although the civil and military aspects of the 
reassessment seem hopelessly divorced from each other, that may be due to the skewed 
image created by the partial documentary releases housed in the National Archives. 
Whilst the files of the DPC and CDO are open, they represent the two `extremes' of 
either military or civil planning. The two Committees one would expect to link the two 
systems, the Ministerial Committee (CDM) and the Home Defence Committee (HDC) 
are withheld, thus creating the image, impossible to dispel using the records we have, 
that the reactions to the hydrogen bomb were distinctly disjointed. It denies us the 
opportunity to examine the full role of Sir Norman Brook, usually the key co-ordinator 
of official and military plans, Chairman of the HDC, ever-present at DPC and the man 
Churchill relied on most in such matters (see Appendix C. 5). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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After Bikini Atoll, the existing civil defence planning machinery began reviewing civil 
defence plans, and quickly suspended the existing advice that the hydrogen bomb did 
not alter existing assumptions (see Chapter 3). This `first review' was completed on 4 
May 1954, and was an attempt to grasp a reality which was itself rapidly changing. The 
sense of confusion is palpable, as General Irwin of the CDJPS argued that `hitherto the 
main concern for civil defence has been overwhelmingly with the blast and fire effects 
of atomic weapons burst in the air above targets of first importance to our war effort', 
but all plans would have to be changed completely `if in the future it transpires that the 
predominant hazard is from the effects of radioactivity'. 51 
This uncertainty over the nature of the hydrogen bomb explains why so much effort was 
expended in the civil defence planning machinery to dealing with the blast effects of the 
new weapon. Between March and December 1954, policies on evacuation, shelter, the 
Civil Defence Corps and others were all recast, but largely in terms of dealing with the 
increased blast threat. The fundamental re-conceptualisation of civil defence needed 
after the effects of radioactive fallout from the hydrogen bomb were known was beyond 
the existing machinery. When, towards the end of year, the true importance of fallout 
became known within Whitehall, a new group, outside the existing planning machinery, 
was formulated to review civil defence. Although the revisions made to policy were 
destined to be ripped up within months, the response of the officials within CDO and 
CDJPS rewards investigation. 
When this `first review' was discussed in CDO, Sir Frank Newsam, Permanent 
Secretary of the Home Office, opened the meeting with a speech which seems to reveal 
the strains that would dog civil defence plans for the rest of the cold war: increasing 
power of weapons meant more destruction which promised to cause a degree of public 
despondency the Government could not hope to alleviate. Now that they knew that the 
effect of a hydrogen bomb explosion was in different in kind as well as degree, `all our 
plans would have to be reconsidered': 
In the target areas our structural protection was useless, our plans for 
evacuation would have to be very much expanded and dispersal of our 
population would have to be more complete. The public probably had 
S' NA, CAB 134/792. CD(O)(54)13, `First Review of Civil Defence Plans', Note by the Chairman of the 
Civil Defence Joint Planning Staff, 4.5.1954. 
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not yet appreciated the appalling devastation which would follow 
hydrogen bomb attacks and did not realise that all amenities would 
disappear, and that a sheer struggle for survival would follow. 52 
More than this, `it was clear that Ministers would have to give guidance as to what form 
of war for which the country must prepare' before any major attempt to revise policies 
could be made'. 53 Newsam, unlike his Minister in DPC, did not stress what civil 
defence could achieve in a future war, but rather concentrated the need for a deeper 
understanding of what a hydrogen bomb war would mean for Britain in order to enable 
the formulation of effective plans. His phrase `sheer struggle for survival' typified civil 
defence policy in the hydrogen bomb era, after the Strath Report effectively tore up 
previous planning, but it is not redolent of the analysis put forward in the `first review'. 
The clue to the review's shortcomings is in the report's name: it was a review of 
existing plans, not an assessment of the plans needed. It advocated patching rather than 
scrapping. It was as if the CDJPS had failed to realise, as Newsam had, that the 
hydrogen bomb differed from the atomic bomb not just in degree, but in kind. 
In policy terms Newsam focussed on the importance of public information. This had 
been a familiar trope throughout the cold war, and it is easy to see why it assumed new 
importance: the hydrogen bomb had, Newsam tacitly admitted, made redundant the 
strategic basis upon which civil defence had been built since 1945. The public would 
have to bear the brunt of the `sheer struggle for survival' and only if they were informed 
of the necessary policies and actions could the struggle hope to be successful. Also, the 
Coventry crisis was erupting around the government and defence against nuclear war 
had, for the first time, become a major political issue. Did the civil defence planners see 
a split in public opinion between those for and those against civil defence? It is not hard 
to imagine Whitehall fearing a succession of Councils following Coventry's lead, and 
believing that the only way to shore up public support for the policy was a propaganda 
effort (for an example of this effort see Appendix B. 9). 
Fyfe issued a written statement to the Commons on Civil Defence on 27 May 1954.54 
Drafted by CDO, it was an attempt to downplay the mounting crisis over the hydrogen 
52 Ibid. CD(O)(54)3`" Meeting, 11.5.1954. 
53 Ibid. 
54 House of Commons, Official Report, 27.5.1954, written answer cols. 41-44. 
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bomb, and can be seen as the first attempt of the new era to defend civil defence. The 
Home Secretary admitted that in a hydrogen bomb war `the problem we should have to 
face in this country would be far graver than ever before', but `Civil Defence would in 
such a situation have an even more important part to play'. He stressed the importance 
of the civil defence organisation in sustaining morale, reiterating the Government's 
`clear duty to continue with all practicable measures', but stressed expenditure would 
not be increased. He tried to dispel the myth that `a single bomb could destroy the 
whole of Britain' but also, rather disingenuously, tried to dismiss the dangers of fallout. 
He claimed that `it is true that there would be very heavy contamination in the 
immediate neighbourhood of a bomb landing on or near the ground, but the publicity 
that the radio-active hazard has received results largely from skin injuries to some 
Japanese fishermen in the Pacific downwind from the explosion and beyond the range 
of the blast'. Finally he stressed the continued, indeed the enhanced, need for the civil 
defence organisation, which would, after modifications, be able to greatly reduce 
casualties in any emergency. 55 
Parliament debated civil defence only on 5 July, and MPs struggled to understand the 
nature of the new weapon; but they understood enough to cast a sombre atmosphere in 
the Commons chamber. John Strachey (Labour, Dundee West) noted the `strange and 
rather doom laden' nature of the debate. 56 When Fyfe's predecessor, Ede, tried to grope 
towards an understanding of the weapon's power, his efforts were mocked by M. 
Follick (Labour, Loughbrough): 
Ede: As I understand [Fyfe], a hydrogen bomb bursting over Charing 
Cross would cause a fire 15 miles away; that is say, such a bomb 
might well set fire to Epsom Grandstand. 
Follick: That is very serious. 
Ede: I do not say it that that would be particularly disastrous, but it does 
indicate the gravity of the picture and what this thing means. 
Follick: Let us hope Ascot will be alright. 57 
Shortly before this oppressive debate, the Home Secretary set out the planned civil 
defence policy revisions in a DPC paper, taking a lead from the Chiefs' view that 
Britain would be devastated in the early stages of a future war. His paper represented 
ss Ibid. 
56 House Of Commons, Official Report, 5.7.1954, col. 1893 
57 Ibid., col. 1823. 
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Home Office thinking, and stressed `that there can no longer be any question of carrying 
on "business as usual"'. 58 He reiterated the need to concentrate `on providing the 
necessary measures to enable us to live during the initial period of the struggle for 
existence', 59 focussing on the post-attack provision of emergency feeding, treatment of 
casualties, housing and `control of the civil population'. Most importantly, it would `be 
necessary to educate the public at the appropriate time and by the appropriate means as 
to what conditions of life they may have to tolerate'. There would be a continued need 
for the civil defence services, for the extension of evacuation plans, the devolution of 
control to regional or even lower levels and the avoidance of any public statement on 
shelter, given that any attempt to provide mass shelter would involve `running the risk 
of bankruptcy' . 
60 
Before Fyfe's paper was discussed, DPC received a Brook-produced report from 
HDC, 61 explaining that the `Defence Preparations by Civil Departments' went beyond 
the civil defence responsibilities of the Home Secretary and included measures such as 
`stockpiling, the protection of communications and the provision of emergency port 
facilities'. Brook supported the Home Secretary by emphasising the need for 
expenditure on defence preparations of this kind: `the risk of war is not so remote... that 
we can neglect all the preparations which might help to ensure national survival in its 
opening phase. We must continue to take some measures of insurance against the risk 
that we may fail to achieve our primary aim of preventing a major war'. 62 
He also echoed the need to maintain public confidence in civil defence. At a time when 
`the trend of Government expenditure on Civil Defence is turning down' it was 
necessary to link civil defence with the broader defence position. If this was not done, 
Brook warned, the public would expect the civil defence effort to increase. More than 
this, `it will be therefore essential, for the maintenance of public morale, to do enough in 
Civil Defence to reassure the public that the Civil Defence Services have a useful part to 
play in a future war in the fight for survival against attack by thermo-nuclear 
58 NA, CAB 134/808. DP(54)9, `Civil Defence Plans', Memorandum by the Home Secretary, 22.6.1954 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. DP(54)11, `Defence Preparations by Civil Departments', Report by the Chairman of the Home 
Defence Committee 3.7.1954. 
62 Ibid. 
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weapons'. 63 Indeed, in the new strategic advice given to Departments public confidence 
in civil defence was held as the `essential' factor in drafting policy. The consequences 
of such an assessment are clear: civil defence provision would need to change to 
providing highly visible preparations to appease public opinion. This is why the Civil 
Defence Corps was such an essential plank in civil defence policy even after 1954, and 
it also demonstrated the shock experienced within Whitehall over the public debate on 
nuclear weapons and the events in Coventry. 
As mentioned above, the review work of the CDJPS continued in parallel and, it seems, 
quite separately, to the work of DPC. An illuminating example of this work was their 
review of evacuation. 64 This advocated an enormous expansion of the population to be 
evacuated (and some degree of shelter provision) to save 90 per cent of casualties. The 
expansion of evacuation would involve extending the evacuation areas to swallow up 
most of the old `neutral' areas and provision to include all `children of school age or 
below, accompanied by their mothers' a well as adolescents, which would mean the 
numbers in the priority classes rising from 4.6 to 12 million people. Evacuating 
families together would appreciably simplify the movement of the population and 
eliminate some of the social strains attendant on separating children and mothers. 
It was also envisaged that there would be `central areas' from which non-priority classes 
would be evacuated - essentially the main cities and ports. Those evacuated might 
include: `persons not employed; non essential workers; and possibly also certain people 
whose special abilities or skills make them essential to the continued life of the nation, 
and who cannot be replaced, but whose continued presence in the central areas is not 
absolutely necessary'. 65 Who these essential workers would be was not discussed, and 
in later years proved to be a thorny and unanswerable question. Obviously the scale of 
the final scheme would rest on the extent of such `non-priority' evacuation (who and 
where from). If billeting was extended to a density of 1.5 persons per habitable room, 
15 million people could in theory be evacuated, doubling the population in reception 
areas and representing, due to the resulting `severe social strains', the `maximum 
63 Ibid. 
64 This was enshrined in their report: NA, CAB 134/792. CD(O)(54)15, `Evacuation and Shelter Policy', 
memorandum by the General Irwin, 12.7.1954; for their second report see Ibid. CD(O)(54)21, `Interim 
Reports on Certain Civil Defence Plans', Note by General Irwin, 20.10.1954; 
65 Ibid. CD(O)(54)15, `Evacuation and Shelter Policy' 
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absorptive capacity of the reception areas before attack'. If such strains were 
acceptable, it might be possible to evacuate the 12 million `priority' and 3 million 
`additional' people. 66 The CDJPS admitted that `it must be recognised that the 
magnitude of such an evacuation plan may impose serious difficulties on its execution', 
especially the issues of transportation and the ability of the reception areas to sustain a 
population of double its peacetime size. 
These revisions to evacuation policy served as a sort of `statement of intent' and 
admitted frankly the difficulties in executing a policy on such an ambitious scale, and it 
was swiftly agreed within CDO that it would be recommended to Ministers as a basis 
for further planning and investigation. 67 This expanded policy was given interim 
Ministerial approval in July 1954.68 Such pragmatism did not extend to the report's 
section on shelter provision. It stated: `it is desirable that shelter should be provided, so 
far as is practicable, for all those who have to remain in the high risk areas', despite the 
admitted unlikelihood `that it will be possible to make the necessary resources available 
for a large-scale programme of shelter construction in peace-time'. 69 Although the 
report argued that trench shelters would be effective, and called for a study of the 
feasibility of providing shelters, it was optimistic to hope that civil defence policy 
would be reversed to such an extent that shelter provision at enormous, crippling 
expense, would become its central plank. Yet the CDJPS report was adopted as a basis 
of planning within CDO and two working parties were set up to investigate evacuation 
and shelter. 70 
The CDJPS plan for evacuation was lambasted by a Treasury official as being 
hopelessly unrealistic. Richard `Otto' Clarke, an Under-Secretary at the time, received 
the papers of the CDJPS Working Party on Evacuation, and he provided perceptive 
criticism of their work to Sir Alexander Johnston. 
7' He had already, in a note to a 
colleague, argued that `it is really rather comical that this matter, which is quite decisive 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. CD(O)(54)4`h Meeting, 19.7.1954 
68 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)3, `The Defence Implications of Fall-out from a Hydrogen Bomb'; 
Report by a Group of Officials, 8.3.1955; the actual decision is unrecorded elsewhere in the archives. 
69 NA, CAB 134/792. CD(O)(54)15, `Evacuation and Shelter Policy'. 
70 Ibid. CD(O)(54)4`h Meeting. 
71 NA, T 227/1129. R. W. B. Clarke to Sir Alexander Johnston, 10.9.1954 
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to our preparations, should be presided over by an Assistant Secretary in the Local 
Government Organisation Section of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government' . 
72 
The fact that a relatively low-ranking official was presiding over the work was, for 
Clarke, a symptom of a much wider problem (although Clarke was himself only one 
grade higher -a touch of Treasury snobbery, perhaps). These plans were being worked 
out, but, as Clarke put it, `I would really have hoped that someone was occupied in 
thinking rather than in working out paper plans'. 73 This statement could be used to 
criticise much of the planning going on throughout the second half of 1954. Clarke 
went on to argue `in order to get a proper basis for civil defence plans, I think one has to 
devote a lot of thought to the making of assumptions for working purposes'. One of 
these assumptions must be which areas were to be regarded as `safe'. The second was 
an issue which had been largely ignored throughout the whole cold war: would people 
stay in the areas the attack was expected? As Clarke put it, `it is important to know 
whether anybody will be willing to stay in London under imminent threat of 
annihilation, and there is something faintly comical about dividing the population into 
classes, some of whom are told by Home Office officials that they are to go and others 
to stay'. A realistic appraisal was needed: `we want a clear idea of whether people will 
remain in those areas or not. The standard work on the subject is by Mr H. G. Wells, 
written, I think in 1896 - "The War of the Worlds" - which is much better than any 
piece of Home Office paper that I have yet seen'. 74 
Clarke had pinpointed an enormous flaw in the Home Office preparations for civil 
defence: there had been no analysis of the human element. The dry paper plans took no 
account of how people might react in wartime. His espousal of The War of the Worlds 
is prescient. Wells' portrayal of the `swift liquefaction of the social body' caused by 
the hysterical flight from London was far from the and Home Office plans and, for 
Clarke, amply depicted the essentially unknowable behaviour of the public . 
75 It was 
unrealistic for civil defence planners to routinely assume a pliable public adhering to 
announcements and corralling by the authorities. By contrast, in early 1950s 
America, 
the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) had worked with the secret 
72 Ibid. R. W. B. Clarke to Thorley, 7.9.1954. 
73 Ibid. R. W. B. Clarke to Sir Alexander Johnston, 10.9.1954 
74 Ibid. 
75 H. G. Wells, The War of the Worlds, (London: Penguin, 2005), pp. 92-104. 
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Psychological Strategy Board and received a study on civil defence by an Ivy League 
cold war think-tank `Associated Universities' which contained significant research on 
panic, and how to prevent it. 76 In Britain, however, the psychologists never got much of 
a look in until the work of the `JIGSAW' group (see Chapter 6), and no significant 
investigation of civilian behaviour in war had been produced. It may be worth 
pondering why. Was it because of cost? Did this mean that civil defence analysis and 
planning had to be undertaken by the specialists within the Home Office who did not 
have such expertise? A more valuable, and perhaps provable, analysis, is that the Home 
Office, initially, did not feel the need for such specialists. In the early post-war years, as 
we have seen, studies were made on the issue of civilian morale, but the conclusion was 
drawn from the lesson of the Second World War, that the British public would be able 
to stand up to the rigours of atomic war. It is possible that such a conclusion became an 
entrenched and probably unspoken assumption. The same factors which saw Home 
Office officials ploughing on through paper plans and incrementally revising policy, 
rather than taking a step back to review a strategic reality which had radically changed, 
might have been responsible for taking morale for granted. 
Although in mid-1954 General Sir Sidney Kirkman was appointed as the first Director- 
General of Civil Defence in order to ginger up policy, 77 we can argue that civil defence 
planners had become stuck in a groove of drafting papers which were related to and 
developed from existing papers which had been drawn up years before. Evacuation was 
a case in point, as was shelter: the policy was there in outline, it just had to be modified. 
Had they been capable of stepping back and analysing civil defence afresh, they would 
have seen the flaws in their plans, and certainly would have understood that the issue of 
morale and public control was central. Not for nothing did Clarke ask Johnston 
`whether there is, in your view, any chance of getting any real thought done on these 
subjects, preferably by fresh minds'. 78 From the Treasury's point of view, he was 
worried that under current planning `an awful lot of money will be wasted on civil 
76 This was `Project East River'. In fact, the psychological study of the effects of war was a significant 
enough factor in American civil defence planning to effectively dominate the historical 
literature on the 
subject. Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War, (Oxford UP, 1994); Andrew D. Grossman, 
Neither Dead nor 
Red: Civilian Defence and American Political Development during the Early Cold War, (London 
Routledge, 2001); and Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, (Princeton UP, 2000) all have 
lengthy sections on the issue. 
77 See NA, HO 322/8. `Appointment of Director-General of Civil Defence'; such an appointment had 
been an aim of the Home Office for some years. For Churchill and Butler's rejection of it in 1952 see 
PREM 11/42. William Armstrong to J. R. Colville, 5.11.1952. 
78 NA, T 227/1129. R. W. B. Clarke to Sir Alexander Johnston, 10.9.1954 
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defence', because although the budget was then limited `it will not be long before 
people are sure to ask for quite considerable sums of money to handle the very large 
casualties which are to be expected. And I don't at that time want to be confronted with 
something really half-baked'. 79 
To be fair to the civil defence planners, they felt the want of basic assumptions. The 
first conclusion of the second major CDJPS report of 1954 argued that `Departments 
feel the need for a more clearly defined picture of conditions likely to prevail in the first 
weeks of a war, and arising therefrom some firmer assumptions on such matters as the 
continuance of industry and business during this critical period'. 80 Another striking 
conclusion was that `increased attention must now be given to the radioactive effects of 
nuclear weapons, and Departments given some planning assumptions to take account of 
these effects'. 81 Effectively, then, planning was stalled as the full implications of the 
hydrogen bomb had not been understood. There can be no doubt that a greater 
appreciation of the effects of hydrogen bomb warfare on Britain should have been 
conducted before the revision of civil defence plans was undertaken. The advice of the 
HDC was simply not enough in terms of scale: it did not lead the Departments 
anywhere. That would only come with Strath. Although the revision of plans within 
CDO continued throughout the rest of the year, 82 they existed in a vacuum, with the 
attention of more senior Whitehall figures now focussed on a fundamental review of 
defence plans. 
The Central War Plans Secretariat 
This inconclusive, rather meandering revision of plans was sharply suspended in 
December, when it was finally decided that the dangers of fallout meant the 
Government's defence plans needed to be comprehensively overhauled to take them 
into account. The catalyst for this new review was a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee held on 8 December which included, the Chiefs, Brook, Sir John Cockcroft 
(Director of UKAEA, Harwell) and Sir Fredrick Brundrett (Scientific Advisor, Ministry 
of Defence) and officials from other Government Departments, including 
William 
79 Ibid. 
80 NA, CAB 134/792. CD(O)(54)21, `Interim Reports on Certain Civil Defence Plans'. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. CD(O)(54)24, `Emergency Feeding', Note by the Ministry of Food, 25.11.1954; Ibid. 
CD(O)(54)5`h Meeting, 27.10.1954. 
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Strath from the Treasury, who had previously served on the Hall Committee. 83 The 
meeting concerned the `latest scientific estimate of the facts' on fallout, and it was clear 
to all that fallout `will have a revolutionary effect on all our war plans - military and 
civil'. 84 Ministers were to be informed through a submission from the Minister of 
Defence, Harold Macmillan, to be written by Brook and the scientists. 85 
After this meeting events, expertly co-ordinated by Brook, moved quickly. Before the 
ministerial memorandum was produced, Brook sent a note to Treasury, setting up new 
organisation to co-ordinate war planning. 86 In it Brook put forward that it was clear 
`from the latest appreciations of the scale and nature of attack to which this country is 
likely to be subjected in a future war', that war planning by civil and military bodies 
would have to become more interrelated. Brook was plainly concerned that the existing 
government machinery could not bring about this co-ordination, and he put forward a 
plan for creating a special small central staff which could aid the Committees and 
Departments in carrying out the planning that would be required. Currently, he argued, 
responsibility for war planning was `dispersed' between the Ministry of Defence (the 
Armed Forces and their supply) and the Home Office (the specific civil defence 
measures `for which it is departmentally responsible' and the `co-ordinating the Civil 
Defence planning of other Departments'). Brook himself, `on behalf of the Defence 
Committee' had a residual responsibility for non-MoD or Home Office war planning 
but was also `concerned to ensure congruity in war planning as a whole'. Brook's remit 
to `ensure congruity' had become a very wide one in the early 1950s and it was clear he 
realised that the task was too large for him to deal with: `under the existing organisation 
there is no single individual who can give his undivided time and attention to the co- 
. ordination of war planning as a whole' 
87 
83 NA, CAB 21/4054. `Fall out', note by Norman Brook, 9.11.54. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. Also a major factor in the Chiefs of Staff meeting, and indeed the deliberations of Strath, was the 
inability to obtain American confirmation of the British findings and the fact that Washington might 
announce their research on fallout before London was ready to respond -a potentially very embarrassing 
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86 NA, CAB 21/4350. `Inter-Departmental Organisation for War Planning', Note by Sir Norman Brook, 
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The new organisation would be partly secretarial in purpose, but `it must be so staffed 
that it can see that the work is carried forward in the intervals between the meetings of 
the Committees... so that the Committee concerned with it can make satisfactory 
progress'. 88 In some cases, therefore, it would have a more proactive role by promoting 
inter-departmental discussion, `following up points raised, conducting investigations, 
preparing reports, etc'. The new Central War Planning Staff would be small, just six 
people, and report to the Defence Committee through Brook. Brook himself stressed 
that the new body would greatly aid the task of radically revising `many of our existing 
war plans... in the light of the latest appreciation of the nature of a future war'. This 
was a `substantial task' which `we shall be obliged to make rapid progress with... not 
because the risk of war has increased, but because disclosures about the power of 
thermo-nuclear weapons have aroused public interest and will sharpen public curiosity 
about the state of our plans'. The special importance of this work meant that for a short 
period `the work of the central Staff should be directed by a more senior officer', 
namely William Strath. 89 The group was renamed after the Chiefs of Staff objected to 
use of the word `Staff' as being misleading and therefore Brook wrote to the HDC to 
announce the creation of the new Central War Plans Secretariat, under Strath. 90 
One of Strath's first jobs was to co-ordinate the drafting of the memorandum on fallout, 
and in addition to the head of the new CWPS, an impressive array of talent was 
involved. The first draft was completed by Sir Frederick Brundrett91 and Strath and Sir 
Edwin Plowden (Chairman, UKAEA) had also cast an eye over it before it was 
dispatched by Brook to Harold Macmillan. When finished, the paper went not only 
from Macmillan to the select group of Ministers, but also to Churchill and finally the 
full Cabinet. The final version contained Brundrett's masterly annex on the effects of 
the hydrogen bomb, explaining the destructive force of the weapon in terms of heat and 
blast and dealing with the phenomenon of radiation. 
92 On the former, it told ministers 
that `blast and heat are more intense from an air burst than from a ground burst'. The 
heat and blast from the explosion of an air burst ten megaton weapon would cause 
`surface devastation to ordinary brick houses' 7.5 miles away, and cause fires up to 12 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. COS(54)123`d Meeting, 18.11.1954 confidential annex; HDC(54)19, `Inter-Departmental 
Organisation for War Planning', 1.12.1954 
91 Ibid. `Fallout', undated draft by Sir Fredrick Brundrett. 
92 NA, CAB 129/72. C(54)289, `Fallout', Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 9.12.1954. 
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miles away. Beyond the areas effected by heat and blast, radiation would be a major 
concern. `Fallout', radioactive particles sucked up by the (ground-burst) explosion, 
carried by the wind and deposited over a potentially huge area killing people and 
contaminating crops, was explained to Ministers. From a single 10 megaton device, 
fallout `would cover an area of 5,000 to 6,000 square miles'. Also, 
There will be an inner zone of approximately 270 square miles in area 
(larger than Middlesex), in which radiation will be so powerful that all 
life will be extinguished, whether in the open or in houses. Because of 
the persistence of the radio-active contamination in this inner zone, 
general relief measures would be virtually impossible for some weeks, 
and possibly months. People in especially deep shelters with their own 
supply of uncontaminated food and water would have some chance of 
survival, provided they were not entombed by other effects of the 
explosion. Even so, for at least a week it would not be safe for them to 
emerge and leave the area. Fires in this area would have to be left to 
burn themselves out. 93 
Outside this area, the danger would progressively lessen with distance, but within an 
area of about 3,000 miles, (around 170 miles long in the direction of an average wind 
and over 20 miles wide in places), `exposure in the open on the first day might easily be 
fatal'. Some rescue operations could commence on the outer fringes of this area by the 
second day `but the greater part of the area would be immobilised for several days. 
Survival in this area depends on cover'. Suitable shelter in ordinary houses would 
`reduce the dosage rate by a factor as high as 20 . Outside this would 
be an outer area 
of 2-3,000 square miles `in which there is a danger of radiation sickness if no 
precautions are taken. In general, it would be sufficient for people to stay indoors for 
about 12 hours after the onset of contamination'. 94 
Thus we can see that the annex left ministers in no doubt of the true effects of fallout. 
In fact, Macmillan's memorandum told the Cabinet, `it is, I think, evident that this new 
information must have a revolutionary effect over a wide range of our war plans, both 
military and civil'. 95 It was clear, then, that planning must be `properly adjusted', and 
that this must mean `widening the limit within which knowledge of the new 
implications has so far been confined', even at the risk `that people may come to know 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
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quite soon that the Government are planning on this new hypothesis'. Although almost 
all of the Government's conclusions `could be reached by diagnosis of material which 
has been published... much of the present indifference of the public would vanish if 
they found that the Government had adopted this basis for their defence plans'. 96 
Politicians and officials alike were rightly frightened of the very grave consequences of 
a leak concerning British war plans. But Macmillan pressed that `the extent to which it 
is desirable to issue guidance on the implications of fall-out to Departments concerned 
with defence preparations' should be considered, and also `the manner in which the 
implications of fallout for our defence policy should be presented in public, bearing in 
mind the facts of this subject are in large measure already available to them and that the 
radical changes in Government plans required to take account of fall-out cannot long be 
concealed from the public once they are applied to our defence plans'. 97 The latter point 
was to greatly exercise minds after Strath had reported, and will be dealt with in depth 
in the next chapter. 
Before the meeting to discuss the memorandum, Macmillan was briefed by Strath on the 
need for `a radical reshaping of our plans for the defence of the home front'. 
98 Fallout 
had created `new problems of an unprecedented kind... for the protection for the 
population - for shelter and evacuation plans' . The role and organisation of the 
Civil 
Defence services would need radical overhaul, and the role of the military forces `needs 
to be determined'. Radioactive contamination created `vast and novel problems for the 
medical services and for agriculture'. Overall, Strath argued `it is evident that civil 
defence in the broadest sense of the term must command a higher priority in defence 
planning than it has so far received'. 
99 
In the meeting itself, on 9 December, 
100 Macmillan, Eden, Gwilym Lloyd-George 
(Home Secretary), 101 Lord Salisbury (Lord President) and key civil servants had to deal 
with two issues: the revision of defence plans and the fact that the annual 
Defence 
White Paper would be published in February, before such a review could be concluded, 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 NA, DEFE 13/45. Notes on `Fallout' by William Strath, undated. 
99 Ibid. 
100 NA, CAB 21/4054. `Note of a Meeting in the Foreign Secretary's Room, 9 December 1954'. 
101 Unlike his father, David, Gwilym hyphenated his name. See K. O. Morgan, `George, Gwilym Lloyd-, 
first Viscount Tenby (1894-1967)', rev., Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004 [http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/34571, accessed 15 July 2005]. 
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requiring a public `middle course', stressing the evolutionary nature of the plans, to be 
steered until the final policy could be announced. It was decided to first appoint a small 
group of officials, reporting to Macmillan, 
to examine the broad consequences of fallout on our war plans as a 
whole and indicate the guidance which Departments responsible for 
detailed planning would require. This group should consist of 
representatives of the Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of Defence, Cabinet 
Office and Home Office and should have expert assistance. This would 
enable work to proceed without disseminating widely knowledge about 
the nature of fallout. '02 
This was something Brook had planned for and had placed Strath in temporary charge 
of the CWPS in order to undertake. On 10 December, Macmillan informed Churchill of 
the outcome of the meeting, 103 and on the minute, Churchill scrawled: `I am in general 
agreement with this. Please keep me informed of the details at every step', and on the 
specific policy of the small group noted `it will be interesting to hear what they 
advise'. 104 It would indeed! A day later, Brook informed Macmillan of the composition 
of the group: under Strath would be General Brownjohn, secretary to the Chiefs of Staff, 
Sir Richard Powell (Ministry of Defence), Sir Fredrick Brundrett and General 
Kirkman. 105 Three days later Philip Allen (Home Office) was added to the list. 106 
Strath also had authority to co-opt Sir Robert Hall, Mr Patrick Dean (JIC Chairman) and 
a scientist to be nominated by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority. 
At the end of these five weeks of frenetic activity, Brook sent a note to his Permanent 
Secretary colleagues informing them of the founding of CWPS, emphasising that a 
`special effort' was needed to update war plans, and stressing that high level officials 
should be placed on the work. `The intellectual problems presented by the latest 
strategic advice are such that we cannot hope to get our plans on the right lines unless 
senior people are enabled to give some thought... to the framing of the outlines of the 
new policy'. 107 Although the Strath group was too secret to reveal to all his colleagues, 
we can see in Brook's note a criticism of the conduct of war planning previous to 
102 NA, CAB 21/4054. `Note of a Meeting in the Foreign Secretary's Room, 9 December 1954'. 
103 NA, DEFE 13/45. Macmillan to PM, 10.12.1954 
104 Scrawled note on Ibid, 12.12.1954. 
105 NA, CAB 21/4054. Brook to Macmillan, 10.12 
106 Ibid. Brook to Macmillan, 13.12 
107 NA, CAB 21/3595. Sir Norman Brook to Permanent Under-Secretaries of State, 17.12.1954. 
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November 1954. It had not been taken seriously enough, and the best people were not 
given time to investigate it. 
In fact, the whole foundation of the CWPS and the Strath Group was a criticism of 
previous war planning. As we have seen, there existed a group which had investigated 
the civil defence implications of the hydrogen bomb, just as it had investigated civil 
defence problems since 1949. The by-passing of the CDJPS was in part due to the 
desire to investigate the problem in the round, bringing civil and military planning 
together, but only in part. The whole official civil defence planning structure centred 
around the Home Office and CDO was weak. This can be seen by the exclusion of the 
CDJPS from the Strath Group. The Home Office representatives were more senior than 
those usually working under Irwin. But if the CDJPS reactions to the hydrogen bomb 
had been poor, this was largely due to a failure in the central planning machinery. It 
was not the job of CDO or CDJPS to analysis strategic assumptions or formulate plans 
for civil and military departments. As we have seen, the CDJPS bemoaned the lack of 
guidance. 108 It was a failure in the central machinery that such advice or `planning 
assumptions' were not given sooner, and it was in recognition of this failure that the 
CWPS was set up (the idea that they could take the lead in suggesting areas of interest 
was a direct result of wanting to ensure Committees could break free of any `tramlines' 
affecting their work) and the Strath Group appointed. 
`Mr Strath's Group', as it was called within Whitehall, officially began work on 1 
January and reported on 8 March 1955. Relatively little is known of the process behind 
the report's `monstrous gestation' as one CWPS official put it, 
109 with only occasional 
brief notes available to the historian. One influential paper is available: the Joint 
Intelligence Committee report on `The H-Bomb Threat to the UK in the Event of a 
General War', known within CWPS as SG(55)1.110 The intelligence message was 
mixed: although the JIC's analysis largely discounted the threat of a global war until at 
least 1960, they added what Peter Hennessy has called `a bone-chilling addendum' on 
108 NA, CAB 134/792. CD(O)(54)21, `Interim Reports on Certain Civil Defence Plans', Note by General 
Irwin, 20.10.1954 
109 NA, CAB 21/4350. K. L. Stock to Sir Kenneth Strong, 3.2.1955. Stock was writing to Strong, head of 
the Joint Intelligence Bureau: `you will, I hope, not be unduly disquieted that this 
Secretariat continues to 
keep more or less silent! It is the quiescence of a monstrous gestation, not of 
lethargy'. 
110 NA, CAB 158/20. JIC(55)12, `The "H" Bomb threat to the UK in the event of a General War', 
13.1.1955. 
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Britain's fate should war occur. 11' Firstly, they believed `that the Russians will regard 
the UK as such a threat that they will aim to render it unusable for a long period, and 
will not hesitate to destroy great parts of the UK to achieve this aim. If the UK were 
attacked, the `simplest and most effective form of attack' to knock Britain out of any 
war would be detonate hydrogen bombs at ground level `in suitable meteorological 
conditions', thus maximising the effects of fallout. The paper went on: 
We are advised that something like ten `H' bombs, each of a yield of 
about 10 megatons, delivered on the western half of the UK or in the 
waters close off the western seaboard, with the normal prevailing winds, 
would effectively disrupt the life of the country and make normal activity 
completely impossible. ' 13 
The JIC assessment formed the essential base on which Strath built his report. Another 
report, (SG(55)5) by General Kirkman on `The implications of fallout for civil defence 
planning', was considered to be `preoccupied with operational plans' rather than general 
policy guidance. 114 If this was a criticism that could have been levelled at Home Office 
plans throughout 1954, the discussion of Kirkman's paper demonstrates the new 
thoughtfulness at the centre of the CWPS. It was argued that the public needed to `have 
a clear and complete understanding of the problem before the outbreak of war' and to 
have `taken all precautionary measures that are possible', in order to aid recovery. For 
this to happen, however, an assessment was needed of `the moral obligation of a 
Government to spell out the whole story', and of `the likely effects of this knowledge in 
determining people's actions should war break out'. Success would depend `on the 
confidence which the Government has engendered due to the measures it has carried 
out'. ' 5 These ideas greatly influenced the final report. 
The 1955 Defence White Paper 
During the deliberations of the Strath Group the `middle course' Defence White Paper 
was published in February 1955.116 It began: `overshadowing all else in the year 1954 
has been the emergence of the thermo-nuclear bomb. This has had, and will continue to 
have, far-reaching effects on the defence policy of the United Kingdom. New and 
111 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 113. 
112 NA, CAB 158/20. JIC(55)12, `The "H" Bomb threat to the UK in the event of a General War'. 
113 Ibid. 
114 NA, CAB 21/3595. Notes on SG(55)5,4.1.1955. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ministry of Defence, Statement on Defence, 1955, Cmd. 9391, (London: HMSO, 1955). 
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revolutionary problems are posed requiring courage and imagination for their 
solution'. 117 The White Paper thus put a strong emphasis on deterrence claiming that 
the destructive power of the thermonuclear weapon `has significantly reduced the risk of 
war on a major scale' . 
118 It was announced that the Government `thought it their duty' 
to build a British hydrogen bomb119 - the hydrogen bomb decision, going through a 
complex series of Cabinet Committee meeting, never leaked - as was the `determination 
to face the threat of physical devastation, even on the immense scale which must be 
foreseen' rather than adopt `an attitude of subservience to militant Communism, with 
the national and individual humiliation that this would bring'. 120 
This was the context in which it had been long believed that civil defence policy had to 
be discussed, and the issue received its own section, `Home Defence'. Before home 
defence was discussed, however, the White Paper outlined the effects of the hydrogen 
bomb: `If such weapons were used in war, they would cause destruction, both human 
and material, on an unprecedented scale'. The fatal effects of fallout were explained, 
and the description ended by informing the public that post-attack life `would be a 
struggle for survival of the grimmest kind' . 
12 1 The statement was indeed a `middle 
course', demonstrating the developments in nuclear warfare by stressing the 
`unprecedented' scale of destruction, but steering clear of an honest portrayal by playing 
down the consequences of such destruction. The discussion of the `interruption' of 
services and the `serious problems' to be encountered post-attack did not do justice to 
thinking inside the government. But the language used was in a sense masterful, not 
apocalyptic but severe enough to stress the nature of the hydrogen bomb and, more 
importantly, to avoid easy accusations of suppressing information on the effects of 
fallout. 
The home defence section started with a sentence which set out Whitehall's justification 
of civil defence planning: `Home defence measures, by demonstrating the country's 
determination to resist aggression in all its forms, buttress the resolution needed to 
sustain an effective deterrent policy'. 122 It would do so by creating an unspoken 
1 17 Ibid., p. 3 
118 Ibid, p. 4. 
119 Ibid., p. 3. 
120 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
121 Ibid., pp. 3-4 
122 Ibid., p. 22. 
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symbiotic relationship with public morale, wherein active home defence measures 
would both create the impression of preparedness for war to the enemy and bolster 
public morale in a future war, thus further underpinning deterrence. The whole civil 
defence policy would rest on creating public support for it and maintaining public 
satisfaction with it. The White Paper was, however, in no real position to garner public 
support for the government civil defence policy: it was made clear that was not, as yet, a 
revised civil defence policy borne out of the `entirely new approach' made necessary by 
the hydrogen bomb. ' 23 
It stressed the continued need for `rescue, fire-fighting and welfare operations', and 
outlined how the Civil Defence Services would be supplemented by the training of the 
armed forces in civil defence and the formation of `The Mobile Defence Corps'. 
Eventually amounting to some forty-eight reserve battalions, these would be made up of 
Army and RAF reservists who would receive a month's training and were to represent 
the fruition of the long-cherished dream of a rapid, well-trained mobile force which 
could be deployed `in support of the local civil defence services wherever the need is 
greatest'. 124 On other policies, the importance of evacuation and stockpiling was 
reaffirmed, and a future shelter policy was hinted at by explaining the efficacy of a 
simple `trench with overhead earth cover' as a way of protecting against fallout. The 
total defence budget for civil Departments was estimated at £69.66 million for 
1955/56.125 Most of the money was to be spent on increasing the strategic stockpiles of 
food, oil and medical supplies. Further measures were promised and the public were 
informed that although there was no `simple or immediate solution' to civil defence 
problems, the Government were `confident that the people as a whole will be ready and 
willing to play their part in building that will to resist which is an essential part of the 
126 deterrent to aggression' . 
The interim nature of the section on civil defence was criticised by the Times, but its 
leader did stress civil defence's importance: without it `the new deterrent may only be a 
test of bluff'. 127 The ensuing Parliamentary debate, which Macmillan believed `one of 
123 Ibid., p. 22. 
124 Ibid., p. 23- 
125 Ibid., p. 30- 
126 Ibid., p. 26- 
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the most exciting Parliamentary scenes since the fall of Chamberlain', 128 was more 
memorable for the internecine warfare within the Labour Party than any penetrating 
look at the hydrogen bomb or civil defence. Churchill began his opening speech by 
stating that `there is no absolute defence against the hydrogen bomb''129 but there was 
no outcry to match that which followed a similar statement by Duncan Sandys as 
Minister of Defence in 1957. Manny Shinwell, a former Minister of Defence, did attack 
the Government for what he considered the paltry provision for the protection of the 
public'30 and Gwilym Lloyd-George, Home Secretary since October 1954, made a 
spirited defence of the need for a civil defence policy and explained that the 
complexities of fallout meant that the Government's full plans `have not yet reached the 
stage when they could be made public'. 131 He did stress that the Government would 
pursue an evacuation policy and he ruled out the provision of `deep-shelters', although 
the Government was `considering how [protection against fallout] can be given'; he also 
announced that all national servicemen would receive basic civil defence training. '32 
Lloyd-George was also praised for taking the issue more seriously than his predecessor, 
whose apparent glibness the year before still rankled with some. '33 
The Strath Report 
On 8 March 1955, the Strath Report was completed. 134 It began by outlining the power 
of one ten megaton hydrogen bomb. An air-burst device (maximum immediate 
devastation), would destroy everything within a two or three mile radius, ordinary brick 
houses would be destroyed or be irreparable up to six miles away, and the same house 
uninhabitable sixteen miles away. In average meteorological conditions fires would 
occur in houses up to fifteen miles away. If ground-burst (for maximum fallout), the 
figures for destroyed and unhabitable houses were reduced to five and twelve miles 
respectively. Overall, `though the zone of major damage by blast and heat would not 
extend more than some 12-16 miles from the point of burst, widespread minor damage 
would be done to roofs, windows and light structures at much greater distances'. 
135 
With fallout, `there would be fatal consequences and considerable sickness over an area 
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of some 400 square miles even if people remained in their houses and this might extend 
to some 50 miles downwind'. In short, `hydrogen bomb war would be total war in a 
sense not hitherto conceived. The entire nation would be in the front line' .' 
36 
If Britain were attacked with ten of these weapons `life and property would be 
obliterated by blast and fire on vast scale'. 137 It would represent an explosive force 
`forty-five times as great as the total tonnage of bombs delivered by all the allies over 
Germany, Italy and occupied France throughout the whole of the last war'. It would 
leave 
No part of the country... free from the risk of radio-active contamination. 
A single attack with ten 10-megaton bombs could deny us the use for 
varying periods of thousands of square miles of our agricultural land and 
the standing crops from a much greater area. Open water supplies for 
sections of the population would become undrinkable for weeks. The 
risk of starvation in the period immediately after the attack would be 
high. 138 
It would leave survivors `isolated not merely from the less contaminated areas outside 
but from one another. The household would become the unit of survival. Individuals 
would have to subsist on such stocks of food and water as they had got ready in advance 
in their individual places of shelter'. For each survivor, `life in the contaminated areas 
would demand a high degree of self-discipline... in the observance of elementary 
precautions to reduce the risks from exposure to radiation until it had subsided to an 
acceptable level. Clearly such discipline could not be secured unless the need for it 
were widely known and the basic precautions thoroughly understood by everyone in 
advance' , 
139 
Without preparations, 12 million would die, and 4 million would be seriously injured. 
Four million of those casualties would be caused by a single bomb on London. A major 
cause of casualties would be fire: `the fire hazard from nuclear attack dwarfs all 
previous experience to insignificance. The heat flash from one hydrogen bomb would 
start in a built-up area anything up to 100,000 fires, with a circumference of between 60 
136 Ibid. 
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and 100 miles'. There would be over 13 million people `pinned down in their houses or 
shelters for at least a week'. There could, at first, be little hope of rescuing them or 
ensuring all those who needed medical aid received it: `it would be quite unrealistic to 
hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards. There would be grave 
problems of priority in dealing with a wide range of casualties some of whom would 
have no hope of recovery'. The `chief difficulty' would be deciding who among the 
injured and burnt `had also been exposed to a lethal dose of radiation and who would 
therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical 
resources'. Even relatively minor radiation cases would probably prove fatal as the 
`good food, good nursing and rest' needed for recovery could not be provided. 140 
Turning from imagining the consequences of nuclear war to preparations and possible 
defences, Strath stressed that `this attack would fall with devastating suddenness. All 
preparations would have to be ready in advance and brought to a high state of 
efficiency. It would be folly to trust to improvisation. The price of unpreparedness 
would be catastrophe. Inefficiency and indecision in the execution of plans would be 
hardly less costly'. The 16 million dead and injured amounted to nearly a third of the 
population. Most of the 12 million deaths would result from heat and blast - more than 
9 million as opposed to less than 3 million caused by radiation. To reduce casualties, a 
threefold policy was recommended: evacuation; `local dispersal of those not evacuated 
to a distance from areas of greatest risk'; and shelter provision'. Strath argued that 
`these measures are not alternatives. In practice a combination of all three would be 
required'. Evacuation, especially, was important: `levelling out risk wherever the 
bombs might fall', could `reduce the figures very substantially'. For example, of the 4 
million estimated dead in London, evacuation might save 3 million of them, `and the 
provision of shelter would reduce it still further '. 141 
Shelter, it was believed, `should in principle be provided on a nation-wide scale', for 
defence against fallout; those `on the outskirts of likely target areas' should be 
constructed `to give some protection against blast and heat', but there could be no 
protective shelters in the inner `target areas'. Strath stressed that `effective protection 
against fall-out can be secured by a shelter of reasonably simple construction', and 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
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recommended that further investigations should be made to see what types of trenches 
or refuge rooms, and what stockpiling measures would be needed. He also stressed the 
need for protected basements in government buildings (an old chestnut) and that 
`guidance should be prepared for issue in due course to householders and others 
. 
concerned on the construction and equipment of shelters' 142 
From the civil defence measures of evacuation and shelter, Strath turned to an aspect of 
planning perhaps even more important: public education. Britain's deterrent policy 
required a `determination to resist aggression even at the risk of having to undergo 
nuclear bombardment', and Strath argued that such `determination can be real only if 
the public understand what is involved'. A `consistent policy of education is therefore 
required to acquaint everyone with the effects of the hydrogen bomb, and particularly 
with the hazard from radio-activity about which people are still largely ignorant, 
together with instruction on the precautions which can be taken to minimise casualties'. 
This, as we have seen, had been a constant refrain from civil defence planners from 
1946 onwards. `The process of indoctrination will take a long time and we recommend 
that a decision to embark on it should be taken as soon as possible. It will have to be 
done in such a way as to avoid spreading despondency or causing panic demands for 
unwarranted expenditure on protective measures'. 143 
The last sentence struck at the very heart of the civil defence paradox: it was of central 
importance to `indoctrinate' the public, but it could not be done in a way which might 
cause `despondency'. In practice this became a policy of minimising the importance of 
the hydrogen bomb in public discourse and refusing to give accurate, specific and full 
information on the consequences of the weapon in an attempt to create an impression of 
the `survivable' nuclear war. Key to this was the idea that the public could do 
something themselves to improve their chances, and information would aid public 
morale by appraising ordinary people of what they could do to defend themselves 
against the bomb. In what may strike us as an understatement, the report noted that 
`hydrogen bombing would place a very severe strain on public morale and on the forces 
of law and order', but `the numbers who survived the attack would largely turn on the 
extent on which discipline could be maintained and this in its turn would depend largely 
'42 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
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on people being fully informed beforehand'. But in dealing with morale, little seemed 
knowable for sure. The report stated that `however successful the educative process 
might be, it would still be impossible to forecast how the nation would react to nuclear 
assault. The effect of this on dense populations would remain beyond the imagination 
until it happened. Whether the country could withstand an all-out attack and still be in 
any state to carry on hostilities must be very doubtful' . 
144 
In addition to a `disciplined' population, nuclear war could only be tackled if the civil 
defence and military forces on the ground could be controlled by an efficient 
government machinery directing the relief effort to where it was needed most, but Strath 
stressed that such control might be impossible: 
In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the 
same area, there might be complete chaos for a time and civil control 
would collapse. In such circumstances the local military commander 
would have to be prepared to take over from the civil authority 
responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the 
administration of the Government. He would, if called upon, exercise his 
existing common-law powers to take whatever steps, however drastic, he 
considered necessary to restore order. He would have to direct the 
operations of the various civil agencies, including the police, the civil 
defence services and the fire service. In areas less badly hit the civil 
authorities might still be able to retain control but only with the support 
of the armed services. '45 
Military government, at least in the short term, would be necessary and desirable as only 
the military on the ground could hope to maintain control and organise and direct the 
essential services which could be resuscitated. In planning terms, the Strath report 
recommended `that a flexible system should be devised which would allow the military 
authorities, where required, to support and, where necessary, to take over control from 
regional or local authorities'. The problem of control meant `very heavy responsibilities 
would fall on the police and arrangements should be made to strengthen their numbers 
in an emergency'. There would need to be strengthened central and regional war rooms 
to aid the maintenance of control, which would also `require the use of drastic 
emergency powers. A complicated series of Defence Regulations, providing for 
detailed controls, as was used in the last war would be quite unsuitable. Much more 
144 Ibid. 
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rough and ready methods would be needed to cover the period when the nation would 
be struggling to survive'. lab 
`Rough and ready' methods of control, military government and the severe rationing of 
medical services leading to the non-treatment of radiation casualties: these would be 
essential characteristics of a Britain which had suffered attack by hydrogen bombs. Yet, 
Strath believed that the nation could emerge from such devastation. Immediately 
following an attack there would be `a critical period during which the surviving 
population would be struggling against disease, starvation and the unimaginable 
psychological effects of nuclear bombardment'. As long as `what was left of the nation 
could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the 
work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide 
enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs'. Although substantially 
reduced, `the standard of living... would still be above that of the greater part of the 
147 world' . 
The Strath Report was devoted to understanding the implications of a hydrogen bomb 
attack and it tried to piece together some recommendations to provide a basic defence 
against it or rather to aid Britain in the crucial recovery phase. The bomb's power and 
its effect on Britain were graphically described, but the key policy strands Strath 
recommended were as follows: an effective machinery of control based on the 
maintenance of central government and an ability to devolve power to the regional 
headquarters; a thoroughgoing evacuation policy; extensive provision of shelters; and a 
fundamental programme to educate the public in the conditions to be expected in future 
war. This included well staffed, well trained and well equipped civil defence forces 
(rescue, fire, police duties) and a system to monitor and warn against fallout. 148 
Historians have paid tribute to the group's handling of a task of unparalleled 
complexity. As Jeff Hughes puts it: `In constructing their imaginary space of the 
thermonuclear apocalypse and after, the planners literally reached the limits of language 
146 Ibid. 
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- not just the indescribable, but also the unthinkable'. 
149 This concept is important. 
Strath opens with the sentence: `Fallout, combined with the vast explosive power of the 
hydrogen bomb, presents problems of a revolutionary character for the defence of this 
country and a threat of the utmost gravity to our survival as a nation'. 150 Language this 
severe had been used from 1945 onwards, and especially so in the Hall Working Party's 
report of 1953. At no point was the use of such language an exercise in hyperbole, 
rather in the atomic age the threat of nuclear attack stretched understandings of potential 
destruction and the ability to articulate what such destruction meant to its limit. There 
can be no doubt that the hydrogen bomb went beyond the limit of human understanding. 
At one point, as we have seen, Strath judged that the effect of the hydrogen bomb `on 
dense populations would remain beyond the imagination until it happened'. 's' Looking 
into the abyss of nuclear war was a painful business: the sole survivor of Strath, now 
Lord Allen of Abbeydale, declined to revisit the memories of that `terrible committee on 
a terrible subject'. 152 And how politicians reacted to this picture of the abyss and its call 
for a substantial civil and home defence effort will be seen in the next chapter. Strath 
remained the central document for understanding thermonuclear war in Whitehall. It 
defined the limits of the possible and proposed strategies that could possibly have aided 
Britain's recovery from the abyss of nuclear destruction. 
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Five 
The Crucial Years, 1955-59 
The twelve months following the delivery of the Strath Report were spent discussing the 
implications of its policy recommendation. The key issue became financial: could 
Britain afford the full implementation of Strath? Whilst the answer was negative, the 
decision over Strath did not determine civil defence policy for the rest of the decade. It 
was the Eden Government's almost-forgotten policy review of mid-1956 which finally 
rejected the Strathian conceptualisation of civil defence, slashing its budget in half and 
ending `recovery measures. After 1956, civil defence concentrated on the barest level 
of survival and on bolstering the deterrent. Priority was given to measures which 
increased the perception of preparedness: hence the continuation of the Civil Defence 
Corps into the thermonuclear age. Alongside this concentration on public measures, 
however, the post-Strath civil defence era saw an almost opposite policy priority: the 
development of an alternative machinery of government. Centred around a secret 
alternative seat of government near Corsham in Wiltshire, plans were developed which 
would have seen Britain ruled from underground in a future war. 
It was ironic in a way that the twin planks of civil defence policy after 1956 should be 
so different: one so secret that only in the last three or four years has it become publicly 
known; and the other deliberately open and public, an attempt to convince those outside 
Whitehall that Britain was prepared for nuclear war and thus, the reasoning went, 
support the deterrent policy. But although this is how post-1956 civil defence policy 
developed, Ministers and others were uncomfortable with it. There was no confidence 
in civil defence as a deterrent-enhancing facade. Home Office officials who had dealt 
with civil defence throughout the cold war struggled to abandon the idea that civil 
defence could mitigate the effects a nuclear attack. Moreover, the upkeep of the facade 
proved problematic. Like stage scenery, the facade of civil defence did not bear close 
scrutiny; therefore a key aspect of the 1956-59 era was to take no actions, good or 
ill, 
which would increase the public's gaze on it. Only in 1960 was it 
decided that the 
facade needed strengthening; before then, Harold Macmillan was himself responsible 
for ensuring the scenery painters stayed their hands. Even this implies more order than 
there was. There can be no doubt that civil defence was in a profound mess after Strath: 
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the budget was cut heavily both in 1955 and again in 1956, non-machinery of 
government measures floundered and, crucially, the Government failed to convincingly 
link the lack of civil defence preparations with the deterrent, instead perpetuating the 
atomic-age idea of civil defence as a vitally important life-safer and shying away from 
all discussion of the real effects of nuclear war. This inability to firmly graft civil 
defence and deterrence together in the public mind had profound consequences for the 
Government after 1957. 
The Initial Discussions on Strath 
The far-reaching implications of the Strath report were first discussed by Ministers in an 
ad hoc meeting (GEN. 491) chaired by Harold Macmillan on 24 March 1955. Attending 
the meeting were those Ministers `most directly concerned' including Lord Salisbury 
and Lloyd-George as well as Brook and Strath. Some major strategic concerns were 
raised. One was the fact that the Chiefs of Staff believed that the enormous devastation 
from a future thermonuclear attack would `prevent the United Kingdom from being 
used as a main supply base for such operations as continued after the opening phase of 
the war', and that the `earlier conception of a period of broken-backed warfare 
following the initial attack, in which this country would take part had been abandoned'. ' 
As we saw in a previous chapter, it is debatable that such a conception should have 
survived the analysis of the Hall Group in 1953, but the thermonuclear weapon did 
seem to have `tremendous implications' for the armed forces; their `role, composition 
and equipment' would have to be reviewed on the back of such an assumption. One 
strategic decision had important consequences, and would dictate the pace at which it 
was assumed civil defence plans would need to be implemented. This was the decision 
`that, for planning purposes, Departments should continue to proceed on the assumption 
that the Government would be able to detect a serious deterioration in the international 
situation some six months before war came and would know, say, seven days in 
advance that an attack on this country was to be expected'. 2 Although the military 
always stressed the `uncertainty' of the warning period, the planning assumption 
remained in place for the rest of the decade. 3 
1 NA, CAB 130/109. GEN 491/1" Meeting, 24.3.1955. 
2 Ibid. 
3 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)1 S` Meeting, 17.3.1955. 
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On the specifics of policy, GEN. 491 agreed an attempt to `impress on the public the 
dangers of thermo-nuclear war' should not be made `until they could tell them at the 
same time what measures of protection could be taken'. 4 It was feared that such 
knowledge `would breed despair among our own people and encourage the view that 
civil defence preparations were a waste of time and money'. 5 Interestingly, Strath 
himself provided a caveat to the doctrine of no publicity which was adopted. In an 
informal meeting called by Brook on 16 March 1955 to discuss the Report, Strath 
argued that `he had been struck by the tremendous difference between what would 
happen if people knew what the hydrogen bomb could do and what preparations could 
be taken against it, and what would happen if the public were left in ignorance'. 6 He 
continued that he was `convinced that the time must come before very long when people 
must get accustomed to the implications of hydrogen bomb warfare. The population 
would need to be trained in the same way as it had been decided to train servicemen 7 
It was advice the Government was destined to ignore. 
The issue of publicity soon gave way to the nitty-gritty of policy. GEN. 491 had agreed 
that civil defence measures remained. necessary as `the argument still held that these 
were valuable both as a contribution to the deterrent and because our worst fears about 
the nature and weight of the attack might not be realised'. 8 It fell to Brook's HDC to 
thrash out the response to the Strath report after it had been accepted by the Defence 
Committee on 22 April 1955 as the basis for revising war plans. 9 The delay between 
the meetings of GEN. 491 and the Defence Committee is explainable by the accession of 
Sir Anthony Eden to the Premiership. Once Eden was settled in Downing Street he was 
briefed by Brook on Strath prior to the Defence Committee meeting. 10 The new Prime 
Minister was apprised of the report's central thrust: `although a determined hydrogen 
bomb attack against this country would cause human and material destruction on an 
appalling scale, it would be possible to contain its effects and enable the nation to 
survive if adequate preparations had been made in advance'. Much work was needed 
and it would be based on two main strategic assumptions: that planning relevant only to 
4 Ibid. NA, CAB 130/109. GEN 491/1S` Meeting, 24.3.1955. 
5 Ibid. 
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conventional or atomic weapons should be discontinued and that Britain could no longer 
be assumed to function `as a main supply base after the attack'. ' 1 
Brook informed Eden that `endorsement of these assumptions would have important 
and far-reaching effects'. There was, the Cabinet Secretary continued sternly, `a natural 
temptation to shrink from applying them stringently and to hedge against the possibility 
that war may take a different form', but the available resources meant that only one 
contingency could be planned for. `War planning is in itself an exercise in choosing 
between various risks: as the resources available for home defence are so limited, they 
must be concentrated to meet the most likely and most dangerous possibility'. As to 
what use these resources would be put, Eden was informed that `the two most difficult 
and politically sensitive questions of policy are those concerning evacuation and 
shelter'. The evacuation of priority classes would be necessary as would some `simple 
construction' to protect against fallout, but further research was needed. Eden was also 
informed of the intention to set up an `independent' committee to recommend policy to 
the public, but he was advised that `it would be premature to set up such a body until the 
plans for presentation to it have been more fully elaborated'. Also, Eden was advised 
against excessive secrecy: `public opinion will before long demand the further 
Government pronouncement' promised in the Defence White Paper. 12 
We can see from this submission that Brook had been profoundly affected by the Strath 
report. In previous debates over civil defence, Brook had advised that shelters were 
financially prohibitive and that, strategically, they were unnecessary. His views had 
now changed, and his advice to Eden reflected the belief that the power of the hydrogen 
bomb and the devastating potentialities of fallout demanded some sort of protection. 
This did not represent a conversion to full scale civil defence provision on Brook's part; 
rather it reflected the fact that although British defence strategy must continue to rely on 
the power of offensive, the risk of utter destruction seemed to demand some degree of 
shelter provision. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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Reorganising the Machinery of Government 
After the Defence Committee decision to accept the Strath report, an attempt was made 
to overhaul the Cabinet Committee system. The Ministerial side of this restructuring 
was discussed when Selwyn Lloyd, the new Defence Minister, wrote to Anthony Eden 
on 28 July 1955, outlining the plan thrashed out between him and Lloyd-George, 13 
namely that a Home Defence (Ministerial) Committee (HDM) should be established, 
consisting of Lloyd (as Chairman), Lloyd-George and James Stuart (Secretary of State 
for Scotland). This would co-ordinate the military side of Home Defence. `Under that 
committee', argued Lloyd, would be CDM, under the chairmanship of the Home 
Secretary. He would continue to be responsible for co-ordinating the civil side of Home 
Defence'. On the official level, HDC would now report to HDM, and CDO would 
`report in either of two ways, as appropriate' : either through HDC to HDM, or directly 
to CDM. (This despite Lloyd's statement in the same paper that HDC would `normally' 
report to CDM). 14 Overall Lloyd believed `that this arrangement would clarify the 
chain of responsibility', but the opposite proved true. Although the aim was to have `a 
high level co-ordinating body for the military and civil sides of home defence', it 
actually just provided a rather confusing dual system (Appendix C. 6). On a more 
sensible note, Brook saw through a reorganisation that widened the terms of reference 
of CDO and moved its chairmanship from the Home Office to the Cabinet Office. 15 In 
the same way the CDJPS was reconstructed as an official Cabinet Office group - the 
Civil Defence Planning Committee. 16 The creation of the CDPC and the transferring of 
the chairmanship of CDO from the Home Office to the Cabinet Office had the effect of 
greatly weakening the control of the Home Office over the civil defence planning 
machinery (surely at least in part inspired by the attacks on CDO delivered in 1953 and 
1954 - see Chapter 3). From mid-1955, the research and planning on civil 
defence 
would feed through these two committees. 
In fact, this dual system never worked and was scrapped when Macmillan became 
Prime Minister in 1957. Although the existence of two Ministerial committees on civil 
and home defence suggested a neat distinction between the terms, such a 
division did 
13 NA, PREM 11/4111. Sewlyn Lloyd to the Prime Minister, 28.7.55 
'a Ibid. 
15 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)1 1, `War Planning: Committee Structure', Note by the Secretary of the 
Cabinet, 31.8.1955. 
16 Ibid. 
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not really exist in practice. In fact all civil defence policy decisions went to HDM. The 
only subject dealt with by CDM while HDM existed was evacuation, and even then at 
the key meeting to decide the post-Strath policy the Minister of Defence was present - 
leading to the suspicion that the only reason evacuation was not dealt with by HDM was 
the fact that the Minister responsible, the Minister for Housing and Local Government 
was not a member of it. Moreover, a look at how the machinery worked shows that 
Lloyd's system never operated, with CDO channelling all its work into HDC who sent it 
to HDM, unless it was on evacuation. This was a more sensible machinery, although it 
turned CDM into a de facto sub-Committee on Evacuation (Appendix C. 7). 
When the dual system was scrapped CDM was reconstructed to oversee the whole area 
of civil and home defence. It is clear that the arguments of late 1955 and 1956 over the 
home defence budget (see below) caused some to believe that the Minister of Defence 
was, instead of adequately `co-ordinating' policy, defending his own Departmental 
budget against that of civil Departments. Eden, at least, issued a stern rebuke to Sir 
Walter Monckton, who had replaced Selwyn Lloyd, in July 1956, informing him that: 
I wish it to be clearly understood that your Ministerial responsibility for 
determining the balance between the various sectors of our defence 
effort includes the allocation of resources to home defence... not only 
between the Service Departments, but between all the Departments that 
play a part in defence. 
This does not mean that your relations with the Ministers in charge of 
these Civil Departments in respect of their defence tasks are the same as 
your relations with the Service Ministers.... I am here concerned only 
to make it clear that your responsibility for the balance within our 
defence effort covers the defence programme as a whole and not only 
the programmes of the Services. '7 
By 1957, when Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence was 
ousted from his unique co-ordinating role. Instead, the Home Secretary, as chairman of 
the new stand-alone Ministerial Committee, controlled civil defence, reporting to the 
Defence Committee. The new CDM had the terms of reference: `to co-ordinate the 
home defence preparations of the civil agencies of government', 
18 and HDC became 
fully subservient to it. By 1957 the arguments over Strath had been decided and the 
fundamental direction of civil defence policy decided upon. The machinery of 
17 NA, CAB 21/3346. Prime Minister to Minister of Defence, 3.7.56. 
IS NA, CAB 134/1476. CD(57)5, `Terms of Reference and Composition', 19.11.1987. 
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government changes of 1955, far from being an and technical debate, shaped these 
decisions. By placing the Minister of Defence in the prime co-ordinating role, and the 
Cabinet Office in control of the Official Committees Eden (and Brook) had lessened the 
influence of the pro-Strath Home Office and increased the influence of those more 
likely to argue that the deterrent made high levels of spending unnecessary. As we have 
seen, some felt that the Minister of Defence had abused his position, deliberately 
privileging the claims of the military over those of civil defence. 
The Revision of War Plans 
When Brook sat down with other officials in CDO (he chaired the Committee for the 
only time here) on 1 June 1955 to discuss the revision of war plans, 19 he had already 
informed the Committee that this revision should be completed by September in order 
to finalise the civil defence budget for 1956/7 and to enable Ministers to announce any 
revised civil defence policy. 20 Main areas (aside from evacuation and shelter) needing 
immediate revision included research; fire-fighting; medical services; water supply; 
telephones; broadcasting; `due functioning' of essential industries; and stockpiling. 21 
By the end of the year a vast array of papers had been discussed in the CDO committee 
room. 22 
The revision of the plans, and their cost, was outlined in CDO's report of 3 October 
1955,23 the first of twelve papers and reports passed between CDO, HDC, HDM and the 
Defence Committee on civil defence expenditure during the last three months of 1955. 
CDO put forward a `general policy' arguing that `all necessary provision should be 
made for the training of the civil defence and associated services carried out by local 
authorities'. This included the necessary fire-fighting and other equipment, such as 
radiac instruments and communications systems. Command and control systems would 
also require overhauling. The expenditure on medical services would need to increase, 
19 NA, CAB 134/793. CD(O)(55) 1" Meeting, 1.6.1955. 
20 Ibid. CD(O)(55)2, `Revision of War Plans', Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 23.5.1955; 
21 Ibid. CD(O)(55)14 (Final), `Research Programme for Civil Defence', Note by the Home Office, 
3.10.1955; CD(O)(55)26, `Scale of Fire-fighting Preparations', Note by the Home Departments, 
7.10.1955; CD(O)(55)8, `War Plans of the Health Departments', Note by the Joint Secretaries, 3.8.1955; 
CD(O)(55)23, `Water Supply', Note by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 20.9.1955; 
CD(O)(55)15, `Gas Industry Due Functioning Programme', Memorandum by the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power', 12.9.1955. 
22 See Ibid. CD(O)(55)4`h Meeting, 14.9.1955; CD(O)(55)5`h Meeting, 27.9.1955; CD(O)(55)6`h Meeting, 
24.11.1955; CD(O)(55)7`h Meeting, 12.12.1955. 
23 Ibid. CD(O)(55)13 (Final), `Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments', Report by the Official 
Committee on Civil Defence, 3.10.1955. 
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as current plans, even if fully implemented, could not provide an inadequate standard of 
treatment for those injured in a thermonuclear attack. Lastly, `a steady programme 
should be maintained on preparations to restore public utilities and transport facilities 
after attack', including railways, ports, the gas and electricity industries and protection 
of the water supply. 24 
By 11 October, Brook as chairman of HDC had submitted a report to HDM which gave 
more concrete figures on future expenditure. 25 Brook informed Ministers that it was 
believed that stockpiling vital food, oil, medical and other essential supplies in order to 
prevent `people dying of starvation, exposure or disease' in a future war would cost 
some £383 million, including the construction of storage facilities. To maintain these 
stocks would cost an additional £30 million a year. As Brook put it, `although this part 
of the Home Defence Programme is not one which attracts much public attention, its 
importance is great'. The Civil Defence and Allied Services would cost around £7 
million per year to maintain and would require £78 million of capital expenditure of 
which £11 million was for radiac equipment and £40 million for fire-fighting 
equipment. The cost of building the central and regional headquarters of government 
(see below) as well as protected accommodation for civil defence, police and fire 
services was estimated at £38 million. Although `due functioning' planning was 
incomplete and `no preparations can prevent extremely severe dislocation of public 
utilities' in war, it was believed a programme costing £80 million would be needed. 
Including the `Home Defence' share of the Post Office's defence spending, this 
amounted to capital expenditure of £628 million, with a recurring cost of about £50 
million a year on completion. 26 This figure represented half of what we can style the 
`full Strath' preparations - the other half was of course the cash-intensive shelter 
provision. 
When HDM put forward its final proposals to the Defence Committee, it outlined the 
HDC proposals for the full £628 million programme spread over seven years, from £78 
million in 1956/7 to £150 million in 1960/1 and then back to £128 million for 1962/3.27 
24 Ibid. 
25 NA, CAB 134/1245. HD(M)(55)4, `Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments'. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. HD(M)(55)12 (Final), `Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments', Report by the Home 
Defence (Ministerial) Committee, 30.11.1955. 
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HDM argued that the sale of stockpiles of industrial war materials (no longer needed 
due to the Strathian abandonment of the `broken-backed' war concept) would bring in 
between £20-25 million a year for the next five years, and that they had `examined the 
effects of a home defence programme costing £50 million net' (after subtracting the 
money from stockpile sales). Such a limit would be acceptable for 1956-57 as the 
programme was just starting, but `the consequences of maintaining the same ceiling... 
in later years would... be extremely serious'. On such a budget, adequate food 
stockpiling would be impossible, and it would be politically controversial `to reduce 
home defence expenditure below the abnormally low level of 1955-56'. 28 This `low' 
level had been explained as an interim figure whilst plans were reformulated, but the 
civil defence budget was never to reach such heights again. 
Ministerial decisions are difficult to piece together as the Defence Committee minutes 
on this issue are missing from the reading rooms in Kew, but it is clear that this seven 
year plan was rejected by the Defence Committee on 7 December 1955, as HDM were 
asked to `examine further' the programme. 29 Ministers could not agree, with the 
Treasury wanting a limit of £50 million gross imposed, and others believing that `it 
would create a deplorable impression on Parliament and the public if the effect of the 
review of home defence policy in the light of the hydrogen bomb was seen to be 
expenditure appreciably lower than in 1955-56, and considerably lower than in earlier 
years'. 30 This strong standpoint from the Treasury can be explained by need to cut 
expenditure due to the precarious state of the national economy in late 1955 and early 
1956.31 As we shall see later, this imperative also drove an enormous cost-cutting 
exercise in the summer of 1956 which was to further slash the home defence budget. 
32 
A compromise was evidently reached and, when the Defence White Paper was 
published in February 1956, the home defence budget was some £44.66 million net, 
33 
meaning that around £16 million would be spent (on stockpiling) beyond the £28.39 
million on other home defence measures which was regarded `as the minimum needed 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. HD(M)(56)1, `Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments', Memorandum by the Chairman of 
the Home Defence (Ministerial) Committee, 3.1.1956. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Edmund Dell, The Chancellors, (London: HarperCollins, 1997), pp. 199-202. 
32 For an interesting although hardly sympathetic analysis of the `Climacteric of 
1955' see Andrew 
Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the War, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958), pp. 196-227. 
33 Ministry of Defence, Statement on Defence, Cmd. 9691, (London: HMSO, 1956), p. 
32. 
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to maintain public confidence'. 34 £5 million was saved, but at the same time Strath was 
lost. The figure of £50 million was seen as the beginning of a steady expansion which 
would allow the full £628 million programme to be implemented, but the full Strath had 
been scuppered, and instead of a seven year programme, civil defence measures were 
left to the mercy of yearly reviews and continual short-term expenditure limits. 
Shelter 
Although Strath argued that fallout shelters `should in principle be provided on a nation- 
wide scale', and Brook had suggested the same to Eden, the battle over shelter policy 
from October-December 1955 decided once and for all that shelters were too expensive 
to be built. But a battle it was; for the first time the Minister in charge of the policy, the 
Home Secretary, seriously advocated building shelters. Whereas his predecessors had 
always agreed that shelters would be prohibitively expensive, Gwilym Lloyd-George 
advocated shelter-building out of principle. He was, in Hennessy's words, Strath's `one 
unequivocal champion' . 
3s 
Before the Ministerial discussions took place, the outline shelter programme was 
thrashed out in the official committees from June, causing bitter divisions that were to 
be replicated when Ministers discussed the issue. 36 The proposals eventually presented 
to Ministers by Brook on 11 October 1955 (an original report by CDO heavily revised 
by HDC), focused on the construction of covered outside garden trenches or cellar-style 
trenches dug under the ground floor of a house at a `highly provisional' cost of £25 per 
head - an enormous £1,250 million for the whole country. 37 CDO put forward two 
other alternatives: constructing shelters in new homes only, and stockpiling the 
materials to allow shelters to be built in an emergency. The former, although potentially 
popular with local authorities would mean providing shelters only in the new 2% of 
housing stock which was built every year, creating provision haphazardly with no 
regard for strategic necessity. Even such a limited programme would cost some £60 
million a year. Stockpiling, and the production of advice enabling the public to build 
the shelters, would cost £5 per head, a total of £250 million for the whole country. 
34 NA, CAB 134/1245. HD(M)(56) 1, `Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments'. 
35 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 147. 
36 NA, CAB 134/793. CD(O)(55)11, `The Implications of Shelter Policy', 20.8.1955; NA, CAB 134/940. 
HDC(55)3'd Meeting, 10.10.1955; NA, CAB 134/1245. HD(M)5, `Shelter', Note by the Chairman of the 
Home Defence Committee, 11.10.1955. 
37 NA, CAB 134/1245. HD(M)5, `Shelter'. 
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The options presented to Ministers, however, had already been attacked within HDC. It 
was argued that the `new housing' policy, `though it made little immediate contribution 
towards protective shelter for the majority of people, implied the acceptance of the need 
for shelters and when this became known it would be difficult to resist claims for shelter 
on a national scale'. Also, combined with a policy of evacuation `which was likely to 
include the almost complete evacuation of densely populated [and therefore densely 
housed] areas' such a policy would be a waste of effort. 38 But this position, and the 
original CDO paper, had been savaged as `an invitation to Ministers to do nothing, 
either by way of shelter construction or stockpiling of materials' by General Kirkman in 
HDC. 39 He `agreed that a large-scale shelter programme was out of the question' but he 
stressed `the time had come to recognise that the public would expect positive action by 
the Government'. Despite the `recognised difficulties, local, financial and political', 
Kirkman pressed for the adoption of the new houses strategy. 40 He certainly had a point 
on the report being an invitation to do nothing. It made no effort to recommend any 
policy. The revised paper sent to Ministers was even worse: the original CDO version 
pointed out the consequences of a rejection of a shelter policy, but when Ministers saw 
it, this had been removed. The casualties had been taken out of the equation. 
When Ministers met, however, Lloyd-George ensured the casualties were at the 
forefront of everyone's mind. He argued that `radioactive fallout would cause a very 
large number of casualties unless some form of shelter was provided for the 
population''41 and, clearly dissatisfied by the officials' report, promised to submit fuller 
proposals himself. When Lloyd-George submitted his paper, the only time a senior 
Minister had strenuously advocated building shelters for the population, he began by 
outlining the Strath analysis of the need for shelters - that, unprepared, Britain would 
suffer 12 million deaths from a hydrogen attack with 3 million injured and 13 million 
more trapped in their homes, many suffering from radiation sickness. 
42 The Home 
Secretary noted that evacuation was essential to reduce deaths, but it could not replace 
shelters as it increased the numbers pinned down by fallout and, without shelters in 
38 Ibid. 
39 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)3`d Meeting, 10.10.1955. 
ao Ibid. 
41 NA, CAB 134/1245. HD(M)(55)1S1 Meeting, 13.10.1955. 
42 Ibid. HD(M)(55)10, `Shelter Policy', Note by the Home Secretary, 25.10.1955. 
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addition, `the numbers who will be sick and who will die from radiation' would rise. 
Lloyd-George called for the adoption of the covered trench style shelter (`a cavity along 
the line of an inspection pit in a private garage') on a nationwide basis, as it would 
protect against fallout and give some protection away from the centre of devastation. 
These should be incorporated in all new housing, at a new estimated cost of £30 million 
a year. (The figure was reduced from £60 million due to the slashing of the 
Government's housing programme on economic grounds). Although other shelter 
would have to be provided in dwellings where the `inspection pit' style was impractical, 
Lloyd-George gave again the figure for providing all houses with shelters as £1,250 
million, or £62.5 million a year for twenty years starting in 1957/8. `Alarming as these 
figures are they would not appear so to the man in the street while we are spending 
some £1,500 million a year on defence'. 43 
Whereas the official paper, bogged down in detail and frightened of the economic 
implications of shelter, seemed to have forgotten the point of shelters, Lloyd-George 
expounded the Strathian analysis of their necessity. The heavy casualties estimated 
could not be kept secret: `any intelligent person in possession of a population density 
map of this country and details of the effect of thermonuclear weapons, which have 
been officially given to the public in America, and indeed to civil defence authorities in 
this country, can forecast comparable casualty figures'. Simply, `it is in my view the 
duty of the Government, by planning evacuation and by the gradual provision of shelter, 
to reduce the possibilities of casualties on this scale'. Without shelters, morale would 
be endangered, and there was little point `keeping forces for the "hot war" if the morale 
of this country is to collapse and we lose the will to fight'. The Government would be 
`politically vulnerable' if no shelters were provided, given that they had been in 1939- 
45 and `casualties would be immeasurably greater in another war'. 
44 
Lloyd-George's plan that the Government should announce in Parliament their intention 
to build shelters in new houses and embark on a long-term plan of shelter building for 
45 
existing housing was fiercely resisted when HDM met on 27 October 1955. Although 
he argued that `if the Government are to announce that any expenditure on the provision 
of shelter was impracticable the consequences were difficult to predict but would 
43 Ibid. 
as Ibid. 
45 Ibid. HD(M)(55)2"d Meeting, 27.10.1955. 
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certainly be very serious', the Committee stood against him. General Brownjohn `said 
that he was sure the Chiefs of Staff would be seriously alarmed at a proposal that a sum 
of the order [proposed]... should be spent on what was a purely passive measure. It 
would be a sum comparable to what was being spent on the primary deterrent to war'. 
Selwyn Lloyd admitted `that the problem was an extremely difficult one. He fully 
realised the force of what the Home Secretary had said. On the other hand, the primary 
objective was to prevent war, and a sum of this order spent on medium bombers would 
be much more likely to influence the decision of the aggressor than the same sum spent 
on shelter' . 
46 
Thinking inside the Air Ministry, as evidenced by a brief for George Ward, Under 
Secretary of State for Air, agreed with this - £62.5 a year was too much to pay for the 
deterrent value of shelters. It was also felt that in the long term `expenditure on shelter 
policy is likely to compete with the amount of money spent on the active deterrent'. 47 
Its impact on morale was doubted: `is it really true that the public would feel comforted 
by the knowledge that a house in the London area had a shelter of the "inspection pit" 
type? ' Finally, it was `difficult to see that shelters... would make a great deal of 
difference to the number of casualties' in London and other target areas. 48 
When the Defence Committee met on 7 December 1955, the minutes show Lloyd- 
George attempting to convince his colleagues of the need for shelters but finding it 
impossible to overcome the financial objections. 49 One consideration was that he was 
calling for spending on shelters for homes at a point when the Government had reduced 
the housing programme on economic grounds. It was quietly decided that `the financial 
and economic situation precluded a programme for the construction of domestic shelter 
at public expense'. 50 Shelter policy was effectively dead. Never again would it be 
seriously investigated as a pursuable policy. The unlikelihood of Lloyd-George ever 
succeeding can be gauged by the fact that the very meeting rejecting the policy had also 
decided against the newly revised home defence programme for 1956/57. 
46 Ibid. 
47 NA, AIR 8/1836. `Brief for Under Secretary of State for Air and the Chief of the Air Staff on Shelter 
Policy', 6.12.1955. 
48 Ibid. 
49 NA, CAB 131/16. DC(55)170h Meeting, 7.12.1955. 
50 Ibid. 
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Evacuation 
Almost concurrently with the issues of shelter and the revised home defence 
programme, Ministers dealt with the third key policy: evacuation. Strath had 
recommended that priority classes, made up of children, mothers and the elderly and the 
infirm should be removed from evacuation areas which would themselves be larger than 
previously thought. Non-essential workers should be `dispersed' from the central target 
areas, while `the remainder should be expected to stay at work in the high risk areas' but 
should be dispersed locally as far as possible. 51 This mixture of outright evacuation and 
limited dispersal was similar to the plan put forward in 1950, but involved many more 
people. It was enshrined in the first major post-Strath report on the issue by CDO, 
completed on 17 November 1955. This argued that `an evacuation scheme which 
commands the confidence of the public' was the only way to `avoid uncontrolled public 
evacuation, which was likely to bring the life of the community to a stop; would cause 
congestion at the railway stations and on the roads, with catastrophic effects on public 
order". To enable sufficient numbers to be evacuated from the main target areas, 
smaller areas were to be excluded, including places like Brighton, Stoke and Grimsby, 
which did not `appear to be obvious targets in a hydrogen bomb war'. 52 
The priority class population in the evacuation areas numbered 11.25 million people; 
the non-essential population of the `areas of highest density of population' (no longer 
called the High Risk Areas, as the term was apparently `liable to misinterpretation' - the 
term `Target Area' was also discouraged) numbered 2.8 million; and 1.8 million 
Essential workers would be dispersed to `peripheral' areas within travelling distance of 
their workplace. The dilution of the women-and-children principle in the five largest 
conurbations had important implications. It was seen as essential as 3.5 million people 
lived within a five mile radius of the centre of London, and more than 1 million in 
Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow. Unless evacuation beyond the 
priority classes took place, there would be `intolerably heavy casualties'. 
53 But it left 
open some important questions: how to define these areas, how to define those 
`essential' workers who would not be evacuated but only dispersed to the edges of such 
51 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)3, `The Defence Implications of Fall-out from a Hydrogen Bomb', 
52 NA, CAB 134/793. CD(O)(55)22, `Evacuation and Peripheral Dispersal', Memorandum by the Home 
Office, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Scottish Office, 17.11.1955. 
53 Ibid. 
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areas, how to enforce the distinction, and how to justify excluding the five areas with 
central populations of over 500,000 from the scheme 
This limited dispersal was intended to keep people at work; those industrial workers and 
their essential office staff in plants which were impossible to move, virtually all 
transport workers, and the workers needed to maintain essential utilities and services. 
CDO believed that some undertakings `vital to the survival of the nation' should be able 
to relocate. It was suggested a Committee be set up to identify these firms (this would 
have been similar to the 1939-45 Key Points Directorate). For a scheme of such 
complexity to work, planning would have to proceed `on the assumption that the 
Government of the day would not delay putting into effect some measure of evacuation 
until war seemed certain', because it would take eleven days to complete the evacuation 
of London. Even that was a best case scenario. Given this requirement, it was also 
necessary that the scheme catered `for the possibility that the outbreak of war might be 
delayed for some time after the evacuation has been carried out, or might indeed never 
come at all'. For this reason, `plans must not therefore bring the life of the community 
to a stop merely on a threat of war' . 
s4 
Some of these questions were highlighted when this plan was discussed fully by HDC. 55 
There were certainly grave concerns over the practicability of the dispersal aspects of 
the plan. It was argued that there was `little was to be gained by attempting to keep 
productive workers at work, since production would inevitably be brought largely to a 
standstill by the general disorganisation arising from the evacuation scheme'. 56 
Moreover, any economic loss `would not be of much consequence' if war followed, 
`and if it did not, the relief would be so great that the loss would soon be forgotten'. 
Therefore, the question was raised, should not the `essential workers' scheme be more 
narrowly drawn, concentrating on, say, `police, fire brigades, and essential public utility 
workers'? This argument was attacked as `a counsel of despair'. If `no serious attempt 
were made to reduce economic loss' two things could happen: the first was that 
`evacuation would be ordered whenever there was a threat of war, in which event the 
sa Ibid. 
ss NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)4`h Meeting, 16.12.1955; this meeting took place after CDO had 
discussed the report (NA, CAB 134/793, CD(O)(55)6t' Meeting, 24.11.1955) and submitted it, after 
minor changes, to HDC (NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)28, `Evacuation and Peripheral Dispersal', Report 
by the Official Committee on Civil Defence, 12.12.1955). 
5 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)4t' Meeting. 
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Russians would be able to ruin us by frequent threats of war'; or, `evacuation would not 
be ordered until war seemed certain, in which case it would almost inevitably be 
ordered too late'. It was also noted that if these `key workers' were not deemed 
necessary, then they would presumably be evacuated from the areas of `high density' 
along with the other non-essential workers, placing even greater strain on the scheme. It 
would also create the impression of a full scale evacuation from the five main areas, 
which would prove controversial in those non-'high density', but likely target, areas 
such as Newcastle and Bristol. 57 
HDC reached no conclusions on the issue and forwarded the report to CDM. Before 
CDM met, the Treasury Minister on the Committee, Henry Brooke, 58 received a brief on 
the report from Sir Alexander Johnston. 59 The Treasury had an interest in a coherent 
and plausible evacuation policy: it cost nothing in the planning stage and would 
alleviate pressure for shelters and other expensive projects. Johnston clearly felt the 
plan neither coherent nor plausible. The complete disruption to production that an 
attack would undoubtedly bring would leave those men `asked to let their families go 
and to stay because their work was vital to the country... hanging about without enough 
to do'. Johnston argued that the planners `seem appalled by the idea of a 95% or 98% 
evacuation of these high density areas and they look round for some way in which to 
reduce the commitment they are undertaking'. He thought that `there would in fact 
have to be almost complete evacuation of these areas, certainly of Central London', and 
that `every attempt to interest people in civil defence by painting the full horrors of the 
hydrogen bomb makes it less likely that people would be willing to remain behind in 
areas where certain destructions seemed to await them'. 60 
Yet despite this, Johnston attacked the basis on which the Home Office and the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government planned to evacuate those it had earmarked: `it is all 
very well for officials to lecture Ministers... on the need to order the evacuation of 
priority classes at an early date; but Ministers will not take early decisions on this, nor 
57 Ibid. 
58 Henry Brooke, Financial Secretary to the Treasury from July 1954 was destined to spend the majority 
of his career in posts which had a significant civil defence function. He became Minister of Housing and 
Local Government in July 1957 and, after nine months as the first Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Home 
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will the public accept evacuation until things are looking pretty dark'. 61 He went on: 
`we are not dealing with pawns who can be moved across the chess board to the whims 
of officials'; families would stay together in an emergency, and it would be difficult to 
persuade fathers to remain behind. A compulsory, rather than voluntary scheme might 
be necessary. `One is dealing with an unprecedented risk, whereas the Ministry of 
Housing still cling to the idea of a glorified Sunday School picnic'. Finally, he attacked 
the two arguments against mass evacuation of the areas of `high density' population: 
firstly, `that it would be impossible to get workers to remain in places like Coventry and 
Sheffield if workers in the five main areas of population had been allowed to go'. 
Johnston believed it `quite impossible... that large numbers of highly-skilled workers 
are to be left to certain death in Central London solely because it was thought 
undesirable that workers in Coventry or Sheffield should leave these towns'. Secondly, 
on the lack of billets in the reception areas, Johnston argued that more people could be 
put in the same number of rooms: `the problem is not the physical impossibility of 
billeting much larger numbers in the reception areas, but the degree of discomfort which 
can be tolerated'. 62 
Johnston's paper demonstrates the enormous problem of formulating a sensible 
evacuation policy. There was no official agreement on the policy to be pursued, and an 
analysis of Johnston's penetrating but contradictory paper explains why. Here was the 
Treasury Minister on CDM being briefed that the evacuation policy did not go far 
enough and that it should plan to evacuate the whole of the five designated areas, but 
also that it was unrealistic in believing that evacuation could be started before war was 
deemed inevitable. Yet Johnston clearly did not take into account the constraining 
factor of the limited capacity of the transport services. The eleven days plan was 
essential because that was the fastest London could be evacuated. It was clearly 
impossible to evacuate more people than the plan envisaged in less time than was 
originally allocated. Although Johnston was correct in questioning the possibility of an 
early evacuation, as well as in arguing that London would probably need to be 
evacuated wholesale, he seemingly failed to understand that such a policy was 
impossible: the population of these cities would not be magically evacuated from the 
cities on the say-so of a senior Treasury civil servant. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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The contentiousness of the plan was further demonstrated when Ministers finally 
debated the issue on 11 January 1956.63 Peter Thorneycroft, the President of the Board 
of Trade, argued that `he did not attach any weight to the importance of keeping 
industry going once the Government had decided to start evacuation.... Any plans that 
were approved ought to be for evacuating as many people as possible on the basis of an 
orderly and phased programme'. lain Macleod, the Minister of Labour and National 
Service, also `thought it important to define objectives. We could either plan to save 
life to the maximum possible extent, or to keep industry going. We could not plan to do 
both at the same time... the principle should be to save lives'. This seemed to be 
accepted, and it was clear that `most Ministers were not in agreement' with CDO. In 
fact, they argued that `they thought it desirable that the plan should provide for the 
evacuation of virtually the whole population of all the evacuation areas'. 64 Although the 
length of time such an evacuation would take was realised, a phased plan starting with 
the priority classes and with the essential workers leaving last would at least `have as its 
stated objective the virtually complete evacuation of all evacuation areas (though it was 
admittedly unlikely that time would be available for so large a move)', unlike the earlier 
plan. 
These findings of 11 January were drafted into a report to the Defence Committee by 
Lloyd-George, sent out to the rest of CDM for comments, outlining the plan for 
evacuating the priority classes and non-workers at an early stage and the subsequent 
evacuation of adult workers when the Government saw fit (only the newly defined 
essential workers - police, fire and public utilities - would be asked to stay to protect 
utilities, many of which were necessary for those outside the evacuation areas). 
65 The 
new evacuation map, therefore, had no inner `high density areas', as the policy was to 
eventually clear all the evacuation areas, not just the five major centres. This would be 
an enormous undertaking, involving the movement and billeting of 97% of the 
evacuation areas, some 24 million people. The Home Secretary admitted that `such a 
plan is never in fact likely to be carried through to completion, but we feel that it is 
essential to make it, to announce it and to put it into operation if the situation ever called 
63 NA, CAB 134/1206. CDC(56)1" Meeting, 11.1.1956. 
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for it'. 66 Substantial criticisms of the policy would have to be faced: it would cripple 
production in an emergency; the decision on who would stay would be a difficult one; 
there was the danger of inducing panic; it would entail breaking up the family unit; it 
would destroy civil defence recruitment in the evacuation areas. These were 
acknowledged by Lloyd-George, but he argued that none were decisive, and the policy 
of saving as many lives as possible was paramount. 
The new 24 million policy was much simpler and in a way more realistic than its 
predecessor: industrial production would have been impossible to maintain once 
evacuation had begun. The comments on Lloyd-George's paper bore this out, although 
a couple of Ministers seemed uncomfortable with the new policy. 67 Patrick Buchan- 
Hepburn, the Works Minister, argued that such a scheme would immediately cripple the 
nation's industrial production, and he doubted `whether the decision would ever in fact 
be taken; but if it were it might mean that we had lost the war before a single bomb had 
been dropped'. Aubrey Jones, Minister of Fuel and Power, argued that such a scheme 
would be seen as `manifestly impossible' to implement and would destroy public 
confidence: `we should in effect be proclaiming that practically every urban area in this 
highly urbanised country would be uninhabitable'. 68 
In response to these comments, Lloyd-George presented to CDM two alternatives which 
would substantially alter the evacuation policy: `to divide the evacuation areas into two 
classes, from the first of which there would be virtually complete evacuation of the 
whole population, and from the second, evacuation of the priority classes only' (the 
former areas would now be the ten most densely populated areas), or `to limit 
evacuation to the priority classes in all the evacuation areas roughly defined as at 
present, and to make no organised plan for the evacuation of other classes of persons' , 
69 
The first option, Lloyd-George conceded, might lead to unauthorised total evacuation in 
other areas not selected. The second alternative would `avoid the objection that by 
closing down production we should be planning to eliminate ourselves from the struggle 
before a blow is struck', as well as avoiding over-congestion in the reception areas. No 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. CDC(55)2, `Evacuation Policy', Note by the Secretaries, 25.1.1956. 
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mention was made of the fact that in a nuclear war it would leave millions in central 
London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow and other cities. 
After this, Duncan Sandys, Minister of Housing and Local Government, made a final 
plea for the 24 million scheme, calling for a variegated policy of evacuation for the 
priority classes, and then workers, from all evacuation areas as the Government saw fit 
in an emergency. When CDM met to discuss it on 6 February 1956,70 however, support 
for maximum evacuation scheme fell away. The scheme re-imposing a division 
between high density and other evacuation found no supporters. Sir Walter Monckton, 
the Minister of Defence, `had no hesitation in ruling out the proposal for discriminating 
between different classes of evacuation area'. The plan for full evacuation of 
effectively half the population `would have a demoralising effect on the nation itself and 
allies both now and in the event of war.... It followed, in his view, that a scheme based 
on the priority classes only would constitute the right approach at this stage'. 7' 
In an impressive retreat from what must have seemed the fevered atmosphere of the 
previous month, Ministers lined up to knock the full scheme down, praising the `women 
and children first' doctrine, and stressing that full evacuation would `undermine the 
country's will to resist'. It was clearly felt that a priority classes only policy would be 
manageable and that refusing to evacuate any workers would have less disastrous 
consequences than evacuating some. Only Macleod stood up for Sandys. He `regretted 
any withdrawal' from the original scheme, and `failed to see how any plan could secure 
public support and confidence that might leave the working population to feel that they 
had been disregarded in the official plans'. But it was to no avail. Lloyd-George - who, 
it appears, had been silent during the discussion - summed up on the basis of planning 
only for the evacuation of the 11.5 million priority classes. Although it was to be the 
intention to plan only for the priority classes, it was hoped in an emergency to remove 
`as many as possible of the rest of the population' from the evacuation zones, `to the 
extent that facilities were available and time permitted' . 
72 In the space of a few weeks 
Ministers had rejected a scheme to evacuate 14 million and disperse 2 million more, 
replaced it with one to evacuate 24 million, and then torn up their own scheme 
in favour 
of evacuating around 12 million. 
70 Ibid. CDC(56)2°d Meeting, 6.2.1956. 
71 Ibid. 
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The 1956 Defence White Paper announced that the Government `have reached the 
conclusion, which they are sure will find general support, that first attention must be 
given to the evacuation of "priority classes"'. 73 After this had been agreed, a meeting of 
HDM was called to clarify the extent to which Monckton, in his Commons speech, 
would indicate that evacuation could be extended beyond the priority classes. 74 Lloyd- 
George warned against any indication `that they regarded wholesale evacuation as a 
desirable objective, to be secured as transportation etc., permitted'. It would lead to 
`chaos'. Sandys argued that `he had only agreed to the more limited statement about 
evacuation in the White Paper on the understanding that something more would be said 
during the defence debate'. It was essential, he believed, `that during the course of the 
debate at least a brief indication should be given that evacuation would not stop with the 
priority classes'. 75 Sandys was again defeated, however, and in Monckton's speech the 
stress was laid on the enormity of the plan to move 12 million people rather than on the 
need to move more. 76 
There would be enormous logistical barriers to the success of any evacuation scheme. It 
was clear that everything rested on the Government ordering evacuation with enough 
time to evacuate London, meaning before war was deemed unavoidable, but it was open 
to debate whether such a policy would ever be followed. Equally unknowable was the 
impact evacuation would have had on the ordinary population: would it have caused 
panic, unauthorised flight, a crippling of production and a collapse of the public's will 
fight? So much of any evacuation policy, and therefore civil defence policy in general, 
rested on what was little more than partially educated guess-work of how millions of 
individuals would have reacted in that final, unthinkable emergency. These 
imponderable questions, which went to the heart of civil defence policy and Britain's 
capacity to wage nuclear war, remained unanswered. In the end pragmatism ruled. The 
simple fact of the unlikelihood that anywhere near 24 million people could be evacuated 
probably did most to kill the policy off, and the fact that the 12 million, `women and 
children first' would be simpler, both logistically and morally, ensured it was favoured. 
73 Ministry of Defence, Statement on Defence, 1956, p. 25. 
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Corsham 
Strath's recommendations on the Machinery of Government were more successfully 
received than those on evacuation or shelter. An alternative seat of government was 
actually built near Corsham in Wiltshire and was designed to receive the Prime Minister 
and an inner group of Ministers plus support staffs and others and enable them to 
govern Britain during and after a nuclear war. It was the last great cold war home 
defence secret, and only now due to some stunning recent releases under the Freedom of 
Information Act can its story be fully told. 
The Padmore Committee on Machinery of Government in War, set up in 1953 after the 
Hall Report, was charged with producing a report on how central government could be 
maintained in a hydrogen bomb war. Strath had considered action on the machinery of 
control to be an absolute priority if Britain were to be able to survive a future war and 
Sir Thomas Padmore's report, delivered to HDC and Ministers on 6 July 1955, was to 
institute an entirely new system. Its first principle was that the nation could not be 
governed in war from the London citadels, as had been thought possible in the atomic 
age. 77 Although quitting London in the face of attack would involve risking `a general 
exodus' from London and a possible collapse in morale, Padmore outlined a scheme 
which would involve governing Britain some distance away from London and other 
target areas. 
Padmore recommended two new centres of Government. One `would be prepared for 
the reception of the nucleus of central Government at such time as it might be decided 
to move it from London', and the other would be a `reserve centre to which a small 
group of Ministers and officials, capable of taking other direction of the struggle for 
survival, would be moved before the outbreak of war'. Once in place, `the central organ 
of Government would be concerned solely with directing the national struggle for 
survival' after an attack `and could not afford to be encumbered with extraneous 
activities. Large parts of what are normally regarded as the essential functions of the 
state (and have been regarded as so in past wars) would have to be abandoned 
temporarily'. 78 As much activity as possible `should be devolved to the regions', but 
the necessary work `to be discharged centrally' would include `essential overseas 
77 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)7 (Revise), `Submission to Ministers on the Machinery of Government in 
War', Report by a Working Party of Officials, 6.7.1955. 
78 Ibid. 
165 
relations... control of the military and civil defence authorities, supervision of the 
central control of essential supplies, shipping and communications, and communication 
with the civil population by broadcasting and other means'. 79 This could be achieved 
with a staff of a thousand or less. 
The two new centres would have to built to withstand some degree of heat, blast and 
radiation, although `it would be impossible to devise any accommodation for the seat of 
Government which would be proof against a direct hit, or even a near miss against the 
hydrogen bomb' 
. 
8° They could, however, be built to withstand an explosion of a 10- 
megaton bomb if it was at least half a mile away. They would be linked to a Post Office 
network of vital communications then under construction which would allow Ministers 
to communicate with overseas governments, the military and the regional headquarters. 
The two sites envisaged were codenamed SUBTERFUGE and MACADAM. Only the 
former was definitely built, going through the names STOCKWELL81 and 
BURLINGTON82 (the name under which it became operational) before becoming 
TURNSTILE. 83 The story of MACADAM is more mysterious, although it became 
known as QUADRANGLE84 and then LINSTOCK. 85 Devolution would be achieved 
by building regional headquarters under the direction, in an emergency, of a Minister 
(or person of Ministerial status). These would take the load off the central organisation 
and be able to operate independently if, as was thought possible, central authority was 
for a time suspended. In close association with the military, these regional headquarters 
would effectively rule the civil defence regions, directing what relief services were 
possible. 
When Padmore's group received a note on 15 September 1955 informing them their 
recommendations had been accepted, it was explicitly Prime Ministerial, rather than 
Cabinet approval. 86 Eden alone seems to have decided. Thus a policy was agreed 
which planned to impose a network of war headquarters over Britain. With this 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 NA, CAB 134/1611. DH(O)(59)5, `Security: Code Words', Note by the Secretaries, 21.4.1959. 
82 NA, CAB 134/1619. DH(O)(MG)(61)14, `Security: Code Words', Note by the Secretaries, 19.7.1961. 
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machinery it was hoped civilian control could be exercised over the whole nation in the 
event of war, directing civil defence services and the military. The importance of this 
policy cannot be over-emphasised. All the civil defence policies we have seen 
discussed relied on the ability of the government, either centrally or regionally, to 
control them. Emergency feeding, communications, rescue and medical services would 
all collapse if there was no organisation to direct them. 
Progress on SUBTERFUGE was slow, and up to 1960 the main development was the 
question of a cover story for SUBTERFUGE. In 1959, as we shall see, the Berlin crisis 
caused a reappraisal of civil defence policy, and the emergency use of STOCKWELL 
(as was) was investigated. Concurrently to this planning, officials discussed the need 
for subterfuge over SUBTERFUGE. Obviously, the location of the alternative seat of 
Government was `Top Secret'. As the site could not sustain a direct hit, it was 
imperative that no potential enemy discovered its location. For this purpose a `cover 
story' was constructed which was to take account of the work undertaken on the site. 
Before 1959, the story was a simple one as building work only was being completed. 
From that year, however, more complex scenarios were being discussed as more 
sophisticated work began. In the earlier period, the `interim' cover story was that the 
Ministry of Works were tidying it up and `improving it as war potential in the form of 
protected accommodation, not for any specific use but because there were clearly many 
uses to which the Government would be glad to put it in a thermonuclear war'. 
87 
By March 1959 `a more convincing plan' appeared necessary due to the more 
sophisticated work about to begin. The real problem was formulating a cover story 
which would simultaneously `satisfy local people and those having access to the site', 
and not arouse the suspicions of either the press or `the prospective enemy'. 
88 In short, 
the story needed to be plausible, but not too plausible. In July it was decided that the 
new cover story `should describe STOCKWELL primarily as one of a number of Post 
Office centres for providing internal and overseas communication in war and should 
indicate that part of the remaining accommodation is being developed as a standby 
Regional headquarters while any space left over will be used for storage by Government 
87 NA, CAB 134/1617. DH(O)(MG)(59)2, `Security of SUBTERFUGE', Note by the Secretaries, 
10.3.1959. 
88 Ibid. 
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Departments'. 89 This was agreed to by HDC. 90 The press at least were kept away, 
despite a minor murmur when the Daily Express published a story by Chapman Pincher 
in January 1960 which referred to a deep `Government headquarters being hollowed out 
far away from ]London'. 91 
The Policy Review, 1956 
Shortly after the major decisions on home defence had been taken in late 1955 and early 
1956, the Eden Government began a policy review based on an official paper: `The 
Future of the United Kingdom in World Affairs'. 92 The review was to consider what 
changes could be made in British policy, considering the nation's economic 
circumstances and given that it was now believed that general war would be unlikely 
due to the destructive power of the hydrogen bomb. 93 `One of the lesser known 
casualties of Suez', 94 the policy review was a major attempt at reconciling foreign 
policy aims with domestic policy and Britain's economic weakness, and is crying out 
for in-depth historical treatment. 
The review did not question Britain's wider economic and political strategy, only `the 
demands placed on it'. 95 Eden initiated the review by arguing that `we must now cut our 
coat according to our cloth. There is not much cloth. We have to find means of 
increasing by £400 millions a year the credit side of our balance of payments' and that 
`in our defence programme generally we are too doing to much to guard against the 
least likely risk, viz. the risk of major war'. 96 In economic terms, Macmillan, now 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was pursuing expenditure cuts of £100 million in order to 
save the pound. In defence terms, it was an antecedent of the Sandys White Paper, 97 the 
point when, according to Macmillan's diary, the military were `gradually beginning not 
only to talk about the Hydrogen Bomb strategy but to contemplate putting it into 
89 Ibid. DH(O)(MG)(59)17 (Final), `Security of STOCKWELL: Report to the Chairman of the Home 
Defence Committee', Report by the Sub-Committee on Machinery of Government in War, 21.7.1959. 
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effect 1.98 The home defence effects of the re-cutting of the national cloth were drastic. 
Civil and home defence expenditure for 1956/7 was cut from £44 million to £30 
million, 99 and the estimates for 1957/58 slashed to under £22 million. The home 
defence cuts were proportionately much greater than any other aspect of government, as 
Lloyd-George later argued, '°° and represented a major part of the cost-cutting drive. 
Home defence had clearly been singled out as the policy area where cuts could be made 
with the least risk - the belief that the deterrent made global war increasingly less likely 
meant less money would be required for the `insurance' of civil defence. Yet the 
attempt to justify the reduced civil defence budget in these terms in the 1957 Defence 
White Paper badly back-fired. 
Based on this new strategic belief, Monckton delivered a report recommending 
swingeing cuts in long-term civil defence provision and expenditure. '°' He believed 
`we should discontinue expenditure which is designed to enable us to "survive" a war 
and to "recover", subject to the point that our discontinuance of these preparations 
should not be so abrupt as to cause a shock to our allies and our own public'. All that 
should be continued were `those home defence preparations the absence of which would 
be liable to undermine the deterrent'. These were: `measures for the continuity of 
government and the control of the population under attack; communications for air 
defence and for air-raid warning; and the maintenance and training of civil defence 
forces and of military forces allocated to home defence'. These three policy strands 
were needed because without them `all central command would come to an end and 
complete chaos would ensue the moment the first bombs fell' . Further savings would 
be accrued by the fact that `the pace at which we continue these preparations, and their 
scale, should reflect the fact that we do not think war is very likely in present 
circumstances'. 102 In all, this would allow home defence spending to fall to under £30 
million in 1957/8 and under £20 million a year thereafter (it had already been agreed to 
cut £5 million off the budget for the current year). 
98 Catterall (ed. ), The Macmillan Diaries, p. 564, diary entry for 9.6.1956. 
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This abandonment of the Strathian conception of home defence as a means to survive 
and recover from a war did not mean the end of the volunteer civil defence forces. As 
Monckton put it, `we must continue to take an active interest in civil defence... 
otherwise the volunteer forces will wither away'. Vitally, `our policy would not be one 
of providing a facade, and we must be careful not to think in such terms'. What 
Monckton meant was the new conception of home defence - maintenance of the 
deterrent - would have to be explained publicly, and `that within these limits, our home 
defence preparations will be realistic and not a facade'. 103 This could only occur if the 
Government were prepared to announce the adoption of the new rationale and the 
abandonment of the publicly held policy that civil and home defence preparations were 
designed to save lives. Of course, if the government failed to do this then the revised 
civil defence policy would indeed be a facade, one that would be increasingly difficult 
to maintain. 
In the Policy Review Committee meeting, Monckton's new policy was approved, and 
only the abolition of home defence stockpiling raised any concerns. 104 But hoarding 
food and medical supplies was deemed to involve `expenditure on a scale inappropriate 
to the new assumptions on which our defence policy was to be based'. As we have 
seen, stockpiling accounted for some £383 million of the total £629 home defence 
programme agreed in principle just six months previously. And although `to allow this 
country to be involved in global war without adequate stocks would be catastrophic', it 
was considered that `such a war would be catastrophic in any case - not only to this 
country but to the human race - and it was unlikely that the presence or absence of 
stocks would be a material factor in a Government's decision on whether to allow this 
country to become involved in a global war'. '05 
When the implications of the Policy Review were discussed in HDM, an argument 
ensued. It was bound to, as Monckton's two colleagues were not privy to the 
deliberations of the Policy Review. As Monckton told the Policy Review Committee 
`in view of the especial secrecy of the Committee's discussions at the present stage, he 
had not consulted the Home Secretary or other Civil Ministers concerned in the 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. PR(56)3`d Meeting, 9.6.1956. 
105 Ibid. 
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preparation of his memorandum'. 106 When he did, it was in the form of a paper putting 
forward a policy which the Policy Review had already agreed on. 107 There can be little 
doubt that Monckton had sacrificed civil defence to save his own departmental budget - 
a criticism implicit in Eden's rebuke issued in July mentioned above. Unsurprisingly, 
the excluded Lloyd-George reacted angrily to the suggestion that provision be cut so 
radically, especially because he had not been informed of the revised strategic 
assumptions on which the cuts were apparently based. He fumed: 
The fact that the chances of global war are receding is not enough to 
warrant such a disproportionate cut in the expenditure that has been 
previously regarded as an absolute minimum. It must be borne in mind 
that in any case, a long term plan on the lines of that to which so much 
thought was given last winter involved expenditure rising above £100 
million a year, over a period in excess of five years, so that no attempt 
was being made even on that basis to provide for an early war. '°8 
Therefore if such a cut `is to be extended into future years also', it `can be justified only 
if it is the Government's considered view that global war can be discounted altogether'. 
The Government could not `abandon all serious attempts at realistic home defence 
preparations (as we have done this year) and expect the present organisation of civil 
defence to continue'. It was Lloyd-George's firm belief that the voluntary civil defence 
organisation `would very soon break up of its own accord' if its work was not placed in 
the context of a wider, thorough home defence policy of the sort being abandoned by 
Monckton. 109 The Home Secretary's anger was unsurprising. As he put it, the previous 
home defence policy had been painstakingly put together over the course of many 
meetings and many months and had settled on a course of providing the bare minimum 
necessary to enable Britain to fight and survive a nuclear war. Six months later, this 
carefully constructed policy was ripped up in less than a week in a group he was not 
only excluded from but in all probability did not know existed. 
Lloyd-George and Monckton restated their arguments when HDM met on 20 June. 
110 
In particular, Lloyd-George argued that limiting home defence expenditure to £25 
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million `would make it difficult to convince local authorities and the public that the 
Government attached any serious importance to home defence preparations'. It was 
also suggested that the home defence policy envisaged by Monckton could not be met 
with such limited funds. To reconcile his policy with this view, Monckton called for an 
official report `on the possible bases and levels of expenditure on which a coherent 
home defence policy could be constructed. In the light of such a report, Ministers could 
decide which policy to adopt and programmes could thereafter be drawn up on the basis 
of that policy'. "' Thus the basis of future policy on home defence was entrusted to 
Brook's HDC. Brook, of course, along with Chilvers of the CWPS, had been present 
throughout the deliberations of the Policy Review meetings, and was thus more seized 
with the necessity of reducing home defence expenditure than was the outcast Lloyd- 
George. 
In his immediate note to HDC colleagues (22 June), Brook told them `the important 
thing is to examine the possible philosophies of home defence, and what, in very 
general terms, they would imply; but not, at this stage, to spend too much time in 
discussing precisely what effect they would have on individual programmes'. 112 In 
practice, so much space was spent discussing Monckton's £25 million a year scheme 
and what it would mean, and so little on the alternatives that, despite being left to the 
Committee to decide, it was clear which option was favoured by Brook. As we have 
seen, Monckton's scheme had already been agreed to in principle by the Policy Review 
group, and the two alternatives were a policy based upon annual expenditure of 
substantially less than £25 million a year, or of some £15 million more (but still 
significantly less than the £100 million per year necessary to plan for the survival and 
recovery of the nation from nuclear attack). Brook wrote that it was arguable that the 
former `would be neither one thing nor the other' and the latter `would largely be 
money down the drain'; although he did concede that extra expenditure might make all 
the difference in providing for efficient Civil Defence Services and adequate machinery 
of control, and that `it would avoid the very sharp drop in expenditure which would be 
liable to do much damage to public confidence'. 13 
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Brook outlined the Monckton policy based on the unlikelihood of global war and the 
desire to maintain the policy of deterrence, made up of: the Civil Defence and Allied 
Services (and their Equipment); the Machinery of Control; completion of current plans 
for the public utilities but no more; ditto for oil stocks and storage; research; and 
maintenance of essential communications. ' 14 When HDC met it agreed this policy with 
some reservations, but also discussed the role of civil and home defence in maintaining 
the deterrent, something conspicuously lacking in the Policy Reviews. 115 It was pointed 
out that `without a food stockpile, the whole population would starve within weeks, 
rendering to no avail any efforts of the civil defence forces and of the medical services 
to succour the immediate victims of attack'. Without oil supplies, the whole home 
defence effort would be `immobilised almost immediately'. Communications would 
collapse without electricity. It was argued that `civil defence measures contributed to 
the deterrent policy insofar as they demonstrated to the enemy our determination to 
fight and use the deterrent if forced to and sustained the morale of the nation in support 
of the Government to the point of accepting the consequences of nuclear war rather than 
surrender', and as a whole HDC believed `that a slackening of effort on food 
stockpiling, which could not be disguised, would have... [an] encouraging effect on the 
enemy'. 116 This led Brook to conclude that if any money over that supplied to the basic 
policy could be found, it should be devoted to food stockpiling. 
It was this line Brook took in the HDC report to HDM, explaining that expenditure of 
less than £25 million was unfeasible, and that if more could be found stockpiling should 
be continued, but that the Monckton policy could proceed at a cost of between £25-30 
million a year. ' 17 Ministers were warned, however, of the risks such a policy entailed. 
`If the likelihood of war should increase it would not be easy to reinstate quickly any 
insurance against the failure of the deterrent'. Capital works and stockpiling would take 
time, and `without stocks of food and oil and the means of distributing them the deaths 
from starvation in global war might well exceed those from bombing'. Also, HDC 
made it clear `that the absence of an insurance against the failure of the deterrent could 
1 14 Ibid. 
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not be concealed. In particular, although no information about the size of food stocks is 
made public, the fact that they were being run down would become widely known'. 118 
To recap, the envisaged home defence policy scrapped any pretence at being able to 
`recover' from nuclear war, with stockpiling mostly stopped and `due functioning' 
measures severely limited. What was left was the continuation of the Civil Defence 
Services and measures to ensure the machinery of control. Even this reduced policy 
was attacked by Macmillan, in a Policy Review paper, seeking further savings: `I do not 
think that we should spend more than £15 million in 1957/58 on defence expenditure by 
the Civil Departments'. 119 He believed half of this could be spent maintaining existing 
stores, with the rest spent on measures which would either `take a long time to 
complete, are relatively inexpensive' or which `would give us a foundation on which we 
could build a more adequate structure of defence, if the need arose'. This would mean 
`a decision to stand down the local civil defence volunteers and have nothing locally 
except a nucleus organisation which could be expanded - along with other preparations 
- if the risk of global war came above the horizon'. Macmillan believed `that there is 
sufficient in this programme to show the people of this country and any potential 
enemies abroad that we are prepared to face a hydrogen bomb attack in the unlikely 
contingency of global war'. 120 
A further cut on this scale was opposed by Brook when he briefed Eden before the 
Policy Review Committee met on 13 July 1956.121 Brook reminded the Prime Minister 
that the Committee had `agreed that we should maintain the minimum element of home 
defence required to support the deterrent', and that this minimum level had been 
outlined by Monckton and fleshed out by officials and amounted to spending about £25 
million a year. Macmillan's proposal to stand down the Civil Defence Services `would 
have to be justified on the basis that we can see no prospect of an attack on this country 
for many years to come. It would not be consistent with our defence policy generally'. 
It would `at least appear to undermine the deterrent', as well as being difficult to defend 
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publicly; `it would involve admitting Coventry was right'. 122 This was a shrewd 
comment by Brook, given the controversy caused by Coventry's actions in 1954. 
When the group met, swelled in number by admission of the Home and Scottish 
Secretaries, Macmillan's proposal was savaged by Monckton and Lloyd-George. 
Monckton explained: `though the risk of global war in the near future might be remote, 
the possibility of global war could not be ruled out altogether', and the new policy 
maintained `a sufficient level of defence preparations to ensure that the deterrent could 
operate and that the Russians were not led to believe that they could destroy this country 
in one attack without being destroyed themselves'. 123 Monckton believed that `it would 
be inconsistent to provide the necessary fighters for the protection of the bases, and not 
to take comparable precautions to maintain the essential civilian infrastructure of the 
country without which operations could not continue even for the short period now 
envisaged'. This meant the Civil Defence Services had to be maintained. `Moreover, if 
the Civil Defence Services were stood down it would be impossible to conceal the fact, 
which would be likely to have a disturbing effect' both on public opinion and on 
Britain's allies'. 124 
Lloyd-George, converted to Monckton's plan out of the necessity of defending civil 
defence from Macmillan's even more devastating cuts, weighed in by arguing that £25- 
30 million a year was `the lowest level on which it would be possible to maintain a 
successful home defence programme'. It was his belief that some civil defence 
preparations were `essential to the preservation of the deterrent, for example the 
warning and monitoring system for radioactive fallout'. Also, `widespread casualties 
among the civilian population would affect the willingness of the Services to continue 
active operations'. The continuation of the Civil Defence Services was vital: `if the 
volunteers were stood down, the whole organisation would be likely to disintegrate and 
it would be difficult to build it up again if it were required'. The local authorities `were 
already beginning to lose interest in civil defence activities because of their doubts 
about the Government's attitude' and the steady decline in civil defence spending `since 
the development of thermonuclear weapons' had left the `growing impression that the 
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Government had accepted that nothing could be done about civil defence in global war. 
There was a risk that a defeatist attitude might spread throughout the country'. 125 
These arguments triumphed, and Monckton's policy was confirmed. Some months 
later, a three-year plan based on this policy was produced. The report, presented as a 
Policy Review paper, made it clear just how limited provision would be even in the 
areas covered by the new scheme. 126 For example, `no further progress will be made 
with the long-term plan... to build up stocks of vehicles and equipment' for fire-fighting 
purposes. The previous policy, to have emergency supplies of water available `on an 
operational scale' had been abandoned. The lack of due-functioning measures meant 
there would be virtually no electricity, and all communications and `in particular the 
operation of the warning system would be drastically impaired; wireless communication 
with the public might become impossible'. There was to be no scheme to 
decontaminate, or indeed protect, water supplies. There would only be enough food 
stockpiled for two weeks post-attack. 127 Although Corsham would be completed, not a 
single regional headquarters would be finished by 1960. Brook also noted how the 
drafters in CDO had stressed `the difficulty of defending a home defence programme 
which makes no significant provision for the survival of the country in the event of 
nuclear attack'. 128 They also suggested `that it might be easier to justify this programme 
by reference to the general financial and economic conditions than by reference to any 
revised appreciation of the risk of global war'. 129 
The debate over civil and home defence policy in the summer of 1956 was the third 
time this policy had been investigated since the hydrogen explosion in March 1954, and 
it ripped up the carefully thought-out and minutely discussed plans formulated in the 
wake of the Strath Report. Although the financial limits placed on civil defence 
expenditure and the refusal to build shelters had fatally compromised the policy outlined 
by Strath, it was the 1956 Policy Review which finally killed off the report, with its 
rejection of the whole Strathian basis of home defence policy. It also signalled the end 
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of Lloyd-George's brave attempt to implement Strath, and the Home Secretary 
delivered a remarkable valedictory Cabinet paper on the subject on 7 January 1957. 
The new policy, he argued, would cause people to conclude that `the real reason for the 
reduction is not so much the reduced risk of war as a Government decision that civil 
defence preparations are of little value'. 130 He believed that if this view became 
widespread existing civil defence preparations would be jeopardised, thus undermining 
the deterrent. Evoking the `widespread defeatism' felt after knowledge of the hydrogen 
bomb became public, Lloyd-George warned that only `reiterated assurances that the 
Government was still convinced of the value of civil defence' could avert a calamitous 
collapse of confidence within civil defence and discourage local authorities following 
the example of Coventry and abandoning civil defence. 131 Two days later, Eden, broken 
by Suez, resigned and Lloyd-George was removed by Macmillan, the new premier. 
This paper was a last roar from a Minister who had devoted much of his time since 
becoming Home Secretary in October 1954 to dealing with civil defence, and whose 
humane attempts to secure adequate finances for the protection of the public had been 
continually swept away by colleagues concentrating on economic circumstances. 
The Suez Emergency Plan 
Prime Ministerial concentration was diverted from the Policy Review by the onset of 
the Suez crisis, but there was no related civil defence contingency planning within the 
Cabinet Committee structure, which seems to suggest that the escalation of the crisis 
into a global war was not considered a grave possibility within the Cabinet Office, 
despite Bulganin's coded threat to Britain and France on 6 November. ' 32 Officials in 
the Civil Defence Department of the Home Office, however, began to piece together an 
emergency `crash' plan of civil defence measures which could be implemented within 
ten days of war appearing imminent. The work was never seen by Ministers, or even 
officials outside the Civil Defence Department until the crisis was over, but a note was 
prepared `to identify the major matters on which Ministerial and official decisions 
would be urgently required and in certain instances to suggest in the broadest outline the 
sort of policy which might be workable'. 133 It painted a sorry picture, a million miles 
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away from the thorough-going civil defence policy as recommended by Strath and 
advocated by Gwilym Lloyd-George. 
It stated that in the advent of a sudden emergency, Ministers would have to be advised 
`of the unreadiness in all fields of home defence; that such preparations as could be 
made depend upon: the taking of overt action, full use of all means of publicity to 
advise the public, then making them aware of the imminent threat of attack, and action 
requiring emergency powers or resort to the prerogative'. At that point there was no up- 
to-date draft of an Emergency Powers Bill. Ministers would have to initiate a crash plan 
of the most dire kind. The picture was bleak in terms of measures which could be taken 
to protect the public. Ministers would have had to be told that the 12,000,000 
evacuation plan `is not at present operable; that, with public co-operation, some measure 
of officially sponsored evacuation (possibly based on the 1951 scheme) might be 
achieved', but it would be `rough and ready' and liable to interference from `unofficial' 
evacuation which would be hard to stop. There were of course no shelters, but `in the 
event of nuclear attack, there would be an almost unlimited demand for fall-out shelters 
of all kinds in all areas'. Ministers would have to advise `stay-put' policy `to protect 
them against the hazards of fall-out, which would have the effect of immobilizing them 
for at least two days after attack'. 134 
As the attack would disrupt the usual distribution of food, Ministers would need to 
advise householders to have seven days supply of food, and to decide whether to 
distribute food to those who could not stockpile it. The siren system would warn of 
attack, but the warning system for fallout would again at best be `rough and ready'. The 
Government would have to take over the broadcast media for the rapid dissemination of 
information to the public. Also, would the Government relocate to the uncompleted 
SUBTERFUGE? It could not stay in any of the London citadels. Regional 
Commissioners and their staffs would have be selected and dispersed - but they had no 
reinforced headquarters to go to. The GPO would have to install communications in the 
various war rooms as they were not operational. Finally, `while the voluntary civil 
defence services are inadequate in numbers and quality, their role could not be 
performed by the peace-time services (police and fire) and they must be mobilised and 
used'; new volunteers would probably be plentiful, but only a few, probably 150,000, 
134 Ibid. 
178 
could be equipped and trained. 135 Only if the Armed Forces called up more men than 
was then envisaged could additional manpower be raised. The only result of this 
activity was a rather desultory attempt to review short-term planning (see Chapter Six 
for the failure of this to get off the ground). 
Sandys 
The new Monckton-influenced civil defence policy was outlined in the 1957 Defence 
White Paper, often named after his successor at the Ministry of Defence, Duncan 
Sandys. In linking the reduced civil defence budget to the reduced risk of war and the 
increased reliance on deterrence, the `Sandys White Paper' contained by far the most 
famous statement ever produced on defence against nuclear war in Britain: `it must be 
frankly recognised that there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for 
the people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear 
weapons-). 136 CDO had warned against this stand, but the White Paper did not give the 
argument much chance of succeeding. Instead of arguing that a reduced level of civil 
defence still had an important role to play in an era of deterrence, it seemed to admit 
that there was `no defence', exactly the impression the civil defence planners were 
determined to avoid. This completely overshadowed the statement that `it would be 
wrong not to take some precautions to minimise the effects of nuclear attack, should the 
deterrent fail to prevent war. Civil Defence must accordingly play an essential part in 
the defence plan' . 
137 
With the Government apparently contradicting itself within the same policy document, 
the outcry predicted by Monckton's opponents followed, although the initial press 
reaction was relatively muted. Neither the Times nor the Daily Telegraph mentioned 
the admission outside of summaries of the document. The Manchester Guardian had it 
in bold type on the front page, ' 38 but its leader said `this is a bold statement, but it will 
only come as a shock to those who have been cherishing illusions dangerous to 
themselves'. 139 Within days of the publication of the White Paper in April, however, St 
Pancras Borough Council decided to follow the example of Coventry in 1954 and 
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renounce civil defence. The row erupted when the General Purposes Committee of the 
council recommended that civil defence should be stopped because, the Town Clerk 
informed the Home Office, `in view of the Government's admission in the recent White 
Paper that there is no real defence against atomic and hydrogen bomb warfare, we are of 
the opinion that to continue with civil defence is a complete waste of money' . 
140 The 
issue was resolved swiftly, with a Commissioner being appointed to undertake the 
Council's civil defence functions, 141 but it was an embarrassing episode which 
generated a deal of adverse publicity for the Government's defence policy. 
This is certainly how `Rab' Butler, the new Home Secretary, considered it, and he 
moved swiftly to crush the St Pancras rebellion in order to stop the `embarrassment' of 
other local authorities following Suit. 142 Although a look at the press reaction should 
have placated the Home Secretary, as the Daily Telegraph and the News Chronicle gave 
ample space to critics of the St Pancras move, 143 it was a grim warning of the future, as 
opponents of the Conservative Government's nuclear policy made use of its own 
published information to launch attacks - and especially that single sentence in the 
Sandys White Paper. For example, an early CND pamphlet by A. J. P. Taylor made 
much of the admission: `there is no defence against the H-bomb, according to the 
Minster of Defence. No preparation can be made to secure the civilian population. And 
it is official policy that none can be made'. 144 
Its fingers burnt by the Sandys debacle, the Government retreated from any further 
public pronouncements on the issue of nuclear war -a policy which they had followed 
for most of the 1950s. An illustrative example of this aversion to publicity was the 
treatment of a civil defence training manual, `Radioactive Fallout: Provisional Scheme 
of Public Control'. This outlined the scheme whereby the Civil Defence Services would 
control areas affected by fallout and rescue those stranded within them. It was a well 
thought-out document, which had been first drafted in June 1955, and had been placed 
on sale for civil defence units, but not the general public. Gwilym Lloyd-George had 
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first attempted to get it published in November 1956 but Cabinet rejected his plan for 
two reasons: that if it was published at that point it might be linked with threats of 
Soviet action during the Suez crisis; and that publication might have the effect of 
drawing attention to the inadequacy of home defence preparations in general. 145 
In the new Administration four months later, Butler asked Macmillan to reconsider 
given that the Suez crisis was over and the Medical Research Council had concurred 
with the content of the report. ' 46 Also, as to leading to some sort of pro-civil defence 
spending clamour, Butler argued that `past experience suggests that publication is 
unlikely to occasion any such public response. In fact the less we are able to make large 
scale physical preparations for home defence the greater becomes the need to show that 
we are continuing to prepare realistic plans for making the best use of what we can do'. 
For Butler, there was a great need to publish the document (it had also been 
foreshadowed in the 1956 White Paper): `if home defence is to have any meaning a 
programme of public education of the threat of radioactive fallout is essential. It is a 
clear duty of the Government to make the facts of nuclear attack known and to give 
guidance on the kind of plans required to meet the new threat'. 147 Butler was rebuffed, 
and rebuffed once more when he tried again a month later. 148 He tried a third time in 
August, and told Macmillan that declassifying the scheme `would allow us, as 
opportunity offers, to take credit for a piece of realistic planning, which would provide 
some answer to the criticisms we constantly face of failing to bring civil defence up to 
date in relation to the conditions of nuclear warfare'. 149 Yet still Macmillan resisted. 
150 
When Butler tried for the fourth time, in December 1958, after the local authorities had 
pressed him to publish it, Macmillan relented. 151 
This was a farcical state of affairs. As Butler pointed out, the memorandum was a rare 
example of a realistic and effective civil defence plan ready to put into action. 
Moreover, the Medical Research Council's investigation into The Hazards to Man of 
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Nuclear and Allied Radiations had excited little publicity when published in 1956.152 
Macmillan was too scared of the consequences to publish it, an understandable if 
misguided decision. Publishing it would have proved the Government's understanding 
of the complexities of modern warfare and publicly shown that saving lives would be a 
priority. By leaving the public in the dark, it created anxiety over the effects of fallout 
and showed the Government in the worst possible light, giving the impression that they 
had no answer to the questions posed by fallout. Yet, as we shall see in the following 
chapter, little was done even after 1958 to educate the public. 
Between 1954 and 1957, civil defence had existed in a world of public apathy. But after 
Sandys, civil defence against nuclear war was open to attack by disarmers using 
Government statements as weapons. This change was slow, and the Government 
detected a (to them) pleasing level of apathy on the issue in 1958, but the tension was 
immediately apparent in recruitment propaganda for the Civil Defence Services. In 
September 1955 it was possible to begin a recruiting advertisement with `this is a 
moment for optimism, and for hope. A suitable moment to thank the men and women 
of our Civil Defence Service, who by their efforts have helped to proclaim Britain's 
determination to be free' (Appendix B. 10). Such confidence was absent two years later, 
when, underneath a cartoon of a civil defence volunteer admonishing those with their 
heads in the sand (Appendix B. 11), an advert was intent on getting across the `facts' 
about civil defence: `we hear too much of the horrors, not enough of our chances of 
survival. Some people will tell you that if this country were attacked with H-Bombs, 
every man jack of the population would be wiped out. That just isn't true: it isn't 
anything LIKE the truth. '53 
Apathy, 1957-8 
After the perpetual crises of 1954-56, Whitehall and Westminster activity on civil 
defence slowed down remarkably during 1957-58. The Committee structure had been 
simplified with just one ministerial committee responsible for civil defence (Appendix 
C. 8), and during these two years, that Committee received just fourteen memoranda and 
held just three meetings. Even CDO wound down: just twenty-two memoranda and 
three meetings. The main activities were an attempt to take stock of civil defence policy 
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and reorganise it so that the small amounts spent on it could be used most efficiently, 
and an attempt to increase the budget. The latter was put forward by Butler who argued 
that the low figure of £21.9 million for 1957/58 was agreed only when it seemed `we 
were facing economic bankruptcy'. 154 Yet this attempt was crushed in November 1957 
by the Chancellor, Peter Thomeycroft, in the middle of his ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to freeze public expenditure levels. In fact the budget was again cut, to only 
£18.85 in 1958/59.155 The reorganisation of civil defence was a relatively minor affair. 
It was designed to improve the efficiency of the Civil Defence Services, the 
communications network, the warning and monitoring system and the control network 
(as the wartime machinery of government was called), as well as ensuring the 
continuation of evacuation planning. 156 
The post-1956 world of civil defence was shaken in 1958 when Macmillan intervened, 
seeking to find savings, questioning whether expenditure on civil defence was justified 
when `it contributed little towards preparing the country as a whole to withstand nuclear 
attack'. 157 He thought it `was illogical to endeavour to increase the numbers who would 
outlive the immediate effects of a nuclear attack if they and the other survivors were to 
die thereafter from starvation, thirst or disease'. Personally, Macmillan wanted some 
degree of survival measures. He `doubted... whether it would be politically practicable 
for the Government publicly to deny all responsibility for the fate of the surviving 
population in the event of a failure of the deterrent policy'. But providing for both 
rescue (in the form of the Civil Defence Services) and survival would be prohibitively 
expensive, so two options were raised: scrapping the Civil Defence Services and 
providing some survival measures with the money saved or continuing `the present 
programme at about the current level of expenditure. This would enable a facade of 
civil defence preparations to be maintained'. 158 
In the subsequent discussion, the Defence Committee agreed that ideally, something 
more should be done, but the money could not be found. In the end it was decided that 
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it was safer to do nothing, because `any change in the existing policy, whether directed 
to expanding or curtailing the limited preparations already being made, would be liable 
to attract attention and so to provoke discussion of an issue to which public opinion 
appeared at present to be remarkably indifferent'. To perpetuate this indifference would 
be government policy, continuing the current policy, `acquiescing in its fundamental 
illogicality and realising that its main purpose was to maintain the morale of the 
population rather than to provide them with any effective protection against nuclear 
attack'. Therefore, the main civil defence effort should be devoted to `those measures 
which provided a positive and visible indication of the Government's support for the 
voluntary civil defence services', such as `the provision of uniforms and equipment and 
the holding of civil defence rallies'. 159 Yet events were to prove that civil defence 
policy could not be banished quite so readily as this. 
The 1959 Emergency Plan 
Just six months after this decision, in early 1959, at the height of the first stage of the 
second Berlin Crisis, `the longest and one of the most dangerous of all cold war crises', 
as John Lewis Gaddis called it, 160 Butler, spurred on by officials in the Home Office, 
began discussions on the formulation of an emergency `crash' home defence plan to be 
put into operation if war came at short notice. Since 1948 civil defence planning had 
relied on the notion that Britain would know a war was coming six months in advance, 
thus enabling the government to implement civil defence policies, yet the crisis 
appeared out of nowhere. On 17 March 1959 the Home Secretary wrote to his 
colleagues on CDM that `however the international scene develops', the Government 
needed `to be sure that the best possible use could be made, if need be, of the resources 
already available for home defence. 161 The Government needed, `without any 
considerable expenditure', to maintain public morale should it be tested `by an increase 
in international tension', and to be `able to convince opinion in Parliament that we are 
not dragging our feet on matters like evacuation which require decisions of policy, and 
that we have a reasonable and practicable line in mind'. 162 Butler recognised that `there 
can be no question of suggesting a modification of existing policy which would improve 
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the home defence position in the next few months', but the poor state of preparations 
clearly concerned him-' 63 He also recognised that home defence preparations had been 
kept `necessarily deficient' due to their low priority in the `last three years' as the 
possibility of global war was considered remote. Although the decision of the previous 
September was mentioned, the irony arising from comparing the approval of a 
continued facade to his current fears seems to have been largely lost on the Home 
Secretary. 
Two points clearly concerned Butler. The first was that there was no plan to deal with 
an interim emergency. General Kirkman in February 1959 called on Departments to 
draw up and submit `plans showing what action they could take if an emergency were to 
occur... without more than seven days' notice'. 164 This was to have been completed by 
October, but Butler brought the deadline forward to the end of May. Butler's second 
concern was `the absence of an agreed evacuation policy. This has been noted by 
Members of Parliament', and he promised that he, along with Henry Brooke, Minister 
of Housing and Local Government, would put forward proposals `in the immediate 
future for consideration by the Committee'. 165 Butler had already stalled in the 
Commons by admitting that `we are having a review of the whole scheme in order to 
bring it thoroughly up to date'. '66 Kirkman's February paper reviewed `Interim 
Planning' since the Home Office Civil Defence Department had looked at the issue in 
November 1956.167 HDC had agreed with the Home Office in 1957 that Departments 
should draw up plans to make best use of the resources in a sudden emergency, and 
even decreed that the Government War Book should set out the action to be taken in the 
event of an emergency at any time `irrespective of the current strategic assessment of 
the likelihood of war'. However, by mid-1958 the pressure for short-term planning had 
abated and it was decided that `Departments should prepare realistic interim plans, 
capable of completion by 1961' (hardly a `crash' plan). 168 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 House of Commons, Official Report, 26.2.1959, cols. 1267-8. 
167 NA, CAB 134/1437. C(O)(59)1, `Interim Planning', Memorandum by the Director-General of Civil 
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This was obviously a mockery of the original idea of interim planning, and Kirkman 
believed the 1961 date was `unacceptable'. It `would perpetuate for nearly three years 
the position in which we have no definite plans for making the best use existing 
resources should an unexpected emergency occur'. 169 The inability of civil defence 
planning to deal with an emergency was as marked in early 1959 as it had been after 
Suez, and it was planned to keep it like that until 1961. This was a clear example of 
civil defence planners bending reality to suit their own planning purposes. As it was 
more suitable to put off an interim plan, it was argued that one would not be needed 
until 1961 - when the whole point of the exercise was to plan for unexpected 
eventualities. 
Butler and Brooke's evacuation review began by arguing that current strategic thinking 
held that the initial Russian attack `would be aimed in all probability at our nuclear 
bomber bases and offensive missile sites as a first priority'. 170 This meant that the areas 
around airfields (essentially the Eastern part of England) could no longer be considered 
safe as reception areas - they would be the first to be bombed. This reduced the amount 
of reception accommodation available and increased the distances evacuees would need 
to travel. Now only 5 million evacuees could be accommodated - although accepting 
greater overcrowding would allow some increase. It was recommended that the 
transport issue should be reviewed and an emergency interim plan, even though it would 
amount to `little more than the preparation of instructions to the selected evacuation 
areas to make improvised arrangements' for the evacuation of the priority classes, 
should be pursued. 171 The new plan would involve evacuating priority classes from 
London, Birmingham, Manchester, Merseyside, Tyneside, Leeds/Bradford, Sheffield, 
Teesside and Hull, but that the boundaries of these areas should revert to those of the 
1951 evacuation plan rather than 1956. Reducing the size of the evacuation areas 
allowed the number to be evacuated to be restricted to 5.8 million. 
When Ministers met, one Committee member disagreed with the Butler/Brooke plan, 
arguing for a `stay put' policy: at least they `would have food, water and limited 
protection'. 172 Also, it was also doubtful whether Ministers would order evacuation 
169 Ibid. 
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`knowing that this would lead to a defection of the non-priority classes and so, by 
disrupting essential services and industry, lose in advance the war which it was the 
object of the deterrent to prevent'. Evacuation therefore should be abandoned and `the 
Government should not give a hostage to fortune by announcing a policy which was 
unrealistic and which would only lead to public pressure for evacuation if tension ever 
heightened dangerously' 
. The argument against staying put was that it `could well 
prejudice the deterrent by undermining public morale'. Also, if no official evacuation 
scheme was in place `an unofficial exodus of large numbers of the population, including 
non-priority classes' would take place from the cities in a period of high tension. 173 
Order, it was argued, could only be maintained if the Government gave a firm lead and 
the flight of non-priority classes was likely to be less if priority classes were evacuated 
under the aegis of the government. 
Whether an official evacuation scheme would encourage or deter unofficial evacuation 
was one of the great imponderables of civil defence. Some considered the emotional 
pull of `women and children first' strong enough to keep key workers (usually male) in 
the cities happy in the knowledge that their families were being evacuated and cared for 
under government auspices. In this view, if no official evacuation scheme existed, it 
was more likely key workers would travel with the women and children to ensure their 
safety. But would workers stay in the cities even with official evacuation? Given the 
widespread knowledge of the destructive powers of thermonuclear weapons, would they 
really have stayed in the cities as their families rattled off on an evacuation train into the 
unknown? Would they stay and risk destruction in the cities and allow their families to 
fend for themselves in the uncertain post-attack world? Another imponderable question 
was whether the government would actually order evacuation at a crucial point in an 
international crisis, knowing the dislocation it would cause and the message it could 
send the international community. In the end the 5.8 million scheme was agreed in 
outline, 174 but no firm answers could be found. 
Concurrently with the revised look at evacuation, Macmillan and the senior home 
defence planners were looking again at STOCKWELL and investigating if it could be 
made ready on an emergency footing. In an ad hoc meeting chaired by Burke Trend (of 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
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the Treasury) it became clear that Corsham could not be made ready at short notice due 
to the structural and communications work remaining to be completed, and if it were to 
be manned, could be for only around two weeks and with only 1,500 staff (as opposed 
to its proposed full establishment of 4,000). 175 Harold Macmillan himself was fully 
apprised of this in May 1959 when the sub-Committee on the Machinery of 
Government in War sent him a full brief on STOCKWELL, 176 explaining that it would 
be vulnerable in fallout conditions. '77 Therefore when Macmillan's ad hoc group 
GEN. 684 met to discuss Corsham, it was decided to let STOCKWELL's preparations 
continue as normal as even increasing expenditure would not drastically speed its 
completion. 1 78 One fascinating, but unfulfilled, hint in GEN 684 was that 
`consideration should... be given to the possibility of housing the Sovereign at 
STOCKWELL' 
. 
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Virtually simultaneously with CDO's May evacuation paper and Macmillan's look at 
Corsham, the report on interim `Home Defence Preparations' was submitted to CDM on 
5 June. This outlined what could be done if an emergency occurred after 31 July 1959 
with no more than seven days' warning. 180 Although Sir Charles Cunningham, 
Permanent Secretary of the Home Office (the Chair of CDO had been returned to the 
Home Office), stressed that much more could be done if Departments could discuss the 
plans with outside bodies (echoes of 1948 here) or could divert staff to planning, it was 
clear that there would be real value in `setting down what could be done at short notice'. 
The envisaged measures would still `be totally inadequate to prepare the country to 
meet the devastating effects of a nuclear attack and would not, in any case, add 
materially to the physical preparations that have so far been made'. In addition to 
evacuation, the area of most concern was the machinery of government. As we have 
seen, Corsham was unfinished - as were most of the regional headquarters. Although 
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work could be done in an emergency, `these headquarters, upon which many home 
defence plans hinge, will still be only partially effective'. '81 
The annex gave the outline emergency plan, which rested on improvisation in areas 
such as transport, but emergency food and fuel schemes would be in place. The key 
civil defence measures were paltry - no shelter, local authorities mustering up 
volunteers to use the `very limited equipment' in the Civil Defence Corps, a leaflet on 
building a refuge room. Even the attack warning was reliant on the maintenance of the 
mains electricity supply and fallout warnings were dependent reliant on the various 
Royal Observer Corps posts - recruits being diverted from their preferred activity of 
spotting aeroplanes for the purpose - surviving the attack. 
182 Such a plan would not 
have saved many lives and could not have averted the tremendous destruction described 
in the Strath report. The consequences of the post-1956 civil defence settlement were 
clear. But however paltry these measures were, when agreed by Ministers they at least 
represented a genuine emergency plan which could be implemented at very short 
notice. 183 
But Ministers did not agree to the 5.8 million evacuation scheme. The initial approval 
was overturned when it was reconsidered in CDM on 8 June 1959, with a fundamental 
split between those who believed in evacuation and those who did not. This indecision 
led to the issue being taken to the Cabinet, 184 where it was further delayed, the view 
being expressed that `it would be desirable to avoid making a statement on evacuation 
policy for as long as possible'. 185 In December, Henry Brooke submitted another 
memorandum to CDM, suggesting it was time to reach a decision one way or another, 
either to plan for evacuation on the planned scale or to abandon it. 
186 He summarised 
the imponderable questions but when Ministers discussed it for the third time that year, 
no agreement was reached. 187 Therefore, it was decided that evacuation should form 
part of the `general review of home defence policy in 1960'. 
188 It had been Butler's 
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main issue of concern when he initiated the review of emergency planning in March 
1959, but nine months later the only result had been to tear up the 1956 scheme. Once 
again a difficult decision on civil defence had been left untaken, just as the decision on 
an interim home defence plan had lain dormant from January 1957 until June 1959. 
Conclusion 
When the 1960 Defence White Paper was published it showed that despite the anxiety 
of 1959, the civil defence budget for 1960/61 was £19.57 million, ' 89 the same level as it 
had been since the 1956 Policy Review. It was this review, and the decision to cease 
expenditure on stockpiling, which dealt the fatal blow to Britain's civil defence policy. 
Until then, the policy had attempted to provide for both the protection of the public and 
their continued survival and recovery in the post-attack phase. Strath's very basis had 
been its investigation into how Britain could absorb and recover from a hydrogen bomb 
attack. As we have seen, key elements of Strath never got off the ground, namely a 
thoroughgoing shelter policy. Other elements such as evacuation were rigorously 
investigated, but eventual provision never equalled the Strathian dream. On the key 
issue of stockpiling - the ability to feed and water the surviving population - Strath's 
recommendations were resisted from the start. In 1955 a compromise was reached and 
a start was made. But finances intervened, and by 1956 no more stockpiling was being 
undertaken, and the Strathian hope of recovering from a nuclear attack had been 
abandoned. Only in terms of the machinery of Government did anything like Strath's 
original recommendations become reality, as the bunker at Corsham slowly came into 
being. Of course, the arguments behind the curtailing of civil defence were sound - the 
deterrent was there to stop global war, making civil defence largely irrelevant. Also, the 
job of governing today was always a more compelling argument than providing for 
tomorrow. But the complacent attitude of Macmillan's Defence Committee in 
continuing the facade of civil defence in the face of a benignly ignorant public could not 
last. The rise of CND inspired a level of public interest in civil defence not seen since 
1954. The cosy arrangements in place since 1956 were shattered and no government 
could believe that the Civil Defence Services provided an adequate facade. 
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Six 
Civil Defence in the Era of `Nuclear Equipoise', 1960-64 
Thermonuclear War in the 1960s 
By 1960, the nature of a future thermonuclear war had been discussed and analysed in 
Britain for more than five years, but it was nevertheless a key year in Britain's nuclear 
history. There was secret in-depth study work on the effects on Britain of a 
thermonuclear war by a Whitehall group called the Joint Inter-Services' Group for the 
Study of All-out War (JIGSAW). There was also a Home Defence Review, the 
successor to the Strath Report, which sought to apply the new strategic analyses of 
thermonuclear war and formulate a new home defence policy for the 1960s. This secret 
work was conducted against a backdrop of rising cold war tensions and increased public 
awareness of the nature and the effects of nuclear weapons which seemed to highlight 
the futility of civil defence. A central part of this context was the increased awareness 
of the complexity of maintaining the `nuclear peace' in an age of growing armaments 
and rapid technological change. The deployment of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs) by the two superpowers and the growing stockpiles of warheads seemed to 
make defence against nuclear war futile: the missiles could never be stopped and the 
belligerents would have so many that utter annihilation would inevitably follow any 
nuclear exchange. This view of the apocalyptic nuclear war and the emotional revulsion 
it caused was harnessed, and in a way caused, by CND to bolster its moral agitation for 
the banning of the bomb. CND's action placed severe limits on how the government 
could publicly react to the shifting conceptualisations of nuclear war in this period. 
The complexities of formulating policy in this period were increased by the new 
strategic doctrines concerning nuclear war. The old thinking of the great deterrent and 
massive retaliation was seen as less relevant in the era of mutual deterrence and 
concepts such as 'counter-force'. ' American strategists, argues Lawrence Freedman, 
formulated new rules for fighting a nuclear war: 
It must be worth fighting and the destruction received must not be so 
great as to be terminal. To do this, it was necessary to explore all means 
1 See L. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 125-9. 
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of reducing the enemy's strike forces to manageable quantities as well as 
his means of defence. This included any methods available for 
protecting the civilian population from blast and fallout.... The essential 
message was that thermonuclear war need not be suicidal; America could 
survive, battered but capable of recovery. 2 
The apogee of this strand of thought on the `winnable' nuclear war was Herman Kahn's 
On Thermonuclear War (1960). 3 Gerard DeGroot has called Kahn's book `a massive 
window into a warped mind', 4 but Kahn's thesis, although certainly peculiar and 
designed to shock, 5 penetrated to the heart of civil defence problems. He argued that 
civil defence was essential to ensuring the survival of America in a future war, and that 
evacuation, shelter and rescue plans could cut nuclear casualties from 80 million to 20 
million. He argued that `the survivors will not dance in the streets or congratulate each 
other if there have been 20 million men, women and children killed; yet it would have 
been a worthwhile achievement to limit the casualties to this number'. 6 There were, 
Kahn believed, degrees of destruction and it was worth planning to restrict it: `a 
catastrophe can be pretty catastrophic without being total' .7 
Of course, this `non totally-catastrophic catastrophe' idea was the whole basis of civil 
defence planning in Britain, but one largely unarticulated in the public sphere. Where 
Kahn is perhaps most interesting is his realisation that it was difficult, if not impossible, 
to conduct a reasoned public debate on the variations of nuclear destruction. The 
preference for 20 million rather than 80 million dead, he argued, `is very difficult to 
get... across to the layman or experts'; people have `a dour attitude towards planners' 
who argue that casualties could be limited to 20 million: `somehow the impression is 
left that the planners said that there will be only 20 million dead. To him is often 
attributed the idea that this will be a tolerable or even, astonishingly enough, a desirable 
state'. 8 Due to the difficulty of discussing these degrees of destruction, the view that a 
nuclear war must by definition cause complete and utter destruction became dominant 
in public discussions of nuclear weapons. Kahn illustrated this with examples of the 
2 Ibid., pp. 129-30. 
3 H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). 
4 G. DeGroot, The Bomb: A History of Hell on Earth, (London: Pimlico, 2005), p. 207. Kahn is held up as 
the supreme advocate of the `winnable' nuclear war and as a murderous exponent of 
`megadeaths'. 
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language used to discuss war: `expressions such as intolerable, catastrophic, total 
destruction, annihilating radiation, and the like', which evoked end-of-the-world 
images. 9 
It is this aspect of Kahn's thesis which is most relevant in the British context, rather 
than his views of the survivable war, which are less useful in the very different 
geographical circumstances of Britain. CND, launched in 1958, based its appeal on the 
revulsion many felt towards nuclear weapons - linking their destructive powers with an 
end-of-the-world scenario and contrasting this with the simple moral beliefs of 
Campaign supporters. Meredith Veldman, in linking CND with other aspects of middle 
class `romantic protest' in postwar Britain, has argued that a key `mission' of CND `was 
to convince ordinary individuals that they knew better than the experts, that the almost 
instinctive emotional revulsion against the idea of nuclear war should be trusted as 
much as or more so than any strategic calculations'. 10 In an early CND pamphlet, A. J. P. 
Taylor argued that `most people agree that the bomb is morally wrong. Most admit that, 
if used, it would destroy civilised life throughout the world'. " This basic `populist 
moralism', 12 enshrined by the `ban the bomb' slogan was the engine of CND's growth 
from 1958 onwards, and it was when CND, rife with ideological tension, was forced to 
adopt a more sophisticated policy after 1960 revolving around withdrawal from NATO 
and neutralism that its message declined in power. '3 
A. J. P. Taylor's argument that war would certainly `destroy the civilised world' became 
the orthodox view and demonstrates the massive success of CND in the public sphere. 
Any argument made to the contrary was opposed as hopelessly optimistic, out of date 
or, as the 1960s proceeded, deliberately misleading. As we have seen, the Government 
ceded the initiative on the nuclear debate when, in attempting to link a reduced civil 
defence programme with the reduced risk of war ushered in by the thermonuclear 
deterrent, the Sandys White Paper `admitted' the impossibility of defence against 
nuclear war. 14 Although it was not until 1963 that CND fully turned to attacking civil 
9Ibid., p. 55. 
'° M. Veldman, Fantasy, the Bomb, and the Greening of Britain: Romantic Protest, 1945-80, (Cambridge 
UP, 1994), p-202- 
11 Taylor, The Deterrent Myth, p. 1. 
12 R. Taylor, Against the Bomb, p. 43. 
13 Ibid. pp. 55-6. 
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defence preparations, the Government's attempts to explain publicly its nuclear defence 
policy were from 1958 made in an increasingly hostile and disbelieving context. 
As we have seen, the Government responded to the rise of CND and the adverse 
reaction to the Sandys White Paper by adopting a policy of silence. This had the result 
of conceding the public ground on nuclear weapons to CND, leaving the Government's 
own `survivable nuclear war' message undefended and increasingly undefendable on an 
intellectual level. For example, the 1958 recruitment drive for the Civil Defence 
Services included the slogan, `The H-Bomb: What About the Millions of Survivors' 
(Appendix B. 12). Such propaganda was no match for the intellectual moralism 
expounded by such supreme communicators as A. J. P. Taylor, J. B. Priestley and other 
CND advocates. In the early 1960s, civil defence propaganda retreated from the 
survival message, concentrating more on notions of community and self-improvement 
(Appendix B. 13-14). 
When civil defence policy was recast in 1960-61, it was done so explicitly to provide a 
more honest and publicly defendable policy - one based on efficiency and greater 
degree of professionalism. A key factor in the reversal of the 1958-60 policy of silence 
and atrophy was the consequence of maintaining a policy which no longer had the 
public's confidence. The increased gaze on nuclear questions in general made it vital 
that such policies inspired confidence at least in the government's intentions and vigour. 
A successful civil defence policy needed to demonstrate a commitment to saving lives 
and present an image of activity - showing the government could be trusted to mount a 
positive response to a future crisis was as vital as the policies themselves (the merits of 
which could be endlessly argued over) in bolstering the fragile nature of the survivable 
nuclear war. 
CND's victory, therefore, was its ability to force the government to reorder its nuclear 
policy. Whereas before 1960 the Government had been content to ignore civil defence 
in the hope that by refusing to discuss the issue it could not be criticised, after this date 
the government realised that to do nothing was to court disaster. To maintain the fiction 
of civil defence for morale-deterrent purposes a feasible structure was needed to both 
maintain morale within the service and impress upon the public that the services were 
efficient and worthwhile. Of course, the former also reinforced the latter. The 
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Government's policies on civil defence during and after 1960 have to be seen as a direct 
consequence of CND's popularity; the whole policy was now geared to ensuring that 
the majority of the population did not follow the disarmers down the no-nuclear road in 
a crisis. Central to this government strategy to put forward a basic theory of the 
survivable nuclear war was a discussion of live-saving civil defence measures with 
continual references to the fact that, although millions might die, many more would 
survive. This theory, however, could only indirectly be propounded. The CND 
narrative of the catastrophic war had become so dominant that the government still 
feared any direct engagement with the issue. Every time a measure was discussed, such 
as the 1963 booklet giving advice to the public on defence against nuclear attack, they 
were criticised or, worse, lampooned. 
Breakdown 
In Whitehall, teams of officials were working to decide whether there was any defence, 
any hope for Britain, against a thermonuclear war. A central group was JIGSAW, 
within the Chiefs of Staff structure. 15 Their highly-secret work concentrated on the 
conceptualisation of `Breakdown', a term difficult to define but in JIGSAW taken to 
mean a threshold reached as the level of attack increased, `beyond which the cumulative 
effect of damage to different components will cause a general collapse of national 
structure'. 16 In his summary of the lengthy debate on the meaning of breakdown, '7 
Peter Hennessy described it nicely as `the point at which survivors turn inwards, and 
cease to be assets to a state which has lost the capacity to govern and the means of 
waging war, leading both industry and whatever society helplessly continues to slow 
down of its own accord'. ' 8 
Key work included estimates of the number of bombs needed to cause breakdown in the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and the UK. Analysing the effects of nuclear weapons 
also helped to identify fundamental civil defence problems. In fact from the earliest 
days of the JGWC, as Richard Moore puts it, `one of the most important strands of the 
15 For the genesis of JIGSAW and global war studies see Richard Moore, `A JIGSAW Puzzle for 
Operational Researchers: British Global War Studies, 1954-62', Journal of Strategic Studies, 20: 2 (1997), 
75-91. 
16 NA, DEFE 10/402. SG(60)35, `Note on the Concept and Definitions of Breakdown', Edgar Anstey, 
10.6.1960. 
17 For an interesting, if lengthy, note on the term, see Ibid. SG(60)79, `Breakdown in JIGSAW', note 
by 
I. J. Shaw, 29.11.1960. 
18 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 152 
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work was its emphasis on civil defence, identified quickly as a crucial part of a 
warfighting posture but persistently neglected by government'. 19 This dual nature of 
JIGSAW's work on the idea of mutual deterrence and on the effectiveness of civil 
defence highlights what can with some usefulness be called the `civil defence paradox': 
studies showed that in order to have any hope of `surviving' nuclear war, civil defence 
measures would have to be undertaken (the view of Strath, Kahn and JIGSAW). Yet 
those same studies argued that mutual deterrence made war increasingly unlikely, 
meaning expensive civil defence preparations were unnecessary (a position held in an 
early form in the late 1940s, firmly adopted as Government policy in the Sandys White 
Paper, and was held with increasing vehemence by the Ministry of Defence from the 
mid-1950s). It is possible to identify a general shift in thinking away from the Strath 
era when the importance of civil defence was almost widely accepted in principle (if not 
in economic and financial practice), through to the post-Cuba world where the threat of 
war had palpably receded and civil defence was mostly deemed superfluous. 
But around 1960, when JIGSAW was at its most active, the principle of the need for 
civil defence was still firmly entrenched in much of Whitehall, if under increasingly 
strong attack. As we have seen, the `deterrent' to war was the trump card played in 
justifying the decline of civil and home defence spending from 1956 onwards, yet the 
strategic notion of `mutual deterrence' was far from accepted and was immensely 
controversial in the public sphere. Civil defence was not scrapped; it would be too 
contentious to have no defence against nuclear weapons, however weak those defences 
were. In this period, then, there was a mixed civil defence message: what measures 
there were had to be explained in terms of their usefulness for saving lives and 
bolstering the deterrent; yet calls for more efficient measures had to be resisted on 
grounds of economy and only partly on grounds of lack of necessity. Thus the 
Conservative Government's civil defence debate was a `balance' between insurance 
measures, current financial cost and the risk of war. 
Home Defence Review 
The inter-relationship between civil defence and the deterrent was the key issue tackled 
by the Home Defence Review (HDR) of 1960. HDR was seen specifically as a 
successor to Strath, designed to review the whole of civil and home defence policy root 
19 Moore, `A JIGSAW Puzzle', p. 76. 
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and branch. 20 Although firmly in the lineage of civil defence reviews, it should also be 
seen within the context of the Government's `Future Policy Study' conducted late in 
1959 and early 1960 which sought to evaluate the fundamental problems of British 
overseas policy and relative economic decline within a framework of long-term 
planning. 21 Both the studies aimed to think deeply about previously intractable 
problems. Under the chairmanship of Freddie Bishop, the acting Cabinet Secretary due 
to Brook's illness, HDR included such officials as Burke Trend, Brook's eventual 
successor, Sir Sidney Kirkman, the Director-General, of Civil Defence, and Philip 
Allen, at the Ministry of Housing and Local Government until returning to the Home 
Office in the autumn, a survivor from the Strath Group. 
HDR started its work in February 1960, receiving a series of background studies, 
including a paper from the JIC on the likelihood and scale of a future war and another 
on what that war would mean for Britain. 22 The JIC paper radically altered the strategic 
basis for civil defence policy, destroying the notion of a long-term strategic warning of 
a nuclear attack: tension could rise `so quickly that it seems unlikely that a deterioration 
in the international situation giving rise to an increased risk of war could be detected 
several months before the occurrence of the particular crisis which "boiled over" into 
open hostilities' . 
23 The JIC considered that the threat of war arising from the 
`miscalculation' of a superpower in a snap crisis was greater than that arising from a 
planned long-term build up of tension leading to war (a scenario they deemed unlikely 
due to the `retaliatory capabilities' of the superpowers). In essence, this was a lesson 
learnt from the response to the Berlin crisis in 1959, and it meant that the Government 
could no longer reasonably assume that it `should be able to detect a deterioration in the 
international situation some six months before war came', as had been the case since the 
atomic age. Only a seven days' warning `from Soviet preparations for global war' 
could be forecast, and although tension may rise for some weeks beforehand, `the 
Government would need to weigh', considering the frantic diplomatic activity that 
20 NA, CAB 134/2039. HDR(60)1, `Terms of Reference and Composition', Note by the Acting Secretary 
of the Cabinet, 9.2.1960. 
21 Although the study was deeply concerned with the independent UK deterrent, civil defence was not 
discussed nor was deterrence in any meaningful way. See NA, CAB 134/1930. FP(A)(60)7th Meeting, 
4.12.1959. 
22 NA, CAB 134/2039. HDR(60)3 (Revise), `Nature of Threat to the United Kingdom', Note by the 
Secretaries, 4.3.1960; HDR(60)8, `Assessment of the Effects of Attack on the United Kingdom', Note by 
the Home Office, 5.8.1960. 
23 Ibid. HDR(60)3 (Revise), `Nature of Threat to the United Kingdom'. 
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would invariably be taking place, `the advantages of taking measures which showed 
their resolution to maintain their position as against the dangers of action which could 
be regarded as provocative' . 
24 
If war did start, it was believed the Soviets would target the nation's nuclear retaliatory 
capacity, its centres of population, government and the major ports. These targets, 87 in 
number, would be attacked with an immense total of 159 three-megaton bombs. 25 The 
possible effects of such an attack were awesome, unknowable and unthinkable. In stark 
figures the Home Office estimated that 8 million would die and 3 million would be 
injured from the instant, direct effects of the bombs. 26 Deaths from radiation in 
`average' fallout conditions would take the total to 21.5 million dead and 4 million 
injured, out of a population of 50 million, unless some degree of evacuation and shelter 
were provided. 27 Even implementation of the unapproved 1959 plan to evacuate six 
million priority-class people from urban centres would save only four million lives as 
fallout would invade the old reception areas even in favourable weather conditions. If 
unfavourable easterly winds were prevailing, evacuation would save less than one 
millions lives as the evacuees would be irradiated in the western half of Britain. 
To reduce the fallout casualties to less than 13 million would take some degree of 
shelter. Shelter had traditionally been a Home Office obsession, and so it was again. It 
was argued that peacetime shelter provision could save 12.5 million of these casualties. 
But this would be reliant on a remarkable series of contingencies. These lives could be 
saved if `there had been sufficient provisioning of shelters to permit a two weeks stay 
and if sufficient warning of the approach of fallout had been received to enable the 
public to reach communal refuge'; and if they remained continuously in their refuge for 
up to two weeks and then spent not more than 15 hours in getting clear of the fallout 
area. 28 Moreover, the original the figure of 13 million deaths before taking into account 
shelter provision was based on the assumption that 3 million of the 16 million originally 
pinned down in the highly contaminated `Z' Zone could be evacuated within 48 hours. 
But could they be rescued? Secondly, the `average weather conditions' for fallout gave 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. HDR(60)8, `Assessment of the Effects of Attack on the United Kingdom', Note by the Home 
Office, 5.4.1960. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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the Home Office the figure of 16 million trapped in their homes, but the very worst 
conditions meant 27 million such people - on top of the 11 million already dead and 
injured. Only 12 million survivors would be left. The endless list of `ifs' and other 
caveats made a mockery of the attempt to analyse seriously the effect of a shelter policy 
on the number of casualties resulting from a nuclear attack. 
With grim irony, the rest of the document outlined how, because of the enormously 
reduced number of people, other civil defence measures would ensure that the survivors 
would have enough food, water, fuel and power to survive, `provided they were 
available' in the first place. 29 But then the Home Office planners did not investigate the 
impact on food resources of a successful shelter policy. Had ten millions lives been 
saved through shelters, many of those would have starved to death as the feeding 
arrangements collapsed around them, even assuming these facilities survived an attack 
so devastating it killed or injured half the population of Britain. 
Even after these, optimistic, casualties had been suffered, and although `the shortage of 
food might give rise to serious law and order problems, and the surviving police forces 
would need assistance from the Armed Forces', the Home Office believed, `in these 
general conditions, survival appears to be possible, but only if the available resources 
and the energy of the survivors are properly applied'. 30 What could survival really 
mean in a nation which had just seen 21 million of its citizens die? Only the survival of 
some sort of governing framework which would aid a subsequent, and very slow, 
recovery of the nation. Although the Home Office paper stressed the vital nature of a 
control system, its work was too slight and hopeful, too based on assumptions to 
convince. It contained none of the statistical weight which informed studies by 
JIGSAW, none of the compelling, if slightly deranged, analysis which drove Kahn's On 
Thermonuclear War and made his thesis plausible if not entirely convincing. Post- 
attack, the fragile, damaged infrastructure of emergency feeding, water supply and fuel 
and power would all need to be maintained - and would be reliant on continuing 
imports - if the nation was to `survive' in any sense. 
29 Ibid. HDR(60)3`d Meeting, 11.4.1960 
30 Ibid. HDR(60)8, `Assessment of the Effects of Attack on the United Kingdom', Note by the Home 
Office, 5.4.1960. 
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After understanding what an attack on Britain would entail, the main thrust of HDR's 
preliminary work was to formulate, in Bishop's words, `the philosophy of home defence 
as an addition to the deterrent and its credibility and as a reinforcement of public 
morale, as well as its purpose for saving life and preserving administration'. 31 The 
Ministry of Defence paper investigating this was the first time the question of civil 
defence's deterrent role had been officially examined rather than assumed. 32 It saw 
`narrow' Civil defence (excluding measures of government control and communications 
which had a major military function) as having no influence on the technical element of 
deterrence - that of inflicting `damage on the Soviet homeland'; but a complex 
influence on the `credible' element of deterrence - the Russians' belief that the British 
Government would authorise a nuclear attack in the final analysis. Although `no 
economically feasible scale of civil defence measures in this country could significantly 
affect the results of a full-scale attack on this country', it was clear that having no civil 
defence programme in place could, in a period of crisis, lead to an `overt - and 
vociferous - element of opposition to any stand taken by the Government of the day 
which appears to involve a risk of attack on this country'. This might prejudice the 
Government's ability `to keep staunchly in line with the declared deterrent policy', and 
such divided public opinion might be taken by the Soviets as `a significant rift in an 
otherwise firm attitude of the Western Powers'. 33 
The MoD belived that such a `defection' could be avoided by a greater degree of public 
education on `the real issues involved in the nuclear equipoise'. This would allow the 
government to cut back heavily on the more expensive `tranquillising facade' of civil 
defence. They argued that public support for the deterrent could be maintained without 
civil defence, citing the fact that, `whether through ignorance, indifference or common 
sense, there has never been any strong reaction in the country at large' to the `no 
defence' admission contained in the 1957 White Paper (an interesting assessment of the 
achievements of CND). 34 However, it was recognised that the most sensible option of 
scrapping civil defence was impossible because of the political impracticality, so 
throughout the HDR discussions, MoD officials argued for a minimum programme with 
31 Ibid. HDR(60)2, `Business of the Committee', Note by the Chairman, 9.2.1960. 
32 Ibid. HDR(60)12, `The Influence of Civil Defence Measures in the United Kingdom on the 
Effectiveness of the Deterrent', Note by the Secretaries, 26.4.1960. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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no measures to save lives and a drive `educating the public to accept that the best 
defence and hope for survival lay in resolute support of the deterrent policy'. 35 This 
opposition to civil defence became the established Ministry of Defence posture 
throughout the 1960s, and moved from being the `minority' view in HDR to becoming 
the strategic basis for reducing civil defence spending when civil defence was put on a 
care-and-maintenance basis in 1968. 
This largely negative appraisal of the deterrent role of civil defence was contradicted by 
Kirkman, who was in no doubt about the valuable deterrent role of civil defence. 36 If 
preparations were abandoned, `a considerable, and possibly uncontrollable, impetus 
would inevitably be given to criticism of the deterrent policy'. The Government could 
not `reasonably expect a potential enemy to believe that it intended to use nuclear 
weapons in the last resort if it announced that it was abandoning any serious 
preparations to succour the survivors of a counter attack', and `no amount of education 
of the public in the need to place complete reliance on the deterrent policy could affect 
this'. Kirkman also stressed the need for genuine life-saving measures to continue in 
order to maintain `the support of volunteers, local authorities and others outside the 
Government service' and `unless they can be convinced that the organisation is likely to 
serve a useful purpose, it would not be practicable to keep it alive. 37 
Given the potentialities of the wartime control network - an operational chain of 
command from `central government down through the regions to Sub-Regions and 
Groups, Areas, Sub-area and Sectors to warden posts', exercising governmental control 
whilst also enabling the decentralised control of the civil defence services, Kirkman 
concluded that it was not necessary to maintain civil defence as a facade `as there are 
good grounds for regarding its life-saving activities as of great importance and its 
contribution to the maintenance of the framework of society as fundamental'. He added 
`in any event, while nuclear attack remains a possibility, home defence preparations 
must be an inescapable responsibility of Government'. 38 When HDR met it affirmed 
35 NA, CAB 134/2040. HDR(60)32, `Draft Report: Sections I-III', Note by the Secretaries, 3.8.1960. 
36 NA, CAB 134/2039. HDR(60)11. `Civil Defence in Relation to United Kingdom Defence Policy', 
Note by Director-General of Civil Defence, 24.4.1960. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid; this idea of `inescapable responsibility' had been dismissed by the MoD, see Ibid. HDR(60)12. 
The Influence of Civil Defence Measures in the United Kingdom on the Effectiveness of the Deterrent', 
Note by the Secretaries, 26.4.1960. 
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civil defence's central position within the Government's deterrent posture, stressing that 
`civil defence preparations lent conviction in the eyes of the Soviet Union to our 
expressed intention to use our nuclear forces'. 39 If civil defence was abandoned or was 
`obviously inadequate', a `loss of morale and public support for the Government's 
deterrent policy' might follow, and although `much could be done to educate the public 
in the realities of nuclear war, some practicable civil defence measures would be needed 
if public morale was to be sustained in the face of acute international tension,. 40 This 
`majority' view dominated civil defence policy until it was suspended in 1968.41 
The belief that education of the public was the key to a successful civil defence policy 
pre-dated Strath, but little thought had been devoted to the issue of public presentation 
of policy and public morale. The Government had made little direct attempt to 
influence public opinion, aside from the annual section on civil defence in the Defence 
White paper and a couple of information booklets on nuclear weapons. Vitally, there 
had been no attempt to harness the one obvious source of public information: the annual 
recruitment campaign for civil defence. The content of the annual drive, its slogans, 
images and written content was never discussed within the Cabinet Committee 
structure, Ministerial or Official: it was solely a Home Office affair. By ignoring civil 
defence's public face, the senior planners neglected a unique apparatus for manipulating 
perceptions of nuclear war and civil defence. But after 1960, as mentioned above, the 
Corps' recruitment message retreated away images of life-saving and focused more on 
those of personal development and community. 
HDR were deeply concerned with the issue of morale - much more so perhaps than 
previous planners. Whereas before 1960 its importance was stated, its existence was 
largely assumed. The rise of CND, however, represented the new existence of a large 
minority of the public who openly doubted the Government's deterrent policy, and it 
shook the Government's confidence in the durability of civilian morale. For the first 
time, civil defence planners had to look beyond the old `people's war' notion of a 
population battle-hardened by the blitz and ready to face any external danger. 
39 Ibid. HDR(60)4th Meeting (confidential annex), 2.5.1960. 
40 Ibid. 
41 NA, CAB 2040. HDR(60)32, `Draft Report: Sections I-III'. 
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The Home Office planners believed that the lack of `comprehensive' and `authoritative' 
Government guidance was damaging its civil defence policy; they believed local 
authorities were beginning `to conclude that the Government have lost faith in there 
being any substantial number of survivors from nuclear attack', and that the public were 
beginning `to dismiss the possibility of taking useful measures to mitigate the effects of 
nuclear attack'. 42 Unless `the thesis that sensible plans can and are being made to 
reduce casualties and to preserve society' in any possible nuclear war was presented 
vigorously, there was a `danger of acceptance by the public of a "peace at any costs" 
policy in a period of tension'. Key to this `vigorous presentation' would be a 
demonstration of the `Government's conviction that home defence preparations are 
worthwhile'; this could only be done by `setting out in greater detail than has been 
accustomed in recent years, the broad lines of what the Government has in mind . 
43 
Linking detailed plans to the broad defence policy would raise the profile of civil 
defence and the morale of the organisation. In some ways, the Home Office clearly 
believed, the attitude struck by the Government was as important, if not more so, than 
the actual preparations. 
What actual preparations were envisaged by HDC, given that the `purpose' of home 
defence was explicitly to bolster public confidence in the deterrent rather than actually 
saving lives (although recognising that demonstrating the ability to save lives was the 
surest way to secure public morale)? In an anatomy of current preparations, the Home 
Office stressed that while Strath `ranged over the whole field' of civil defence, 
Government policy had been to exclude expenditure on the expensive `survival' 
measures and concentrate resources `on the maintenance of the civil defence services'. 44 
Over the whole field it was clear preparations had been woefully deficient. 
As we have seen, in addition to there being no shelter provision, there was no agreed 
evacuation scheme after the inconclusive 1959 discussions. Therefore, if an emergency 
arose in the short-term, the Government would issue advice for everyone to stay put, 
costing millions of lives. Paper plans existed for the wartime operation of the Civil 
42 Ibid. HDR(60)40, `The Public Presentation of Home Defence Plans', Note by the Secretaries, 
21.9.1960. 
43 Ibid. 
as NA, CAB 134/2040. HDR(60)9, `Current Home Defence Policy and Preparations', Note by the Home 
Office, 6.4.1960. 
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Defence Corps and other services, but cash, men and equipment were all in short 
supply, especially for fire-fighting. In the Corps, `largely as a result of the low priority 
given to civil defence preparations' the numbers and efficiency were well below 
operational standard. Moreover, due to the ending of conscription - announced in the 
Sandys white paper and in 1960 about to be completed - the military forces available to 
support civil defence were considerably less than those previously envisaged. Stockpiles 
of medical supplies and food had been reduced to save money. The lack of preparations 
for public utilities and industry as a whole was an 'embarrassment'. 45 Also there had 
been little attempt to educate the public on the realities of nuclear war. 
On a more positive note, the warning and monitoring infrastructure for fallout had been 
established, and with forty-eight hours notice sirens would warn of approaching aircraft, 
`and once the BMEW Station [Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, completed in 
1963] is in action some four minutes warning could be given of the approach of 
missiles'. Also, `good progress' had been made in preparing the country's 
communications system, but emergency broadcasting plans remained uncompleted. 
The wartime machinery of control had been agreed, enabling decentralised direction of 
life-saving operations, `as the situation demanded... from the Central Government 
nucleus to Regions, Sub-Regions and Groups, Areas, Sub-Areas and Wardens'. 
Corsham was virtually finished but little had been completed on constructing special 
Regional Headquarters, and `revised plans for using and strengthening existing 
buildings will not be completed for some time; for sub-regional and lower controls 
progress is also slow'. 46 Preparations for the ports and shipping emergency organisation 
were also well advanced. 
All told, this was a poor return for five years post-Strath planning. None of those 
aspects which could be considered a success - Corsham, communications and the 
emergency ports - were considered civil defence measures in the strict `narrow' sense, 
and all had been heavily monitored or initiated by the military. Given the recent history 
of civil defence, and the continuing and perpetual economic constraints, let alone the 
growing scepticism concerning its worth, it was clear that the HDR Committee could 
not recommend preparations on the Strath scale. Instead, it set out to propound a 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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coherent civil defence policy, involving a limited increase in expenditure, which would 
remain credible in a future crisis. 
Due to the fragmented nature of the archive, historians have yet to see the final Home 
Defence Review report, submitted in December 1960, but we can piece together its 
conclusions from draft versions and subsequent discussions. 47 The Report had two 
main themes: ensuring the maintenance of Government control in a future war and 
ensuring that public morale did not collapse in a period of international tension. In 
terms of financing these policy aims, HDR recognised that `to suggest large increases 
over the present figure would be unrealistic. There is no prospect of going back to the 
position of five years ago, when the home defence budget was about £70 millions'. 48 
Therefore, HDR put forward a policy ('Programme X') as `the most economical 
programme which could be presented as a reasonably consistent and logical one and 
would be likely to command confidence among local authorities and home defence 
workers and through them the general public'. Programme X would cost an average of 
£19,600,000 a year for five years. A less expensive alternative programme was also 
discussed ('Programme Y'), but whereas `X' would `provide a coherent and publicly 
defendable policy', Y meant shouldering the burden of continued inadequacies. 49 
The determination of the planners to secure the greatest return for the scarce funds to be 
spent on civil defence can be seen from the prioritisation of the different strands of civil 
defence. For example, there was nothing but a token sum for the water and other 
industries, and the food stockpile would remain depleted. The fact the medical 
stockpile was to be increased demonstrates, however, the desire to fund only the most 
significant and high profile measures. Money was also recommended to complete the 
national warning system of protected Royal Observer Corps posts 1964 and the system 
for government control, with Corsham completed by 1961/2, and the purpose-built 
Regional and Sub-Regional Headquarters completed by 1964 (all controls below the 
s° Sub-Regional level would be completed in 1965). 
47 NA, CAB 21/5182. Draft report on `Home Defence Policy', n. d; it can be dated to the middle of 
November because it incorporates the revisions of 14 November, but not those from the end of that 
month. See Ibid. B. M. Day to Freddie Bishop, 14.11.1960; D. J. Turner to J. B. Howard, 25.11.1960; 
Philip Allen to Freddie Bishop, 25.11.1960; B. M. Day to Freddie Bishop, 29.11.1960. 
48 Ibid. `Home Defence Policy'. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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Aside from these policies, there were two main areas that HDR were determined to get a 
grip on: evacuation and the Civil Defence Corps. HDR's discussion of evacuation 
demonstrated the new rigour applied across the board. Decision-making paralysis 
meant that no agreed plan existed (see Chapter 5 above), and HDR recommended a 
policy adapted from the aborted 1959 scheme. By excluding adolescents, the aged and 
the infirm, the boundaries of the 1959 evacuation areas scheme could be extended to 
include more mothers and children. Of course this would still leave out some major 
target areas and even those moved would still face great potential danger from fallout. 
HDR conceded that `the Government runs the risk of criticism whether it has an 
evacuation scheme or not. If there is a scheme, it may be criticised for its inadequacy; if 
there is no scheme, the Government may be accused of imprudence or irresponsibility'. 
It was pointed out that no scheme could be improvised at short notice, and `without a 
scheme the Government would have practically nothing to offer the inhabitants of our 
largest cities as a means of reducing the number of casualties in a nuclear attack'. It 
would also `be likely to lead to demands for an expensive shelter programme 51 
Whatever the decision, it was vital an early announcement should be made. On shelter 
itself, no longer one of the major issues in civil defence thinking, two future plans were 
presented: a survey by local authorities on all premises which could be used in war as 
communal shelters and the preparation of guidance for the public on how they could 
improvise shelter in their own homes which could be issued in an emergency or even in 
war. 
On the Corps, the supporters of a defendable policy believed that its annual budget of £4 
million represented an irreducible allocation, and around £1,000,000 in total was 
envisaged for extra equipment across the services. The big policy initiative was to recast 
the training and recruitment and base the Corps around a newly formed, highly trained 
elite membership. This was necessary because although the paper strength of the Corps 
was 350,000 `probably not more than 150,000 had done any serious training, and only a 
small proportion are of high enough quality to be capable of holding posts of 
responsibility'. The idea was to institute a `bounty' scheme along the lines of the 
Territorial Army. Those willing to give full-time service in war and undergo extensive 
training would receive between £10 and £20 a year. The Home Office hoped numbers 
51 Ibid. 
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taking up the offer would start at 50,000 before rising to a total of 200,000 highly 
trained people. This would cost £750,000 a year at the beginning, before rising to 
£2,000,000. The scheme would also probably have to be extended to the Auxiliary Fire 
Service and the National Hospital Reserve Service. 52 
Arguments in favour of such a scheme were `that it would be a visible and impressive 
symbol of the Government's belief in the value of civil defence'. It would boost the 
morale of the Corps, providing `a corps d'elite -a nucleus of well-trained men and 
women who could act as leaders if war came'. 53 Against, it was argued that costs could 
not be controlled and might exceed forecasts, and that `tightening up of training 
requirements and the imposition of an obligation to serve full time in war would 
probably make little practical difference to the situation if war came', thus rendering it 
pointless as well as expensive. No firm recommendation was made, however, and a 
more thorough review of the issue was suggested for when after the report had been 
discussed. 
HDR stressed the need for a fundamental overhaul of civil defence. It had `reached the 
point where it needs re-energising, if it is to continue'. 54 Thus it was recommended that 
Programme X was adopted, along with plans for a6 million evacuation scheme, a 
survey of possible shelter accommodation in buildings, and plans for the emergency 
manning of the RSGs. The Home Defence Review attempted to save civil defence from 
both those who believed it had no use and those who were happy to ignore it. Its 
findings ensured that planning in Britain continued for at least another five years. But 
the Committee clearly had no real faith in the traditional life-saving capacity of the 
home defence organisation. Instead, the work of the HDR Committee has to be placed 
within its economic and cold war context. As the report itself said, the days of a £70 
million home defence budget were over; as were the days when an official group could 
recommend the building of a formidable, wholesale home defence edifice. Indeed, it 
dealt honestly with the manifest failings of home defence, recognising that without 
shelters, at least 13 million people would die in an all-out nuclear war. They recognised 
that home defence could have no real life-saving role, and that its sole purpose was to 
create the image of preparedness; to provide succour for the mind for those questioning 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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the deterrent; to influence those who, in the final emergency, might see the lack of 
Government preparations and decide to protest against any possible British participation 
in a nuclear war. This was reflected in the minuscule budget and the palpable 
reluctance of all but the most ardent civil defence supporters to increase it. Thus HDR 
has to be seen not merely in civil or home defence terms, but as a wider part of the 
deterrent strategy. Civil defence in its traditional sense was dead in 1960, and had 
probably been so for some time. It was now a prop in the deterrent strategy, used to 
bolster the image of British might, resolve, and preparedness: a strategy aimed at 
influencing the British public as much as the Kremlin. 
HDR Discussed 
Subsequent discussion of the report is hard to piece together, due to the nature of the 
archival closures, but a fascinating brief for Sir Norman Brook written by Freddie 
Bishop on 12 December 1960 before a HDC meeting, does shed further light on how the 
final report was conceptualised. 55 Bishop praised the positioning of home defence as 
`an integral part of the deterrent policy' and rubbished the alternative view held by 
Ministry of Defence that spending should be curtailed because although home defence 
had little point (and would not affect public opinion), political expediency alone meant 
it could not be completely scrapped. It was unrealistic and `places too much faith in 
popular support' for the deterrent policy `in a period of tension'. This was especially 
so, Bishop's argument runs, given the changing nature of deterrent theory. What he 
called the `Sandys attitude' of putting one's faith in inevitable retaliation was outmoded 
in the new period of `nuclear equipoise' . 
56 The old one-dimensional strategic scenario 
of massive retaliation to Soviet aggression was gone. The current balance of forces 
meant that the Soviets could be tempted into `a test of relative willpower'. In such a 
crisis, the credibility of the deterrent would be severely tested, and it is at this point 
public opinion would be at its most vulnerable. Herein lay the case for a credible home 
defence strategy. 
How this meeting of HDC proceeded is not fully known, but HDR's findings were 
forwarded to Macmillan and the Cabinet on 14 December 1960.57 This made it clear 
that HDC warmly supported implementing Programme X. It was equally made clear, 
ss Ibid. F. A. Bishop to Sir Norman Brook, 12.12.1960. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. Sir Norman Brook to the Prime Minister, 14.12.1960. 
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however, that the Cabinet desired a slightly watered down, less expensive, version. 58 In 
the original scheme, £19 million would have been spent in 1961/62, but in the draft 
Defence White Paper sent to the Cabinet in February 1961, it was down to £18.58 
million. 59 On evacuation, however, there was no agreement. A precis of the Cabinet 
debate was prepared by Bishop for Macmillan in advance of a second meeting, 60 held in 
the Defence Committee on 18 January 1961. Henry Brooke, Minister for Housing and 
Local Government, had pushed for an early announcement and argued `that the choice 
was simply whether to announce that we were abandoning evacuation or that we were 
about to start planning for the six million scheme'. Other Ministers questioned the 
advisability of discussing evacuation with local authorities: `such an announcement 
might have an adverse effect on support for the defence and foreign policies of the 
Government'. 61 
Bishop's brief advised Macmillan that `the arguments for and against planning an 
evacuation scheme are evenly balanced'. Although he made it clear that official opinion 
favoured implementation, Bishop stressed the old imponderables of whether `any 
evacuation would be practicable in the precautionary period before global war', and 
whether `an official evacuation scheme might serve to inject order or disorder into the 
movement from large cities that might be expected to occur'. Overall, however, 
Macmillan was steered towards the HDR argument that if a scheme was adopted then in 
any crisis the option `would at least be open', whereas `if a scheme is not prepared, the 
Government might have to admit that this was so'. Furthermore, Bishop `doubted 
whether an announcement that planning is to start would cause much excitement or lead 
to any general discussion of defence policy, still less to public alarm'. If it did, the 
`ephemeral' consequences would be nothing compared to the `considerably more 
criticism and real embarrassment, in a period of tension, if no planning had been 
done' 
. 
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It is clear from this briefing that the Cabinet had not accepted the spirit of the HDR 
report, even if the rest of its conclusions had met with broad agreement. A publicly 
58 Ibid. Ronald Harris to F. A. Bishop, 30.12.1960. 
59 NA, CAB 129/104. C(61)16, `Defence White Paper, 1961', Note by the Minister of Defence, 
16.2.1961. 
60 NA, CAB 21/5182, Freddie Bishop to the Prime Minister, 16.1.1961. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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announced evacuation plan was essential if the government's home defence policy was 
to have any semblance of credibility. As the planners had always known, evacuation 
was the cheapest way to save millions of lives in a future war, and if a scheme was 
agreed beforehand, the government could meet a future crisis secure in the knowledge 
they had a policy designed to save millions, which, even if its success was far from 
certain, would surely ameliorate criticism of the government's policy. This was now 
the stated point of home defence. One struggles to see the utility of the Government 
agreeing a policy costing around £19 million per year but refusing to plan (at virtually 
no cost) for the one aspect which would give the policy most credibility. Without the 
full minutes of the Cabinet meeting, we cannot reconstruct the motives of those against 
evacuation, but it seems that the old fear of embarrassment was paramount: fear of 
stirring up criticism by advocating a new policy, and therefore favouring a strategy 
based on inertia. It was this entrenched fear of tackling the issue of home defence 
which HDR had tried to defeat - but it clearly ran deep in Whitehall. 
The Cabinet's Defence Committee steered a middle course, agreeing to investigate the 6 
million scheme with the local authorities but deciding against any early 
announcement. 63 In fact, Brooke quickly accepted this deferment, recognising that any 
such statement could only explain the abandonment of the old scheme and the intention 
to replace it with a more limited scheme. `People would expect me to make a rather 
more informative statement than that, after two years of examination of these problems'. 
Brooke told Butler that he would simply have to stall when answering any questions 
that came up on the issue, which they did in March. 64 
Meanwhile, CDM had been charged by the Cabinet with dealing with the other issues 
discussed by the HDR report which needed policy decisions but required no substantial 
expenditure. 65 On shelter, `an inter-departmental examination' and the register of 
premises for use as wartime accommodation were agreed, as was the review of the Civil 
Defence Corps. 66 The importance of preparations designed to restore essential industry 
quickly after an attack was stressed, as was the need for those industrial undertakings to 
63 Ibid. Henry Brooke to R. A. Butler, 6.2.1961. 
64 Ibid. Also, see House of Commins, Official Report, 30.3.1961, cols. 1529-30. 
65 NA, CAB 134/1477. CD(61)1, `Review of the Home Defence Policy', Memorandum by the Home 
Secretary, 30.1.1961. 
66 Ibid. CD(61)1 S` Meeting, 1.2.1961. 
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be identified, and for discussions to take place beforehand. In all these plans, the details 
were left to the official committee. 67 
A major concern within CDM was the disarray of the plans for manning the 
Government's emergency organisation. 68 At the level below the Alternative Central 
Government Headquarters at Corsham, over 3,500 staff would be needed. Of the 2,000 
needed for the Regional Headquarters, around 1,250 needed to be trained beforehand, 
but only around 250 had been. 69 When discussing the issue, the Committee resisted any 
move away from the traditional methods of securing volunteers for this vital wartime 
service. `At some stage', it was judged, `it might be necessary to consider further 
measures to attract volunteers, such as additional payments or making provision to 
safeguard the families of staff concerned'. 70 It is important to remember that 
volunteering implied serving in a Regional Headquarters in war, and civil servants 
clearly questioned their moral right to do so. F. R. Barratt was the Treasury Assistant 
Secretary who was to be the financial advisor to the Northwest Regional Commissioner 
in the post-attack period, and he told Peter Hennessy that, `speaking for myself, I find it 
difficult to see how I could have left my wife and children to fend for themselves when 
I was going off to sit in comparative safety in the Northwest'. 71 Hence the mention, 
never followed up, of the state offering to protect the families of those willing to serve 
underground in a future war. 
At the same time, Butler asked his colleagues to agree to the preparation of a new 
pamphlet to educate the public in civil defence and the nature of a nuclear attack. 72 As 
we have seen, education of the public was a central issue in the HDR discussions. 
There was some work already being undertaken through the annual civil defence 
publicity campaign and the Women's Voluntary Service's One-in-Five Scheme (to train 
one woman in five in first aid and basic precautions against nuclear attack). 
73 Butler 
was hoping to issue `some simple guidance to the public about the precautions which 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. CD(61)3, `Staffing of Government Headquarters', Memorandum by the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, 27.1.1961. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. CD(61)1 S` Meeting. 
71 Letter to Peter Hennessy from F. R. Barratt, 25.06.2002. 
72 NA, CAB 134/1477. CD(61)2, `Education of the Public', Memorandum by the Home Secretary, 
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they could take if the need should arise'. 74 It was to be aimed at the `many people 
[who] are still confused or ignorant about the probable effects of a nuclear attack'. 75 
Such a publication `would require careful preparation to avoid providing ammunition 
for the critics both of civil defence generally and of the gaps that remain in civil defence 
preparations'. Such a task, it might be argued, was doomed to failure. Certainly, when 
the pamphlet was published some two years later as Civil Defence Handbook No. 10: 
Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack, 76 it was vigorously 
attacked (see below). 
Overall, however, it must be stressed that the Ministerial and Official discussions 
following the Home Defence Review, no less than the Review itself, represented a real 
attempt to make progress on civil defence within its new limited conceptualisation. For 
once there was a largely unified purpose within Whitehall to achieve the greatest degree 
of success within the known boundaries of the budget. The latter point cannot be 
overstated. The history of Strath was in a way determined by its costly 
recommendations. Over the next five years Ministers never gave the planners the 
money the latter thought was necessary. Vitally, they also chopped and changed the 
budget as the Government lurched from crisis to crisis - there was no unified planning 
and no civil or home defence programme was secure from one year to the next. The 
decision of late 1960 to set out a five year budget, although tiny compared to the one 
desired by Strath, was possible only because the HDR officials produced their detailed 
report to dovetail with the Government's budgetary requirements, rather than a 
`shopping list' of cripplingly expensive measures such as universal shelter provision. 
Once the Cabinet decision had been made, planning could continue - and this included 
the more detailed studies of evacuation, the Civil Defence Corps and publicity put in 
train by Butler. Although the final preparations had a questionable value in terms of 
their ability to mitigate the effects of nuclear attack, the result of a civil defence policy 
finally giving a degree of focus and momentum was intended to be the best possible 
degree of planning and preparation achievable with limited resources. 
74 NA, CAB 134/1477. CD(61)2, `Education of the Public' 
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Emergency Again: The Berlin Wall Crisis, 1961 
How this detailed planning work progressed is uncertain, partly because, the archive for 
CDO is closed from 13 September 1961 until the Committee was reconstituted on 31 
October 1963. Of greater importance was the re-eruption of the Berlin crisis in the 
summer of 1961, which precipitated the suspension of such long-term planning in 
favour of mapping out a new `emergency' scheme to enable Britain to be as prepared as 
possible to face nuclear war within four months. 77 This is not the place for a detailed 
analysis of the crisis, 78 but its seriousness should not be underestimated. As Lawrence 
Freedman put it in relation to those strategists who envisaged how an international crisis 
might escalate into all-out nuclear war, `the powder trail from Berlin to a nuclear 
catastrophe always had a simplicity and credibility that more contrived scenarios 
lacked'. 79 On 25 June, a worried Macmillan noted in his diary that `we may drift to 
disaster over Berlin -a terrible diplomatic defeat or (out of sheer incompetence) a 
nuclear war'. 80 
On 4 August, the Defence Committee discussed the measures which could be taken 
within four months `to improve preparedness against the possibility of an emergency in 
the autumn'. 81 Both the Defence Committee papers and the initial FIDC proposals are 
unavailable, 82 so we must rely on the subsequent discussion of the issue in CDO over 
the following weeks. Ministers received advice as to what could be achieved both in 
secret and with some outside consultation, but they decided any risk of publicity `would 
not at present be justified', and so only `covert measures not involving substantial 
expenditure should go forward as quickly as possible'. 83 The examples of what could 
be done given to Ministers, amply demonstrate the severe limitations of any emergency 
plan. 
In secret the Government could prepare all the vital emergency legislation needed 
before hostilities broke out. In August 1961 nothing was up to date. A draft Emergency 
77 NA, CAB 134/1437. C(O)D(61)2, `Home Defence', Note by the Chairman, 4.8.1961. 
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Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 1. 
80 Bodleian Library, Department of Western Manuscripts, University of Oxford. Harold Macmillan 
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Powers (Defence) Bill `could be completed quickly, but Defence Regulations have not 
yet been prepared'. Preparing the `complete code' of the latter in time `would be a 
major undertaking'. 84 Within this time frame, the government's advice to the public 
could be completed; with a pamphlet drafted and ready for distribution at short notice, 
and moreover, a television film and radio announcements could also be prepared. On 
the warning system, however, the short-term prospect was dire: there was no capacity 
for warning the public against fallout, apart from improvised arrangements by the police 
to ring church bells', although this `might be supplemented by arrangements with the 
BBC to broadcast warnings'. Although some oil pumping machinery could be 
purchased and the port emergency scheme could be speeded up, there was little in this 
area that could be undertaken in secret that would provide any real tangible benefit. Had 
the risk of publicity been acceptable, much more could have been undertaken - such as 
improving protected accommodation at some regional headquarters, and allowing local 
authorities to do the same. Planners could attempt to bring the Corps `up to something 
like its wartime establishment', and organise mobile forces and warden posts, rest 
centres and the manning of other improvised controls. The medical services and water 
industry could be placed on a war footing, and heavy industry could also be instructed 
to undertake their own preparations. 85 
The Government control system and its communications were considered of overriding 
importance. The system could not hope to function as intended. As there would `have 
to be considerable improvisation at levels below Region', it was unlikely these sub- 
Controls could be activated, leaving the government forced to use local authority 
offices, and police and fire headquarters'. The GPO would have to arrange what 
communications they could between Regional Headquarters and `these improvised 
subordinate controls'. 86 When discussing the system of control, CDO were informed 
that `under the new assumptions for the machinery of government in an emergency, the 
Central Government would remain in London until nuclear retaliation had been 
ordered', 87 but the record of what concrete measures were being planned has been 
excised from the record. A document recently released shows that the Prime Minister, 
twelve Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet Secretary would have been 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. C(O)D(61)2°d Meeting, 9.8.1961. 
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helicoptered out of London to Corsham at the last minute. 88 In the regions, `eight out of 
ten regional headquarters could be brought to a higher state of readiness, though some 
would not be fully protected or large enough to take the full war complement', but two 
would require makeshift accommodation. It would be impossible for controls below the 
regional level to be set up before the autumn, and ad hoc arrangements would have to be 
made for finding accommodation and communication channels for the civil defence 
forces in the area. 
Progress on these issues was swift, demonstrating the new desire to place civil and 
home defence on a much surer short-term footing, and by September 1961 the eight 
inadequate regional premises were being improved (with alternative accommodation in 
the two other areas). Also, the staff earmarked for service had been largely selected, 
and although these preparations would be even less effective than the standing long- 
term plan, important preparations had been completed. 89 These included the limited 
purchase of oil stocks, the redrafting of the public advice booklet, now bearing its final 
name `Advice to Householders', and the imminent installation of communications 
between regions and between regional headquarters and sectors of the warning and 
monitoring organisation. Also, progress had been made on issues such as public 
pronouncements in a precautionary phase, the revision of Departmental War Books and 
the drafting of the Defence Regulations. 90 
When CDO reported this progress to CDM in October 1961,9' it added that `whatever is 
done, home defence preparations will remain far from complete; and what can be done 
to improve them is severely limited by the prohibition on consultations outside 
government circles'. 92 What CDO wanted was the authority to extend its consultations 
to local authorities and the representatives of various industries. This would allow 
them, for example, to consult the principal firms holding food stocks which would be 
required to implement an emergency rations scheme in war and to make additional 
peacetime appointments of industry outsiders to emergency wartime control 
organisations for food distribution and the ports. Ministers did agree that some limited 
88 NA, CAB 21/6083. Note on `Prime Minister's Helicopter Party', by R. W. Stephenson, 4.10.1961. 
89 NA, CAB 134/1437. C(O)D(61)6, `Progress in Home Defence Preparations'. 
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widening of consultation could take place. 93 By limited, it was meant that `some 
hundreds' of outsiders could be consulted rather than `some thousands'. Overall, the 
risk of publicity in filling senior control system positions and holding talks with the 
food and medical supply industries was worth running against the risk of `prejudicing 
the establishment of an effective wartime organisation'. Moreover, although 
consultation would still be severely curtailed, these proposals `went a good deal further 
than we had ever gone before and would enable substantial progress in planning to be 
made'. 94 
Again, the final analysis of the Government's civil defence-related reaction to Berlin 
must be suspended because the document trail stops at the end of 1961. We can see, 
however, that as in the post-HDR discussions, there does seem to have been a new 
seriousness and sense of purpose permeating the home defence planning machinery. 
For example, in all previous crises, the risk of publicity had overruled public 
consultations. Planners and Ministers were now determined to be as prepared as 
possible should the crisis escalate. This, one must conclude, was a result of the new 
vigour in home defence policy, which was itself partly caused by the changed cold war 
paradigm: three years of almost continual crisis since 1958 had ratcheted up the tension, 
and British civil defence planners had to be alert lest any future crisis erupted. 
Evacuation and the Review of the Civil Defence Corps, 1961-2. 
After the consultations with local authorities agreed in February 1961, evacuation policy 
was back on the Cabinet agenda in February 1962. Interestingly, the term `Evacuation' 
had been dropped and `Dispersal' adopted. 95 This has importance beyond the merely 
semantic, as `dispersal' implies a much more limited moving of population 
`evacuation' . Evacuation, a term so evocative of 
1939-40, implies movement from 
areas of great risk to areas that were safe. Removing the term may be seen as a 
recognition that in a nuclear attack there would be no `safe' areas, only potentially 
`safer' ones with people remaining in target areas and that to talk of `evacuation' in this 
context would be merely courting controversy. As Macmillan approvingly noted in the 
93 Ibid. CD(61)2"d Meeting, 18.10.1961. 
94 Ibid. 
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Cabinet discussion, the term `evacuation' was `misleading in the context of nuclear 
war'. Rather than provide safety in rural areas, `the object of dispersal was to secure 
better average chances of survival for the population as a whole by spreading them out 
more evenly through the country'. 96 
The Cabinet paper, produced jointly by Butler, John Maclay (Scottish Secretary) and 
Charles Hill (Minister of Housing and Local Government), recommended that a 
dispersal policy be prepared, supplying the caveat that `its preparation would not 
commit the Government to the view that dispersal must be ordered in an emergency. 
No one can foresee whether conditions at the time would permit this to be done'. 97 The 
actual policy which emerged from discussions with the local authorities, who were 
strongly in favour of the measure, went further than the one originally envisaged in 
1960. It provided for the dispersal of 9.5 million people from England and Wales and 
another million from Clydeside and Edinburgh. The next steps were a public 
announcement of the policy, then all local authorities could be informed before detailed 
planning began. In Cabinet, Butler advocated adopting this strategy because `it would 
not be possible for the Government to continue to remain silent on this subject. To 
announce the abandonment of a policy of dispersal would be unacceptable to public and 
parliamentary opinion'. Whilst objections to the plan would undoubtedly be raised, 
`these could be dealt with by saying that the plan as a whole was still under 
examination'. 98 In a silent echo of previous discussions, the possibility of the 
Government outlining its plan and explaining its difficulties in an honest and forthright 
manner was not mentioned. 
Just two weeks before the Cabinet discussed the new `dispersal' policy, Butler sent his 
colleagues on CDM the report on the future of the Civil Defence Corps and the 
Auxiliary Fire Service. 99 Chaired by the ubiquitous Philip Allen, the Committee 
submitted its report to CDO on 6 September. '°° Allen's report had three main planks 
extending logically from the PIDR concept of civil defence: that the continued existence 
96 NA, CAB 128/36. C(62)13th Meeting, 13.2.1962. 
97 NA, CAB 129/108. C(62)26, `Home Defence: Dispersal Policy'. 
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of the Corps was vital to defence preparation; that the quality, rather than quantity, of 
the volunteers had to be improved; and that to achieve this, a `bounty' scheme was 
needed to encourage the completion of a more rigorous training regime. 10' The four 
months delay between CDO receiving the report and forwarding it to CDM was due to 
the complicated discussions between the Home Office and the Treasury about the 
financial implications of the bounty. '02 
It had been accepted in HDR that in a future war there was no other organisation which 
could even attempt the intelligence gathering and rescue role of the Corps, and the 
Review concentrated on improving the Corps' efficiency. This was vital, for although 
the `nominal strength' of the Corps was 357,000, its trained, `effective' strength was 
estimated at less than 170,000. Although `much has been done to bring the Corps up to 
date... clearly the contribution that could be made by any section would fall far short of 
the requirement'. 103 The Corps `suffered from a tendency to put numbers before 
quality' and contained `an undue number of ageing volunteers who served in civil 
defence during the last war. Many of them, while retaining their enthusiasm, have 
found it difficult to adapt themselves to changes of outlook, planning and technique'. 
Finally, `it must be accepted that the public conception of the Corps and indeed of the 
value of civil defence is not as such to encourage the more energetic and capable 
members of the community to join'. loa The Corps' public image as an `anachronistic 
survival which has lingered on from the war' was firmly proved by a 1960 study on 
recruitment commissioned by the Home Office, '05 and was demonstrated by a disastrous 
piece on Panorama, which portrayed the local Stafford unit as amateur, inefficient and 
hopelessly divorced from the realities of nuclear war. '06 
To improve the quality of the Corps as a whole and to reach a point where a highly 
trained caucus could assume positions of responsibility in war, greater training would be 
needed, and a small financial incentive would be required. These bounty payments, it 
was hoped, would have an effect beyond encouraging training. They would boost the 
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morale of the entire Corps, placing it on a similar footing to the Territorial Army and 
Royal Observer Corps. It was felt that `no single step could do more to hearten and 
encourage the Corps... as much for the recognition and status it would confer as for the 
financial inducement'. 107 It would, additionally, create an impression that the 
Government was `serious' about realistic civil and home defence plans. Accepted 
without the Ministerial Committee meeting, ' 08 the plan to make changes to the Civil 
Defence Services as well as the commitment to a dispersal policy was announced in the 
annual Defence White Paper in February 1962.109 The bounty scheme, approved in 
December 1962,110 was included in the home defence budget for 1963/4. 
When the 1962 Defence White Paper was debated in the Commons, the dispersal plan 
was attacked. William Baxter (Labour, West Stirlingshire) decried the `hypocrisy' and 
`deceitfulness', and wondered whether anyone would really `believe that civil defence is 
a reality and a matter of practical politics? "" Emrys Hughes criticised the fact that no 
Minister with responsibility for civil defence was on the Government front bench for the 
debate. 112 The press, however, were remarkably indifferent to the White Paper's 
treatment of civil defence. "3 
After evacuation and the Corps, the third policy main policy plank left over from the 
HDR was dealt with by Ministers in May 1962 - the preparation of advice to the public. 
CDM approved a draft of the `advising the householder' booklet, ' 14 subject to removing 
material with `alarmist' impact. "5 Preparation on the booklet had been suspended 
because of the Berlin crisis, when priority was given to the drafting `of more detailed 
guidance... which could be issued in an emergency'. Since Berlin, the lesson had been 
learned that `there must be ready for issue in a period of emergency instructions to the 
public about what they can do to protect themselves'. 
116 This meant that the draft 
booklet was more informative than that originally envisaged, and that plans were 
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proposed to put it speedily into the public domain in an emergency. As printing and 
storing 20 million copies would cost £100 million, involve severe problems of 
distribution in time of crisis (the booklet would need to be sent out very quickly in any 
period of alert), and might commit the Government to a text possibly `inappropriate in 
an emergency some time ahead' it was proposed that `all national and leading provincial 
dailies should be consulted at the appropriate time and asked to reproduce the booklet in 
the pages of every copy of their newspapers in the first or second day of a period of 
alert'. This would save all the printing and distribution difficulties, using the 
infrastructure which managed to sell 24 million daily newspapers nationwide - ensuring 
that virtually all households received a copy. In the meantime, copies of the booklet 
would be printed for all police, civil defence and fire services and some `might also be 
put on sale'. 117 The more limited booklet originally conceived in 1961 was shelved. 
The work completed on evacuation, advice to the public and the Civil Defence Corps 
maintained the momentum of the recast civil defence policy from 1960, even though the 
Berlin crisis had interrupted planning. Successive crises and reviews between 1960-62 
meant that civil defence planning had reached a state where it was largely well thought- 
out and sensible. For this reason, the civil defence impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
of October 1962 was small relative to the importance of the crisis. In this sense, the re- 
eruption of the Berlin Crisis in the summer of 1961 had more impact on civil and home 
defence preparations than the Cuban Missile Crisis did little over a year later as much of 
the overhauling of plans had already taken place. 
FELSTEAD and Cuba 
The month before the unanticipated Cuban Missile Crisis began, defence planners 
converged on the Cabinet Office to conduct a transition-to-war exercise codenamed 
FELSTEAD. Conceived in the same spirit as the concurrent NATO exercise FALLEX 
62, FELSTEAD was intended to test the transition to war machinery of the government 
by compiling scenarios of an unfolding international crisis and reactions to this on the 
home front. It is important not to overstate the importance of these `war game' 
exercises, partly because scenarios were created explicitly to test all aspects of the 
War 
Book machinery. It is interesting, however, to note how public and press opinion was 
117 Ibid. 
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expected to react to the crisis and the actions of the `Government', doubly so because it 
occurred weeks before the major war scare of the entire cold war era. The imagined 
crisis unfolded as the Soviet Union ('Orangery' in the exercise) stepped up war 
preparations across Europe; in Britain the `Precautionary Stage' was declared and the 
Regional Seats of Government were put on an alert footing. 118 By the fifth day of the 
crisis, large scale peace demonstrations had occurred in Trafalgar Square and at military 
bases, there were major population movements away from the cities and reports of 
shortages of food and petrol. That morning, the `Advice' booklet appeared in all 
newspapers, including pictures of the appointed Regional Commissioners. The Press 
that day were `strongly critical of the inadequacy of the steps announced by the 
Government' - especially its reluctance `to make a clear statement of its intentions 
about evacuation... and its failure to make any realistic provision for shelter'. 19 Also at 
this fifth day point, it was noted that 40% cent of staff detailed for duty in the RSGs had 
yet to report back to their departments. 
The Regional Commissioners were in their regions with some staff on day six, but `only 
two of the Regional Seats of Government are ready to receive them... and less than a 
third of the full complement had arrived at the headquarters ,. 120 There was `unabated' 
criticism from the press of the lack of evacuation or shelter plans and calls for the 
Government `to give a more positive lead'. Regional Commissioners in the `safer' 
western areas were seriously concerned about the huge numbers arriving in their regions 
and the complete lack of plans to deal with them. By day seven, `normal life is at a 
standstill', and there were serious public order problems in some rural areas. Two- 
thirds of the Civil Defence Corps had reported for duty, but a quarter of the staff for 
Regional Seats of Government had refused to turn up. 121 By the eighth day, when the 
daily intelligence summary concluded `that everything points to the fact that the Orange 
bloc is preparing for war very shortly', 122 national life appeared to be bordering on 
collapse, with gangs roaming the deserted city centres and public order crises 
developing in the overcrowded areas in the Western half of Britain. 
123 Here the exercise 
ended, with, one can assume, a massive Orangery attack to follow. 
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FELSTEAD's significance lies in how the planners thought the deficiencies in civil 
defence preparations would affect the British home front in the build up to a major war. 
For example, the `dispersal' scheme was still in its planning stage and could not be 
implemented in an emergency. There was obviously no shelter policy, and aside from 
the issuing of the `advice', there was little the government could do to assuage the 
public's fears. FELSTEAD demonstrated the necessity of measures which made the 
public feel they were being proactively protected by the government. The inability to 
obtain the recommended stocks of food, it was believed, would fuel massive resentment 
and anger - including enormous, CND-inspired protests. If the authorities could supply 
such stocks, panic would be lessened. 124 Most importantly, it showed how essential a 
functioning evacuation scheme would be. Whatever the life-saving merits of the 
scheme, FELSTEAD estimated that not having a scheme would breed panic, discontent 
and opposition amongst the public. 
Overall, one can argue that the `outcome' of FELSTEAD was unsurprisingly predicted 
by the HDR deliberations - that the lack of government preparations might endanger 
morale and the lack of a clear political lead might endanger public support for a posture 
of deterrence. This crumbling of public support for the deterrent was not pursued by 
FELSTEAD, but it is clear that the injunctions of the HDR to have a clear strategy with 
definite policies could not be met. Given the decisions of 1961-62, however, it could be 
hoped that in any future exercise, or indeed real emergency, the Government could 
deliver a more positive response: ordering dispersal and mobilising a well-trained Civil 
Defence Corps, to give very public examples. 
The position in FELSTEAD was also the position during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
when Britain came closest to nuclear catastrophe. It is believed that Macmillan was 
only a few hours away from instituting the secret Precautionary Stage on Sunday, 28 
October when the crisis was alleviated. 125 The Precautionary Stage was the signal for 
the government's transition-to-war plans, including civil defence measures, to be 
activated. Although the status of the Missile Crisis as the cold war's ultimate crisis 
is 
not in doubt, it is important to stress that its very danger and the fear it inspired was the 
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harbinger of an enormous downturn in cold war hostilities. It was in response to Cuba, 
in John Lewis Gaddis' words, that `a series of Soviet-American agreements began to 
emerge, at first tacit, later explicit, acknowledging the danger nuclear weapons posed to 
capitalist worlds alike'. 126 These agreements included the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 
1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, and in 1972, both the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, as well as more informal moves towards a 
cold war modus operandi. This represented a real move towards detente and an 
understanding of the necessity of the nuclear balance: the triumph of the `idea that the 
vulnerability that came with the prospect of instant annihilation could become the basis 
for a stable, long-term Soviet-American relationship'. 127 
Cuba and subsequent detente had profound implications for British civil defence policy. 
After 1962, the threat of all-out nuclear war annihilating Britain palpably decreased. 
Certainly, the popularity of CND, already declining from its 1960 peak, seemed to fall 
away steadily. 128 Richard Taylor argues that `with the resolution of the crisis, the 
intense urgency which had characterised all movement activism evaporated'. 129 Even 
worse for CND's continued effectiveness, Cuba seemed to represent in the public mind 
a vindication of the Government's deterrent argument. ' 30 Over the course of the 1960s, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, the decline in the risk of nuclear war, and the decline 
of concomitant political pressure from the peace movement, allowed the Government to 
reduce spending on civil defence. Using the increasingly popular metaphor of insurance 
to discuss civil defence, 13' a marked reduction of the risk of nuclear war was seen to 
enable a concomitant reduction of the premium paid in the sense of civil defence 
measures. 
126 J. L. Gaddis, The Cold War, (London: Allen Lane, 2006), p. 81. 
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Post-Cuba 
Of course, the accepted historical view of Cuba-as-turning-point was far from obvious 
at the time. On the contrary, it was in November and December 1962 merely the latest 
in an increasingly long line of cold war crises which seemed to be escalating in menace 
and importance. Thus Cuba led to a speeding up of existing home defence plans and a 
`Post-Cuba Review' of transition-to-war planning. When CDM received a submission 
on the home defence budget proposing an acceleration of key measures, the report 
stressed the shortcomings identified in the recent exercises (i. e. FALLEX and 
FELSTEAD) as well as Cuba as justification. Work on the RSGs and the 
communication and warning systems was to be accelerated at a small additional cost 
(only around £630,000). 132 This was agreed, as was the proposal to print rationing 
documents in peacetime, at a cost of £240,000. Even the usually all-conquering 
consideration of publicity was swept aside. ' 33 The seriousness of recent crises, and the 
calamitous results of a lack of rationing in a future emergency flagged in FELSTEAD, 
must have combined to ensure the proposal was accepted. This acceleration meant that 
when the civil defence budget was announced in the 1963 Defence White Paper, it had 
increased by over £3.5 million to £23 million'34 - the first meaningful increase of the 
thermonuclear era - although in the subsequent Parliamentary debate, civil defence was 
not raised. 135 
The post-Cuba Review, however, continued into the summer of 1963. Conducted 
within HDC, it was not concerned with actual civil defence measures - these had been 
discussed and revised comprehensively since the Home Defence Review - but with 
ensuring that the government machinery, in the words of the new Cabinet Secretary, Sir 
Burke Trend, `was sufficiently flexible' to react quickly to a `sudden emergency, in 
which we might have no more than two or three days warning of the outbreak of 
war'. 136 This was why three new specially-built RSGs were approved, as their existing 
accommodation could not be got ready to meet the new two-three day target - not to 
mention why others were extended. By the time Ministers met to discuss the Report on 
132 NA, CAB 134/1477. CD(62)8, `Home Defence Budget 1963/4', Report by the Chairman of the 
Official Committee, 18.12.1962. 
133 Ibid. CD(62)2"d Meeting, 20.12.1962. 
134 Ministry of Defence, Statement on Defence, Cmnd. 1936, (HMSO, 1963). 
135 House of Commons, Official Report, 4.3.1963, cols. 31-164; 5.3.1963, cols. 221-350. 
136 NA, DEFE 13/321. Sir Burke Trend to Minister of Defence, 21.5.1963; see Hennessy, The Secret 
State, pp. 165-8 for an expert analysis of the Post-Cuba Review. 
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30 July 1963 to discuss its findings, Macmillan (who had been unable to chair the 
meeting as intended), had already approved the proposal that the Precautionary Stage 
should be ordered (by the Prime Minister alone, if necessary) earlier in any crisis, to 
ensure the machinery was up and running. ' 37 This would include manning Corsham, 
and the list of Ministers to go to the bunker, to the Regions and to stay in London with 
the Prime Minister had been drawn-up in August 1962 as part of general war planning 
and slightly revised independently of Cuba, in November 1962 (the full list is at 
Appendix D). 138 Later, during the Douglas-Home Premiership, a new list was 
constructed, naming the two Ministerial Deputies authorised to order nuclear retaliation 
if a first-strike had made the Prime Minister unable to do so. The first was R. A. Butler, 
the Foreign Secretary, designated as being in London with the Prime Minister; the 
second was Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Privy Seal, who was to be posted to H. Q. Bomber 
Command at High Wycombe. '39 
Other decisions taken at the 30 July 1963 meeting included confirmation that no 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill should be introduced in peacetime, due to presumed 
Parliamentary resistance to its more extreme aspects, but that this bill and all draft 
Defence Regulations should be completed, submitted and after approval printed and 
stored for emergency use. Also, there should be a Local Government `War Book' 
explaining what local authorities would have to do in an emergency rather than leaving 
it up to individual authorities. And, finally, it was agreed that although the planning 
assumption would remain that Departments would have `seven days warning to put their 
plans into action, they should plan to get as far ahead as possible within two or three 
days'. 140 
This concentration on the machinery of government and Government War Book 
measures is explainable as a fine-tuning to ensure the Government was ready to act in 
any crisis. In the same way that printing ration documents was important, up-to-date 
war book measures and pre-printed defence regulations would mean that in any future 
emergency, the Government could state its policy quickly, asserting its authority, 
137 Ibid. `Copy of a Minute to the Prime Minister from the Secretary of the Cabinet dated ls` August 
1963'. 
138 NA, CAB 21/6083. Michael Cary to Mr Bligh, 15.11.1962. 
139 Ibid. `Machinery of Government in an Emergency', n. d. 
140 NA, DEFE 13/321. Sir Burke Trend to Minister of Defence, 21.5.1963 
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establishing its control and implementing its policies immediately, without waiting for 
essential documentation or legislation to be prepared, printed or distributed. Therefore, 
one can see this focus as the final push to ensure that British home defence plans, 
however limited in practical scope, would be on a fully established footing and ready to 
implement at short notice. 
That this is so can be seen in the draft Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill, 14' rightly 
described as `ferocious' by Peter Hennessy. 14' After its introduction and enactment 
during the precautionary stage, the Act would essentially put all powers of law and 
order and life and death in the hands of the Regional Commissioners. It amounted to `a 
voluntary abdication by Parliament of the whole of their functions during the period of 
the emergency". 143 Although such widespread powers seem drastic, there can be no 
doubt that they would be vital in the event of nuclear war if the Regional 
Commissioners were to have any chance of maintaining the control of the population. 
FELSTEAD envisaged serious law and order problems in the regions even before the 
attack took place. The question of whether the government's wartime government 
apparatus could have maintained control in wartime even with the help of the military is 
unanswerable. The whole system of Corsham and Regional Seats of Government, 
Precuationary Stages, and emergency legislation was designed to give the state the best 
chance of governing, but there is grave doubt whether it would have worked. As we 
have seen Strath envisaged the possibility of some kind of military government. In 
1959, in a private lecture to the Home Office, Sir Norman Brook also outlined the 
prospects of a post-attack military government, making it clear that it was the intention 
of the government's policy to ensure `the maintenance for as long as possible of the 
supremacy of the civil power', and the `capacity to re-assert civil control, and, as soon 
as possible, central political control, for the period of recovery after the initial nuclear 
phase'. 144 F. R. Barratt, a civil servant assigned to the Regional Seat of Government in 
the North West Region has written that `actually I believe that the survivors would have 
been very lucky if the Armed Forces and the police between them had been able to keep 
141 NA, DEFE 13/32 1. Review of Government War Book Planning In the Light of the Cuba Crisis, 
20.05.1963. 
142 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 166. 
143 Ibid. 
'44NA, CAB 21/4959. `Cabinet Government', Lecture by Sir Norman Brook, 26.6.1959. 
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some kind of order with powers over life and death. A collapse into a nasty and brutish 
nightmare seems more likely in the short term'. 145 
CND and Spies for Peace 
As the planners were conducting and then discussing the Post-Cuba review, the public 
debate on civil defence erupted to become a national issue for the first time in the post- 
war period. In 1963 CND launched a full-scale campaign to highlight the failings of 
civil defence, reaching its height with an autumn mock exercise `FALLEX 63'. This 
campaign was perhaps inspired by two events occurring earlier in the year: the 
publication of Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack and the 
notorious `Spies for Peace' episode. The booklet was published in January 1963, and 
although on general sale, was officially a Civil Defence Corps document. (In this it 
followed other Civil Defence Corps handbooks publicly available such as Light 
Rescue146 and Elementary Fire-Fighting. 147) It was plainly inadequate in terms of an 
honest account of the destructive powers of a hydrogen bomb, but it did give simple 
advice to the layman about basic warning procedures and how to construct a fall-out 
shelter. Had the booklet been issued, almost certainly in the form of being reprinted in 
newspapers, a series of seven accompanying Civil Defence Information Bulletins would 
have been broadcast on television. Each five minute long film was presented by a calm 
uniformed figure giving much the same advice as contained in the booklet. Although 
never broadcast, copies of the films exist in the Imperial War Museum Archive. 148 
On the booklet's publication, its shortcomings were seized upon by CND. Its 
Twickenham branch announced in 1963 that although the Twickenham area would need 
up to 5 million sandbags, the local council's Civil Defence Department did not know 
where to get them and that Handbook No. 10 was not available in any bookshop or 
library within the borough. 149 Although this was a local case, it illustrated the larger 
problems of the Government's civil defence policy, and in 1982 Duncan Campbell 
pointed out that in 1963 sandbagging Hull would have exhausted the national Supply. 150 
145 Letter from F. R. Barratt to Peter Hennessy, 25.06.02. 
146 Home Office, Civil Defence Handbook No. 5: Light Rescue, (HMSO, 1961). 
147 Home Office, Civil Defence Handbook No. 4: Elementary Fire-Fighting, (HMSO, 1960). 
148 IWM, HOY 66, `Advice to Householders: Civil Defence Information Bulletin Nos 1-7'. 
149 Driver, The Disarmers, pp. 189-90. 
150 Campbell, War Plan UK, p. 274. 
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The handbook was lambasted for its banality, but its plain instructions, though 
oversimplistic, were designed to convey information simply and effectively. 
It was first attacked by the Commons Select Committee on Estimates, who argued that 
it did not achieve `any useful purpose', that it did not give the impression that civil 
defence preparations were `of any value whatsoever', and that it should be 
withdrawn. 151 Other MPs slowly followed the Committee's lead. Mentioned in the 
debate on civil defence in March 1963,152 no MP attacked the booklet until the debate 
on 2 December 1963, when it was savaged by Emrys Hughes (Labour, South Aryshire) 
on much the same line as the Estimates Committee. '53 The Government defended the 
pamphlet arguing that it was for training purposes only, and was not designed for the 
use of ordinary householders and that those who had used the booklet for these purpose 
had had no complaints. '54 
After Advising the Householder, 1963 saw another controversial civil defence policy 
aired in public, with the sensational blowing of the RSG system during the Aldermaston 
March in Easter 1963. The people responsible called themselves the `Spies for Peace', 
a never-identified group whose members were part of the Committee of 100.155 The 
`Spies' produced a pamphlet, distributed among those on the annual march, entitled 
`Danger! Official Secret: RSG-6', which in its own words was 
about a small group of people who have accepted nuclear war as a 
probability, and consciously and carefully planning for it.... They are 
based in fourteen secret headquarters, each ruled by a Regional 
Commissioner with absolute power over millions of people... these 
chosen few are our shadow military government. Their headquarters are 
called Regional Seats of Government. '56 
ist House of Commons, Eleventh Report from the Estimates Committee, Session 1962-63: Home Office, 
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Shrill in tone, the pamphlet obviously painted the RSG system in an authoritarian light; 
as far as we know, the Government did not accept nuclear war as a `probability', and the 
Regional Commissioners were to be Cabinet Ministers, not soldiers. 157 The provenance 
of the `Spies for Peace' remains a grey area, although both Christopher Driver and 
Richard Taylor link them to anarchist elements of the Committee of 100.158 The 
Security Service, despite not being able to shed any light on the individuals involved 
also investigated `Spies for Peace' for the Cabinet's Personnel Security Committee a 
month after the revelations. ' 59 What seems clear is that the `Spies' broke into RSG-6 at 
Warren Row, near Reading, and, they claimed, extracted secret material relating to the 
RSG system, the government's transition-to-war and civil defence plans, and the results 
of the previous autumn's FALLEX '62 exercise. 
Apparently, after their success on Warren Row, the `Spies' had hoped to `expose the 
emergency government system that lay behind the RSG structure... [leading them ] to 
explore an enormous military complex at Corsham: but the group found it impossible to 
get far enough into the complex to gather sufficient evidence to confirm their 
suspicions' 160 The suspicions of the `Spies for Peace' were correct, for they had of 
course stumbled on TURNSTILE. There is no evidence to suggest Whitehall knew how 
close the `Spies' were to making such a sensational discovery. Duncan Campbell first 
revealed the bunker's existence in his War Plan UK in 1982, describing it under its pre- 
Cold War name, `Spring Quarry, Hawthorn'. 161 It was only when Peter Hennessy's 
account of his visit to see part of the site there was published in The Secret State that a 
description of TURNSTILE surfaced. 162 Given the controversy surrounding the 
infiltration of Warren Row, had the existence of TURNSTILE become known, it would 
have been ruinous for the government's civil and home defence plans, as well as being a 
hugely embarrassing security breach. 
157 Ibid. S(O)(PS)(64)4, `Staff Appointed to Regional Seats of Government', Note by the Home Office, 
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The consequences of the revelations of Easter 1963 were tremendous. The newspapers 
generally condemned the breach of security and the leader in The Daily Telegraph 
declared that `the pamphlet seems to reflect an amalgam of the worst elements of CND: 
Communist subversion and pure rebellious irresponsibility'. 163 The Daily Mail had an 
interview with Henry Brooke in which the Home Secretary called those responsible 
'traitors'. 164 This line was also taken by the Times, who criticised the increasing 
anarchist influence within the movement. 165 A week after the revelations were first 
reported in the press, Harold Macmillan made a statement linking the RSG system to 
the system of Regional Commissioners Britain had put in place during the Second 
World War: : 
It is widely known that our defensive plans for any future war, whether 
nuclear or conventional, include provision for a similar, essentially 
civilian organisation. What have been referred to as regional seats of 
Government are, in fact, the headquarters from which the regional 
commissioners would operate in a war emergency.... To prepare 
them... is an obviously essential precaution. '66 
Both in his speech and in his private diary, Macmillan dismissed the importance of the 
actual revelations. ' 67 The speech was a masterful exercise in gentle subterfuge, with 
Macmillan keen to point out the `essentially civilian' aspects of the RSG system whilst 
underplaying the military aspects. In fact the existence of control centres had been 
mentioned on a number of occasions: in Parliament on 5 December 1962,168 and in the 
1963 Defence White Paper. 169 
Overall, Macmillan played down the importance of the whole episode throughout his 
speech, arguing that although `the deliberate breach of security is in itself both serious 
and strongly to be condemned, the disclosure of this particular information is not 
seriously damaging to the national interest'. 170 Whatever Macmillan said in the 
Commons, the revelations of Easter 1963 were a spectacular and immensely 
163 Daily Telegraph, 16.04.1963. 
164 `Brooke talks to the Mail', Daily Mail, 15.4.1963. 
165 `CND Undercurrents', The Times, 16.4.1963. 
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embarrassing breach of security concerning the nation's war planning and civil defence 
measures. Macmillan the politician may have wished to play down the significance of 
`Danger! Official Secret: RSG-6', but the Security Service were far from sanguine 
about the affair, believing that the pamphlet was merely the start of a wider programme 
of activities. 17 1 Although the Security Service seemed very sure of its ground, 
Aldermaston 1963, turned out to be the first and last hurrah of the `Spies for Peace'. By 
October 1963 it had been recommended that members of the Committee of 100 who 
were public servants `should be excluded, or if already so engaged, removed from work 
to which security vetting applies', unless Departments wished otherwise. 172 Later, in 
1964, it was decided to ensure that no nuclear disarmers would be among those chosen 
to man the Regional Seats of Government. 173 
CND's FALLEX '63 campaign was based on NATO's own FALLEX '62 exercise, and 
essentially amounted on a practical level to an organised pestering of local civil defence 
forces for information and a concerted campaign to put across the myriad failings of the 
government's civil defence policy. The effectiveness of the FALLEX '63 campaign is 
open to debate. A Cabinet Office report on the demonstrations explains that very little 
was done and little press attention (even locally) was given over to CND except for 
some minor activity in Bristol, Cambridge and Oxford (significantly, university towns). 
In London, `no reports of the demonstration have been received; and the inference is 
that it made little impact'. 174 However, Richard Taylor stresses the educational 
achievements of FALLEX '63, arguing that `public consciousness was alerted to the 
whole issue of civil defence, which had previously been shrouded in mystery. The 
uncomfortable facts of wholesale human destruction which would inevitably follow a 
nuclear exchange were made known on a very wide scale, and for the first time'. 
15 
Although this might overstate the importance of FALLEX '63 itself, it neatly 
encapsulates CND's impact over the 1958-63 period; and although scholarship on CND 
often gives little space to civil defence, it is perhaps the only issue where they scored 
171 NA, CAB 21/6027. S(PS)(63)7, Personnel Security Committee, `Spies for Peace', note by the 
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any real success. Certainly when Christopher Driver examined the impact of CND on 
civil defence in 1964 he argued that `the greater frankness which has recently been 
evident in Home Office statements and advertising may well be a tribute to CND's 
efforts' . 
176 
FALLEX '63 and `Spies for Peace', along with the criticisms of Advising the 
Householder gave the impression that the government's civil defence preparations were 
under relentless attack. But, in spite of being forced on to the defensive about civil 
defence from those within the various manifestations of the nuclear disarmament 
movement, civil defence planning still went ahead, and recruitment for the Civil 
Defence Corps continued, although those responsible for it were naturally concerned 
about the strategy of CND and Committee of 100. A Civil Defence Corps circular in 
May 1963 relating to the annual recruitment drive told all the local civil defence forces 
that `a further purpose of the national publicity campaign will be to promote more 
understanding of the wide scope of home defence preparations and thus commend the 
cause of civil defence to thoughtful and responsible people'. 177 
Conclusion 
The activity of CND in making public the realities of nuclear war, as well as changes in 
the nature of the nuclear threat itself, enormously affected the conceptualisation of civil 
defence policy in this period. The reorientation of that policy, focusing it on bolstering 
the deterrent, announcing evacuation plans, and reorganising the Civil Defence Corps, 
reversed the slide into paralysis which characterised the last years of the 1950s. This 
recasting of policy represented, we know now, the last throw of the dice for a sensible, 
sustainable civil defence policy which at least attempted to maintain a life-saving 
capacity. It ended the attempts to cobble together a compromise policy between that 
envisaged by the unrealistic civil defence planners in the Home Office and that 
demanded by financial reality. More importantly, it signalled the end of the shameful 
policy of refusing to engage with the issue out of fear of the public consequences. One 
of the major achievements of civil defence policy in these years was the decision that 
the rise of CND necessitated more information on nuclear war and civil defence not 
less. By presenting civil defence as a necessary and essentially uncontroversial 
176 Driver, The Disarmers, p. 191. 
177 Home Office, Civil Defence Circular No. 15/1963, `Recruiting Publicity for the Civil Defence Corps 
and the Auxiliary Fire Service', 17.05.1963. 
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insurance premium attached to the deterrent policy the government may have inspired 
attacks by CND. More importantly, however, it probably gained the tacit approval of 
the sort of `majority' opinion the government had always appealed to support the 
deterrent and other `sensible' or `common sense' measures. 
Another breakthrough was the realisation that whatever the actual life-saving capacities 
of civil defence, it mattered more that the government were seen to be actually doing 
something. Although any evacuation scheme could not hope to save anything but a 
small percentage of the casualtes that could be expected in nuclear war, there can be no 
doubt that an implemented scheme would have provided an image of purpose and 
vigour in any crisis, whereas the absence of such a policy would have the effect of 
spreading panic and create the impression of a government drifting towards disaster. In 
the 1960 conceptualisation of civil defence as adjunct to the deterrent, this ability to 
shore up public opinion in a crisis was where its value lay. But civil defence policy in 
this peroid was not solely focused on the formulation of policies for largely public 
consumption. It also saw the final division between this public facade and the genuine 
policy operating on a highly secret level: this was the policy of Corsham, the RSGs and 
secret communications networks. It was the policy which was intended to deliver 
Britain from the nightmare of nuclear annihilation and allow it to become a nation and a 
society again, albeit one scarred forever. 
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Seven 
Endings, 1964-68 
The Labour Government elected in October 1964 had an ambiguous relationship with 
nuclear weapons. Although the Party had been in turmoil over unilateral nuclear 
disarmament in 1960-61,1 it seemed united under Wilson's leadership in 1963-64. In 
opposition, Wilson made the most of the Conservatives' faltering defence policy, and 
although the manifesto commitment was measured, 2 it seemed to many that the new 
Labour Government would not proceed with the purchase of the Polaris missile system 
negotiated by the Conservatives. Certainly no government has ever entered office with 
such an anti-nuclear image. The CND-inspired revulsion of nuclear weapons enabled 
Wilson to attack his predecessors' policies from the moral high ground, but collapse of 
the disarmament movement throughout 1963 and 1964 ensured that when the Wilson 
Government did confirm the purchase of Polaris in a Cabinet Committee in January 
1965,3 it did so without fear of major criticism. 
Although the nuclear question featured in the 1964 election more prominently than it 
ever had, opinion polls suggested that few voters considered the issue of significant 
importance. 4 Labour came to power promising a new economic dynamism based on 
planning and the utilisation of new technology - ideas that had dominated political 
discourse in the last years of the Conservative Government. 5 It was faintly ironic, 
therefore, that a government promising a new era of economic prosperity should spend 
so much of its time in office dealing with the consequences of what appeared to be an 
endless stream of financial crises. It is within the context of these crises, as much if not 
more than the changes in the cold war, that civil defence policy needs to be assessed. 
1 See, for example, Philip Williamson, Hugh Gaitskell: a Political Biography, (London: Cape, 1979), 
Chapter 22; Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan: a biography. Vol. II. 1945-1960 (London: Davis-Poynter, 
1973), ch. 15; Edmund Dell, A Strange Eventful History: Democratic Socialism in Britain (London: 
HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 282-318. 
2 The wording was: `it will not be independent and it will not be British and it will not deter. Its 
possession will impress neither friend nor foe.... We shall propose the re-negotiation of the 
Nassau 
agreement'. Labour Party, `Let's go with Labour for the new Britain', in Iain Dale (ed. 
), Labour Party 
General Election manifestos (London: Politico's, 2000), p. 123. 
3 NA, CAB 148/19. OPD(65)5th meeting, 29.1.1965. 
4 D. Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1964 (London: Macmillan, 1965), p. 129. 
5 See Kevin Jefferys, Retreat from New Jerusalem: British Politics, 1951-64, (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 
1997); Hugh Pemberton, `Relative Decline and British Economic Policy in the 1960s', The Historical 
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The documentary trail for the period of the mid-1960s is at its poorest. Even more so 
than in the last years of the Conservative Government, the records of the civil defence 
decision-making process are unavailable. We are able, however, to pick out the general 
development of policy from some those documents which have been released. Labour's 
policy was simply to spend as little as possible on civil defence, and three phases of 
civil defence policy are detectable. Firstly, the immediate decision to suspend spending 
on the RSGs within two months of coming to power demonstrated how economic 
necessity and a new strategic conceptualisation of the cold war enabled cuts to be made. 
Secondly, there was another Home Defence Review, its results announced in 1966, 
which sought to reinterpret civil defence within this new framework. Finally, there was 
the sacrificing of civil defence preparations in 1968 on the altar of post-devaluation 
financial stringency. 
The RSG Debate, 1964 
Within two months of their arrival in power, the new Government was anxiously 
attempting to limit civil defence spending. The main bone of contention was the 
proposed building of six new Regional Seats of Government at a cost of £2 million over 
two years. Although obviously not an enormous sum, it is clear that the Treasury 
opposed such an increase in the home defence budget. It was discussed, we know, in 
CDM on 16 December 1964, where the Treasury reserved judgment. This was in order 
that the Chief Secretary, Jack Diamond, could consult the Chancellor, Jim Callaghan. 
Diamond informed the Home Secretary, Sir Frank Soskice, that the Treasury could not 
fund the programme - citing the new Government's spending commitments - and 
sought a deferral. Moreover, Diamond stressed that he did not believe deferment 
`would cause any significant difficulty' for home defence preparations'. 
6 
Due to the imminent deadline for the acceptance of the tender for the RSG construction 
work, a final decision was needed quickly. Soskice, therefore, appealed to the Prime 
Minister (18 December), forwarding him a memorandum stating the Home Office case 
-a neat summary of the whole 
RSG system and the planning changes involved with the 
Post-Cuba Review. 7 The new RSGs were required because the previous intelligence 
6 NA, PREM 13/23. John Diamond to Sir Frank Soskice, 17.12.1964. 
7 Ibid. Sir Frank Soskice to the Prime Minister, 18.12.1964. 
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advice that the government would have at least seven days warning of impending attack 
in which to make preparations was no longer tenable. In the six regions (including the 
Wales, North-West and Northern Regions8), therefore, where no quickly adaptable 
accommodation existed, bespoke buildings were required. Moreover, Soskice was keen 
to pooh-pooh the new strategic belief that the RSGs would be on any list of possible 
Russian targets - obviously a key argument for not building them. 9 One would have 
thought the enemy's post-attack system of Government was an eminently suitable target 
for Russian nuclear strategists, but the Home Office felt able to doubt it. `This 
assessment', they argued, `is not based on any direct evidence', and suggested a foreign 
power would not consider extending their attacks beyond nuclear installations and cities 
because they would be unnecessary, and, in any case, RSGs `represent no danger... 
since they have no role in connection with our nuclear strike forces' . 
10 In fact, one must 
question why this issue had only just arisen, some twenty months after the `Spies for 
Peace' episode. Surely the issue of the Soviets attacking the RSGs should have been 
dealt with before December 1964. For example, the Daily Mail discussed this issue at 
the time, telling its readers that `the bunkers... are sited in areas where H-bomb attack is 
- or WAS - least likely'. 
II 
In putting forward such a dubious strategic argument one can detect a note of 
desperation in the Home Office's submission. Although the sum involved was small, 
the RSGs were the backbone of the Government's civil defence policy: without them in 
place before a crisis, there could be no chance of maintaining a government presence 
on, or rather under, the ground in the aftermath of attack. The same day, Diamond sent 
a countering memo to Wilson, 12 arguing that the `record peace time increase' in public 
expenditure was coming `at a time when the economic and financial situation demands 
the opposite'. All `not urgently necessary' expenditure needed to be cut, `especially on 
things with low economic or social priority'. It was proposed that the increase should 
be deferred until the whole civil defence programme was reviewed. Finally, the doubts 
over whether the RSGs would survive the initial attack strengthened `an already 
compelling case both for not incurring this expenditure next year and for reviewing our 
8 These regions were discussed in January 1964. See NA, HO 322/318. `Note of a Meeting held 22nd 
January 1964'. 
9 NA, PREM 13/23. Sir Frank Soskice to the Prime Minister, 18.12.1964. 
10 Ibid. 
11 `Survival: twelve secret bunkers built for H-war "governments"', Daily Mail, 15.4.1963. 
12 NA, PREM 13/23. John Diamond to the Prime Minister, 18.12.1964. 
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predecessors' plans for home defence'. 13 After consultation with the Cabinet 
Secretary, 14 Wilson sided with the Treasury, and the Home Office were defeated. '5 
Usually when a government decision went against the civil defence planners, economic 
considerations can be mostly blamed. The same was essentially true in 1964-65, but a 
large additional factor was the strategic untenability of the Home Office position. With 
the MoD arguing that measures would be pointless, and the intelligence experts arguing 
that it was unlikely the RSGs would survive the first hours of a nuclear war, the Home 
Office were left with a pretty unimpressive case. The strategic background of 1960 had 
made it questionable whether civil defence measures were worth the money to support 
the deterrent, and four years later it was only more so. Not only was the damage to be 
expected in a nuclear war even greater, but the risk of war had seemingly lessened 
dramatically. This, aligned with the sharp decline of the anti-nuclear movement, meant 
that the public price of abandoning the policy would not be so high as it was thought in 
1960. All this lay in the future, however, and the RSG system belonged to a different 
aspect of policy than, say, the Civil Defence Corps. The latter since 1960 had been a 
policy pursued solely for its public effect, but the former was a policy the Home Office 
considered necessary for Britain's survival in a nuclear war. 
Home Defence Review, 1965 
The Home Defence Review of 1965 was initiated on 1 February 1965 when Wilson 
agreed to Soskice's proposal for a fundamental review of policy. 16 A year and a day 
later, the results of the review were briefly outlined in Parliament by Soskice's 
successor, Roy Jenkins. '7 Archival secrecy means historians have had trouble piecing 
together the decisions made in the review. 18 We have the Prime Minister's brief for the 
final Ministerial meeting on the Review (21 September 1965) and set of notes on 
`Presentation of Government Policy' from March 1966 which set out the basis of the 
Government's policy in some depth. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. Handwritten note on margin. 
15 Ibid. Prime Minister to Sir Frank Soskice, 23.12.1964. 
16 NA, PREM 13/797. Sir Frank Sosckice to Prime Minister, 1.2.1965 
17 House of Commons, Official Report, 2.2.1966, cols. 1089-91. 
18 For example, the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Home Defence, the Home Defence 
Committee and 
the Home Defence Review Committee are all closed. 
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In his brief for the Prime Minister on the broad policy recommended by the Review, Sir 
Burke Trend, wrote that `although the risk of nuclear attack on the United Kingdom is 
much reduced, it cannot be ignored and home defence cannot be entirely abandoned'. 
The two pillars of the review were `the need for economies' and `the assessment that a 
Precautionary Stage might be as short as two or three days', thus limiting the time 
available for ad hoc preparations. 19 The only controversy, it seems, was on the Civil 
Defence Corps. A majority on CDM was in favour of retaining its functions on the 
grounds that `it would not be defensible for the Government to say that no provision at 
all need be made for the functions now fulfilled by the Corps'; also, although its life- 
saving capacity was `marginal', there was a view that `in such a desperate situation', the 
Corps' functions `would be of increased importance and could not be carried out as 
effectively by other means'; and finally that disbandment `would be interpreted as 
meaning that the Government were abandoning all effective measures for civil 
defence '). 20 The uncertainty of the Corps' future had already caused the cancelling of 
the annual recruitment programme. 21 
The `speaking notes' on the review, circulated to Government Departments in May 
1966,22 reveal that the new basic philosophy of civil defence was that it `can do some 
things well, and that it should concentrate on those things', and that `only those 
measures which are likely to make a substantial contribution to national survival should 
be continued'. Civil defence preparations were divided into three types: casualty 
prevention, post-attack life-saving operations, and survival measures. The first and the 
third were considered the most important, and the second an inefficient way of saving 
lives. Casualty prevention had four elements: warning, `fall-out discipline', shelter and 
dispersal. An adequate warning, of even a few minutes, would apparently `save 
between 15% and 20% of the total casualties', because people could rush into buildings, 
throw themselves into ditches and so on (although what proportion of Britain's 
population in 1966 could expect to be next to a ditch at any given time is not given). 23 
Fall-out discipline, meaning everyone staying indoors and only leaving home when they 
19 NA, PREM 13/797. Sir Burke Trend to the Prime Minister, 21.9.1965. 
20 Ibid. 
21 NA, CAB 21/5185. J. E. Fraser to Mr Rogers, 3.8.1965. There had been no campaign in 1964, as it 
been cancelled - like in 1959 - due to the election. 1965 was thus the first year since 1949 that there 
had 
been no annual campaign. 
22 NA, CAB 134/2634. CD(O)(PC)(66)7. `The Home Defence Review: Presentation of Government 
Policy', Note by the Home Office, 25.5.1966. 
23 Ibid. 
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are told to (and only for brief periods) would save between 10 and 20% of casualties. 
Shelter in the home, in refuge rooms or self-constructed core shelters, if combined with 
discipline, would save an additional 5%-10%. Dispersal would save 20%. Those 
`dispersed' would be the same as those envisaged in 1962, but it was hoped to move 
them in the two or three days envisaged as a precautionary stage by only dispersing 
them within 50 miles of the cities, using commuter rail services (for the reason that, 
post-Beeching review of the railways, 24 only the suburban services had the capacity to 
move so many people). 25 
Altogether, then, it was estimated that between 50% and 70% of casualties could be 
avoided for the cost of only £3 million for the warning system. No actual figures were 
given, and the casualty prevention estimates were so vague as to be worthless, but they 
are worth stating to demonstrate the realms of farce civil defence planning had 
descended to. Of course, these speaking notes do not reveal the secret, internal 
deliberations behind the Home Defence Review, which would probably show a 
justification for civil defence similar to that found in the discussions in 1960. As we 
have seen, it was believed in 1960 that without preparations some 21.5 million would 
die from a nuclear attack. 26 Assuming that figure was the same in 1965, this would 
have meant between 6.45 million and 10.25 million dying even if the new home defence 
policy would have worked. But there are too many assumptions for this to hold true. 
Could they build refuge rooms? All the evidence from 1963-4 suggested they could 
not. Would the public follow fall-out discipline? Could dispersal really save so many 
people in so few days? Surely the scale of attack, the problems of fallout and the 
difficulties of transportation suggests that saving over 4 million lives in this way was an 
incredible over-estimate. 
In this context, the life-saving potential of the Civil Defence Corps was seen as 
inefficient. The Headquarters and Warden sections were seen as essential part of the 
control system, and the welfare organisation likewise essential in the survival stage. 
But the rescue and ambulance sections were `less easy to justify on operational 
24 See C. Loft, `Reappraisal and reshaping : government and the railway problem, 1951-64', 
Contemporary British History, 15: 4 (2001), pp. 71-92. 
25 NA, CAB 134/2634. CD(O)(PC)(66)7. `The Home Defence Review: Presentation of Government 
Policy'. 
26 NA, CAB 134/2039. HDR(60)8, `Assessment of the Effects of Attack on the United Kingdom', Note 
by the Home Office, 5.4.1960. 
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grounds'. 27 This was prior to negotiations with local authorities, and when the results of 
these talks were announced by Jenkins in the Commons on 14 December 1966, the 
rescue and ambulance sections were to be scrapped and the Corps was to `help the local 
authorities to man the control system, which is the system of government in emergency; 
and to provide limited numbers of specialists to help to organise the first aid and welfare 
resources of the community'. 28 The active strength of the Corps, would be reduced 
from 122,000 to 75,000-80,000, saving £1 million. In reply, the Richard Sharples 
(Conservative, Sutton and Cheam) argued that `for a comparatively small saving, in the 
opinion of many civil defence workers he is virtually destroying an organisation which 
has rendered a great service both in peace and war'. 29 Certainly, the life-saving capacity 
had been abandoned, and it surely explains why the government's policy on pre-attack 
casualty prevention was so laden with hyperbole - the measures described there had to 
compensate for the axing of the rescue and ambulance section of the Civil Defence 
Corps. 
To return to the initial Review, its final strand was the `survival measures'. This, 
essentially, was the control system, `long regarded as essential if the available 
resources, human and material, are to be deployed to best advantage'. 30 Related to this 
was the maintenance of law and order, which would of course have to be directed from 
the regional or sub-regional apparatus. The police as well as the new, but short-lived, 
`Home Defence Force' branch of the Army Volunteer Reserve would be vital `if 
ordered community life is to survive, and if food and other essentials of life are to be 
distributed equitably, and if people are to be given assurance and hope for the future'. 
31 
The restructuring of the control system was heavily influenced by the analysis that the 
RSGs would be targeted in any future war. The HDR sub-committee on the issue made 
it clear that `it is essential, if the nation is to survive as an organised entity, for some 
form of government to operate at the regional level between central and local 
government'. Also, `it must be viable. It must be more flexible, in the sense of being 
27 NA, CAB 134/2634. CD(O)(PC)(66)7. `The Home Defence Review: Presentation of Government 
Policy'. 
28 House of Commons, Official Report, 14.12.1966, cols. 458-9. 
29 Ibid., cols. 459-60. 
30 NA, CAB 134/2634. CD(O)(PC)(66)7. `The Home Defence Review: Presentation of Government 
Policy'. 
31 Ibid. 
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reasonably likely to survive attack, than that hitherto proposed'. 32 This led to the 
conclusion that the RSGs should only be manned after attack, and that a greater burden 
should be placed on the Sub-Regional Controls, or which there were usually two per 
region. These would be manned pre-attack, usually in previously identified buildings 
and they would have some ability to conduct operations for the whole region if the RSG 
was unavailable for use. The RSG staff would convene in the region away from the 
premises which would probably have to be improvised to some extent as the building 
programme, it was decided, could continue to be deferred. This at least meant that the 
system was more flexible, but it also meant that it was very tenuous. It relied on the 
RSG staff being able to occupy a standing, and previously identified building, and SRCs 
remaining off the Soviet Target list. 33 
Could this new system have worked? On 15 November 1965, the Civil Defence 
Department of the Home Office sent a letter to all its Regional Civil Defence Directors, 
asking them to identify premises which would be suitable for the short-term as Sub- 
Regional Controls. 34 A year later, the Home Office drafted a paper for the HDC sub- 
committee on the control system to report on progress. 35 Of the twenty-one SRCs 
mentioned, ten were already operational. A few of the these were ex-RSGs, such as 
Kidderminster and Dover. Of the rest, most were in government hands and could be 
strengthened, but five were in private hands (including the University of Wales at 
Bangor, and the Craiglands Hotel, Ilkley) and could only be earmarked. The same 
earmarking process occurred for buildings where the RSG staff could `gather' pre- 
attack: the Grand Hotel in Scarborough, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Arundel 
Castle, and the less salubrious Durham or Chelmsford Prisons, were all listed as 
possible premises. In short, there were few premises from which the regions could be 
governed in a war emergency. Assuming the Soviets would destroy the old RSG sites 
(and of course, half of those had not been built because of this very assumption), the 
control system would be in tatters, trying to find buildings with adequate 
communications in which to operate. Even in the long-term, no money was to be found 
32 NA, HO 322/353. UKLP/HDR(CS)(65)6. `Home Defence Committee: A Precis of the Report of the 
Sub-Committee of the Control System', undated. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. Letter from the Civil Defence Department of the Home Office to all Regional Civil Defence 
Directors, 15.11.1965. 
35 NA, HO 322/354. `Home Defence Committee: Civil Defence Planning-Sub-Committee. The Wartime 
Control System in England and Wales: The Location of Controls', draft note by the Home Office, 
October 1966. 
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for new premises. It can only be argued that in the wake of the `Spies for Peace' 
revelations and the new assumptions concerning the Soviets' intentions, the 
government's policy of regional control had collapsed. This had been a central civil and 
home defence policy in the years following Strath: it was considered of paramount 
importance, second only to that of the central government headquarters itself. By 1966, 
all the RSGs should have been completed, and a rare civil defence planning success 
could have been celebrated. By the middle of 1965, however, the policy which had 
evolved over the previous eight to ten years was essentially dead. 
When Jenkins outlined the changes to the Civil Defence Corps, he argued that it would 
allow the Government to cut the home defence budget of £19.7 million in 1966/67 by 
£1 million the following year. Since Labour assumed power in October 1964, the 
budget had been cut from £24.1 million in 1964/65, or, more crucially, from the 
projected cost of £26.9 million in 1965/66 to £18.7 million in 1967/68, a cut of over 
30%. But can the 1965 review and the semi-policy it instigated be explained purely in 
financial terms? In 1960-64 there had been a genuine attempt to work towards a 
realistic civil defence policy, one which although not expected to save a great deal of 
lives post-attack, would have a system of government in place and some sort of 
workable dispersal policy. But this plan had been swept away in 1963-64 when it was 
decided that the RSGs were untenable and that there could be no week-long 
precautionary stage. The 1965 Review did no more than realign civil defence policy 
with these strategic realities. 
These realities precluded an attempt to construct a civil defence policy of the sort 
laboriously put together under the previous Conservative administrations. In 1965 the 
strategic and political pressure to do so had also lessened. Firstly, the likelihood of 
global war in 1965 had markedly decreased since 1960, with detente ruling in place of 
the sharply defined antagonism of the 1958-62 era. As John Lewis Gaddis puts it, `cold 
war history is, at least in part, the story of how what was thought to be unendurable 
became endurable; how order and stability, if rarely justice, evolved from bitter and 
sustained rivalry'. 36 Post-Cuba, the cold war did indeed become markedly more 
endurable. Gaddis continued: `surely the nuclear revolution provides one explanation. 
These new weapons raised the costs of challenging the status quo even as the ylowered 
36 Gaddis, We Know Now, p. 113. 
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the burdens of defending it: once they were in place on both sides and in sufficient 
quantity, they created a kind of stalemate that neither thought it could safely change'. 37 
The belief that nuclear war could be averted and the desire to avoid conflict reaching the 
fevered pitch of Cuba certainly gave international relations a less frenzied air, and it 
gave a strategic background for the government's decision to cut back on civil defence. 
The second factor was the collapse of the nuclear disarmament movement as an 
organiser of mass-opinion. Again, Cuba has been used to explain this. After Cuba, 
support drifted away from disarmament groups worldwide, 38 especially in Britain. 
The War Game 
Yet the decline of anti-nuclear feeling in Britain must not be overstated. Nuclear war 
and civil defence were still capable of creating controversy, as the War Game furore 
proved. In 1965 the BBC produced The War Game, a documentary style drama by 
Peter Watkins detailing the effects of a nuclear attack on a town in Kent, but decided 
against broadcasting it ostensibly due to the violence of the images it contained. 39 The 
non-transmission of The War Game was extremely controversial, with some, Watkins 
included, believing it was a political decision designed to keep his film, representing the 
`truth' about nuclear war, from the screens. 40 The controversy surrounding the non- 
transmission has been thoroughly investigated in recent years, and the debate over 
whether the Government `censored' The War Game has been authoritatively dealt with 
by the film historians James Chapman and Tony Shaw. 41 Shaw argued that `there now 
seems little doubt that the government passed on to the BBC's senior officials very clear 
advice that to broadcast the film would be contrary to the national interest, and that this 
played a significant part in the Corporation's final decision' . 
42 Just as important, 
however, was the `overwhelming support' which greeted the ban from within the BBC 
and the press. Slightly more firmly, Chapman argued that `the claim that the 
Government suppressed the film' does not `stand up to close investigation', stressing 
37 Ibid., pp. 113-4. 
38 L. S. Witmer, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-70, 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press), pp. 452-4. 
39 The complicated history of the episode is admirably reconstructed in J. Chapman, `The BBC and the 
Censorship of The War Game (1965)', Journal of Contemporary History, 41: 1 (2006), 75-94. 
ao Ibid. 
41 Ibid.; see also T. Shaw, British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consensus, (I. B. 
Tauris, 2000). 
42 Ibid., p. 138-9. 
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the `consensual' nature of the decision not to broadcast: `the balance of opinion - within 
the BBC, in Whitehall and on the part of the press - was in favour of the ban'. 43 
Whatever the reasons for its non-transmission, the decision caused outcry among the 
nuclear disarmers, who felt that the Government had heavy-handedly intervened to 
squash debate on civil defence and nuclear war. The BBC, who felt under pressure to 
assert its independence and to prove its decision had been an honourable one, held 
closed screenings. Tickets to these screenings, incidentally, were in great demand. The 
BBC archives detail the attempts of dozens of MPs attempting to get extra seats. 44 
Interestingly, the BBC invited the defence rather than television correspondents of the 
newspapers. As Tony Shaw put it, `to most newspapers the production was deemed 
either gratuitously violent, politically dangerous or monstrously misrepresentative - in 
' 4s short, CND propaganda . 
But despite its reputation and its power, the image of nuclear war and civil defence 
displayed in The War Game is hardly one to which Ministers and planners could have 
objected. Lord Normanbrook, the Chairman of the BBC told his successor as Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, that `I have seen the film, and I can say that it has been 
produced with considerable restraint. But the subject is, necessarily, alarming; and the 
showing of the film might have a significant effect on public attitudes to the nuclear 
deterrent' . 
46 Normanbrook was of course well qualified to judge, and herein lies the 
answer to the question of government censorship: with such a figure as Sir Norman 
Brook, as was, making the decision (with the Director-General, Sir Hugh Greene), the 
government had no need to twist arms. The man who had co-ordinated Britain's 
nuclear and civil defence policies since the cold war began was never going to allow a 
film to be shown which undermined the deterrent policy to which so much of his 
working life had been devoted. The Chairman's attachment to his Whitehall past is 
43 Chapman, `Censorship of The War Game', p. 93. 
as BBC Written Archives Centre [BBCWAC], Caversham, Berkshire. R101/436/1. "`War Game" 
Showing: General Correspondence. 
as Shaw, British Cinema and the Cold War, p. 139. 
46 NA, CAB 21/5808. `HMG censorship of BBC Film "The War Game"'. Lord Normanbrook to Sir 
Burke Trend, 7/9/1965. 
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illustrated by his stepping in personally to ensure that a much sought-after ticket was 
sent to a retired civil servant with an interest in the issue: one Sir William Strath. 47 
As Normanbrook said, the subject was necessarily alarming, and the power of the film 
lies in its violence and brutality - key scenes include the execution of food rioters by the 
police, the social divisions unmasked by evacuation, the results of a rationing of 
medical supplies and the traumatised survivors. But the reality, as these chapters have 
shown, would have been undoubtedly worse than that portrayed by Watkins. Key 
government policies were shown to be a success: evacuation occurs before the attack 
comes and the government are able to maintain control of food distribution and law and 
order. The execution of looters would be preferable to anarchy resulting from the 
disintegration of government control. Had a nuclear war broken out on the scale 
envisaged in the film, the British civil defence planners could have only hoped that their 
policies worked as well in reality as they did in The War Game. The problems over the 
film were not caused by the difference between it and the government's policy, but 
between it and the public discourse over that policy. For although many people 
followed the CND line that nuclear war would be all-destructive, the actual physical 
damage caused by nuclear war and the post-attack condition of Britain were enormously 
difficult to conceptualise - as Strath put it, `beyond the imagination'. 
48 Watkins' vision, 
therefore, could have had an enormous impact on an unprepared public mind caught 
between two opposing versions of nuclear war - CND's all-encompassing catastrophe, 
and the government's survivable nuclear war. Officials, meanwhile, understood that the 
reality would be worse than The War Game. 
Care-and-Maintenance 
These factors also explain why the end of civil defence, when it came, was relatively 
uncontroversial. In November 1967 the Wilson Government devalued the pound 
against the dollar, the final wrecking the Government's doomed economic policy. More 
important for British domestic and overseas policy was the programme of cuts in public 
expenditure thrashed out in no less than eight Cabinet meetings between 4-15 January 
1968.49 Announced in the House of Commons by Wilson on 16 January, the main 
47 BBCWAC. R101/437/1. "`War Game, The"': Showing: General Correspondence. Note to Chairman 
from A. L. Hutchinson, 16.12.1965. 
48 NA, CAB 134/940. HDC(55)3, `The Defence Implications of Fall-out from a Hydrogen Bomb'. 
49 See NA, CAB 128/43. C(68)l` Meeting, 4.1.1968; C(68)8`h Meeting, 15.1.1968. 
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measures included the accelerated withdrawal of British troops from the Far East, and 
also from the Gulf; the scrapping of plans to purchase fifty F-111 aeroplanes from 
America; the reintroduction of prescription charges; and, perhaps most controversial of 
all, deferring the raising of the school leaving age from 15 to 16. Wilson himself called 
this last measure a `difficult, indeed repugnant' decision to make. 50 In the face of this 
onslaught of cuts, the transferral of civil defence planning to a care-and-maintenance 
basis received little attention. Wilson announced: 
We have decided to reduce Home Defence - Civil Defence - to a care- 
and-maintenance basis, with a saving of about £14 million in 1968-9, and 
£20 million in 1969-70 and in subsequent years. This will involve the 
disbandment of the Civil Defence Corps, the Auxiliary Fire Service and 
the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve Category III. 5' 
The proposal had been put to the Cabinet as part of the post-devaluation measures of the 
new Chancellor, Roy Jenkins. 52 Jenkins outlined the results of a still-secret Home 
Defence Review Committee Report commissioned by himself and Callaghan (the new 
Home Secretary), which advised that two cost-cutting options could be pursued: `a 
minimum coherent programme' of active home defence preparations, which would cost 
£19-£20 million per annum, and placing everything on a care-and-maintenance basis, 
which would cut costs `to about £13 million in 1968-9, and thereafter to about £7-£8 
million per annum'. 53 
What the `minimum' programme consisted of is unknown, but Jenkins was `quite sure 
that in present circumstances we must put H. D. on a care-and-maintenance basis'. This 
meant `no new physical assets would be created' beyond those already at an advanced 
stage of planning, `but existing physical assets would generally be preserved'. The 
volunteer services `would be disbanded, and planning and instruction would be limited 
to what was necessary to enable active preparations to be resumed at some future date'. 
It was recognised that `it would not be easy to recruit volunteers again after a lapse of 
time, or to bring ourselves back to the present state of readiness without intensive effort. 
But we cannot afford to pay £20 million or more every year as an insurance premium 
50 House of Commons, Official Report, 16.1.1968, col-1586. 
51 Ibid, col. 1589. 
52 NA, CAB 129/135. C(68)5, `Public Expenditure: Post-Devaluation Measures', Memorandum by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer', 3.1.1967. 
53 Ibid. 
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against nuclear attack'. 54 In the Cabinet discussion, Callaghan simply agreed with the 
proposal, as did Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary, who stated that `the maintenance 
of civil defence in this country on the existing scale was not a significant element in the 
deterrence of nuclear aggression' . 
55 
And that was that. A sterling crisis too far, and the whole basis of cold war civil 
defence was swept away and the Civil Defence Corps consigned to history. But as with 
the 1965-66 Review, the strategic context that allowed civil defence to be so savagely 
cut was all-important. Although the need to limit spending post-devaluation was the 
initial spur, it must be remembered that by 1968 home defence had few supporters left 
in Whitehall. Although we cannot investigate the arguments put forward by the Home 
Defence Review Committee as they debated cuts in provision with the axe hovering 
over them, we can readily imagine how the arguments against continuing with civil 
defence ran: it was no longer needed as the threat of war had receded; if there was a 
war, civil defence could not mitigate its effects anyway; that £27 million, or £20 million 
for that matter, was an excessive `premium' to pay for such an insurance policy. The 
Ministry of Defence had been arguing for scrapping it as an irrelevance along these 
lines since 1960, and by 1968 the case appeared compelling. The strategic context had 
caught up with the MoD argument, making the case against civil defence very strong. 
With the added economic imperative, it was irresistible. 
The Government's policy of ending conspicuous civil defence preparations positioned 
them in-between those implacably opposed to civil defence and those firm supporters of 
it. This was amply demonstrated in the brief debate on civil defence held on 18 January 
1968. No one made any real case for continuing civil defence. David Ennals, Under- 
Secretary at the Home Office, had to reply both to Hugh Jenkins (Labour, Putney), who 
called the possibility of civilised life after nuclear attack `a totally unrealistic fairy 
tale', 56 and Sir David Renton (Conservative, Huntingdonshire), who argued that both 
the `credibility of the deterrent' and `a most valuable service to humanity' were being 
`removed'. 57 Ennals simply stated that `the extent of civil defence preparations must 
depend both on the extent of the danger, as represented by the international situation, 
54 Ibid. 
ss NA, CAB 128/43 Part one. CC(68)3`d Conclusions, 9.1.1968. 
56 House of Commons, Official Report, 18.1.1968, col. 2093. 
57 Ibid., cols. 2097-8. 
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and on the ability of the country to pay for the cost of civil defence preparations', 58 and 
that the expense could be justified `were there to be a situation of mounting 
international tension; but this, happily is not the present situation'. 59 It was the 
government's stated policy that once the international position changed, civil defence 
preparations could be ratcheted up from the level suspended in 1968 (although Jenkins 
had informed the Cabinet that this would not be possible), which allowed Ennals to 
side-step the argument that the Government was jeopardising the deterrent. It also 
allowed him to refute the notion that the Government was ending civil defence 
preparations because they had come to their senses and realised it was pointless: 
because they had not, in fact, ended civil defence at all -just suspended it. 
The Government, and the local authorities, still had a statutory duty under the Civil 
Defence Act of 1948 to undertake civil defence plans. The Home Office actually sent a 
circular to the local authorities outlining that `the Government's decision must not be 
construed as implying the abandonment of all civil defence measures'. 60 Future civil 
defence activity `should consist primarily of planning how to raise the level of 
preparations should the circumstances demand it... rather than of making physical 
preparations against the contingency of an imminent war. 61 
Although the planning obligation remained and official statements stressed that civil 
defence preparations could be resurrected, 1968 must be seen as the end of postwar 
British civil defence. When civil defence preparations began again - in a small way in 
1972, and more substantially after 1980, both under Conservative Governments - there 
was no voluntary civil defence organisation, and scant effort was made to protect the 
population. 62 The Corps, which formed the heart of civil defence policy between 
1948/9 and 1968, and had been depleted gradually throughout the 1960s, was finally put 
out of its misery, and all physical preparations were stopped. The constant battle to 
update plans and preparations to meet the contingency of nuclear war had been fought 
and largely lost for more than twenty years, but was now given up. 
58 Ibid., col. 2099. 
59 Ibid., col. 2100. 
60 Civil Defence Circular 2/1969,11.3.1969. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See Duncan Campbell, War Plan UK, pp. 137-77. 
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Although Sir Burke Trend led a move to have the care-and-maintenance decision 
reversed in 1969, arguing that the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 
1968 `has emphasised the incalculability of Soviet actions', and that `it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that a year of "care-and-maintenance" has left us with home 
defence arrangements less effective than was contemplated would be the case when the 
1968 decision was taken', 63 an increase in spending was ruled out by the Home 
Secretary himself. 64 The continuation of this debate belongs to the history of civil 
defence's road back to viability in 1972 rather than its decline, but the episode 
illustrates the state of home defence as the 1960s ended - it was difficult even to muster 
the enthusiasm of the Minister departmentally most concerned. It is clear that in 1969 
there were massive problems in home defence policy which would have detrimentally 
affected Britain's ability to fight a war, let alone survive it - but then, the whole policy 
was based on the strategic calculation that no war would come. But it is important to 
trace this ending of civil defence back to the formation of the Wilson Government, and 
even before. Although care-and-maintenance appears as a snap decision in order to 
save around £20 million a year, we can see that the policy was a logical development of 
trends discernable from 1960. 
These trends can be seen in the two strands of policy: the Civil Defence Corps and what 
we can call the Control System - the continuation of Government in and after war. In 
that year, the Ministry of Defence had declined to support the continuation of the Civil 
Defence Corps, believing the `humanitarian' aspect of civil defence a needlessly 
expensive charade. The Civil Defence Corps had been reorganised twice in the 1960s 
to rationalise it and save costs - first to strengthen it by weeding out the inefficient 
members, then by ending its rescue role - before it was finally axed. It was a justifiable 
decision, and one which might well have happened sooner. Civil defence in general and 
the Corps in particular, however, were the Government's shield against accusations of 
brutality - nuclear war with a human face, if you will. Once it was gone, governments 
were faced with the policy of possessing nuclear weapons but having no policy to save 
lives in the event of their use -a nightmare policy for the Conservative Governments 
and the trumping argument whenever the abolition of the Corps was raised - but an 
acceptable one in 1968. As mentioned above, the political imperative behind retaining 
63 NA, CAB 134/2871. HDC(69)5 
64 Ibid., Callaghan to the Prime Minister, 29.7.1969. 
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the Corps, so powerful in 1960 (even the MoD admitted that scrapping the Corps would 
be politically impossible in the short term) was absent in 1968 when the tensions of the 
cold war had eased enormously and - related to this - the hold of the disarmament 
movement over the hearts and minds of the public had lessened. 
The second strand, the system of government, is more complex, mostly as a result of the 
debate around it being conducted in secrecy (except of course, for the `Spies for Peace' 
episode). The whole trend of civil and home defence since the Strath Report had been 
away from the previously dominant Second World War conceptualisation of life-saving 
and towards a concentration on the preservation of the central, regional and local 
government and thus the means to maintain authority and the ability to organise a 
recovery of the nation. When the Wilson Government came to power, the six essential 
RSGs needed were scrapped partly for economic reasons but there was also a sound 
strategic rationale for the decision. It was on this level that the care-and-maintenance 
decision, in the opinion of Trend, was a disaster. By undermining the ability of the 
Government to maintain law and order, it contravened one of the basic tenets of home 
defence policy. This was a result of preparations coming to a sudden stop, rather than 
being allowed to run down, reaching a natural end-point. But then Trend's case was 
doubtlessly undermined by the fact that there was grave doubt over whether the RSGs 
or any other government installation could survive an attack. 
The abolition of the Civil Defence Corps and the placing of other elements of civil 
defence into remission provides the historian with a natural break in the history of cold 
war civil defence, an aspect of Britain's past peculiarly weighed down by its own 
history. The civil defence triumphs of 1939-45 led partly to the form the Corps took in 
1945, and once it was in existence, its presence meant that it could not be abolished. 
The more its life-saving role in the atomic age and the early thermonuclear era was 
stressed or exaggerated by politicians, the harder it was then to dismiss it. In other 
aspects of civil defence policy, however, British planners were far from hidebound by 
the past - grasping the issues of the atomic, thermonuclear and rocket ages with vigour 
and perception. But even the more efficient aspects of the policy appeared outmoded by 
the developments in nuclear technology. Finally, civil defence's reason for existing 
seemed to vanish. The decline of cold war tension seemed to make it worthwhile to 
many to stop the insurance policy - that irresistible, if hackneyed nuclear defence 
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metaphor - as the premium seemed excessive compared to the slight risk. Some 
insurance was still needed - hence care-and-maintenance rather than outright scrapping 
- but there was disagreement on what level of premium to pay. The politicians wanted 
the bare minimum, but the planners in 1969 seemed to suggest that this minimum was 
not enough. No one believed a return to the higher level of cover provided by a vast 
volunteer group was worth paying. Had someone suggested in 1969 Whitehall a policy 
of the complexity, scope and above all cost of that contained in the Strath report, there 
would have been either honest and earnest concerns for his mental health or a real threat 
to his future pension. By the end of the 1960s civil defence had few friends left in the 
corridors of power. 
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Conclusion 
Civil defence was put in cold storage in 1968, twenty-three years after it had last been 
stood down. In those twenty-three years what civil defence meant, cost, and was able to 
do, had changed dramatically. Indeed, what was understood as civil defence policy in 
1945 was simply unrecognisable in 1968. Civil defence, like the world, had been 
revolutionised by the cold war and the technological developments in nuclear weapons. 
In 1945, as well in 1948 when the Civil Defence Act was passed, civil defence still 
stood squarely for saving lives. This was only one of two principal aims. The other 
was equally forgotten in 1968 - that of ensuring the continued functioning of the 
economy in war. Designed to allow Britain to successfully prosecute a future war, these 
aims had been the central tenets of civil defence in 1939-45 and continued to be in the 
early cold war. Before 1949, enemy attack was still conceived in terms of conventional 
warfare. Although the scale of attack in any war was assumed to be far greater than that 
delivered in 1940, its character would be the same. Evacuation, fire and medical 
services, emergency feeding, a capacity to help the homeless, a large volunteer force to 
rescue the victims of attack, and an expanded police force to help maintain law and 
order: these were the measures to stave off defeat on the home front. In 1945, indeed 
even in 1948, the threat of attack with atomic weapons seemed some way off. When the 
Soviet Union exploded its atomic bomb, the character of civil defence initially remained 
essentially unaltered: although it would take more effort and more money to achieve the 
same results, the basis of planning did not greatly change. 
That this `classic' civil defence policy began to crumble in the 1950s is well known, but 
it is less widely understood that this crumbling began before the great Strath review of 
plans in the wake of the hydrogen bomb in 1954-55. Nearly two years before Strath 
reported, a different working party came to the conclusion that the effects of an all-out 
atomic bombardment (with 132 atomic weapons) would seriously affect Britain's ability 
to fight a future war. The belief in Britain's post-attack war fighting capacity was swept 
away in the wake of the hydrogen bomb, but Strath still held to the core civil defence 
principle of saving lives. He recommended public shelters, as all previous civil defence 
planners had done, more evacuation and an increased capacity to fight fires and save 
lives, although it was clear millions would die. The key policy to emerge from the 1955 
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review however, was the importance of the maintenance of control. This had also been 
stressed in 1953, but in the wake of Strath it was to become the guiding principle of 
civil defence policy. 
After Strath, Ministers struggled to fit its revolutionary conclusions within the 
Government's financial constraints. Their compromise, no shelters but evacuation and 
increased stockpiling of food and medicine, was painfully reached but quickly swept 
away in the summer of 1956. Eden's pre-Suez, pre-Sandys policy review has been 
neglected by historians, but it destroyed the Strath conceptualisation of civil defence by 
imposing cuts of over 50 per cent. The expensive stockpiling was gone - but the Corps 
and evacuation remained. After 1956, civil defence largely drifted along, with the 
Macmillan Government seemingly unwilling, or unable, to restructure civil defence 
policy in the wake of the imposed financial settlement. Only in 1960 was civil defence 
overhauled, with a new evacuation policy, a restructured Civil Defence Corps, and a 
new programme for the Regional Seats of Government re-energising civil defence 
policy. 
The 1960 Home Defence Review, along with intermittent crises of the early 1960s, 
meant that civil defence policy by 1963 was as honed and as well-developed as perhaps 
it ever had been. Even if the level of provision was enormously different from seven 
years earlier, the government plans were well thought-out and could probably have been 
implemented in war - which is more than can be said for most periods. But just five 
years later civil defence was shelved as a going concern and the Corps disbanded -a 
combination of finance, detente and a disinterested public all combined to ensure that 
the care-and-maintenance policy was an attractive one for the Wilson Government. 
What of the key themes which emerge from civil defence? What does the study of this 
previously shadowy, virtually unknown policy tell us about postwar Britain? Firstly, it 
reminds us of the centrality of the cold war in British history, something which is not 
sufficiently recognised, even today. We know from previous work that the cold war 
dominated the thinking of Prime Ministers such as Churchill and Macmilllan, but civil 
defence was a time-consuming policy. It may not have dominated the political agenda, 
but the Ministerial time spent on the issue in 1948,1955-56,1960-61 and 1964-66 
demonstrates its enormous significance. 
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Secondly, it demonstrates the key place civil defence had in conceptualisations of 
Britain's wider defence policy. The wartime machinery of government planned after 
1955 shows British strategy to deal with nuclear attack rested in the last analysis on the 
maintenance of control in the post-attack period, and this whole shadowy system of 
half-built controls has remained shrouded in secrecy until recently. It can now be 
understood that these `bunkers' were conceived as part of an overall defence policy that 
represented a genuine attempt to recover from nuclear war. The whole 
conceptualisation of civil defence in the thermonuclear age sheds light on the 
government's determination to uphold the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Civil 
defence on the 1939-45 model lasted into the 1960s solely to uphold the image that the 
government could direct life-saving operations in the event of nuclear attack; an image 
which itself was sustained solely to convince the public, in a future and unspecified 
crisis, to support the government's deterrent policy (crudely, that of maintaining a threat 
of nuclear attack to deter Soviet conventional attack); and this itself was important not 
in terms of whether the government would launch the deterrent, but in terms of 
convincing the enemy that a united front existed in Britain about launching the deterrent 
and thus risking all-out Soviet attack, and thus, in the final analysis, actively deterring 
the Soviets from starting a conventional war. It may seem tenuous, but the Home 
Office spent around £11 million a year on maintaining the Civil Defence Corps alone: a 
substantial sum to spend on bolstering the credibility of the deterrent. It may be argued 
that the sum was needed for political reasons - that it would be too controversial to 
scrap civil defence. But this is to miss the point that the reason the deterrent needed 
bolstering and the reason it was politically controversial were the same: the existence of 
a formidable group opposed to Britain's possession of nuclear weapons. 
Another important conclusion, then, is the influence of CND. Although by the mid- 
1960s, the group was a shadow of its former self and had achieved none of its aims, 
there can be little doubt that their protest shook Whitehall greatly. The torpor and drift 
which characterised civil defence policy-making in the late 1950s, as well as the 
maintenance of civil defence in the 1960s, was directly influenced by the rise of CND. 
Civil defence, after the heavy cuts of 1956, had no answer to the power of the hydrogen 
bomb. The advent of CND led to the policy being frozen - provision could neither be 
254 
expanded nor contracted as activity itself was frowned upon. The Government was 
effectively distancing itself from defence against nuclear attack. 
Political silence over civil defence led to an erosion of the concept of the survivable 
nuclear war -a concept central to the use of civil defence to bolster the deterrent. How 
the idea of defence against a nuclear war was managed is also a fascinating theme of 
this thesis. The controversial nuclear strategist Herman Kahn argued in 1960 that one 
of the great victories of the anti-nuclear movement in America was the success of its 
narrative of nuclear war as truly apocalyptic. ' As is shown in chapter six, by this time 
the notion that nuclear war must destroy the world was also firmly entrenched in 
Britain. The result of the victory of the `apocalyptic nuclear war' narrative made it 
virtually impossible for serious discussion of civil defence policies and nuclear war to 
take place after 1958-60. Proof of this can be seen from the publicity disaster associated 
with the 1963 booklet, Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack 
and the derision which often greeted the activities of the Civil Defence Corps. The 
reaction to the famous admission in the 1957 Defence White Paper that there was no 
adequate defence against nuclear war taught the Government that stressing the fact that 
lives could be saved was vital, even though the object of Sandys had been, at least in 
part, to justify the reductions of civil defence expenditure by linking the cut with the 
new security to be gained by the deterrent. There can be no doubt the White Paper's 
reticence over the worth of civil defence measures was caused in part by the reluctance 
to stress the value of policy which had just seen its budget halved - hence the statement 
that the hydrogen bomb had reduced the value of civil defence. This reticence 
dramatically added to the impact of, and in fact helped create the myth of, the apparent 
admission that there was no defence against the hydrogen bomb. A robust paragraph on 
civil defence measures might have diluted this impression, but would certainly have 
drawn more attention to the cut in provision. 
In essence, we can see the paradox over the government's public presentation of civil 
defence. The all-destructive nuclear war was a misleading image, but the Government 
felt unable to present a truthful image of the effects of nuclear war. Such a presentation 
would have involved admitting civil defence measures were essentially useless unless 
conducted on a massively expensive scale. It would, however, have been a nuanced and 
1 Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pp. 9-21. 
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sophisticated argument which managed to both admit this and also convince the public 
that nuclear war would not be an end-of-the-world scenario. In 1960 the Ministry of 
Defence argued that the government should attempt just this sort of reasoned argument 
to maintain support for the deterrent after scrapping civil defence. Although the 
prospect might have been an alluring one, surely the niceties of explaining the `reality' 
of nuclear war would have been obscured in a blizzard of condemnation - more so than 
the Sandys White Paper had been in 1957. The route left open to the government, then, 
was to maintain the fiction that civil defence measures would have an important part to 
play in mitigating the affects of nuclear attack. The perpetuation of this myth was a 
dangerous policy for the government, as it rested on a Civil Defence Corps which was 
increasingly becoming a laughing stock. As outlined above, the government's attempt 
to inject life into its myth by reorganising the Corps came five years too late. 
In many ways 1956, that year of global turning-points, can be seen as the pivotal date in 
civil defence policy: it was the year the budget was cut in half, ending expenditure on 
measures considered vital to the recovery of the nation in the post-attack phase; it was 
also the year the Sandys White Paper was largely developed. The cut, and the infamous 
`admission' of the indefensible nature of nuclear war marked the turning point between 
a civil defence policy existing to mitigate the affects of attack, and a civil defence policy 
existing to manipulate an image about defence against nuclear war. Of course there 
were major elements of `facade' in civil defence policy from 1948 onward, and the live- 
saving role of civil defence was stressed by ever-decreasing amounts of insiders before 
1956. But after 1956 the policy was ruled by fear - fear of what would happen if the 
policy was scrapped - rather than the positive emotion of what it could achieve. 
The 
1960 review enshrined these developments, recasting the Corps to make it more 
credible and aiming to secure Britain's future through the physical construction of a 
workable wartime machinery of government. Only in 1968 when the image of the 
survivable nuclear war had served its purpose was the public face of the policy 
scrapped. A few words must be devoted the hundreds of thousands of ordinary men and 
women who volunteered to join the Civil Defence Corps and allied services. 
Cruelly 
derided by CND in its later years, and largely forgotten by historians since, they were 
prepared to train for, and one must assume, to fight in a nuclear war. That their voice 
has been largely absent from this thesis is the most glaring of its failings, but the 
sociology of the movement as a whole deserves a work in itself. 
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Cold war British civil defence policy has been undeservedly, if understandably 
neglected by historians, and has been rather ill-served by those writing on it in the pre- 
archival era. This concentrated on the notion of a facade, a sham -a cruel trick played 
to dupe the population. This can only be partially true. In the atomic era, the life- 
saving role of civil defence was genuinely and strongly felt. Only later was civil 
defence a deliberate facade. But, by investigating how civil defence was conceptualised 
and how it developed over the course of the cold war, we can see that although it was a 
sham and a facade, it was a rational and understandable sham, and in terms of the 
government's overall defence policy, a necessary facade. 
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Chronology 
Aug 1945 Atomic Bombs first used 
June 1946 Publication of The Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki: Report of the British Mission to Japan, to universal 
indifference 
Feb 1948 Prague coup installs Communist regime in Czechoslovakia 
June 1948 Start of Berlin blockade 
Jul-Oct 1948 Berlin `Crash Plan' prepared 
Dec 1948 Civil Defence Act passed 
Jul 1949 Civil Defence Corps founded (recruitment begins in November) 
Scheme to evacuate 4,500,000 `priority classes' agreed by Ministers 
Aug 1949 First Soviet atomic explosion 
June 1950 Outbreak of Korean War 
Dec 1950 Four year spending plan to increase preparedness agreed by the 
Cabinet 
July 1953 Hall Report estimating the effects of 132 atomic bombs 
Mar 1954 Explosion of Hydrogen Bomb over Bikini Atoll 
Apr 1954 Coventry City Council announces its intention to cease wasting its 
money on civil defence preparations 
Mar 1955 Strath Report recommends massive increase in civil defence provision 
Jul 1955 Padmore Working Party recommends the construction of a wartime 
Machinery of Government 
Sept 1955 Civil Defence Corps reaches peak strength of 338,366 volunteers in 
England and Wales 
Dec 1955 Final defeat of Gwilym Lloyd-George's shelter policy 
Feb 1956 11,500,000 evacuation scheme agreed 
Jun 1956 Eden Government's Policy Review cuts civil defence by over 50% 
Nov 1956 Veiled `rockets' threat to Britain and France over Suez action. 
Apr 1957 `Sandys' White Paper admits there is `no adequate defence' against H 
Bomb 
St Pancras Borough Council promise to end civil defence preparations 
Feb 1958 Foundation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
Sept 1958 Macmillan's policy of `No Policies' adopted 
Nov 1958 `Second' Berlin crisis (1958-61) begins 
Feb 1959 Another Berlin `crash' plan formulated 
1956 Evacuation scheme was abandoned 
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Dec 1959 Final failure of attempt to find an alternative Evacuation scheme 
Dec 1960 Home Defence Review Report - and new 5 year spending plan 
accepted - civil defence now serves solely to bolster the credibility 
of the deterrent 
Feb 1961 New Evacuation policy agreed 
Aug 1961 Berlin Wall Crisis - machinery of government preparations speeded up 
Jan 1962 Reorganisation of Civil Defence Corps accepted 
Oct 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 
April 1963 `Spies For Peace' publish details of the wartime control system 
Sept 1963 BMEWS Fylindales officially operational. 
Dec 1964 Final abandonment of Regional Seats of Government system 
Feb 1966 Second Home Defence Review announced 
Dec 1966 Ambulance and Rescue functions of Civil Defence Corps scrapped 
Nov 1967 Devaluation 
Jan 1968 Harold Wilson announces `care-and-maintenance' Policy - civil 
defence preparations shelved and the Corps disbanded 
259 
Appendix A: Tables 
Table One: Civil and Home Defence Budget, 1949/50-1968/69. 
Financial Year Estimated Expenditure 
(in £ Millions) 
Annual Change 
(in £ Millions) 
Annual Change 
(%) 
1949/50 6.32* - 
1950/51 9.08* 2.76 43.67 
1951/52 16.78* 7.7 84.80 
1952/53 41.03 * 24.25 144.52 
1953/54 77.7** - - 
1954/55 57.21** - - 
1955/56 69.66 - - 
1956157 44.66 -25 -35.89 
1957/58 21.9 -22.76 -50.96 
1958/59 18.85 -3.05 -13.93 
1959/60 18.48 -0.37 -1.96 
1960/61 19.57 1.09 5.9 
1961/62 18.61 -0.96 -4.91 
1962/63 19.37 0.76 4.08 
1963/64 23.01 3.64 18.79 
1964/65 24.1 1.09 4.74 
1965/66 22.7 -1.7 -7.05 
1966/67 19.7 -3 -13.22 
1967/68 18.7 -1 -5.08 
1968/69 7.6*** -12.1 -64.71 
* Expenditure on `narrow' civil defence measures, excluding measures such as stockpiling and 
building works (see `From the Select Committee on Estimates, Session 1953-54: Civil Defence', 
Reports from Committees. Session 3 November 1953-25 November 1954). There is great 
difficulty in establishing the full amount of money spent on Civil and Home Defence before 1955, 
although it was apparently £110-120 million for the three years preceding 1954/55. This figure 
was probably made up largely of stockpiling provisions to help with `war production' (sold off 
after 1955) - measures beyond the scope of this thesis. It seems that until 1956 `narrow' civil 
defence expenditure amounted to a third of the total budget. See NA, CAB 134/1245. 
HD(M)(55)12 (Final), `Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments', Report by the Home Defence 
(Ministerial) Committee, 30.11.1955. 
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** Defence Expenditure by Civil Departments, excluding stockpiling measures. Food stockpiling, 
for example, accounted for some £23 million of the 1955/56 figure, and close to £9 million the 
following year. 
1953/54: NA, CAB 134/791. CD(O)(53)2, `Civil Defence Expenditure, 1953/54', Note by the 
Secretaries, 30.1.1953. The `narrow' was agreed at £44.2 million, but the Estimates Committee 
gives it as £40.8 million. 
1954/55: NA, CAB 134/792. CD(O)(54)6, `Civil Defence Expenditure in 1954/55', Note by the 
Chairman, 26.3.1954. The `narrow' figure was agreed at £27.2 million 
*** Actual expenditure. 
Table Two: Civil Defence Corps Volunteers in England and Wales, 1950-1967. 
Date Enrolled Members 
October 1950 61,509 
December 1951 172,238 
December 1952 238,010 
December 1953 302,406 
June 1954 312,376 
September 1955 338,366 
September 1956 322,060 
September 1957 321,751 
March 1958 327,959 
September 1959 328,743 
June 1960 321,301 
June 1961 319,660 
December 1962 294,531 
December 1963 241,763 
September 1964 211,570 
March 1965 225,672 
December 1966 122,000 
December 1967 80,000 
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Appendix B: Images 
Image One: Civil Defence Recruitment Advertising, The Times, 1.4.1950. 
6(a Of course I'm patriotic. 
I'd join at once, but... 
Patriotism is not enough, unless you back it up with action. Civil Defence is I 
commons= se peace ime precaution against war. D 't leave it to somebody 
else.. The job that's left to so=body else never gets done. Join TODAY. You're 
urgently wanted in one of these four Services concerned with Civil Defence- 
CIVIL DtFINCE GDRPS 
Rcsp , tuibLc mm and women orrr 3o art wanted 
to tzin for range, ambutarýtc, pioneer, com- 
mumicatic'a and wetfsrc werk, am4 as w*rdeao, 
Wo mm over x* c*i join the imbaluce re ium 
MMIIAARY 11&c StKV ci 
M-sically M m= over ya mid w=m over 18 
ere not4 d for this sie snd imparcanc Scrvkr. 
KALTlONAL M03PTTAL UU1 NESEIM 
W . men bttwtta z71 gnd , azd men 
bam 
30 ami 6-4 tniatd or =_ i cd, uc nccdni fcw 
auztL- wort- 
SPECIAL CO TU'ODU 
M, m Ind w=tn over 3a of &ood dwmactrz aid 
phy u ic ruire4 for dries ü pc *m or . ter. 
Women with piv iauD slict eiixric M aas 
clJt Sk at 16. 
You can get further &tails of each of the Services frormYour Zocd 
Councd Offxm, Your local Hospizal, or at any Fire Starion or Police 
Sixi n 
cliko 
A CALL TO DUTY 
ISSUED LY 11. M. GQvtRNMlNT 
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... but what? 
Image Two: Civil Defence Recruitment Advertising, The Tinies, 27.10.1950. 
66 w& 'It 
sukrd VOK d", KC 
%" 6w auun,. jum 6me 
THE PRIME MINISTER 
That's why men and women are 
urgently wanted in each of these Services 
CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS 
AUXILIARY FIRE SERVICE 
NATIONAL HOSPITAL SERVICE RESERVE 
SPECIAL CONSTABULARY 
Arc you ready to give a few hours a month for the training on which 
your family's safety might one day depend? Bocause brat's what Civil 
Lfcnxe training takes. Dare you ride shirking that responsibilicy? 'mink 
it aver, aiW apt quickly. ' 
CAD 
THIS IS WHAT TO 00 
Ask for fiutb&r details and Jca#Eeu 
at your local Council Offices, your 
local Hospital or at any Fire or 
Police Starion.. 
C1v4 
1 Defritiiww! 
AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY H. M. GOVERNMENT 
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Image Three: Civil Defence Recruitment Advertising, The Times , 
7.11.1950. 
10, b ag 
irttt. 
All 4t '". ý3 }laýi. 
De 
sandý are negdýd 
ip 
bý, afl thou .ý*__ 
i, vjl Defence 
Ca7ps º 
carvice 0 
ý It glre the 
tta xos 
1 service 
t1ý ý 
he Specie`', 
c° tabulaLry " 
serve aý 
ý' 
to valunteer 
B engen 
do that " &I 
",, f ncrw ý'hý J 
ýeU1 vaineä- 
ý: ; _ý they v'ý- 17 
THIS IS WHAT TO DO 
Ask for further details and leaflets at 
your 1<1 Council Offices, your local 
Hospital, or atany Fire or Politic Station. 
ISSUED BY H. M. GOVERNMENT 
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CIVIL DEFENCE-JOIN NOW! 
Image Four: Civil Defence Recruitment Advertising, The Times , 
2.12.1950. 
Suppose there is 
a next time? Therc could be. But will there be? Nobody knows. But we know one 
thing --- now is the time to prepare in case the worst should happen. 
Whatever the weapon or form of warfare, if we start now we shall be 
able to deal with it. Delay - and the highest courage will be useless. 
We must train now -or we may be too late. 
Men and women are urgently" wanted 
in each of these branches of Civil Defence 
CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS 
AUXILIARY FIRE SERVICE 
NATIONAL HOSPITAL SERVICE RESERVE 
SPECIAL CONSTABULARY 
Are you rcady to give a few hours a month for the training out which our 
familys saftty might one day drpcad? Because that's what Civil Ddcnce 
training takes. Dart you risk shirking that responssibi ity? 'Think it over, und 
act quickly. THIS IS WHAT TO HO 930 
Ask for fu thcr details and cnrohncnt 
Ilk forms at your letal -Council Offices, your 
local Hospital, or at any Fire or Police 
Station. 
CIVIL. DEFENCE -JOIN HOW I YýSUED BY HAL GOVERNMENT 
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Image Five: Civil Defence Recruitment Advertising, The Times, 27.1.1951. 
HA VI WI TO FACE ANOTHER WAR E 
WH4T$ 
YOuR VIEW? MEV6R AG4IN ý 
iN F/Vs YE4RS7 
TWO YEARS 
ONE YEAR OR LESS ? 
If, in your heart of hearts, you don't think the first answer's right, then you 
mast ask yourself , "What am 
I doing about it? ", 
W Wd you be of any use to your country if anything did start? Only traincad 
people will be. Yotir duty's quite simple. It's to get yourself trained Now in 
Civil Defence. Volunteer for one of these Services today 
CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS " AUXILIARY FIRE SERVICE 
NATIONAL HOSPITAL SERVICE RESERVE ' SPECIAL CONSTABULARY 
Details and enrmlmcnt forms from your local 
Council Offices, your local hospital, or your local 
Fire or Police Station. 
ISSUED BY H. M. GOVERNMENT 
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Image Six: Civil Defence Corps Recruitment Advertising, The Times, 15.12.1951. 
: _ý::: 
Resc 
Arthur 13. Reynolds, Hale Lanc, Mill Hill, London, N. W. 7. Clerk 
in the Health Department, i Icndon Tovm Hall. Fort, married. 
Did a )ter in the A.. F. S., then served, from 1940-46, with the 
R. A. F. in Egypt and Italy. Early this year he volunteered for 
Civil Defesiae; his fitness made him ideal for the Rescue Section 
of the Civil Defence. Corps. Finds the training interesting, far 
from irksome - an hour or two a week -- and useful if only in 
e of ordinary accidents. Now hopes to become an instructor. 
SPARE TIME FOR TRAINING IN THE 
CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS 
You can't be certain-you can be ready 
I Ask for further details and carotmmt forums at your local Council OfCes. ISSUED BY H. M. GQVERNWENr 
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Image Seven: Civil Defence Recruitment Advertising The Times, 30.10.1952. 
of all ages" 
Evta   02= Y tike Me isn't too old for CirU 
Deicct- l'vt found new laurests, new fzicnds, 
> C. irg Dedeace needs people with ill kin ed 
iv 
u-7,,. ý, t ýv-t -iýý -- 
Al 
Foople wbo, know thca nbbaurs. Who tyke 
pan is the f km -- asst be rtgpcQ ºbsit - of 
awaits life. T .e an the people needed 
f Ora Defence. 
ciw 
[r 
f 'J rr 
New equipv t. oe din  pccialiud knotir- 
kAdv. Jobs for thaw with w dcaz bead tnd a 
attdyhad. The %8dJfiaian of doLn¢ so®cthb 
worth hiie. 
Join your neighbours in 
CIVIL DEFENCE 
we must be strong to pr re peace 
=DEZ) iY H AL GCVEIXMr -r 
"We're a team. 
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Image Eight: Civil Defence Corps Recruitment Advertising, The Thnes, 18.2.1954. 
KtQU61 
WHICH OF TI-LESE IS A 
good neighbour? 
t 
LM 
i 
Pi 
:i ýý 
Y oucan 't pick them out in a crowd. But you know the good 
neighbours when you meet them. They seem to have their 
full share of commonsense and a sense of responsibility, too. 
They really believe in peace -- and they believe in working for it. 
So they give up a few hours a month to training in the Civil 
Defence services. That's where all good neighbours are getting 
together today. Learning to defend their homes, and enjoying 
every minute of hi. Could it be that you have been 
missing something? Free Met and full details 
CVbfrom 
your local. Council Offices. low 
THE MUM ARM 
JOIN YOUR LOCAL CIVIL DEFENCE 0100"a 
,. ýI" wvzaxzwm 
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Image Ten: Civil Defence Recruitment Advertising, The Times , 
22.9.1955. 
Tits is a moment for optimism, and for 
hope. A suitable moment to thank the men 
and women of our Civil Defence Services, 
who by their efforts have helped to pro- 
claim Britain's determination to be free. 
That determination will remain un- 
shaken until peace is finally secure. Till 
thenwe cannot weaken our home defences. 
But there are many people still looking 
on-men and women with initiative who 
vstandeY! """". ".. """""""". """" 
LISTEN TO THE HOME 
SECRETARY'S BROADCAST 
"Civil Defence Now" " 
Friday. 23rd September. 9.15 p. m. 
B. B. C. Home Service. 
" 
should be playing a part in the Civil 
Defence Corps or the Auxiliary Fire Ser- 
vice. Don't be one of them ! 
Autumn recruiting for civil defence is 
now in full swing all over the country. 
Training courses are nowb ä nn ing. They 
are new and interesting, and take only an 
hour or so a week. 
Get details from your local Council 
Offices or fire station, and join now. 
JOIN CIVIL DEFENCE 
Y1_T 11 i t. MfIIýlý 
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Image Twelve: Civil Defence Corps Recruitment Advertising (detail), The Times, 2.10.1958. 
THE H-BOMB 
What about the 
MILLIONS 
OF SURVIVORS? 
273 
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Image Thirteen: Civil Defence Corps Recruitment Advertising (detail), The Times, 18.9.1961. 
You'd want to help-but could you? 
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Image Fourteen: Civil Defence Corps Recruitment Advertising (detail), The Times, 2.10.1962. 
Do Yost have abilitics that are Nv fisted now? Do you suspect 
that you could help an d lead others? ou-and 'tour bilities-- 
W- VODUld b welcomed in Britain's 6oo, ooo-st1'oilg civil defence. You'd be given a chance to deb= lop iV , our powers, ß nd diet 
than to the best use possible - learnin to help others who 
mi ht need that help clesperýateky. 
Use if as you help oflws- 
"- tn bet WI "" 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Image Fifteen: Leaflet produced by the Labour Party during the 1954 Coventry Municipal Elections, 
NA, HO 322/136. P. V. Collyer to C. N. Ryan, 13.5.1954). 
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IT MUST NOT HAPPEN AGAIN! 
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Appendix D: Location of Ministers in War 
NA, CAB 21/6083. Michael Cary to Mr Bligh, 15.11.1962. 
Location of Ministers in War 
August 1962, rev. November 1962 
London 
Prime Minister 
Home Secretary 
Foreign Secretary 
Commonwealth Secretary 
Minister of Defence 
Minister Without Portfolio 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
Air Secretary 
Minister of State, Board of Trade 
Harold Macmillan 
Henry Brooke 
Earl Home 
Duncan Sandys 
Peter Thorneycroft 
William Deedes 
J. Boyd-Carpenter 
lain Macleod 
H. Fraser 
A. Green or Lord Derwent 
Also required in London, Junior Ministers from all Departments whose Ministers go to 
Regions or to Burlington. 
Burlington 
Deputy Prime Minister R. A. Butler 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald Maulding 
Minister of Agriculture Christopher Soames 
Minister of Health Enoch Powell 
First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Carrington 
War Secretary John Profumo 
Minister of State, Home Office Earl Jellicoe 
Minister of State, Foreign Office J. Godber 
Minister of State, Scottish Office J. Browne 
Minister of State, Colonial Office Marquis of Lansdowne 
Minister of State, Commonwealth Office Duke of Devonshire 
Solicitor General Sir P. Rawlinson 
Regions 
Wales 
Minister of Housing Sir Keith Joseph 
Minister of State, Welsh Affairs Lord Brecon 
Northern 
Minister of Transport E. Marples 
Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade D. Price 
286 
North-Eastern 
Minister of Power 
Joint Parl. /Sec., Agriculture 
North-Midland 
President of the Board of Trade 
Parl. /Under-Sec. of State, Colonial 
Eastern 
Minister of Labour 
Parl. /U-S, Air 
Southern 
Minister of Works 
Joint Parl. /Sec., Transport 
South-Western 
Minister of Education 
[Pensions] 
Economic Secretary, Treasury 
Midland 
Lord Privy Seal 
[Technical Co-operation] 
Joint Parl. /Sec., Pension 
North-Eastern 
Postmaster-General 
Joint Parl. /Sec., Home Office 
South-Eastern 
Lord President 
[Aviation] 
Joint Parl. /Sec., Transport 
R. Wood 
Lord St. Oswald 
F. Errol 
N. Fisher 
J. Hare 
J. Risdale 
G. Rippon 
Lord Chesham 
Sir E. Boyle 
[N. Macpherson ] 
E. du Cann 
Edward Heath 
[D. Vosper] 
Lt-Cdr S. Maydon 
R. Bevins 
C. Fletcher-Cooke 
Viscount Hailsham 
[Julian Amery] 
Vice Admiral J. Hughes-Mallett 
Note: It is unclear why some names are in square brackets - perhaps they are 
alternatives to the named Minister who may be required elsewhere. 
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